Connect with us

Published

on

Since Donald Trump returned to the White House last year, his administration in the US has laid off thousands of scientists and frozen research grants worth billions of dollars.

The cutbacks have had far-reaching consequences for all areas of scientific research, extending all the way to Earth’s fragile polar regions, researchers say.

Speaking to Carbon Brief, polar researchers explain how Trump’s attacks on science have affected efforts to study climate change at Earth’s poles, including by disrupting fieldwork, preventing data collection and even forcing researchers to leave the US.

One climate scientist tells Carbon Brief that the administration’s decision to terminate the only US icebreaker used in Antarctica forced her to cancel her fieldwork at the last minute – with her scientific cargo still held up in Chile.

As US polar scientists reel from the cuts, Trump has caused a geopolitical storm with threats to take control of Greenland, the self-ruling island which is part of the Kingdom of Denmark and located between the Arctic and Atlantic oceans.

Below, Carbon Brief speaks to experts about what Trump’s sweeping changes could mean for climate science at Earth’s poles

Why is the US important for polar research?

The US’s wealth, power and geography have made it a key player in polar research for more than a century.

Ahead of Trump’s second term, the National Science Foundation (NSF), a federal agency that funds US science, was the largest single funder of polar research globally, with its Office of Polar Programs overseeing extensive research in both the Arctic and Antarctica.

The US has three permanent bases in Antarctica: McMurdo Station, Amundsen-Scott South Pole Station and Palmer Station.

In Alaska, which the US purchased from Russia in 1867, there is the Toollik Field Station and the Barrow Arctic Research Center. The US also has the Summit Station in Greenland.

US institutes operate several satellites that provide scientists across the world with key data on the polar regions.

This includes the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) Joint Polar Satellite System, which provides data used for extreme weather forecasting.

Over the past few years, US institutes have led and provided support for the world’s largest polar expeditions.

Researchers taking part in the MOSAiC expedition in 2019. Credit: Daisy Dunne for Carbon Brief
Researchers taking part in the MOSAiC expedition in 2019. Credit: Daisy Dunne for Carbon Brief

This includes MOSAiC, the largest Arctic expedition on record, which took place from 2019-20 and was co-led by research institutes from the US and Germany. [Carbon Brief joined the expedition for its first leg and covered it in depth with a series of articles.]

The US has historically been “incredibly valuable” to research efforts in the Arctic and Antarctica, a senior US polar scientist currently living in Europe, who did not wish to be named, tells Carbon Brief.

“For a lot of the international collaborations, the US is a big component, if not the largest,” the scientist says.

“We do a lot of collaborative work with other countries,” adds Dr Jessie Creamean, an atmospheric scientist working in polar regions based at Colorado State University. “Doing work in the polar regions is really an international thing.”

Back to top

How has Trump affected US polar research in his second term?

Since returning to office, the Trump administration has frozen or terminated 7,800 research grants from federal science agencies and laid off 25,000 scientists and personnel.

This includes nearly 2,000 research grants from the NSF, which is responsible for the Office for Polar Programs and for funding a broad range of climate and polar research.

Courts have since made orders to reinstate thousands of these grants and some universities have settled with the federal government to unfreeze funding. However, it is unclear whether scientists have yet received those funds.

As with other areas of US science, the impact of Trump’s attacks on polar research have been far-reaching and difficult to quantify, scientists tell Carbon Brief.

Key scientific institutions affected include NASA, NOAA and the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) in Colorado.

In December, the Trump administration signalled that it planned to dismantle NCAR, calling it a source of “climate alarmism”. At the end of January, the NSF published a letter that “doubled down” on the administration’s promise to “restructure” and “privatise” NCAR.

NCAR has been responsible for a host of polar research in recent years, with several NCAR scientists involved in the MOSAiC expedition.

“NCAR is kind of like a Mecca for atmospheric research,” the US polar scientist who did not want to be named tells Carbon Brief. “They’ve done so much. Now their funding is drying up and people are scrambling.”

At NOAA, one of the major polar programmes to be affected is the National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC), which regularly issues updates about Arctic and Antarctic sea ice.

