Fortescue Metals Group is forging ahead with its bold plan to achieve “real zero” emissions by 2030, a move that could generate substantial financial rewards under the Australian government’s new carbon credit scheme. This initiative, known as Safeguard Mechanism Credits (SMCs), is part of the Albanese government’s broader strategy to incentivize businesses to cut emissions and meet the country’s climate targets.
If Fortescue succeeds in meeting its ambitious emissions goals, it could earn between $50 million and $150 million annually from selling the carbon credits.
Fortescue’s Bold “Real Zero” Ambition
Chairman Andrew Forrest has made it clear that Fortescue’s ultimate goal is to achieve “real zero” by eliminating all Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions from its iron ore mining operations by 2030. This is distinct from “net zero,” where companies can rely on carbon offsets to balance out hard-to-abate or unavoidable emissions.
Forrest is a long-time critic of carbon offsets and suggests they do little to drive actual reductions in emissions. Instead, Fortescue’s focus is on achieving genuine emissions reductions through the transformation of its operations.
The mining giant’s commitment to decarbonization includes an extensive plan to overhaul its energy sources, transitioning from fossil fuels to renewable energy to power its operations. Fortescue estimated in 2022 that achieving “real zero” in its Pilbara mining district would require an investment of $US6+ billion.

The company’s strategy also involves the electrification of its mining fleet, investments in green hydrogen, and innovative technology solutions to reduce its carbon footprint.
Despite Forrest’s aversion to carbon offsets, Fortescue’s progress toward “real zero” could lead to the company becoming a major beneficiary of the Safeguard Mechanism Credits program.
The Clean Energy Regulator will allow companies to earn carbon credits if they exceed their mandated emissions reduction targets. For Fortescue, this could mean generating around 1.4 million SMCs by 2030. This is because its projected emissions could be significantly lower than the regulatory allowance for its iron ore production.
What is The Safeguard Mechanism Credits Scheme?
The Safeguard Mechanism, set to begin in 2024, is a key component of the Albanese government’s strategy to reduce national greenhouse gas emissions. The program rewards companies that cut their emissions beyond the required levels by granting them SMCs. These credits can then be sold to other companies that fail to meet their emissions reduction targets, creating a market-based approach to driving climate action.
- Analysts project that the value of these credits could be substantial, with a government-imposed ceiling price of $75 per tonne.
If Fortescue succeeds in its decarbonization plans, it could generate tens of millions of dollars by selling SMCs to companies struggling to meet their own emissions reduction targets. According to projections, the miner will be permitted to emit around 1.4 million tonnes of carbon dioxide by 2030.
However, if the company manages to achieve its “real zero” goal, it will have cut all emissions. And thus, it could earn 1.4 million credits in that year alone. Given the price of $75/tonne, that could total about $105 million worth of carbon credits.
While the financial windfall from selling SMCs is attractive, Fortescue hasn’t yet decided whether to participate in this carbon market.
Andrew Forrest said that Fortescue is still finalizing its position on the Safeguard Mechanism, noting that:
“We will do this consistent with our broader approach to voluntary and compliance carbon markets, which is that the core focus must always be the delivery of real reductions in emissions.”
He reiterated that Fortescue’s core focus remains on achieving genuine emissions reductions, not on offsets or carbon capture technologies.
Decarbonization Challenges Amid Rising Emissions
Fortescue’s path to achieving “real zero” is fraught with challenges. While the company is making strides in decarbonizing its operations, it still has a long way to go.
In the year to June 2024, Fortescue’s Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions—the direct emissions from its mining activities and those associated with its energy use—rose by about 7%. This increase in emissions led to the company exceeding its government-mandated emissions cap by about 120,000 tonnes. Therefore, the iron miner was forced to purchase $4.2 million worth of Australian Carbon Credit Units (ACCUs) to comply with the law.

Despite the setbacks, Fortescue has reaffirmed its commitment to decarbonization and has emphasized that it will only purchase carbon offsets when legally required. The company insists that it will not rely on carbon credits to achieve its 2030 target. It will remain focused on reducing emissions at the source.
The company has also pledged not to rely on carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies, which it views as an insufficient solution for addressing the climate crisis.
Rival Approaches in the Mining Industry
Fortescue’s aggressive push toward “real zero” stands in contrast to some of its competitors in the mining industry. Rival miner Rio Tinto, for instance, has set a target to halve its carbon emissions by 2030, at an estimated cost of $US6 billion.
Rio Tinto has been in major partnerships recently with its lithium expansion. Still, though Rio Tinto’s plans are substantial, they do not match the level of ambition shown by Fortescue, which is aiming for complete decarbonization in the same time frame.
Fortescue Metals Group’s “real zero” target is a landmark initiative that could set a new standard for the mining industry. It can also generate significant financial benefits through Australia’s Safeguard Mechanism Credits program. The company’s commitment to genuine emissions reductions, combined with its potential to earn millions from selling carbon credits, makes Fortescue a key player in the global transition to a low-carbon economy.
- READ MORE: Fortescue Launches Innovative Green Metal Project in Australia, Fueled by Green Hydrogen!
The post Fortescue’s “Real Zero” Ambition Could Yield Up To $150M in Carbon Credits by 2030 appeared first on Carbon Credits.
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Want a simpler way to buy carbon credits? Discover our carbon marketplace
Most businesses that decide to act on their net-zero targets reach the same point of friction. Buying carbon credits has meant tracking down brokers, sitting through sales calls, and requesting a quote just to learn a price, sometimes with limited proof of what you are buying.
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Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L
The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.
Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.
Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.
You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.
Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings
The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.
Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.
Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.
What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.
The three commodity exposures that hit margin first
For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.
- Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
- Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
- Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.
TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes
The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.
For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.
The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.
What procurement and finance can do now
Three actions matter near-term.
Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.
Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.
Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.
Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.
If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.
Carbon Footprint
Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?
More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.
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