Published

2 years ago

February 16, 2024

Alice Rush

The average UK winter has become around 1C warmer and 15% wetter over the past century, new Carbon Brief analysis shows.

The analysis covers more than 100 years of data on temperature, rainfall, wind speed and snow, to assess how UK winters have changed.

The data show that extremely warm and wet winters are becoming more common. Six of the 10 warmest winters on record were in the 21st century, and four of these also rank in the top 10 wettest years on record.

Despite the trend towards milder conditions, extreme cold snaps still hit the UK. The winter of 2009-10, for example, was dubbed the “Big Freeze of 2010” and clocked in as the UK’s least-windy, second-snowiest and eighth-coldest winter on record.

However, extreme cold periods are becoming less common. On average, the UK saw more than 12 snow days each winter in 1971-2000. This dropped to 9.5 snow days each winter by 1991-2020.

As the climate continues to warm, the UK can expect winters to continue getting warmer and wetter. Met Office projections suggest that, under an emissions pathway in line with current global policies, the average UK winter by 2080-99 will be 2C warmer and 11% wetter than they were in 1981-2000.

Warmer winters

The UK Met Office has been collecting meteorological data from thousands of weather stations across the UK since the 1880s. Using this data, it has produced a gridded dataset called HadUK, which provides complete coverage across the UK for a range of climate variables – including rainfall, temperature, snow days and wind speed – on a one-square-kilometre grid.

Carbon Brief has analysed the data for meteorological winters – defined as December, January and February – to determine how weather conditions have changed since records began.

The plot below shows a timeseries of annual winter average temperature (dark blue) over 1884-2021. These are shown as anomalies – that is, the difference compared to a baseline, which in this case is the average winter temperature over 1991-2020.

(Winters are shown on graphs in this article according to the year in which December falls. For example, the winter of December 2021 to February 2022 is shown as 2021.)

Average, minimum and maximum temperature over UK winter (monthly data averaged over December-February) for 1884-2021, compared to a 1991-2020 baseline. 10-year rolling average shown in black. Credit: Chart by Carbon Brief, based on the Met Office HadUK dataset.

The Met Office, in line with the World Meteorological Organisation, uses 30-year averages to assess changes in UK climate. The table below shows average absolute UK winter temperatures for overlapping 30-year time periods across the full data record.

Time period	Average temperature	Maximum temperature	Minimum temperature
1881-1910	2.96*	5.77*	0.18*
1891-1920	3.29	6.06	0.53
1901-1930	3.50	6.21	0.80
1911-1940	3.51	6.21	0.83
1921-1950	3.41	6.12	0.73
1931-1960	3.29	6.05	0.56
1941-1970	3.09	5.84	0.35
1951-1980	3.17	5.91	0.46
1961-1990	3.22	5.94	0.51
1971-2000	3.65	6.40	0.91
1981-2010	3.75	6.58	0.94
1991-2020	4.12	6.97	1.28

Average, maximum and minimum winter temperatures for overlapping 30-year time periods, from 1881 to 2020, using the December-February average of mean monthly temperatures. An asterisk (*) indicates that a full 30 years was not available for this average.

The average UK winter in 1991-2020 was 0.9C warmer than during 1961-90. The most recent 30-year period also includes the warmest maximum, minimum and average temperatures since Met Office records began.

In addition, with an average winter temperature of 4.64C, the most-recent decade (2013-22) – not shown in the table – has seen a further temperature increase of 0.52C above the 1991-2020 average.

Warmer winters are already impacting UK wildlife. For example, Grahame Madge – senior press officer for the Met Office – told the Guardian that animals including hedgehogs, bats and butterflies are emerging from hibernation too early:

“Abnormal warm spells during winter can encourage species out of hibernation. Butterflies such as red admirals and small tortoiseshells and other insects can be particularly challenged as they can emerge largely without access to life-saving food sources like nectar. If the warm spell is followed by a return to colder conditions, the hibernating individuals will have used up valuable energy reserves without being able to replace them, possibly with disastrous consequences.”

Meanwhile, the National Trust says warmer winters have “particularly devastating impacts for trees”, as cold snaps are often not long enough to kill off harmful diseases and pests.

Looking at individual years gives a more detailed picture. The graphic below shows the warmest and coldest 10 winters in the UK since 1884. The dark blue line shows average UK winter temperature, and red and blue dots indicate the warmest and coldest individual winters, respectively. The table below shows the dates and temperatures of these winters.

	Warmest winters		Coldest winters
	Years	Temperature (C)	Years	Temperature (C)
1	1988-99	5.76	1962-63	-0.31
2	2006-07	5.53	1894-95	0.42
3	2015-16	5.43	1946-47	0.75
4	1997-98	5.40	1978-79	1.13
5	2019-20	5.28	1939-4	1.23
6	1974-75	5.22	1916-17	1.33
7	2021-22	5.20	1928-29	1.46
8	2013-14	5.19	2009-10	1.63
9	1934-35	5.13	1885-8	1.65
10	2018-19	5.09	1940-41	1.80

Warmest and coldest 10 winters in the UK since 1884. The dark blue line shows average UK winter temperature, and red and blue dots indicate the warmest and coldest individual winters. The table beneath shows the dates and temperatures of these winters. Credit: Chart by Carbon Brief, based on the Met Office HadUK dataset.

The graph shows that six of the 10 warmest winters on record have occurred in the 21st century. Conversely, only one of the UK’s coldest 10 winters were in the 21st century – the winter of 2009-10.

The Met Office also provides country-level data for different parts of the UK. The plot below shows 10-year rolling average winter temperature for England (dark blue), Scotland (red), Northern Ireland (light blue) and Wales (yellow).

10-year rolling average of winter temperatures for England (dark blue), Scotland (red), Northern Ireland (light blue) and Wales (yellow). Credit: Chart by Carbon Brief, based on the Met Office HadUK dataset.

The plot shows that Scotland consistently sees the coldest winters, while England, Wales and Northern Ireland experience winter temperatures that are an average of around 1.5-2C warmer.

Snow days

As average temperatures rise across the UK, extremely cold days are becoming less common, while record-breaking warm days are becoming more frequent.

Five of the top 10 warmest days ever recorded during UK winters occurred during a single week February 2019.

Carbon Brief analysed the warmest maximum and coldest minimum temperature on record for each UK winter. The table below shows the years with the warmest (red) maximum daily temperatures and coldest (blue) minimum daily temperatures since 1960.

	Warmest maximum temperatures		Coldest minimum temperatures
	Temperature (C)	Year	Temperature (C)	Year
1	16.1	2018-19	-10.2	1986-87
2	14.3	1997-98	-10.1	1962-63
3	14.0	2015-16	-10.0	1981-82
4	13.8	1989-90	-9.9	1978-79
5	13.6	2003-04	-9.5	1971-72
6	13.5	1985-86	-9.3	2010-11
7	13.4	2011-12	-9.1	1995-96
8	13.3	2016-17	-8.9	1969-70
9	13.3	2021-22	-8.7	2009-10
10	13.2	1994-95	-8.7	1968-69

Years with the 10 warmest (red) maximum temperatures, and coldest (blue) minimum temperatures, based on individual winter days since 1960. Credit: Chart by Carbon Brief, based on the Met Office HadUK dataset.

Most of the warmest winter extremes on record were in the 21st century. Meanwhile, most of the coldest extremes were in the 20th century.

One way of measuring the change in extreme cold days is to count the number of “frost days” – days with a minimum temperature below 0C – recorded throughout the winter. Another way is to count the number of “snow days”, when snow can be seen on the ground at 9am.