Last July, Space reported that researchers at NSIDC were informed by the Department of Defense – now renamed the Department of War under Trump – that they would lose access to data from a satellite operated by the US air force, which was used to calculate sea ice changes.

Although the Department of Defense reversed the decision following a public outcry, the uncertainty drove the researchers at NSIDC to switch to sourcing data from a Japanese satellite instead, explains Dr Zack Labe. Labe is a climate scientist who saw his position at NOAA terminated under the Trump administration and now works at the nonprofit research group Climate Central. He tells Carbon Brief:

“It looked like they were losing access to that data and, after public outcry, they regained access to the data. And then, later this year, they had to switch to another satellite.”

He adds that the Trump administration’s layoffs and budget cuts has also forced the programme to scale back its communications initiatives:

“A big loss at NSIDC is that they used to put out these monthly summaries of current conditions in Greenland, the Arctic and Antarctic called Sea Ice Today. It was a really important resource to describe the current weather and sea ice conditions in these regions.

“These reports went to stakeholders, they went to Indigenous communities within the Arctic. And that has stopped in the past year due to budget cuts.”

Elsewhere, the New York Times reported that a director at the Office for Polar Programs found out she was being laid off while on a trip to Antarctica.

US polar research took another hit in September, when the NSF announced that it was terminating the lease for the Nathaniel B Palmer, the only US icebreaker dedicated to Antarctic research.

The Nathaniel B Palmer pictured at the Ross Ice Shelf in Antarctica. Credit: NOAA
The Nathaniel B Palmer pictured at the Ross Ice Shelf in Antarctica. Credit: NOAA

The statement gave just one month’s notice, saying that the vessel would be returned to its operator in October.

Creamean was among the scientists who were affected by the termination. She tells Carbon Brief:

“I was supposed to go on that icebreaker in September. I have a project funded at Palmer Station, along with colleagues from Scripps Institution of Oceanography. We were supposed to go set up for an 18-month study there. We have the money for the project, but we just didn’t get to go because the icebreaker got decommissioned.

“It was a big bummer. We shipped everything down to South America. All of our cargo is still sitting in Punta Arenas [in Chile].”

Elsewhere, other scientists have warned that the termination of the icebreaker could affect the continuity of Antarctic data collection.

In a statement, Dr Naomi Ochwat, a glaciologist at the University of Colorado, Boulder, said that decades of data on changes to Antarctic glaciers taken from the deck of the Palmer had been vital to her research.

For some, one of the most worrying impacts of Trump’s attacks on US polar science is on the careers of scientists, which will likely lead to many of them leaving the country.

All of the researchers that Carbon Brief spoke to said they had heard many stories of US polar scientists deciding to relocate outside of the country or to leave the profession altogether.

Creamean is one of the polar scientists to make the difficult decision to temporarily leave the US. She says:

“I’m actually moving to Sweden for a year starting in May. I’m going to do a visiting science position [at Stockholm University]. I’m hoping to come back. But if things are not looking good and things are looking more positive in Sweden, maybe I’ll stay there. I don’t know.”

Labe tells Carbon Brief that the “brain drain” of US scientists is the “biggest story” when it comes to Trump’s impact on polar research:

“I think one of the long-term repercussions is just how many people will be forced out of science due to a lack of opportunities. I think this is something that will grow in 2026. There were a lot of grants that were two-to-three years and, so, were still running, but they will be ending now.”

Back to top

What could the changes mean for international climate research at Earth’s poles?

With all research at Earth’s poles relying heavily on international collaboration, Trump’s attacks on science are likely to have far-reaching implications outside of the US, scientists tell Carbon Brief.

One implication of budget and personnel cuts could be the loss of continuous data from US researchers, bases and satellites.

Many US polar datasets have been collected for decades and are relied upon by scientists and institutes around the world. This includes records for Arctic and Antarctica’s oceans, sea ice, atmosphere and wildlife.

Trump’s impact has highlighted to scientific organisations outside of the US how vulnerable US datasets can be to political changes, says Labe, adding:

“From a climate perspective, you need a consistent data record over a long period of time. Even a small gap in data caused by uncertainty can cause major issues in understanding long-term trends in the polar regions.

