Disseminated on behalf of Alaska Energy Metals Corporation.
The global nickel market enters 2026 after a bruising and uneven year. In 2025, macroeconomic stress, trade disruptions, and deep supply imbalances reshaped pricing and sentiment. Although short-term rallies have returned, the underlying structure of the market remains fragile. As a result, 2026 is shaping up to be a year defined by volatility rather than a sustained recovery.
A Challenging Backdrop from 2025
To understand where nickel is headed, it helps to revisit the environment it emerged from. In 2025, global trade flows came under pressure after the US implemented new tariff policies. These measures disrupted supply chains and dampened confidence across industrial commodities. At the same time, global manufacturing growth slowed, weighing heavily on the broader nonferrous metals complex.
SMM reported highlighted some significant points. Adding to the uncertainty, the US Federal Reserve sent mixed signals throughout the year. Expectations around interest rate cuts shifted repeatedly. Each change altered risk appetite and triggered sharp moves across commodity markets. Nickel, already vulnerable due to oversupply, struggled to attract sustained buying interest.
China attempted to offset some of these pressures. Policymakers rolled out proactive fiscal measures and maintained a moderately accommodative monetary policy. They also focused on boosting domestic demand and diversifying export routes to reduce exposure to trade frictions. In July, China introduced its “anti-involution” policy, aimed at curbing destructive price competition across industries.
Even so, nickel underperformed. While other nonferrous metals showed mixed results, nickel remained constrained by a clear mismatch between supply and demand. Prices trended lower for most of the year. LME nickel opened near $15,365 per tonne and slid to lows around $13,865 per tonne, marking a sharp reset in the price center.
2026 Nickel Price Outlook: A Volatile Start to the New Cycle
Momentum shifted suddenly toward the end of the year. From mid-December, nickel prices began climbing rapidly.
- By early January, LME prices had surged past $18,000 per tonne, the first time in more than a year. In just 12 trading sessions, prices jumped nearly 20%, catching many traders off guard.

Several factors fueled this rebound. Demand signals from China improved modestly, particularly from stainless steel mills and EV battery producers. At the same time, speculative positioning adjusted as supply risks from Indonesia returned to the spotlight.
Trading Economics analysis stated that Indonesia, the world’s largest nickel producer, hinted at a potential 34% reduction in output for this year. Meanwhile, Vale temporarily halted operations at its Pomalaa and Bahodopi mines while waiting for regulatory approvals. Although its flagship Sorowako mine continued operating, these pauses added to market caution.
Still, the rally faced clear limits. Inventory levels remained elevated. Combined LME registered and off-warrant stocks jumped nearly 58% last year, reaching more than 367,000 tonnes. In addition, large shadow inventories in Singapore and Kaohsiung continued to hang over the market. As a result, every price spike met resistance.
Price Expectations Remain Capped
Most analysts expect nickel prices to settle into a narrow band rather than trend sharply higher. Forecasts largely cluster between $15,000 and $16,000 per tonne. Several major institutions attribute the restrained outlook to ongoing surpluses.
- The World Bank’s 2026 nickel price outlook also revealed nickel prices to stay around US$15,500, rising to US$16,000 in 2027.
- Trading Economics data indicated that nickel futures moved back up to nearly $17,800 per tonne, reversing last week’s steep decline as buyers stepped back into the market.
Analysts consider that the differences in price forecasts primarily reflect contrasting views on how strictly Indonesia will enforce production limits and how quickly global manufacturing activity is expected to recover.
- CHECK: LIVE NICKEL PRICES
Nickel Demand Drivers Show Modest Growth
- Stainless steel: remains the dominant driver, accounting for about 70% of total demand. Consumption may rise to roughly 2.45 to 2.5 million tonnes. China’s production recovery offers support, while infrastructure projects in emerging markets add incremental demand. Still, no major surge is expected.
- Battery and EV application: They make up roughly 13% to 15% of demand. Nickel use in this segment could reach up to 500,000 tonnes. High-nickel cathodes continue to support premium EV models.
According to Benchmark Mineral Intelligence, demand for battery-grade nickel is expected to surge, tripling by 2030. This growth will largely be due to mid- and high-performance EVs in Western markets.
Other uses, including alloying, plating, aerospace, and electronics, provide steady but smaller contributions. A broader manufacturing recovery and net-zero investments could lift demand slightly, while faster EV adoption remains the main upside risk.
Supply-Demand Balance Stays Uneven
According to SMM, the nickel market will remain oversupplied through the year, remaining between 120,000 and 275,000 tonnes. While short-term rallies may continue, oversupply will remain the dominant force.
On the supply side, Indonesia’s refined nickel output stays high, supported by sunk investments and low operating costs. On the demand side, growth remains steady but unspectacular.

Ewa Manthey, a commodities strategist at London-Based ING Group, explained that the global nickel market is still set to remain oversupplied, with a projected surplus of about 261,000 metric tonnes. As a result, any production cuts would need to be deep and sustained to meaningfully shift market fundamentals.

