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America Backs First Manila SMR Study: The New Nuclear Roadmap for Philippine Power

The United States is stepping up its push for small modular reactors (SMRs) in the Philippines. In mid-February 2026, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) announced $2.7 million in technical assistance for Meralco PowerGen Corp. (MGEN). The work will review advanced U.S. SMR designs and create an implementation roadmap for what could become the country’s first SMR nuclear power plant.

USTDA framed the project as “vendor-neutral” evaluation support that can help the Philippines compare options and plan the steps needed to move from concept to construction. The goal is to speed early planning, such as technical screening and sequencing, before major capital decisions.

This is not a power plant approval. It is a funded study and planning effort. Still, it signals stronger U.S. backing for nuclear cooperation at a time when the Philippines is looking for more reliable, low-carbon power sources.

Meralco Chairman Manuel Pangilinan remarked:

“Through the generosity of the US government, we are laying the groundwork for the responsible integration of nuclear into our energy mix through small modular reactors. This offers a safe and responsible pathway towards energy security for generations to come.”

Coal Dependence and Rising Demand Drive the Debate

The Philippines still relies heavily on fossil fuels for electricity. Official DOE data show that in 2024, total power generation reached 126,941 GWh. Coal produced 79,359 GWh, which is about 62.5% of the country’s electricity that year.

Philippine electricity generation 2024
Source: CEIC
  • Natural gas produced 18,047 GWh (about 14%). Renewable energy produced 28,193 GWh (about 22%). Oil produced 1,342 GWh (about 1%).

On the capacity side, the DOE reported 29,706 MW of total installed generating capacity in 2024, with the following breakdown:

  • Coal capacity was 13,006 MW (about 44%);
  • Renewable energy capacity was 9,520 MW (about 32%);
  • Natural gas was 3,732 MW (more than 12%); and
  • Oil was 3,448 MW (almost 12%).

Philippine power sector

Demand growth also shapes this debate. In the DOE’s power planning materials, the country’s peak demand is projected to rise from 16,596 MW in 2022 to 68,483 MW by 2050, which the DOE notes equals an average annual growth rate of 5%.

These numbers help explain why policymakers and utilities are reviewing many options at once. They include grid upgrades, energy efficiency, renewables, storage, gas, and now nuclear.

SMRs Explained: Smaller Reactors, Big Expectations

An SMR is a nuclear reactor designed to be smaller than traditional large reactors. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) defines SMRs as reactors with a capacity of up to 300 MW(e) per unit. That is roughly one-third of the size of many conventional reactors.

The image is an example of an SMR design by NuScale Power, an American SMR company.

NuScale SMR power plant view
Source: NuScale

Supporters point to three practical features. First, SMRs aim for modular construction. Developers may build parts in factories and assemble them on site. Second, SMRs can be scaled by adding modules over time. Third, SMRs can provide steady output that does not depend on weather, which can help a grid manage variability from wind and solar.

At the same time, SMRs do not remove hard requirements. Any nuclear project still needs a strong regulator, safe site selection, trained staff, emergency planning, fuel and waste plans, and long-term financing. These items often drive timelines and costs, especially for a first plant in a country that is new to commercial nuclear power.

Small Reactors, Big Global Ambitions

Around the world, interest in small modular reactors is growing fast. Designers have created more than 120 SMR designs in recent years, with dozens in early review or licensing stages.

The global market for SMRs is also expanding. Analysts estimate the value of SMR markets at several billion U.S. dollars today, and rising over the next decade. Some forecasts show markets increasing to roughly double or more by the early 2030s, around $10–16 billion.

Installed SMR capacity is also expected to rise. Industry reports project several hundred megawatts of capacity by 2030, with further growth as more designs reach construction, up to 2.0 GW per IEA forecast.