“Other scientific organisations around the world are realising that they’re going to have to find alternative sources for data.”

Creamean tells Carbon Brief that, while some datasets have been discontinued, researchers have made an effort to keep records going despite personnel and budget constraints. She says:

“I know at Summit Station in Greenland they had some instruments that were pulled out that had been measuring things like the surface energy budget for a long time. That dataset has been discontinued.

“Thankfully, some programmes have been able to somehow hold on and continue to do baseline measurements. There’s a station up in Alaska [Barrow] where, as far as I know, measurements have been maintained there. That’s good because some measurements up there have been happening since the 60s and 70s.”

Summit Station in Greenland. Credit: NOAA
Summit Station in Greenland. Credit: NOAA

Trump’s changes could also cast uncertainty over the US’s role in taking part and offering support to upcoming collaborative Arctic and Antarctic expeditions.

In addition to helping scientists better understand the impact of climate change on Earth’s polar regions, these expeditions have also enabled countries with testy geopolitical relationships to come together for a common goal, the US polar scientist who did not want to be named tells Carbon Brief.

For example, the MOSAiC expedition from 2019-20 saw the US and Germany work alongside Russian and Chinese research institutes to study the impact of climate change on the Arctic, says the scientist, adding:

“It was an international collaboration that involved people who should be geopolitical enemies. Science is a way that we seem to be able to work together, to solve problems together, because we all live on one planet. And, right now, to see these changes in the US, it’s quite concerning [for these kinds of collaborations].”

A team of researchers take ice cores in front of the Russian icebreaker Akademik Fedorov during the MOSAiC expedition in 2019. Credit: Daisy Dunne for Carbon Brief
A team of researchers take ice cores in front of the Russian icebreaker Akademik Fedorov during the MOSAiC expedition in 2019. Credit: Daisy Dunne for Carbon Brief

The retreat of the US from polar research might see other powers step up to fill the gap, scientists tell Carbon Brief.

Several scientists mentioned the Nordic countries as possibly taking a larger role in leading polar research, while one said that “China seems to be picking up the slack that’s left behind”.

China currently has five Antarctic research stations – Great Wall, Zhongshan, Kunlun, Taishan and Qinling – along with one Arctic station in Ny-Ålesund, Svalbard.

The Financial Times recently reported on China’s growing ambitions for Arctic exploration, involving its fleet of five icebreakers.

Back to top

What could be the impact of Trump’s threats to take control of Greenland on climate research?

In recent months, Trump has whipped up a media frenzy with threats to take control of Greenland, the world’s largest island lying between the Arctic and Atlantic oceans, which is self-governing and part of the Kingdom of Denmark.

Last month, he clarified that he will not try to take Greenland “by force”, but that he is seeking “immediate negotiations” to acquire the island for “national security reasons”.

Trump’s interest in the island is likely influenced by the rapid melting away of Arctic sea ice due to climate change, which is opening up new sea routes and avenues for potential resource exploitation, reported the Washington Post.

His comments have sparked condemnation from a wide range of US scientists who conduct fieldwork in Greenland.

An open letter signed by more than 350 scientists “vehemently opposes” Trump’s threats to take control of Greenland and expresses “solidarity and gratitude” to Greenland’s population. It says:

“Greenland deserves the world’s attention: it occupies a key position geopolitically and geophysically. As climate warms, rapid loss of Greenland’s ice affects coastal cities and communities worldwide.”

A breakdown in diplomatic relations between the US and Greenland could prevent scientists from being able to carry out their climate research on the island, one of the scientists to sign the letter wrote in a supporting statement:

“Scientific access to Arctic environments is essential for research which secures our shared future and, directly, materially benefits American citizens. It is deeply upsetting that these essential relationships are being undermined, perhaps irreparably, by the Trump administration.”

Dr Yarrow Axford, one of the letter’s organisers who is a palaeoclimatologist and science communicator based in Massachusetts, told Nature that Trump’s comments could put Greenland climate research at risk, saying:

“We Americans have benefited from all these decades of peaceful partnership with Greenland. Scientific understanding of climate change has benefited tremendously. I hope scientists can reach out to Congress and point out what a wonderful partnership that is.”