Dr Mark McCarthy is the head of the Met Office National Climate Information Centre, which manages the UK’s climate records. He explains that to calculate snow days, an individual looks at a “representative patch of ground” at 9am in the morning, and if at least half of it is covered in snow, then it is counted as “snowy”.

These results are averaged across hundreds or thousands of observations. This means that, for example, “an average of five days of snow might mean that half of that region had 10 days and half the region had no days”, he explains.

The plot below shows the number of frost days since 1960 (red) and snow days since 1971 (blue) over winter. The black lines show the 10-year running average.

Total winter air frost days (red) and days with snow lying at 9am (blue). The black lines show the 10-year running average. Credit: Chart by Carbon Brief, based on the Met Office HadUK dataset.

The table below shows the total number of first and snow days during UK winters for four overlapping 30-year time periods.

Time period	Frost days	Snow days
1961-1990	38.43	–
1971-2000	35.07	12.29
1981-2010	35.17	11.73
1991-2020	32.75	9.54

Total number of frost and snow days for 30-year time periods, from 1931 to 2020, using the December-February average of mean monthly temperatures. An asterisk (*) indicates that a full 30 years was not available for this average.

The plot shows that air frost and snow days are closely linked. Snow will generally not form if the ground temperature is above 5C, and in the UK, the heaviest snowfalls tend to occur when the air temperature is between 0C and 2C.

On average, the UK saw 12.3 snow days each winter over 1971-2000. This dropped to 9.5 snow days each winter by 1991-2020.

There is also regional variation in snow days. Over the entire 1971-2020 dataset, Scotland received 18.6 days of snow per winter on average, while the UK, Northern Ireland and Wales received between 7.2 and 8.8.

“Significant and widespread lying snow might have been considered fairly typical for a UK winter of several decades ago,” says the Met Office’s latest State of the UK climate report. However, it adds that “this type of event has become increasingly unusual in a warming climate over the last two or three decades”.

The graph below shows the UK winters with the greatest (light blue dots) and smallest (red dots) number of snow days since 1971.

	Snowiest winters		Least snowy winters
	Years	Snow days	Years	Snow days
1	1978-79	35.62	2019-20	2.12
2	2009-10	30.59	1991-92	2.39
3	1981-82	26.90	2007-08	2.97
4	1985-86	23.69	1988-89	3.15
5	2010-11	23.13	2021-22	3.35
6	1984-85	21.54	1997-98	3.45
7	1976-77	20.77	2013-14	3.49
8	1977-78	18.54	2016-17	3.57
9	1995-96	18.43	2005-06	3.72
10	1990-91	18.13	1974-75	3.90

Snowiest and least snowy 10 winters in the UK since 1884. The dark blue line shows seasonal “snow days”, and red and blue dots indicate the snowiest and least snowy individual winters. The table beneath shows the dates and number of snow days of these winters. Credit: Chart by Carbon Brief, based on the Met Office HadUK dataset.

While the climate is becoming milder and snow is becoming less common, very cold and snowy winters can still happen. For example, the winter of 2009-10, dubbed the “Big Freeze of 2010” in parts of the UK media, was the least-windy, second-snowiest and eighth-coldest winter on record in the UK.

Severe snowfall that winter caused “very significant disruption across the UK”, according to the UK Met Office, which adds that “transport was particularly badly affected with snowfalls causing numerous road closures, and train and flight cancellations”.

On 18 December 2009, five Eurostar trains got stuck in the Channel Tunnel after cold temperatures caused electrical failures, trapping 2,000 people for 16 hours. All Eurostar services were cancelled for the next three days.

In January that winter, BBC News reported that “heavy snow and freezing temperatures has caused chaos across Scotland over the past three weeks, with hundreds of schools closed and motorists facing hazardous conditions on the roads”.

Snow covered suburban streets during uncommonly severe cold weather in the UK during the winter of 2009/2010. Credit: Anthony Roberts / Alamy Stock Photo

Research from the UK Met Office indicates that the odds of the UK having a winter as cold as the one in 2009-10 will drop to less than 1% by the end of the century as global temperatures continue to rise.

Wetter winters

The total volume of rainfall recorded during UK winters is also rising. The plot below shows total winter rainfall in mm over 1836-2021 (blue) and the 10-year rolling average (black).

Total winter (Dec-Feb) rainfall in mm over 1836-2021, based on the sum of December-February monthly rainfall totals, compared to a 1991-2020 baseline. 10-year rolling average shown in black. Credit: Chart by Carbon Brief, based on the Met Office HadUK dataset.

The table below shows average UK winter rainfall totals for a series of overlapping 30-year time periods across the full data record.

30-year period	Average annual winter rainfall (mm)
1831-1860	254.69*
1841-1870	276.00
1851-1880	284.28
1861-1890	287.46
1871-1900	281.51
1881-1910	279.06
1891-1920	300.55
1901-1930	311.07
1911-1940	314.51
1921-1950	305.00
1931-1960	298.76
1941-1970	290.82
1951-1980	293.23
1961-1990	301.82
1971-2000	329.22
1981-2010	330.01
1991-2020	346.98

Average winter rainfall over overlapping 30-year time periods, from 1831 to 2020, using the December-February average of mean monthly temperatures. An asterisk (*) indicates that a full 30 years was not available.

Between 1961-90 and 1990-2020, the UK winters became 15% wetter on average – increasing from around 300mm of rainfall to almost 350mm. The more recent decade of 2012-21 – not shown in the table – has seen further increases, with average winter rainfall of 380mm.

The Met Office also provides country-level rainfall data. The plot below shows 10-year rolling average winter temperature for England (dark blue), Scotland (red), Northern Ireland (light blue) and Wales (yellow).

The 10-year rolling of average total winter rainfall for England (dark blue), Scotland (red), Northern Ireland (light blue) and Wales (yellow). Credit: Chart by Carbon Brief, based on the Met Office HadUK dataset.

The graph shows that rainfall is increasing across all four regions of the UK, but remains consistently the lowest in England and the highest in Scotland and Wales.

Looking at the wettest and driest years across the UK shows that individual rainfall extremes are becoming more common. In a ranking going back to 1884, seven of the driest years were in the 19th century, while three were in the 20th. None of the driest years on record have been in the 21st century.

Meanwhile, four of the rainiest winters have been in the 21st century. The graph below shows the wettest (blue dots) and driest (red dots) winters since 1884.

	Rainiest winters (mm)		Least rainy winters (mm)
	Years	Winter rainfall	Years	Winter rainfall
1	2013-14	540.3	1963-64	121.3
2	2015-16	505.7	1890-91	141.4
3	1994-95	498.2	1844-45	164.6
4	1989-90	482.2	1933-34	170.4
5	2019-20	474.5	1846-47	171.3
6	1876-77	458.0	1962-63	171.5
7	1914-15	450.7	1857-58	176.6
8	1868-69	439.6	1840-41	179.6
9	2006-07	435.8	1937-38	186.9
10	1993-94	431.4	1854-55	189.1

Wettest and driest 10 winters in the UK since 1884. The dark blue line shows total winter rainfall, and blue and red dots indicate the driest and wettest snowy individual winters. The grey dashed lines the volume of rainfall recorded during the rainiest and least rainy winters on record. The table beneath shows the dates and total rainfall in mm of these winters. Credit: Chart by Carbon Brief, based on the Met Office HadUK dataset.

The fact that UK winters are getting wetter makes sense, McCarthy tells Carbon Brief, because as the atmosphere heats up, it is able to hold more moisture, which can then fall as rain. According to the Clausius-Clapeyron equation, the air can generally hold around 7% more moisture for every 1C of temperature rise.

