During the 2024 UK general election campaign, politicians and newspapers have used a series of “scary-sounding numbers” to mislead voters about net-zero.
While some of the numbers are accurate in isolation, they have been used in false or misleading ways, shaved of context and typically designed to exaggerate the cost of cutting emissions.
Current prime minister Rishi Sunak, his energy secretary Claire Coutinho and a string of right-leaning newspapers have all been guilty of this approach.
The most common tactics for misleading voters about net-zero include: focusing on the cost of action without mentioning the cost of business-as-usual; mentioning the costs of cutting emissions but not the benefits; and omitting the costs of failing to tackle dangerous climate change.
Below, Carbon Brief factchecks a series of claims made around the election campaign, each of which involves a big number about “costs”. The article explains who made each claim, where the relevant number came from – and the missing context that makes the claim false or misleading.
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MISLEADING
Hundreds of billions
“We’ve just found a recording that they have put out there from the deputy chancellor from the Labour Party admitting that their [climate] plans will cost hundreds of billions of pounds.”
– Rishi Sunak during BBC leaders’ debate – 26 June 2024
Where it comes from
In what appears to have been a coordinated move, Sunak attacked Labour’s net-zero plans during the final leaders’ debate hosted by BBC News, by citing an article published online the same evening in the Daily Telegraph. The article, which appeared on the newspaper’s frontpage the following morning, is based on public comments by Labour’s Darren Jones in March 2024 about the cost of reaching net-zero emissions by 2050, which is also government policy. The target was legislated in 2019 under Conservative former prime minister Theresa May.
What it excludes
Sunak misleads voters by omitting the fact that his own government – as well as the Conservative manifesto – also support the net-zero by 2050 target. He also ignores the costs of inaction on climate change and the evidence that accelerated action would yield significant economic benefits.
In 2019, the Climate Change Committee estimated that the net cost to the whole economy of reaching net-zero by 2050 would amount to £1.4tn, offset by savings from lower fossil fuel bills of £1.1tn. As set out by the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) in 2021, this amounted to a net cost of £321bn over nearly 30 years – consistent with the “hundreds of billions” cited by Labour’s Darren Jones. Furthermore, the OBR estimated that only a quarter of the costs of reaching net-zero would come from public spending and that delaying action towards the target could double the overall cost to the UK. It added that failing to act on climate change would have far greater impacts on the economy and public finances, concluding: “Unmitigated climate change would ultimately have catastrophic economic and fiscal consequences.”
In a 2023 report, the OBR found that continued reliance on gas could be more than twice as costly for the exchequer as reaching net-zero. Separate analysis for trade group Energy UK concluded: “[A]n accelerated transition [to net-zero] could boost the UK’s economy by £240bn in 2050 more than current trajectories…Under the most ambitious scenario, the GDP of each area of the UK would be 5.4%-7.5% greater in 2050 than under the current trajectory.”
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FALSE
£116bn
“Labour are still not being honest about the costs of their energy policy. Independent energy experts have warned that Labour’s 2030 target would need an extra £116bn of investment, which means one thing…higher taxes for millions of Brits.”
– Claire Coutinho tweet – 25 June 2024
Where it comes from
The figure is based on analysis by consultancy Aurora, which said a total of £116bn would need to be invested during 2025-2035 to reach Labour’s 2030 clean power target. This works at an average of £10.6bn per year, according to Aurora.
What it excludes
The current secretary of state’s phrasing is false. The same Aurora analysis said a total of £105bn would need to be invested during 2025-2035 to meet the government’s own target of clean power by 2035, averaging £9.5bn per year. As such, the “extra” investment is only £11bn over 11 years, or £1bn a year.
Coutinho’s claim that higher investment would mean higher taxes is also false, as electricity sector investment is predominantly from the private sector and paid for via bills. Moreover, Aurora has said, based on the same analysis, that consumer energy bills would be lower under Labour’s 2030 target than under a 2035 clean power goal – or under the current, less ambitious trajectory. Aurora said: “Either scenario will be highly challenging to implement, stretching the limits of deliverability. However, if delivered, increased investment could lead to lower total system costs once the long-term savings from lower gas consumption are included.”
