As the world works towards using more clean energy, nuclear power is becoming an important part of the solution. It provides a steady, carbon-free source of energy, which is especially useful in remote areas or places where other green energy sources may not work well. In this context, the U.S. military is now looking into using nuclear energy to power its domestic bases in the 2030s.
Powering Up: How Microreactors Are Transforming Military Energy Resilience
The US Army, Air Force, and Navy are planning to build small nuclear reactors to ensure a reliable, carbon-free energy supply for their bases. This strategic move reflects the military’s commitment to sustainability and energy independence while supporting national security in a rapidly changing energy landscape.
Army’s Microreactor Ambitions
The U.S. Army is taking significant steps to deploy microreactors—compact nuclear units with capacities of 3 to 5 MW—at its installations by the early 2030s.
Rachel Jacobson, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Energy, and Environment, emphasized the advantages of these reactors during the American Nuclear Society’s (ANS) winter meeting. Jacobson said that:
“Microreactors operate autonomously and can thrive in environments that challenge other carbon-free energy sources.”

The Army issued a solicitation in June, receiving over 40 expressions of interest. An interdisciplinary team, supported by the Idaho National Laboratory, is narrowing the proposals to a shortlist of 10 finalists. These will present their solutions in a competitive “Shark Tank”-style review.
Delayed Air Force Projects
The U.S. Air Force is also focusing on microreactors, particularly at Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska. The project aims to supplement the base’s coal-fired power plant with a 5 MW microreactor.
However, delays due to legal and administrative hurdles have pushed the timeline, making it unlikely to meet the Congressional deadline of 2027.
In 2025, the Air Force plans to issue a new Notice of Intent (NOI) to award the project contract. Following this, the environmental review and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing processes will begin.
The Air Force is also eyeing nuclear power for bases in Texas and Utah. A potential reactor at Joint Base San Antonio could support local energy needs, while a power purchase agreement may bring nuclear energy to Hill Air Force Base in Utah.
Navy’s Energy Resilience Strategy
As for the U.S. Navy, it is leveraging civilian-owned and operated nuclear plants to bolster energy resilience at its bases. Walter Ludwig, Chief of Staff for the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy, noted that the Navy faces substantial infrastructure challenges in power generation, transmission, and distribution.
To address this, the Navy is considering long-term power purchase agreements with utilities operating nuclear units. These agreements aim to ensure a consistent power supply while maintaining a direct link for resilience.
In October, the Navy issued a request for information on nuclear options at seven bases but asked for assessments across all installations. The response has been robust, with over 40 submissions currently under expert review.
So, Why Nuclear Power?
Since the 1940s, the United States has been at the forefront of nuclear energy innovation, using nuclear reactors to power national defense reliably. With the world’s largest nuclear-powered navy, the U.S. and its military benefit from a robust commercial nuclear industry and a shared nuclear supply chain.
Nuclear plants and fuel facilities are essential components of U.S. infrastructure, supporting the missions of the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense (DoD), and the Department of Energy (DOE). Advanced reactors are also key to future national defense strategies.
Moreover, the Pentagon, backed by Congress, is exploring microreactors for domestic bases for carbon-free energy sources independent of the grid.
Through the DoD’s Project Pele, mobile nuclear reactors are being considered for deployment at over 750 global bases. This initiative focuses on leveraging advanced nuclear technology to meet growing energy demands.

In this regard, nuclear energy offers several advantages for military installations:
- Energy Independence: Microreactors reduce reliance on external grids, providing a reliable, autonomous power source.
- Operational Resilience: These reactors can function in extreme environments, ensuring uninterrupted power for critical operations.
- Carbon-Free Operations: Nuclear power aligns with the Department of Defense’s sustainability goals, reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
From the Largest Emitter to Carbon-Free Military Future
The U.S. military is a major emitter of carbon and the world’s single largest institutional petroleum consumer for its operations.
Some efforts are underway to address environmental impact, but the challenge of balancing security needs with climate goals persists. Global climate talks highlighted the need for military emissions to be incorporated into net zero commitments.
This shift is prompting calls for greater accountability for the U.S. DoD in addressing its carbon emissions. Nuclear is one option that the military sees as a viable solution.
The U.S. military’s move toward nuclear power represents a transformative step in achieving energy resilience and sustainability. With projects in the pipeline across the Army, Air Force, and Navy, these efforts could redefine how military installations power their operations, setting a precedent for large-scale, carbon-free energy adoption through nuclear energy.
The post Why the U.S. Military Moves Toward Nuclear to Power Its Bases in 2030s appeared first on Carbon Credits.
Carbon Footprint
Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?
More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.
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Carbon Footprint
Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets
The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.
The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.
This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.
The two definitions, in plain English
Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.
Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.
The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.
What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says
The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).
For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.
For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.
A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.
When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)
Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:
- The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
- The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
- The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
- It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.
The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.
When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.
The procurement and supplier engagement question
Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.
To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.
The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.
Choosing the right tool for the right target
A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.
The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.
If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.
Carbon Footprint
Net zero needs nature: a carbon credit guide
Net zero is often described as a balancing act: cut what you can, account for the rest, and reach zero on the ledger. That framing is useful, but it leaves something out. It treats every tonne of carbon as interchangeable and every route to zero as equally sound, while the science tells a more specific story.
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