However, he adds that the observed trend in UK winter rainfall is “somewhat larger than can be explained purely through the thermodynamic process”, and explains that natural variability is also very important when discussing changes in UK winter rainfall.

“We’re in a particularly wet regime at the moment,” McCarthy explains, “so we are seeing lots of winter rainfall records and wetter winters, but it’s the combination of variability and climate change”.

For example, December 2015 topped the charts as the UK’s wettest month on record, after Storm Desmond swept across the UK, bringing very heavy rainfall and gale-force winds to much of northern England, southern Scotland and Ireland. The resulting floods left many homes inundated and at least 60,000 without power.

The winter of 2015-16 was also the third warmest on record. Preliminary analysis conducted at the time suggested that the exceptional rainfall totals were 40% more likely because of rising global temperatures.

The jet stream

The graph below shows the relationship between temperature and rainfall, where warm and wet winters are shown in the top right, while cool and dry winters are in the bottom left. Darker dots indicate more recent years.

Temperature and rainfall, where warm and wet winters are shown in the top right, while cold and dry winters are in the bottom left. Labels indicate the year in which December falls – for example, 2013 refers to the winter of 2013/14. Credit: Chart by Carbon Brief, based on the Met Office HadUK dataset.

The UK’s winter weather regime is strongly linked to the strength of the jet stream. This thin, fast flowing ribbon of air in the troposphere – the lowest layer of the earth’s atmosphere – acts to steer weather systems towards the UK.

A strong jet stream brings warm and damp winds to the UK from the west, resulting in a warm and wet winter.

For example, the winter of 2023-24 has already been dominated by a series of storms. Storm Jocelyn, which swept across the UK at the end of January 2024, was the 10th named storm of the season. “The storms have mainly been driven by a powerful jet stream,” BBC News reported.

Similarly, during the winter of 2013-14, a series of storms brought record-breaking rainfall to the UK, clocking in as the wettest and eighth-warmest winter on record in the UK. Intense rainfall led to “remarkably widespread and persistent flooding”, according to the Met Office. Around 18,700 insurance claims related to flooding were filed across the UK in the aftermath of the storms, costing an estimated £451m.

One study suggests that climate change made the sustained wet and stormy weather seen around 43% more likely, and put an extra 1,000 houses at risk of flooding along the River Thames.

The study attributes about two-thirds of the increase in likelihood to the atmosphere being able to hold more moisture because the world is warming up and the remaining third to the position of the jet stream.

Flooding in Abingdon Road area, Oxford, on 10 January 2013. Credit: Roger Askew / Alamy Stock Photo

Conversely, a weak jet stream allows cold air from the Arctic and mainland Europe to enter from the east and north. “A slower, more buckled jet stream can cause areas of higher pressure to take charge, which typically brings less stormy weather, light winds and dry skies,” the Met Office says.

This was the case in the winter of 2009-10, which clocked in as the eighth-coldest and least-windy UK winter on record.

Sometimes, the jet stream can even get “stuck” – a phenomenon called blocking – and instead of shunting weather systems from west to east, it can allow a spell of cold, dry weather to sit over the UK for many days.

While there is a clear trend of UK winters getting warmer and wetter, the data on wind speed is less clear-cut. However, cool weather in the UK is often associated with low speeds, while warm weather is often brought by strong gusts.

The plot below shows average UK winter wind speed over 1969-2021 in knots. The darker line shows the 10-year rolling average, and the most and least windy years are shown by red and blue dots, respectively.

Windiest and least windy 10 winters in the UK since 1884.

	Windiest winters		Least windy winters
	Years	Average windspeed (knots)	Years	Average windspeed (knots)
1	1973-74	13.08	2009-10	7.90
2	1989-90	12.77	2010-11	8.62
3	1974-75	12.72	2005-06	8.81
4	1994-95	12.71	2008-09	9.03
5	2013-14	12.47	1984-85	9.04
6	1982-83	12.41	1976-77	9.31
7	1980-81	12.24	2018-19	9.32
8	1999-2000	12.11	2000-01	9.54
9	1988-89	12.11	1986-87	9.59
10	2019-20	12.08	2016-17	9.68

Windiest and least windy 10 winters in the UK since 1969. The dark blue line shows winter average wind speed, and red and blue dots indicate the windiest and least windy individual winters. The grey dashed lines the average wind speed during the windiest and least windy winters on record. The table beneath shows the dates and wind speeds of these winters. Credit: Chart by Carbon Brief, based on the Met Office HadUK dataset.

The table below shows average UK wind speed totals for three overlapping 30-year time periods.

30-year averages	Average wind speed (knots)
1971-2000	11.06
1981-2010	10.60
1991-2020	10.55

Average winter wind speed for overlapping 30-year time periods, from 1971 to 2020, using the December-February average of mean monthly temperatures.

McCarthy tells Carbon Brief that there has been a notable decline in UK wind speed when looking at annual data, which is consistent with the trend of “stilling” – a slowdown in near surface wind speeds – measured globally. However, he says that this trend is less obvious in the winter-only data.

Meanwhile, the UK State of the Climate report 2022 states that there are no compelling trends in storminess when considering maximum gust speeds over the last four decades.

A range of other atmospheric circulation patterns can also impact UK winters.

The North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) is a large-scale atmospheric pressure see-saw in the North Atlantic region, which describes the difference in air pressure between the high pressure sitting over the Azores, to the west of Portugal, and the low pressure over Iceland.

When the NAO is “positive” and the pressure difference is stronger than usual, the jet stream shifts towards the poles, bringing mild, wet and windy weather to North American and Eurasian winters and leaving the Arctic very cold.

When it is “negative” and the pressure difference weakens, storm tracks shift towards the equator, bringing cold, dry and calm winters to Europe.

Another mechanism is the “stratospheric polar vortex”. This low-pressure weather system sits around 50km above the Arctic in the stratosphere – the layer of the atmosphere above the troposphere. Its main feature is the strong west-to-east winds which encircle the north pole. These winds are known as the “polar night jet” because they only appear during the dark Arctic winter.

As with the jet stream in the troposphere, the polar night jet forms a boundary between the very cold Arctic air and the warmer air over the mid-latitudes. However, if something disrupts the stratospheric polar vortex it can weaken, reverse direction and even split into two. This can trigger a “sudden stratospheric warming” event where air collapses in over the Arctic, causing a spike in temperatures in the stratosphere – by as much as 50C in just a couple of days.

This allows the cold air the polar vortex was holding in to spill out into the mid-latitudes during the weeks that follow. This is what caused the “Beast from the East” snowstorm that hit the UK in 2018. (This is not well reflected in the UK winter data, as the brunt of the storm hit in March 2018 after the end of meteorological winter.)

In general, however, the UK has experienced a run of mild, wet winters in the most recent decade, including the very wet winters of 2013, 2015 and 2019. These are consistent with a positive phase of the NAO and strong polar vortex, according to the latest State of the UK Climate report.

Projections

As the planet continues to warm, the UK’s climate will shift “towards warmer, wetter winters and hotter, drier summers”, the Met Office says.

The UK Climate Projections 2018 (UKCP18) is a series of climate change projections for the UK produced by the UK Met Office, taking advantage of the latest observed data and climate models

The projections include temperature and rainfall changes – for averages and extremes – for each month and season of the year, and for different emissions scenarios and future time periods throughout this century.