China’s real estate support policies may provide limited relief for stainless steel consumption. However, a strong housing rebound appears unlikely, and any improvement is expected to be gradual. Similarly, demand from ternary batteries faces structural headwinds. Solid-state batteries remain years away from large-scale commercial use, and near-term battery chemistry trends do not favor a sharp jump in nickel intensity.
As a result, the average price level may drift lower over time. Tightening ore supply could briefly push prices above $16,000 per tonne. However, high inventories and excess capacity will take longer to absorb.
Why Nickel Matters for US Critical Mineral Independence?
Nickel plays a critical role in military-grade alloys, advanced weapons systems, electric vehicle batteries, grid-scale energy storage, and broader clean energy infrastructure. Despite its importance, the United States remains almost entirely dependent on imports for nickel, while China controls much of the global processing and supply chain. This reliance has become a clear strategic risk, one that domestic resources need more exploration.
And this is the reason America’s push to secure its critical mineral supply is gaining real momentum.
Spotlight: Alaska Energy Metals – America’s Nickel Backbone
At the center of this shift is Alaska Energy Metals Corporation (TSX-V: AEMC, OTCQB: AKEMF) and its Eureka deposit, the largest documented nickel resource in the United States. As Washington intensifies efforts to reshore critical supply chains for national security and clean energy goals, AEMC’s Nikolai Project in Alaska is steadily gaining recognition as a strategic domestic asset.
At the same time, the project aligns closely with the Trump administration’s executive orders focused on critical minerals and Alaska resource development. Those directives sought to speed up domestic production, curb reliance on foreign suppliers, and reinforce US security interests.
Against this backdrop, Nikolai stands out as a fully US-based “Sulphide nickel and battery metal project” to meet the country’s metal needs for the energy transition. Significantly, it has two claim blocks: Eureka and Canwell.

Eureka: The Largest Known Nickel Resource in the US
The Eureka deposit is not just large—it is nationally strategic. It hosts nickel alongside copper, cobalt, chromium, iron, and platinum group metals, including platinum and palladium. This metal mix makes Eureka highly relevant for both defense systems and the expanding clean energy economy.
According to the 2025 Mineral Resource Estimate, Eureka contains:
- Indicated Resource of 814 million tonnes grading 0.42% nickel equivalent, representing 5.62 billion pounds of nickel in situ.
- Inferred Resource of 896 million tonnes grading 0.39% nickel equivalent, totaling 9.38 billion pounds of nickel in situ.
Combined, the deposit contains more than 15 billion pounds of nickel, enough to support American demand for decades.
FAST-41 Listing Accelerates the Nikolai Project
A major step forward came when the Nikolai Project was accepted onto the FAST-41 Transparency Dashboard by the Federal Permitting Improvement Steering Council.
- The initial phase focuses on infrastructure upgrades, including rehabilitation and extension of the Rainy Creek Mining Trail, installation of temporary bridges, and development of an on-site camp.
These improvements will lower exploration costs, improve safety, enable better site access, and speed up the transition to advanced exploration and development at Eureka. Just as important, FAST-41 provides transparency, inter-agency coordination, and defined permitting milestones.

Key catalysts ahead
AEMC is entering a phase with several near- and mid-term value drivers. These include a first-pass metallurgical study to assess metal recovery, the potential for a major US Department of Defense grant, completion of a Preliminary Economic Assessment, and continued drilling at the Angliers target. Each step strengthens the investment and strategic case for Eureka.
Nickel Oversupply Overseas, Opportunity in the US
In summary, the nickel market faces another complex year. Structural oversupply, elevated inventories, and cautious demand growth define the landscape. Although policy shifts in Indonesia and short-term demand improvements can trigger sharp rallies, fundamentals continue to cap sustained upside. For now, nickel remains a market driven more by volatility than by balance.
As the US rebuilds its domestic critical mineral supply chain, assets like Eureka are becoming indispensable. With its scale, multi-metal profile, federal permitting support, and alignment with national policy priorities, Alaska Energy Metals Corporation is positioning itself as a key player in America’s push for resource security. In a world increasingly defined by competition for critical metals, Eureka has the potential to become the backbone of the US nickel supply for generations.
READ MORE: Nickel Demand to Triple by 2030: Can the Market Keep Up?
The post Nickel Prices Hit $18,000 in 2026 Amid Global Oversupply, US Boosts Domestic Supply Chain appeared first on Carbon Credits.
Carbon Footprint
Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L
The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.
Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.
Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.
You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.
Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings
The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.
Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.
Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.
What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.
The three commodity exposures that hit margin first
For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.
- Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
- Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
- Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.
TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes
The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.
For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.
The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.
What procurement and finance can do now
Three actions matter near-term.
Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.
Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.
Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.
Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.
If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.
Carbon Footprint
Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?
More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.
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Carbon Footprint
Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets
The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.
The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.
This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.
The two definitions, in plain English
Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.
Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.
The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.
What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says
The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).
For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.
For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.
A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.
When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)
Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:
- The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
- The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
- The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
- It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.
The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.
When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.
The procurement and supplier engagement question
Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.
To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.
The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.
Choosing the right tool for the right target
A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.
The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.
If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.
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