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FALSE
£30bn
“Ditching Net Zero could save the public sector over £30bn per year for the next 25 years.”
– Reform manifesto – 17 June 2024
Where it comes from
Reform, a climate-sceptic party led and majority owned by Nigel Farage, offers almost no information on how it arrived at this figure. According to the OBR, public-sector spending on net-zero is estimated at around £8bn per year. The only other number mentioned by Reform is for renewable energy subsidies, which it puts at £10bn per year. These are paid by consumers, not the government, such that scrapping them would not save the public sector any money. Instead, Reform proposes to tax renewables by an equivalent amount, which would likely end investor confidence in the UK across the board.
What it excludes
Reform is claiming, implausibly, that the government could save more than it currently spends. It also focuses on the costs of reaching net-zero while ignoring benefits, as well as the cost of business-as-usual. The CCC has estimated that reaching net-zero will entail net investment costs of £44bn per year out to 2050, offset by operational cost savings of £29bn per year, with the annual cost in total averaging £15bn. This excludes wider GDP impacts: the CCC said that the size of the economy, the number of jobs and real disposable incomes would all grow under a net-zero pathway. The CCC’s monetary estimates also exclude the cost of climate impacts, the sizeable health benefits of improved air quality and other externalities. The IEA recently concluded that accelerating climate action towards net-zero “could lead to major reductions in household energy bills”, again purely looking at economic costs and benefits. According to the OBR, the UK government spent £51bn on energy bill support during 2022-23, after gas prices rocketed.
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FALSE
£2tn
“The UK cost of net-zero has been estimated by the National Grid and others at some £2tn or more. It is so big that no one really knows.”
– Draft Reform manifesto – 19 March 2024
Where it comes from
In 2020, National Grid Electricity System Operator (ESO) estimated the cost of building and operating a net-zero energy system at a cumulative total of £2.8-3tn by 2050. This is the total cost of building and operating the country’s energy system for 30 years.
What it excludes
The Reform statement is false. The same National Grid ESO report said: “Scenarios where we hit net-zero in 2050…incur broadly the same costs as the scenario where we miss our net-zero target.” As such, based on the National Grid ESO analysis, there would not be any additional cost to hitting net-zero relative to running an energy system that does not meet the target. Moreover, in 2021, the Treasury stated: “The costs of global [climate] inaction significantly outweigh the costs of action.”
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FALSE
£2.8-3tn
“National Grid ESO, the company which manages our electricity supply, has estimated decarbonising Britain’s entire energy system will cost between £2.8tn and £3tn between now and 2050, working out at between £108bn and £115bn a year.”
– Sun comment by Ross Clark – 23 June 2024
Where it comes from
In 2020, National Grid Electricity System Operator (ESO) estimated the cost of the country’s energy system at a cumulative total of £2.8-3tn by 2050. This is the total cost of building and operating the energy system for 30 years.
What it excludes
The climate-sceptic columnist’s statement is false. The same National Grid report said: “Scenarios where we hit net-zero in 2050…incur broadly the same costs as the scenario where we miss our net-zero target.” As such, based on the National Grid ESO analysis, there would not be any additional cost to hitting net-zero, relative to running an energy system that does not meet the target. Furthermore, the £108-115bn annual cost cited by Clark can be compared with the £265bn spent by UK consumers on energy in 2022 – when fossil fuel costs spiked due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – including more than £100bn on imported oil and gas alone. These 2022 figures did not include investment in new infrastructure.
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FALSE
£1,000
“[R]estoring the 2030 ban on the sale of new petrol and diesel cars will cost an estimated extra £1,000 per household per year from 2022 until 2050.”