The maps below show the probabilistic projections for summer average temperature (top) and winter precipitation (bottom) in the 2080s under the RCP4.5 emissions pathway, relative to a 1961-90 baseline. In this pathway, global temperatures are projected to rise by around 2.7C of warming above pre-industrial levels by 2081-2100, which is broadly in line with the trajectory under current global policies.

The three percentiles (10th, 50th and 90th) reflect the likelihood of those temperatures and rainfall anomalies occurring. The 50th percentile (middle maps) is the “central estimate” across the models, while the 10th (left) and 90th (right) percentiles reflect the lowest 10% and highest 10% of the model results.

UKCP18 projections of winter average temperature in the 2080s (top) and winter precipitation anomaly in the 2080s (bottom), relative to a 1961-90 baseline, under the RCP4.5 emissions scenario. Results are shown at three percentiles: 10th (left), 50th (middle) and 90th (right). Source: Generated from the UKCP18 User Interface.

The table below shows UKCP18 projections for changes in average UK winter temperature and precipitation under RCP4.5, under the 10th, 50th and 90th percentile, for 2080-99, compared to a 1981-2000 baseline.

	10th percentile change	50th percentile change	90th percentile change
Change in average winter temperature (C)	+0.7	+2.0	+3.5
Change in average winter precipitation (%)	-2.0	+11.0	+25.0

Source: UKCP18 Key results spreadsheet

As a central estimate, these projections suggest that by 2080-99, UK winters will be 2C warmer and 11% wetter than they were in 1981-2000.

However, the picture is more complex for wind speed. The Met Office explains that storms in the UK are influenced by factors including sea surface temperatures, Arctic sea ice melt and the jet stream.

It says that “under climate change some of these influences will strengthen storms and others weaken them, as well as potentially change the parts of the world that storms affect”.

It adds:

“UKCP18 projected an increase in near surface wind speeds over the UK for the second half of the 21st century for the winter season when more significant impacts of wind are experienced. However, the increase in wind speeds is modest compared to natural variability from month to month and season to season, so confidence is low.”

The post Analysis: How UK winters are getting warmer and wetter appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Analysis: How UK winters are getting warmer and wetter

Greenhouse Gases

DeBriefed 28 November 2025: COP30’s ‘frustrating’ end; Asia floods; UK ‘emergency’ climate event

Published

18 hours ago

November 28, 2025

Alice Rush

Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed.
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.

This week

‘Lukewarm’ end to COP30

BYE BELÉM: The COP30 climate talks in Belém ended last weekend with countries agreeing on a goal to “triple” adaptation finance by 2035 and efforts to “strengthen” climate plans, Climate Home News reported. The final deal “fell short on the global transition away from oil, gas and coal”, the outlet said, as Brazil announced that it would bring forward voluntary roadmaps to phase out fossil fuels and deforestation, before the next COP. It was a “frustrating end” for more than 80 countries who wanted a roadmap away from fossil fuels to be part of the formal COP agreement, BBC News said.

WHAT HAPPENED?: Carbon Brief published its in-depth analysis of all the key outcomes from COP30, spanning everything from negotiations on adaptation, just transition, gender and “Article 6” carbon trading through to a round-up of pledges on various issues. Another Carbon Brief article summed up outcomes around food, forests, land and nature. Also, Carbon Brief journalists discussed the COP in a webinar held earlier this week.

ART OF THE DEAL: The “compromise” COP30 deal – known as the “global mutirão” – “exposed deep rifts over how future climate action should be pursued”, Reuters noted. The “last-ditch” agreement was reached after fossil-fuel wording negotiations between the EU and Saudi Arabia, according to the Guardian. Meanwhile, Carbon Brief revealed the “informal” list of 84 countries said to have “opposed” the inclusion of a fossil-fuel roadmap in the mutirão decision, but analysis of the list exposed contradictions and likely errors.

UNITY, SCIENCE, SENSE: The final agreement received “lukewarm praise”, said the Associated Press. Palau ambassador Ilana Seid, who chaired the coalition of small-island nations, told the newswire: “Given the circumstances of geopolitics today, we’re actually quite pleased…The alternative is that we don’t get a decision and that would have been [worse].” UN climate chief Simon Stiell said that amid “denial, division and geopolitics”, countries “chose unity, science and economic common sense”, reported the Press Trust of India.

Around the world

Floods and landslides killed more than 200 people in Thailand and Indonesia this week, reported Bloomberg. At least 90 people also died in recent floods in Vietnam, said Al Jazeera.
New measures to cut energy bills and a “pay-per-mile” electric-vehicle levy were among the announcements in the UK’s budget, said Carbon Brief.
The Group of 20 (G20) leaders signed off on a declaration “addressing the climate crisis” and other issues, reported Reuters, which had no input from the US who boycotted last week’s G20 summit in South Africa.
Canadian prime minister Mark Carney signed a deal with the province of Alberta “centred on plans for a new heavy oil pipeline”, said the Guardian, adding that Canadian culture minister and former environment minister, Steven Guilbeault, resigned from cabinet over the deal.
Greenpeace analysis, covered by Reuters, found that permits for new coal plants in China are “on track to fall to a four-year low” in 2025.

27

The number of hours that COP30 talks went over schedule before ending in Belém last Saturday, making it the 11th-longest UN climate summit on record, according to analysis by Carbon Brief.

Latest climate research

The risk of night-time deaths during heatwaves increased “significantly” over 2005-15 in sub-Saharan Africa | Science Advances
Almost half of climate journalists surveyed showed “moderate to severe” symptoms of anxiety | Traumatology
Lakes experienced “more severe” heatwaves than those in the atmosphere over the past two decades | Communications Earth & Environment

(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)

Captured

COP30: The 'global mutirao' text does not use many active verbs

The key COP30 agreement – termed the “global mutirão” – contained 69 inactive verbs, which require no action from countries, compared to 32 active ones. “Recognises”, “recalls” and “acknowledges” were used far more often than more active verbs, such as “decides”, “calls” and “requests”, showed Carbon Brief analysis.

Spotlight

Nine warnings from a UK climate and nature ‘emergency’ briefing

This week, Carbon Brief’s Orla Dwyer reports from an event where experts and campaigners sounded the alarm bell on climate change and nature loss.

Naturalist and broadcaster Chris Packham urged attendees at a climate and nature “emergency briefing” in London yesterday to “listen to the science” on climate change amid a “dangerous wave of misinformation and lies”.

The “first-of-its-kind” event heard from nine experts on the links between climate change, nature loss, health, food production, economics and national security.

Event host, Prof Mike Berners-Lee from Lancaster University, called for a “World War II level of leadership” to tackle the interconnected crises.

Hundreds of people showed up, including Green Party, Labour and Liberal Democrat MPs, leader of the Greens Zack Polanski, musician Brian Eno and actress Olivia Williams.

Here is a snapshot of what the nine speakers said in their short, but stark, presentations.

Prof Kevin Anderson, professor of energy at University of Manchester

Anderson focused on the risks of a warmer world and the sliver of emissions left in the global carbon budget, noting:

“We have to eliminate fossil fuels or temperatures will just keep going up.”

He urged a “Marshall-style” plan – referencing the 1948 post-war US plan to rebuild Europe – to ramp up actions on retrofitting, public transport and electrification.

Prof Nathalie Seddon, professor of biodiversity at University of Oxford

Nature is not a “nice to have”, but rather “critical national infrastructure”, Seddon told attendees. She called for the “need to create an economy that values nature”.

Prof Paul Behrens, British Academy global professor at University of Oxford

Behrens discussed the food security risks from climate change. Impacts such as poor harvests and food price inflation are “barely acknowledge[d]” in agricultural policy, he said.

