With the U.S. aiming for energy independence Alaska’s mineral-rich deposits could play a crucial role in reducing reliance on imports. In this rise-in-demand scenario, Canadian mining company Alaska Energy Metals (AEM) sees a solution to explore Alaska’s underground deposits of nickel.
Greg Beischer, President, CEO, and Director of AEM, expressed optimism, saying,
“We should be working harder to increase our domestic resources and secure a domestic supply chain.”
Let’s deep dive into the progress the company is making under Mr. Beischer’s determined leadership and the ambitious plans it has to boost the U.S. nickel supply.
Why Nickel and Other Critical Minerals Are Essential
The U.S. Department of Energy has identified 18 minerals as critical to energy technology and nickel is one of them having paramount importance.
While nickel’s commercial use spans stainless steel production and jet and turbine components, its growing role in EV batteries has elevated its demand. This makes nickel one of the most sought-after materials in the clean energy transition.
Despite its importance, the United States currently lacks a domestic source for nickel production, which represents a significant vulnerability in the supply chain. Thus, establishing domestic nickel production could boost supply chain resilience and support the nation’s transition to a more sustainable economy.

AEM’s Endeavor: Building a Sustainable Nickel Supply Chain
AEM’s flagship endeavor, the Nikolai deposit, is a sprawling 23,000-acre site in Alaska’s southern foothills. This deposit holds not only nickel but also copper, cobalt, platinum, and palladium—all minerals deemed critical by the U.S. Department of Energy.
Mr. Beischer emphasized that Nikolai’s deposits containing multiple metals are essential for boosting the domestic supply chain.

New Resource Estimates and Project Progress
Since AEM began exploring the Nikolai deposit, their findings have surpassed initial expectations. Mr. Beischer noted,
“As a result of the drilling we did in summer 2023, along with the historical information for the project that we had purchased, we were able to calculate a mineral resource estimate that was really quite substantial—in fact, bigger than we had really imagined would be possible.”
- The company’s revised estimates indicate a resource size of 3.9 billion pounds in indicated nickel and 4.2 billion pounds in inferred resources.
These findings mark a significant increase from AEM’s initial projections of around 3 billion pounds.
However, he clarified that the revised estimate does not guarantee the full recovery of these metals. Initial testing has begun, but results show that only about 50 to 55 percent of the metal may actually be recovered.
The company revealed that the 2024 drilling season, which began in July, and covered approximately 4,000 meters is consistent with last year’s scope. However, recent market conditions for nickel held back the project’s expansion.
Mr. Beischer highlighted,
“The flooding of nickel into the market from Indonesia and Chinese-backed operations has depressed nickel prices.”
So, we can see that this supply surge from China and Indonesia has directly impacted nickel prices which in turn affected AEM’s share value and limited the financing options.
He further explained that as a consequence the company has been unable to expand its drilling program as initially anticipated. However, the project is progressing steadily despite the challenges.
The nickel miner remains committed to its goals, gathering data for essential baseline environmental studies. Most significantly, the company is optimistic about achieving the key project milestones. Additionally, it aims to complete a preliminary economic assessment by the end of 2025 and is also considering a pre-feasibility study if all goes in favor.
Securing Funds for Faster Growth
The Nikolai project is crucial for AEM and has immense nickel potential in the future. This is why the company is exploring funding opportunities which also includes applying for a Department of Defense (DOD) grant that could help expedite planning and exploration.
As the project is still in its early development, it aspires to build external partnerships and engage major investors. Mr. Beischer further explained,
“There are no local big investors or any notable company or major funder. It’s a little early. Typically, you’re going to want to see a bit more advancement, like you’ve done at least a preliminary economic assessment before they’d be putting in bigger dollars. Ultimately, we want a strategic partner that can help with the heavier financial interest but also bring expertise that we might not have in-house.”
Mr. Beischer strongly believes that it makes much sense to have the Nikolai Project located on U.S. soil, where the environmental standards are among the highest in the world.
Last but not least, his commitment goes beyond mineral extraction. From a broader perspective, Alaska Energy Metals seeks to fortify U.S. self-sufficiency in critical minerals while contributing to a cleaner, low-carbon future.
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The post Nickel Could Be the Key to U.S. Energy Independence: Alaska Energy Metals’ Strategic Role appeared first on Carbon Credits.
Carbon Footprint
Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?
More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.
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Carbon Footprint
Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets
The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.
The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.
This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.
The two definitions, in plain English
Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.
Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.
The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.
What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says
The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).
For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.
For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.
A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.
When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)
Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:
- The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
- The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
- The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
- It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.
The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.
When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.
The procurement and supplier engagement question
Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.
To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.
The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.
Choosing the right tool for the right target
A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.
The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.
If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.
Carbon Footprint
Net zero needs nature: a carbon credit guide
Net zero is often described as a balancing act: cut what you can, account for the rest, and reach zero on the ledger. That framing is useful, but it leaves something out. It treats every tonne of carbon as interchangeable and every route to zero as equally sound, while the science tells a more specific story.
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