SMR Global Installed Capacity by Scenario and Case, 2025-2050 IEA data

Countries in North America, Europe, and the Asia Pacific are leading deployment and planning. Many governments see SMRs as a way to add reliable, low-carbon power alongside renewables.

Global forecasts to 2050 show SMRs could play a bigger role in clean energy systems, especially under scenarios that aim for low emissions and stable power. However, real deployment depends on licensing, investment, and supply chain development.

The 123 Agreement: Legal Groundwork for Nuclear Cooperation

A key reason U.S. firms can offer nuclear technology is the U.S.–Philippines Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, often called a “123 Agreement.” The U.S. State Department said the agreement entered into force on July 2, 2024. It sets the legal framework for civil nuclear cooperation and can support exports of nuclear material, equipment, and components under U.S. rules.

In practice, this type of agreement is one building block. It does not select a reactor design and does not guarantee financing. It does create the conditions for deeper technical engagement, training, and potential commercial activity, as long as both sides meet non-proliferation and regulatory requirements.

From Planning to Licensing: Mapping the Nuclear Timeline

The Philippines began its nuclear journey after the 1973 oil crisis. It built the 621 MWe Bataan Nuclear Power Plant in 1984 at a cost of USD460 million. However, safety and financial concerns stopped it from operating. The plant was never fueled but has been maintained.

The DOE has publicly set nuclear targets in its 2022 planning. Reporting around the Philippine Energy Plan has cited a pathway that aims for at least 1,200 MW of nuclear capacity by 2032, rising to 2,400 MW by 2035, and 4,800 MW by 2050.

The DOE has also discussed regulatory readiness. In a November 2025 media release, the DOE said the Philippines aims to begin accepting nuclear power plant license applications by 2026, linked to the creation of the country’s nuclear safety regulator under Republic Act No. 12305.

International reviews add more context. In December 2024, the IAEA reported that the Philippines was making progress on nuclear infrastructure development, while still working through the many steps needed for a full nuclear power program.

Against that timeline, the USTDA-MGEN work looks like an “early stage” accelerator. It helps narrow design choices and map steps. It does not replace the national licensing process.

Geothermal’s Role in a Future Nuclear Mix

The Philippines already has a major source of steady renewable power: geothermal energy. DOE statistics list 1,952 MW of geothermal installed generating capacity in 2024. Geothermal generation reached 10,789 GWh in 2024.

geothermal power plants philippines 2025
Source: National Geothermal Association of the Philippines, Inc. (NGAP)

This matters for the SMR discussion because many people describe nuclear as “baseload,” meaning it can run day and night. In the Philippines, geothermal already provides a similar kind of steady output in many areas. The challenge is that geothermal expansion depends on location, drilling success, and up-front exploration risk.

This is why planners often look at a mix. They can expand renewables like geothermal, hydro, wind, and solar, while adding storage and grid upgrades. They can also evaluate nuclear for future reliability needs, especially if coal plants retire over time.

For the U.S. side, the near-term goal is clear. It wants U.S. designs and services to be part of the shortlist. For the Philippines, the task is also clear. It must match any technology choice to national needs, grid limits, safety rules, and long-term affordability.

The post America Backs First Manila SMR Study: The New Nuclear Roadmap for Philippine Power appeared first on Carbon Credits.

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Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L

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The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.

Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.

Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.

You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.

Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings

The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.

Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.

Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.

What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.

The three commodity exposures that hit margin first

For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.

  • Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
  • Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
  • Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.

TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes

The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.

For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.

The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.

What procurement and finance can do now

Three actions matter near-term.

Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.

Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.

Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.

Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.

If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.

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Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?

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More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.

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Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets

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The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.

The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.

This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.

The two definitions, in plain English

Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.

Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.

The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.

What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says

The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).

For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.

For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.

A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.

When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)

Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:

  • The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
  • The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
  • The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
  • It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.

The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.

When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.

The procurement and supplier engagement question

Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.

To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.

The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.

Choosing the right tool for the right target

A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.

The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.

If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.

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