He also emphasised the “unsustainable” land use of animal agriculture, which “occupies around 85% of total agricultural land” in the UK.

Prof Tim Lenton, chair in climate change and Earth system science at Exeter University

Lenton outlined the “plenty” of evidence that parts of the Earth system are hurtling towards climate tipping points that could push them irreversibly into a new state.

He discussed the possibility of the shutdown of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation, which he said could cause -20C winters in London. He also noted positive tipping points, such as momentum that led the UK to stop burning coal for electricity last year.

Speakers taking audience questions during the “national emergency briefing” event in London on 27 November. Credit: ZUMA Press, Inc. / Alamy Stock Photo

Prof Hayley Fowler, professor of climate change impacts at Newcastle University

One in four properties in England could be at risk of flooding by 2050, Fowler said, and winters are getting wetter.

She discussed extreme weather risks and listed the impacts of floods in recent years in Germany, Spain and Libya, adding:

“These events are not warnings of what might happen in the future. They’re actually examples of what is happening right now.”

Angela Francis, director of policy solutions at WWF-UK

Francis factchecked several claims made against climate action, such as the high cost of achieving net-zero.

She noted that the estimated cost for the UK to achieve net-zero is about £4bn per year, which is less than 0.2% of GDP.

Lieutenant general Richard Nugee, climate and security advisor

Discussing the risks climate change poses to national security, Nugee said:

“Climate change can be thought of as a threat multiplier, making existing threats worse or more frequent and introducing new threats. Climate shocks fuel global instability.”

Tessa Khan, environmental lawyer and executive director of Uplift

Khan said the rising cost of energy in the UK is “turning into a significant political risk for the energy transition”.

She discussed the cost of fossil-fuel dependency and the fact that these fuels cost money to burn, but renewable “input[s], sun or wind [are] free forever”.

Prof Hugh Montgomery, professor of intensive care medicine at University College London

Montgomery discussed the health and economic benefits of climate actions, such as eating less meat and using more public transport, noting:

“The climate emergency is a health emergency – and it’s about time we started treating it as one.”

Watch, read, listen

WATER WORRIES: ABC News spoke to three Iranian women about the impacts of Tehran’s water crisis amid the “worst drought in 60 years”.

CLIMATE EFFORT: The BBC’s Climate Question podcast looked at the main outcomes from COP30 and discussed the “future of climate action” with a team of panelists.

CRIMINAL BEHAVIOUR:New Scientist interviewed criminal psychologist Julia Shaw about the psychology behind environmental crimes.

Coming up

24 November-5 December: COP20 on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora, Samarkand, Uzbekistan
29-30 November: First part of global youth environment assembly, Nairobi, Kenya
3-4 December: Second round of Egyptian parliamentary elections
5 December: World soil day, global

Pick of the jobs

Aldersgate Group, head of policy | Salary: £56,650-£66,950 per year. Location: London
Ofgem, climate resilience expert | Salary: £61,446-£86,547. Location: Cardiff, Glasgow or London
Green Climate Fund, integrity risk management lead | Salary: $171,200. Location: Incheon, South Korea
Isles of Scilly Wildlife Trust, project manager – seabird recovery | Salary: Up to £45,000 per year. Location: Isles of Scilly, UK

DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.

This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s weekly DeBriefed email newsletter. Subscribe for free here.

The post DeBriefed 28 November 2025: COP30’s ‘frustrating’ end; Asia floods; UK ‘emergency’ climate event appeared first on Carbon Brief.

DeBriefed 28 November 2025: COP30’s ‘frustrating’ end; Asia floods; UK ‘emergency’ climate event

Greenhouse Gases

Revealed: Leak casts doubt on COP30’s ‘informal list’ of fossil-fuel roadmap opponents

Published

18 hours ago

November 28, 2025

Alice Rush

A confused – and, at times, contradictory – story has emerged about precisely which countries and negotiating blocs were opposed to a much-discussed “roadmap” deal at COP30 on “transitioning away from fossil fuels”.

Carbon Brief has obtained a leaked copy of the 84-strong “informal list” of countries that, as a group, were characterised across multiple media reports as “blocking” the roadmap’s inclusion in the final “mutirão” deal across the second week of negotiations at the UN climate summit in Belém.

During the fraught closing hours of the summit, Carbon Brief understands that the Brazilian presidency told negotiators in a closed meeting that there was no prospect of reaching consensus on the roadmap’s inclusion, because there were “80 for and 80 against”.

However, Carbon Brief’s analysis of the list – which was drawn up informally by the presidency – shows that it contains a variety of contradictions and likely errors.

Among the issues identified by Carbon Brief is the fact that 14 countries are listed as both supporting and opposing the idea of including a fossil-fuel roadmap in the COP30 outcome.

In addition, the list of those said to have opposed a roadmap includes all 42 of the members of a negotiating group present in Belém – the least-developed countries (LDCs) – that has explicitly told Carbon Brief it did not oppose the idea.

Moreover, one particularly notable entry on the list, Turkey – which is co-president of COP31 – tells Carbon Brief that its inclusion is “wrong”.

Negotiating blocs

COP28, held in Dubai in 2023, had finalised the first “global stocktake”, which called on all countries to contribute to global efforts, including a “transition away from fossil fuels”.

Since then, negotiations on how to take this forward have faltered, including at COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan, where countries were unable to agree to include this fossil-fuel transition as part of existing or new processes under the UN climate regime.

Ahead of the start of COP30, Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva made a surprise call for “roadmaps” on fossil-fuel transition and deforestation.

While this idea was not on the official agenda for COP30, it had been under development for months ahead of the summit – and it became a key point of discussion in Belém.

Ultimately, however, it did not become part of the formal COP30 outcome, with the Brazilian presidency instead launching a process to draw up roadmaps under its own initiative.

This is because the COP makes decisions by consensus. The COP30 presidency insisted that there was no prospect of consensus being reached on a fossil-fuel roadmap, telling closed-door negotiations that there were “80 for and 80 against”.

The list of countries supporting a roadmap as part of the COP30 outcome was obtained by Carbon Brief during the talks. Until now, however, the list of those opposed to the idea had not been revealed.

Carbon Brief understands that this second list was drawn up informally by the Brazilian presidency after a meeting attended by representatives of around 50 nations. It was then filled out to the final total of 84 countries, based on membership of negotiating alliances.

The bulk of the list of countries opposing a roadmap – some 39 nations – is made up of two negotiating blocs that opposed the proposal for divergent reasons (see below). Some countries within these blocs also held different positions on why – or even whether – they opposed the roadmap being included in the COP30 deal.

These blocs are the 22-strong Arab group – chaired in Belém by Saudi Arabia – and the 25 members of the “like-minded developing countries” (LMDCs), chaired by India.

For decades within the UN climate negotiations, countries have sat within at least one negotiating bloc rather than act in isolation. At COP30, the UN says there were 16 “active groups”. (Since its invasion of Ukraine, Russia has not sat within any group.)

The inclusion on the “informal list” (shown in full below) of both the LMDCs and Arab group is accurate, as confirmed by the reporting of the International Institute for Sustainable Development’s Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB), which is the only organisation authorised to summarise what has happened in UN negotiations that are otherwise closed to the media.

Throughout the fortnight of the talks, both the LMDCs and Arab group were consistent – at times together – in their resistance to proscriptive wording and commitments within any part of the COP30 deal around transitioning away from fossil fuels.

But the reasons provided were nuanced and varied and cannot be characterised as meaning both blocs simply did not wish to undertake the transition – in fact, all countries under the Paris Agreement had already agreed to this in Dubai two years ago at COP28.