– Sunday Telegraph article and editorial – 15 June 2024
Where it comes from
The Sunday Telegraph article and accompanying editorial are based on a dossier compiled by free-market thinktank the Institute of Economic Affairs, which, in turn, cites a 2022 report published by consultancy the Centre for Economic and Business Research (CEBR). The CEBR work was funded by Fair Fuel UK, the motoring lobby group run by climate-sceptic Reform candidate for London mayor Howard Cox. The newspaper omits this detail from its article.
What it excludes
The Sunday Telegraph claim is false, because the underlying report from CEBR makes the “simply perverse” assumption that the relative cost of petrol and electric vehicles (EVs) is unchanged for the next 30 years. The assumption that EVs will continue to face a purchase price premium over petrol cars is directly contradicted by the evidence of falling costs, including recent data showing that EVs are now close to up-front price parity in the UK. The Climate Change Committee (CCC) concluded that an earlier combustion-engine car ban would deliver £6bn in cost savings, because EVs have much lower running costs than petrol cars, again directly contradicting the CEBR and Sunday Telegraph claims. When Sunak delayed the combustion-car ban from 2030 to 2035, the CCC said this was “likely to increase…motoring costs for households”, adding that EVs were “significantly cheaper than petrol or diesel vehicles to own and operate”.
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TRUE
£265bn
“The UK spent a staggering £265bn on energy in 2022 – the most recent data available – including more than £100bn on imported oil and gas alone”
– Tweet by Carbon Brief’s Simon Evans – 8 February 2024
Where it comes from
This is the cost of energy – the majority of it being fossil fuels – bought in the UK in 2022 at market prices, reflecting the cost to consumers of heat, power and transport fuel. The data was the most recently available at time of publication and covers the first year of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when Russia restricted gas supplies to Europe and sent fossil fuel prices rocketing. In the pre-crisis year of 2021, the UK spent £184bn on energy.
What it excludes
These figures do not include investment in energy-related infrastructure, such as power plants, pylons, boilers, cars or heat pumps. Many conversations about the cost of reaching net-zero ignore the substantial costs of the status quo, which is heavily reliant on volatile fossil fuels.
The post Factcheck: How ‘scary-sounding numbers’ are being used to mislead the UK about net-zero appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Factcheck: How ‘scary-sounding numbers’ are being used to mislead the UK about net-zero
Claver Gatete is Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa. Jason Veysey is Energy Modeling Program Director and Senior Scientist at the Stockholm Environment Institute. Lisa Sachs is Director of the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment at Columbia University.
The case for global energy transition has rarely been clearer. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz earlier this year exposed the cost of unplanned, fossil-dependent systems, while the falling cost of renewables, the rising penetration of electric vehicles, and the growing value of demand flexibility have made the direction of travel obvious. The benefits of a clean, secure, integrated system are no longer in dispute. What remains unclear is how to build it.
Countries around the world have called for faster renewable energy deployment and alternative energy arrangements. A secure, affordable, resilient, decarbonised system requires specific investments in specific places in a specific sequence, optimised across sectors and borders. But very few governments have the analytical foundation to translate those imperatives into investment.
The two instruments that are supposed to determine investment priorities for decarbonisation – Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and country platforms – cannot answer the most basic question facing any country undertaking an energy transition: what should the energy system look like?
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To close this gap, every country needs a bankable, economy-wide optimisation model for its energy system. A model is not a plan, but it can help answer the critical question of what the future energy system should look like. It shows how optimal scenarios vary as assumptions and policies are adjusted, calculates investment requirements and sequencing, and quantifies how system costs are affected by assumptions, policies, and exogenous variables like trade policy and financing terms.
Tool for efficient investment
Optimisation is a simplified way of simulating an energy system, but it can be an extremely powerful tool for moving energy planning from reactive (how do we manage the disparate actions in the energy system?) to intentional (what energy system underpins our national objectives?). A model can show how optimal scenarios vary as assumptions and policies are adjusted, and how investment requirements are quantified and sequenced.
