President Donald Trump took a bold step to protect American industry by signing a proclamation that doubled tariffs on steel and aluminum imports, from 25% to 50%. The new rate took effect on June 4, 2025.
While Trump aims to curb unfair trade practices, the key question is: Will higher tariffs truly strengthen U.S. manufacturing or simply raise costs for consumers and businesses?
Why Trump Raised Tariffs Again?
Trump made his message clear: the U.S. will no longer accept unjust competition that hurts national security and local manufacturing. The EO highlights that he used Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, a law that lets the president limit imports if they threaten national security.
His team says the U.S. market is being flooded with cheap steel and aluminum from other countries, often helped by foreign subsidies and unfair pricing. This, they argue, puts American metal industries at risk.
This isn’t Trump’s first move. Back in 2018, during his first term, he put a 25% tariff on steel and a 10% tariff on aluminum to protect U.S. jobs and factories.
But now, with U.S. production slowing again—steel output down to 75.3% in 2023 and aluminum at just 55%—he says it’s time for tougher steps.
Trump said at a rally at a U.S. Steel plant
“At 25%, they can get over the fence. At 50%, they can no longer get over the fence.”
Tariffs Take the Test
Trump’s team strongly believes tariffs are getting results—and they’ve got studies to back it up. A 2024 study on Trump’s first-term tariffs said they boosted the economy and brought key industries back to the U.S.
Some key observations highlighted in the EO were:
- In 2023, the U.S. International Trade Commission found that the tariffs cut imports from China and led to more U.S. production, with little effect on prices.
- The Economic Policy Institute said Trump’s first tariffs didn’t cause inflation and only briefly affected prices.
- The Atlantic Council noted that tariffs push U.S. consumers to buy American-made goods.
- Former Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen said in 2024 that higher tariffs won’t lead to noticeable price hikes.
Furthermore, another study from last year found a global 10% tariff could grow the U.S. economy by $728 billion, add 2.8 million jobs, and boost household incomes by 5.7%.
Eased Tariffs for UK, Tough Penalties for Violators
While most imports will face the 50% tariff, the United Kingdom gets a temporary carve-out. Steel and aluminum imports from the UK will remain at 25% until at least July 9, 2025, pending developments in the U.S.-UK Economic Prosperity Deal.
Also, the tariff applies only to the steel and aluminum content of imported products. Other materials will be taxed under standard rates.
In addition, the administration is introducing stricter enforcement. In this regard, importers will need to report steel and aluminum content more transparently now or risk fines or losing their import rights altogether.
- READ MORE: Trump’s Tariffs on Canada, China, and Mexico: A Risky Bet for U.S. Critical Minerals and Aluminum?
The Industry Reaction: Praise and Concern
Some U.S. manufacturers and industry groups welcomed the higher tariffs, viewing them as a necessary shield against unfair global competition.
The American Primary Aluminum Association praised the move, saying stronger enforcement would help revive the domestic sector.
- Domestic production of aluminum is just one-third of its needs. According to Statista, the United States imported about 4.8 million metric tons of aluminum for consumption in 2024.
Imports of aluminum for consumption in the United States from 2010 to 2024 (in 1,000 metric tons)

The steel industry, which saw a wave of investment after Trump’s first tariffs, also backed the decision. Over $10 billion was invested in new U.S. mills between 2016 and 2020, and the industry credited Trump’s policy for that resurgence.
But not everyone’s cheering.
A BBC report says Canadian producers, who supply a significant share of U.S. metal imports, warned the tariffs would “devastate” their industries. Meanwhile, U.S. businesses that rely on imported metals expressed frustration.
Rick Huether, CEO of Independent Can Co., said the chaos from sudden tariff hikes is already forcing firms to raise prices and delay investments.
He also added, “There’s a lot of chaos. I fear my customers will switch to plastic or paper packaging because of the uncertainty.”
Impact on Consumers and U.S. Supply Chains
Moving on, AP News has analyzed that the ripple effects of these tariffs go far beyond the metal industry. The report highlighted the potential impact of Trump’s tariffs on consumers and the U.S. supply chains in the following way:
- Autos: Imported steel and aluminum could raise car and repair costs.
- Electronics: Metal parts may push up gadget prices.
- Canned goods: Aluminum cans could make groceries more expensive.
- Construction: Higher metal costs may raise housing and project prices.
- Logistics: Pricier trucks may increase shipping and shelf prices.
So, while the goal is to boost American production, the short-term cost could land on everyday consumers.
“So, Are Those Hiked Trump Tariffs Strategic or Tactical?”
Some still question Trump’s long-term strategy. Is this a serious industrial policy—or just a negotiating ploy?
Many firms hoped the move would be temporary. But Trump’s speech at the steel plant made one thing clear: he intends this to be permanent, unless countries agree to stricter trade terms.
- The U.S. is the second-largest importer of steel globally, after the EU. Its main suppliers include Canada, Brazil, Mexico, and South Korea. With the new 50% tariff, trade dynamics are likely to shift dramatically.

The Biden administration has not yet responded. But reactions from global partners will follow soon. Retaliatory tariffs are not off the table, and other nations may look to strike back.
For now, Trump’s second round of tariffs shows a strong push to bring manufacturing back to the U.S.—even if it leads to higher costs and trade disputes.
Raising tariffs to 50% is a bold move to support American industry. While metal producers in the U.S. support it, the decision could disrupt global trade and raise prices for American buyers. Whether this move brings long-term benefits or new problems will depend on how it’s enforced, how other countries respond, and what other policies are put in place.
The post Trump’s 50% Tariff Hike: Boost or Blow to U.S. Steel and Aluminum? appeared first on Carbon Credits.
Carbon Footprint
Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets
The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.
The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.
This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.
The two definitions, in plain English
Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.
Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.
The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.
What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says
The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).
For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.
For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.
A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.
When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)
Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:
- The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
- The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
- The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
- It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.
The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.
When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.
The procurement and supplier engagement question
Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.
To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.
The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.
Choosing the right tool for the right target
A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.
The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.
If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.
Carbon Footprint
Net zero needs nature: a carbon credit guide
Net zero is often described as a balancing act: cut what you can, account for the rest, and reach zero on the ledger. That framing is useful, but it leaves something out. It treats every tonne of carbon as interchangeable and every route to zero as equally sound, while the science tells a more specific story.
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Carbon Footprint
Deforestation in Malawi: causes and solutions
Malawi has lost a striking share of its forests over the past three decades. Woodlands that once covered well over a third of the country now cover less than a quarter, and the pressure on what remains is increasing. Behind those figures sit two practical questions: what is driving the loss, and what reverses it?
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