However, further analysis by Carbon Brief of the list shows that it also – mistakenly – includes all of the members of the LDCs, bar Afghanistan and Myanmar, which were not present at the talks. In total, the LDCs represented 42 nations in Belém, ranging from Bangladesh and Benin through to Tuvalu and Tanzania.

Some of the LDC nations had publicly backed a fossil-fuel roadmap.

‘Not correct’

Manjeet Dhakal, lead adviser to the LDC chair, tells Carbon Brief that it is “not correct” that the LDCs, as a bloc, opposed a fossil-fuel roadmap during the COP30 negotiations.

He says that the group’s expectations, made public before COP, clearly identified transitioning away from fossil fuels as an “urgent action” to keep the Paris Agreement’s 1.5C goal “within reach”. He adds:

“The LDC group has never blocked a fossil-fuel roadmap. [In fact], a few LDCs, including Nepal, have supported the idea.”

Dhakal’s statement highlights a further confusing feature of the informal list – 14 countries appear on both of the lists of supporters and opposers. This is possible because many countries sit within two or more negotiating blocs at UN climate talks.

For example, Kiribati, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu are members of both the “alliance of small island states” (AOSIS) and the LDCs.

As is the case with the “informal list” of opposers, the list of supporters (which was obtained by Carbon Brief during the talks) is primarily made up of negotiating alliances.

Specifically, it includes AOSIS, the “environmental integrity group” (EIG), the “independent association of Latin America and the Caribbean” (AILAC) and the European Union (EU).

In alphabetical order, the 14 countries on both lists are: Bahrain; Bulgaria; Comoros; Cuba; Czech Republic; Guinea-Bissau; Haiti; Hungary; Kiribati; Nepal; Sierra Leone; Solomon Islands; Timor-Leste; and Tuvalu.

This obvious anomaly acts to highlight the mistaken inclusion of the LDCs on the informal list of opposers.

The list includes 37 of the 54 nations within the Africa group, which was chaired by Tanzania in Belém.

But this also appears to be a function of the mistaken inclusion of the LDCs in the list, many of which sit within both blocs.

Confusion

An overview of the talks published by the Guardian this week reported:

“Though [Brazil’s COP30 president André Corrêa do Lago] told the Guardian [on 19 November] that the divide over the [roadmap] issue could be bridged, [he] kept insisting 80 countries were against the plan, though these figures were never substantiated. One negotiator told the Guardian: ‘We don’t understand where that number comes from.’

“A clue came when Richard Muyungi, the Tanzanian climate envoy who chairs the African group, told a closed meeting that all its 54 members aligned with the 22-member Arab Group on the issue. But several African countries told the Guardian this was not true and that they supported the phaseout – and Tanzania has a deal with Saudi Arabia to exploit its gas reserves.”

Adding to the confusion, the Guardian also said two of the most powerful members of the LMDCs were not opposed to a roadmap, reporting: “China, having demurred on the issue, indicated it would not stand in the way [of a roadmap]; India also did not object.”

Writing for Climate Home News, ActionAid USA’s Brandon Wu said:

“Between rich country intransigence and undemocratic processes, it’s understandable – and justifiable – that many developing countries, including most of the Africa group, are uncomfortable with the fossil-fuel roadmap being pushed for at COP30. It doesn’t mean they are all ‘blockers’ or want the world to burn, and characterising them as such is irresponsible.

“The core package of just transition, public finance – including for adaptation and loss and damage – and phasing out fossil fuels and deforestation is exactly that: a package. The latter simply will not happen, politically or practically, without the former.”

Carbon Brief understands that Nigeria was a vocal opponent of the roadmap’s inclusion in the mutirão deal during the final hours of the closed-door negotiations, but that does not equate to it opposing a transition away from fossil fuels. This is substantiated by the ENB summary:

“During the…closing plenary…Nigeria stressed that the transition away from fossil fuels should be conducted in a nationally determined way, respecting [common, but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities].”

The “informal list” of opposers also includes three EU members – Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Hungary.

The EU – led politically at the talks by climate commissioner Wopke Hoekstra, but formally chaired by Denmark – was reportedly at the heart of efforts to land a deal that explicitly included a “roadmap” for transitioning away from fossil fuels.

Carbon Brief understands that, as part of the “informal intelligence gathering” used to compile the list, pre-existing positions on climate actions by nations were factored in rather than only counting positions expressed at Belém. For example, Hungary and the Czech Republic were reported to have been among those resisting the last-minute “hard-fought deal” by the EU on its 2040 climate target and latest Paris Agreement climate pledge.

(Note that EU members Poland and Italy did not join the list of countries supporting a fossil-fuel roadmap at COP30.)

The remaining individual nations on the informal list either have economies that are heavily dependent on fossil-fuel production (for example, Russia and Brunei Darussalam), or are, like the US, currently led by right-leaning governments resistant to climate action (for example, Argentina).

Turkey is a notable inclusion on the list because it was agreed in Belém that it will host next year’s COP31 in Antalya, but with Australia leading the negotiation process. In contrast, Australia is on the 85-strong list of roadmap supporters.

However, a spokesperson for Turkey’s delegation in Belem has told Carbon Brief that it did not oppose the roadmap at COP30 and its inclusion on the list is “wrong”.

Saudi negotiators in conversation with COP30 president André Corrêa do Lago. Do Lago is on the left with his eyebrows raised, and 9 negotiators can be seen gathered around him, all people forming a circle. — Saudi negotiators in conversation with COP30 president André Corrêa do Lago. Credit: IISD/ENB | Mike Muzurakis.

Media characterisations

Some media reporting of the roadmap “blockers” sought to identify the key proponents.

For example, the Sunday Times said “the ‘axis of obstruction’ – Saudi Arabia, Russia and China – blocked the Belém roadmap”.

Agence France-Presse highlighted the views of a French minister who said: “Who are the biggest blockers? We all know them. They are the oil-producing countries, of course. Russia, India, Saudi Arabia. But they are joined by many emerging countries.”

Reuters quoted Vanuatu’s climate minister alleging that “Saudi Arabia was one of those opposed”.

The Financial Times said “a final agreement [was] blocked again and again by countries led by Saudi Arabia and Russia”.

Bloomberg said the roadmap faced “stiff opposition from Arab states and Russia”.

Media coverage in India and China has pushed back at the widespread portrayals of what many other outlets had described as the “blockers” of a fossil-fuel roadmap.

The Indian Express reported:

“India said it was not opposed to the mention of a fossil-fuel phaseout plan in the package, but it must be ensured that countries are not called to adhere to a uniform pathway for it.”

Separately, speaking on behalf of the LMDCs during the closing plenary at COP30, India had said: “Adaptation is a priority. Our regime is not mitigation centric.”

China Daily, a state-run newspaper that often reflects the government’s official policy positions, published a comment article this week stating:

“Over 80 countries insisted that the final deal must include a concrete plan to act on the previous commitment to move beyond coal, oil, and natural gas adopted at COP28…But many delegates from the global south disagreed, citing concerns about likely sudden economic contraction and heightened social instability. The summit thus ended without any agreement on this roadmap.

“Now that the conference is over, and emotions are no longer running high, all parties should look objectively at the potential solution proposed by China, which some international media outlets wrongly painted as an opponent to the roadmap.

“Addressing an event on the sidelines of the summit, Xia Yingxian, deputy head of China’s delegation to COP30, said the narrative on transitioning away from fossil fuels would find greater acceptance if it were framed differently, focusing more on the adoption of renewable energy sources.”