Optimisation models can treat the energy system and the sectors it serves as an integrated whole, optimising across sectors and projects in ways that can be mutually reinforcing. If considered independently, growth in industrial demand, transport electrification, and digital infrastructure can add stress to the energy system. But an optimised plan can arrange these and other changes in an efficient, synergistic way.
Two to tango: How governments can unlock private investment for national climate goals
New load can be added where low-cost power is available; industrial customers can ensure the viability of investments in energy supply; electric vehicle charging policy can smooth load curves and reduce costs for all consumers.
Additionally, optimisation modeling can also change the financeability of investments. Taken alone, each project faces uncertainty about the rest of the system, which raises the cost of capital and causes projects to stall or unwind after contracts are signed. A coherent, optimised plan makes visible the coordination that private capital would otherwise have to bet on: identified offtake, sequenced and committed transmission, contracted power supply, and so on.
What COP31 and COP32 should do
The upcoming COPs in Turkey and Ethiopia can shift the center of gravity of international climate cooperation from fragmented commitments to planning. Three moves are urgently needed.
First, optimised, economy-wide, long-term energy system planning must be the foundation on which any meaningful NDC, country platform, or finance commitment rests. NDCs are typically drafted by environment or single-line ministries, with limited cross-sectoral input from ministries of energy, finance, and planning. They contain targets, derived from sectoral strategies or national commitments, not from an analytically grounded picture of what the energy system should look like and what investments would make it work. Country platforms are generally a portfolio of investments assembled from existing project pipelines, rather than derived from a system-level analysis of what an optimised, decarbonised energy system would require.
Second, recognise regions as a key planning unit. Modern integrated energy systems are inherently regional. Renewable endowments are unevenly distributed; balancing variable supply across borders lowers aggregate cost, reduces redundant backup capacity, and unlocks economies of scale no individual nation can achieve. Many energy investments in Southeast Asia, East Africa, Southern Africa and Central Asia may only be financeable in a regional context. Assessing domestic infrastructure without regional optimisation perpetuates the perception that decarbonisation is more expensive than it is.
COP31 leaders unveil global targets, with spotlight on electrification
Third, finance the planning capacity. A coordinated commitment by multilateral development banks, bilateral donors, and philanthropic partners to help every region and its constituent countries develop and maintain their own modelling capability, with open-source tools and regional analytical hubs, would close the most consequential gap in the current architecture. The cost is small relative to current spending on country platforms, failed project preparation, and misallocated infrastructure investment.
This includes supporting regional institutions such as the ASEAN Centre for Energy, the African Energy Commission, regional power pools, and the Latin American and Caribbean Energy Organization to determine what optimised regional systems require. Country-by-country pledging, repeated at every COP, will not deliver what meaningfully integrated systems can.
The 2026 energy crisis made the cost of unplanned, fossil-dependent systems newly visible. That window of clarity will close. The international community should seize the moment to build the planning foundation that has been missing for thirty years, rather than commissioning another round of NDCs or pledges, striving for outcomes neither was designed to deliver.
The post Every country needs a model to help optimise its energy transition appeared first on Climate Home News.
Every country needs a model to help optimise its energy transition
The world is currently experiencing what is expected to become the strongest El Niño on record – dubbed a “super El Niño” by many.
El Niño is the warm phase of a recurring climate pattern in the tropical Pacific that releases heat from the ocean into the atmosphere.
This temporarily raises global temperatures and reshapes rainfall and extreme weather around the world – impacting the lives of billions of people.
The current El Niño event began in June and is expected to last into 2027.
El Niño is part of a wider climate pattern called the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) cycle.
The ENSO cycle also has a cool phase, known as La Niña, as well as a “neutral” phase. El Niño and La Niña events typically last between nine and 12 months, but can go on longer.
Below, Carbon Brief explains how the ENSO cycle works, its impacts on extreme weather and global temperatures and why this El Niño event is projected to be the most intense since records began.
The post Explainer: How the ‘super El Niño’ will reshape the world’s weather appeared first on Carbon Brief.
https://interactive.carbonbrief.org/el-nino-explainer/index.html
The second-largest reservoir in the US reached a record-low water height on Saturday – just days after the country’s largest reservoir broke its own record.
Both Lake Mead and Lake Powell are located on the Colorado River.
They provide water for populations across seven US states in the south-western US, with around 40 million people getting some or all of their municipal water from the Colorado River.
The river also provides water for around 5.5m acres (22,258 square kilometres) of farmland across Colorado, Arizona, California and the other states in the river basin.
Experts tell Carbon Brief that climate change, population growth and over-consumption are all contributing to the current record-low levels of the reservoirs.
Record lows
At full capacity, Lakes Mead and Powell can hold a combined 68 cubic kilometres of water – enough to supply all household consumption in the contiguous US for nearly 1.5 years. However, the water level in both reservoirs has been declining for decades.
The chart below shows the water level of Lake Mead, in metres above mean sea level. The reservoir, which began to fill in 1935 following the construction of the Hoover Dam, has a “full pool” maximum capacity of 347.60 metres. The water level in Lake Mead reached a record low of 317.11 metres on 7 August.
The following chart shows the water level of Lake Powell, in metres above mean sea level. Lake Powell’s full-pool level is 1,127.76 metres.
While the reservoir reached its maximum capacity several times in the 1980s, it has not done so since. On 15 August, the water level in Lake Powell was recorded at a new record-low of 1,072.87 metres.
Both reservoirs have continued to decline in the days since breaking their respective records. The downward trend will largely continue in both lakes until next spring, when the snowpack in the mountains of the Upper Colorado River Basin begins to melt, says Dr Jack Schmidt, a senior research scientist at Utah State University’s Center for Colorado River Studies. He tells Carbon Brief:
“The big dilemma of the moment is that we’re only in the middle of August, and we have no assurance of what the coming winter will be. The only thing we can be sure of is that we will be depleting overall total basin reservoir storage from now until, roughly, early April.”
Compounding factors
The record lows across the two reservoirs are the result of several compounding factors, experts tell Carbon Brief.
Since the turn of the 20th century, the amount of water flowing along the Upper Colorado River has declined by about 20%. Research suggests that half of this decline can be attributed to human-induced climate change.
Most of the river’s streamflow comes from the snowpack of the Upper Colorado River Basin, which stretches across five western US states but is primarily located in Colorado and Utah.
This region has been gripped by a historic “megadrought” for more than a quarter of a century. Nearly half of the megadrought’s intensity over 2000-18 is attributable to climate change, according to a 2020 study.
At the same time, the increasing population in the US south-west has put added pressure on the Colorado River’s water supply. The number of people obtaining some or all of their water from the Colorado system has grown by 15 million (around 60%) since 1992.
Schmidt tells Carbon Brief:
“There’s an ultimate cause of the present water crisis, and there’s a proximate cause. The ultimate cause is a warming climate, a warming planet and a pretty clear correlation between warming conditions and decreased runoff in the Colorado River Basin.
“The proximate cause is that in this messy democratic republic of ours, big policy decisions that match the variability of the climate occur painfully slowly – with intense political negotiations – and only incrementally.”
On 31 July, the US Bureau of Reclamation, which manages water resources in the western US, released an environmental impact statement on its proposed post-2026 strategy for managing Lakes Powell and Mead. The strategy itself has not been released yet.
Schmidt notes that the statement does appear to give the Bureau flexibility to “respond to crisis” by reducing the delivery of water to several states. However, he adds:
“They acknowledge it won’t work if we just stay critically dry, and of course every climate model for the 21st century, especially with a continually warming planet, says that that’s exactly what’s going to happen.”
The post Analysis: The two largest reservoirs in the US have hit record-low levels appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: The two largest reservoirs in the US have hit record-low levels
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