Speaking to Carbon Brief at COP30, Dr Osama Faqeeha, Saudi Arabia’s deputy environment minister, refused to be drawn on whether a fossil-fuel roadmap was a red line for his nation, but said:

“I think the issue is the emissions, it’s not the fuel. And our position is that we have to cut emissions regardless.”

Neither the Arab group nor the LMDCs responded to Carbon Brief’s invitation to comment on their inclusion on the list.

The Brazilian COP30 presidency did not respond at the time of publication.

While the fossil-fuel roadmap was not part of the formal COP30 outcome, the Brazilian presidency announced in the closing plenary that it would take the idea forward under its own initiative, drawing on an international conference hosted by Colombia next year.

Corrêa do Lago told the closing plenary:

“We know some of you had greater ambitions for some of the issues at hand…As president Lula said at the opening of this COP, we need roadmaps so that humanity, in a just and planned manner, can overcome its dependence on fossil fuels, halt and reverse deforestation and mobilise resources for these purposes.

“I, as president of COP30, will therefore create two roadmaps, one on halting and reverting deforestation, another to transitioning away from fossil fuels in a just, orderly and equitable manner. They will be led by science and they will be inclusive with the spirit of the mutirão.

“We will convene high level dialogues, gathering key international organisations, governments from both producing and consuming countries, industry workers, scholars, civil society and will report back to the COP. We will also benefit from the first international conference for the phase-out of fossil fuels, scheduled to take place in April in Colombia.”

Fossil-fuel roadmap

‘Supporters’

Antigua and Barbuda

Australia

Austria

Bahamas

Barbados

Belgium

Belize

Brazil

Cabo Verde

Chile

Colombia

Cook Islands

Costa Rica

Croatia

Cyprus

Denmark

Dominica

Dominican Republic

Estonia

Fiji

Finland

France

Georgia

Germany

Greece

Grenada

Guatemala

Guyana

Honduras

Iceland

Ireland

Jamaica

Kenya

Latvia

Liechtenstein

Lithuania

Luxembourg

Maldives

Malta

Marshall Islands

Mauritius

Mexico

Micronesia

Monaco

Mongolia

Nauru

Netherlands

Niue

Norway

Palau

Panama

Papua New Guinea

Peru

Portugal

Romania

Samoa

São Tomé and Príncipe

Slovakia

Slovenia

South Korea

Spain

St. Kitts and Nevis

St. Lucia

St. Vincent and the Grenadines

Suriname

Sweden

Switzerland

Tonga

Trinidad and Tobago

Vanuatu

Both ‘supporter’ and ‘opposer’

Bahrain

Bulgaria

Comoros

Cuba

Czech Republic

Guinea-Bissau

Haiti

Hungary

Kiribati

Nepal

Sierra Leone

Solomon Islands

Timor-Leste

Tuvalu

‘Opposers’

Algeria

Angola

Argentina

Armenia

Bangladesh

Benin

Bolivia

Brunei

Burkina Faso

Burundi

Cambodia

Central African Republic

Chad

China

Democratic Republic of the Congo

Djibouti

Ecuador

Egypt

El Salvador

Eritrea

Ethiopia

Gambia

Guinea

India

Indonesia

Iran

Iraq

Jordan

Kuwait

Laos

Lebanon

Lesotho

Liberia

Libya

Madagascar

Malawi

Malaysia

Mali

Mauritania

Moldova

Morocco

Mozambique

Nicaragua

Niger

Nigeria

Oman

Pakistan

Palestine

Paraguay

Philippines

Qatar

Russia

Rwanda

Saudi Arabia

Senegal

Somalia

South Sudan

Sri Lanka

Sudan

Syria

Tanzania

Togo

Tunisia

Turkey

Uganda

United Arab Emirates

Venezuela

Vietnam

Yemen

Zambia

Additional reporting by Daisy Dunne.

The post Revealed: Leak casts doubt on COP30’s ‘informal list’ of fossil-fuel roadmap opponents appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Revealed: Leak casts doubt on COP30’s ‘informal list’ of fossil-fuel roadmap opponents

Greenhouse Gases

China Briefing 27 November 2025: COP30 wraps; Climate and critical minerals at G20; Coal use up

Published

2 days ago

November 27, 2025

Alice Rush

Welcome to Carbon Brief’s China Briefing.

China Briefing handpicks and explains the most important climate and energy stories from China over the past fortnight. Subscribe for free here.

Key developments

China called for ‘strengthened’ climate cooperation

‘URGENT ACTION’: As the COP30 climate talks in Brazil drew to a close (see today’s spotlight below), world leaders gathered in South Africa for the G20 summit, where China’s premier Li Qiang urged countries to “strengthen ecological and environmental cooperation”, “take urgent action” on climate issues and “accelerate” implementation of COP30’s outcomes, state news agency Xinhua said. The Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post said that, due to the US being a “no-show”, “China and its allies drove the consensus” leading to the final G20 leaders’ declaration, adding that it “delivered major wins for African countries on debt, climate and critical minerals processing”.

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MINERALS REGIMES: The G20 declaration included a call to ensure critical mineral value-chain resilience, highlighting “geopolitical tensions, unilateral trade measures inconsistent with [World Trade Organization] rules, pandemics or natural disasters” as potential risks, Bloomberg reported, in a “seemingly veiled reference to China’s sweeping export curbs”. Bloomberg also quoted Li defending China’s need to “cautiously manage” critical-mineral exports for military use, adding that China launched a “green mining initiative with 19 nations” at the summit.

MINING TIES: Meanwhile, China and South Africa agreed an “initiative for supporting Africa’s modernisation” pledging to “assist Africa in achieving a fair, just, open and inclusive green and low-carbon transition”, according to the Communist party-affiliated People’s Daily. The text also “encourages countries to strengthen international cooperation on green infrastructure and green mining”, including in “building responsible, transparent, stable and resilient critical mineral value chains”. Reuters said that, in a meeting between the Chinese and German government, Li “pitched stronger ties” in the face of tensions over rare-earth minerals. The UK has “rolled out a critical minerals strategy designed to reduce dependence on foreign suppliers by 2035”, Reuters also reported.

‘SPECIAL’ CONNECTION: Li highlighted China and Russia’s “special, strategic” cooperation in the “oil, gas, coal and nuclear sectors” in talks with Russia’s prime minister, Reuters said. However, at a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in Moscow, Li said governments “should work together to advance green and low-carbon transformation”, the People’s Daily reported. Executive vice-premier Ding Xuexiang also said at the China-Russia energy business forum that the two countries should “deepen cooperation on energy transition”, the People’s Daily also said. Russian oil and gas giant Gazprom is “pushing ahead with plans” for the Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, according to the Financial Times, which added that Chinese officials have yet to confirm the project.

Coal covered October’s power surge

COAL BACKUP: A heatwave in southern China in October caused a surge in power demand, with “coal-power plants picking up the slack amid slow growth in renewables”, Bloomberg reported. This could “make it difficult” for the country to see a plateau or reduction in carbon emissions this year, it added. David Fishman, principal at the consultancy Lantau Group, theorised on Twitter that this could have been due to the rigidity of China’s power-purchasing mechanisms, availability of coal power on spot markets and poor wind-power generation in October.

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SLOWING APPROVALS: China’s permitting for new coal-fired power units is on track to hit its lowest level since 2021, according to new research from Greenpeace East Asia. Around 42 gigawatts (GW) of new capacity was permitted in the first three quarters of 2025, it said, noting that the amount of new coal power approved between 2021-2025 was still “more than twice the total permitted” between 2016-2020. Separately, Swiss bank UBS estimated that power demand in China will grow 8% between 2028 and 2030, said finance outlet Yicai.

RENEWABLES RISE: Meanwhile, 13GW of new solar capacity was added in October, as well as 9GW of wind and 8GW of thermal power, reported Bloomberg. According to energy news outlet BJX News, from January to October 2025, China added 253GW of solar, 70GW of wind and 65GW of thermal power, mostly coal.

Managing industry emissions

MARKETS EXPAND: China has approved plans to expand its national carbon market “via a test system” some time this year, reported Bloomberg, effectively confirming that steel, aluminum and cement will be covered in the mechanism by the end of 2025. The government has also released its third batch of methodologies for its voluntary carbon market, all of which are projects related to the country’s oil and gas sector, according to energy news outlet China Energy Net.

SUPER-POLLUTANT PLAN: Separately, the government issued two plans restricting the manufacturing of products using the potent greenhouse gases known as hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) and a particular type of hydrochlorofluorocarbon (HCFC), such as refrigerators, freezers and insulation foam boards, reported state news agency Xinhua. An interview with an environment ministry official on the state-run China Environment News noted that the policies “clarify” that the HFC controls “include exported household refrigerators and freezers”, although it “excludes vehicle-mounted refrigerators”. Experts had previously told Carbon Brief that exported products were not covered by an action plan to enhance China’s HFC controls published in April that governs these two policies.

ALL-IN ON HYDROGEN: “Green hydrogen” capacity is being “ramp[ed] up”, said Bloomberg, with several projects coming online in the past few months “after Beijing signaled its continued support” for the sector. The government has “backed [hydrogen] tech with several pilot projects this year” and allowed the sector to access “carbon credits to help with funding”, it added. China has also developed its first “coal-to-chemicals project integrating green hydrogen”, which is forecast to produce 71m cubic metres of hydrogen per year, according to Reuters. Meanwhile, the hydrogen industry has also launched its first “anti-involution” initiative, pledging to avoid or prohibit actions such as “below-cost bidding”, “false planning” and “blind pessimism”, said economic news outlet Jiemian.

Spotlight

How China approached COP30 endgame

As negotiations at COP30 entered their final stages, China’s positions in several of the debates proved to be central to discussions.

Below is an excerpt of our coverage of what China said, wanted and got at COP30. The full article is available on Carbon Brief’s website.

Climate finance

One of China’s key priorities – the provision of “financial resources” from developed to developing countries under Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement – proved to be a significant sticking point in negotiations.

With discussions on climate finance looming large, China proposed during the second week the development of a “practical roadmap for implementation”, predominantly by developed countries, of the $300bn per year “NCQG” climate-finance goal.

China delegation head Li Gao said this would help “avoid blame-shifting…and prevent further erosion of trust” on climate finance.

In the end, while COP30 resulted in a plan within the mutirão decision to develop a “two-year work programme on climate finance” that included a mention of Article 9.1, it was situated within the “context of Article 9…as a whole”. This means that developing countries’ contributions also fall under its scope.

“The EU needed to spend its biggest leverage [at COP30] to adjust the adaptation-finance goal,” Kate Logan, director of the China climate hub and climate diplomacy at the Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI), told Carbon Brief.

EU-China non-alignment

There was a marked lack of EU-China coordination at COP30 overall, despite efforts to develop a united stance in July.

Multiple observers told Carbon Brief that early negotiations featured a rancorous back-and-forth between the two on the ambitiousness of their respective 2035 emissions reduction targets.

Another point of contention between the two was the role of “unilateral trade measures” (UTMs), which the “like-minded” bloc of developing countries (LMDCs, of which China is a member) asked to be included on the agenda.

Japan, the EU and others argued that other fora would be “more appropriate” for discussions. The EU also implied that China’s critical-mineral export restrictions could also fall into the scope of discussion, should the item be included.

Ultimately, China and others secured its inclusion in the mutirão text and agreement on three annual dialogues on UTMs, culminating in a “high-level event” and report in 2028.

China was also among the countries present for the COP30 presidency’s launch of an integrated forum on climate change and trade, although Carbon Brief understands that it has not formally joined the platform.

Meanwhile, a mention of critical minerals in a draft just-transition text – a potential first for COP – was deleted by the final version.

Joseph Dellatte, head of energy and climate studies at the Institut Montaigne, told Carbon Brief: “Even though the EU is worried about China’s trade measures on [critical materials], it still wants to strike a deal with Beijing.”

Fossil-fuel fracas

China also faced significant pressure on its approach to mitigating emissions.

It was not among countries supporting the idea of a roadmap away from fossil fuels as part of the COP30 outcome. It also opposed calls to emphasise the 1.5C temperature limit, instead “requesting the entire Paris Agreement temperature goal [which includes “well-below” 2C]…be mentioned”.

While the final mutirão text does emphasise the 1.5C limit, fossil fuels were not explicitly mentioned.

Arguments by China that the UAE dialogue should not become a “mini-GST [global stocktake]” also seem to have been considered, with no mention of an annual agenda item in the final outcomes.

The mutirão text “sends a red alert” on the consensus on fossil fuels, Greenpeace East Asia’s global policy advisor Yao Zhe told Carbon Brief.

But Li Shuo, director of ASPI’s China climate hub, said that, despite this, China’s prior agreement to transition away from fossil fuels would “guide its domestic energy reforms”.

Watch, read, listen

VISUALISING CHANGE: Greenpeace East Asia published its work with Chu Weimin, who has used drone photography to document how China’s clean-energy transition is reshaping “landscapes, communities and people’s everyday lives”.

CLIMATE ENVOY’S DEBRIEF: Climate envoy Liu Zhenmin explained why China felt a fossil-fuel roadmap was “unfeasible”, in a wide-ranging interview with the Paper held at the end of COP30.

NDC AMBITION: The Outrage + Optimism podcast spoke with Wang Yi, vice-chair of China’s expert panel on climate change, among others, during week two of COP30.

MISCONCEPTIONS: Wang Binbin, founding director of the Climate Future Global Innovation Lab, explained the thinking behind China’s climate strategy – and how mistranslations underplay its ambition – for China News.

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The number of nuclear reactor units in China, once the newest unit at Fujian Zhangzhou nuclear power plant – the world’s “largest Hualong One nuclear power base” – completes final checks, Jiemian reported. The unit began delivering power to the grid on 22 November.

New science

Climate warming and forest expansion significantly enhance China’s forest methane sink
Agricultural and Forest Meteorology

China’s forest methane sink “significantly increased” over 1982-2020, according to new research. The paper used a database of “forest methane fluxes” to produce a map of changes in forest methane uptake, finding that rising temperatures, decreasing soil moisture and forest expansion were the main drivers of the increased methane sink. The authors said their study “highlights the positive contribution of climate warming-drying and afforestation to methane sink enhancement”.

Quantifying global climate change impacts on daily record-breaking temperature events in China over the past six decades
International Journal of Climatology

A new study found that summer record-breaking high-temperature events occurred more frequently in China than “theoretically predicted”, while winter record-breaking low-temperature events occurred less frequently. The authors carried out statistical analysis of record-breaking events, using daily surface-air temperature data, collected over 1960-2023 from around 2,300 meteorological stations across China. They found a “more pronounced acceleration” in the frequency of high-temperature record-breaking events after the year 2020.

China Briefing is compiled by Wanyuan Song and Anika Patel. It is edited by Wanyuan Song and Dr Simon Evans. Please send tips and feedback to china@carbonbrief.org