In addition to the US-run Summit Station, there are at least eight other research stations in Greenland, operated by a range of institutions from across the world.

Aerial view of Greenland ice sheet.
Aerial view of Greenland ice sheet. Credit: Alvis Upitis / Alamy Stock Photo

A major focus of research efforts in the region is the Greenland ice sheet, Earth’s second-largest body of ice which is rapidly melting away because of climate change.

The ice sheet holds enough freshwater to raise global sea levels by around more than seven metres, if melted completely.

Any political moves that could “jeopardise” the study of the Greenland ice sheet would be detrimental, says Creamean:

“Greenland is a ‘tipping point’ in that, the ice sheet melting, that could be one of the biggest contributors to sea level rise. It’s not like we can wait to study it, it needs to be understood now.”

Back to top

The post Q&A: How Trump is threatening climate science in Earth’s polar regions appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Q&A: How Trump is threatening climate science in Earth’s polar regions

Continue Reading

Climate Change

Colorado River Faces ‘Devastating Consequences’ If Another Dry Winter Lands, Experts Warn

Published

on

Even a huge snowpack during the coming winter would only give the river basin states less than two years of storage before reservoirs returned to historic lows.

Another warm, arid winter could leave Colorado River reservoirs nearly dry.

Colorado River Faces ‘Devastating Consequences’ If Another Dry Winter Lands, Experts Warn

Continue Reading

Climate Change

Q&A: The current state of ‘carbon dioxide removal’ around the world

Published

on

Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies will need to be deployed at rates even faster than those seen for solar power, if the world is to have a chance of limiting global warming to 1.5C by 2100, says a new report.

Nearly all pathways to meeting the Paris Agreement’s highest ambition of keeping global temperatures to 1.5C above pre-industrial levels in 2100 involve CDR techniques – ranging from tree-planting to sucking CO2 from air with machines.

This is in addition to steep and immediate emissions cuts.

Scientists expect carbon emissions to push warming beyond 1.5C in the decade ahead, meaning that the target can only be achieved “from above” via large-scale CDR that brings down global temperatures.

These temperature trajectories are known as “overshoot” pathways.

The third “state of CDR” report, written by more than 50 scientists, says that countries’ current CDR plans would fall short of what is needed to limit warming to 1.5C by more than 5bn tonnes of CO2 (GtCO2) per year by 2050.

Global CDR would have to increase fourfold – from 2.2GtCO2 in 2026 to 8.75GtCO2 by 2050 – to have a chance of meeting the 1.5C target by 2100, according to the report.

It adds that deploying CDR can be a “gradual process”, making the period 2026-30 “crucial” for “establishing CDR’s role in limiting climate damages” in the future.

Below, Carbon Brief covers the key findings of the third state of CDR report. (This follows from Carbon Brief’s coverage of the first report in 2023 and second report in 2024.)

What is CDR?

According to the report, the definition of CDR is:

“Human activities capturing CO2 from the atmosphere and storing it durably in geological, terrestrial or ocean reservoirs, or in products. This includes human enhancement of natural removal processes but excludes natural uptake not directly caused by anthropogenic [human-caused] activities.”

In addition to this, the report includes “three key principles” for CDR, which are:

  1. The captured CO2 must come from the atmosphere, not from “fossil sources”.
  2. The subsequent storage “must be durable”, so that the CO2 is not soon reintroduced to the atmosphere.
  3. The removal must result from human intervention that is in addition to Earth’s natural processes.

In this report, a CDR method is considered durable if it is able to lock up carbon for “decades or more”.

The report classifies CDR techniques as either “conventional” or “novel”.

“Convential” CDR techniques are “well established, already deployed at scale and widely reported by countries as part of [land-use] activities”.

The methods included in this group are tree-planting, ecosystem restoration, agroforestry (trees in agriculture), improving soil carbon in croplands and natural lands, and durable wood production.

“Novel” CDR techniques have “lower level of readiness for deployment and, as a consequence, are currently deployed at smaller scales”, says the report.

Some examples of different CDR methods are listed on the graphic below.

The graphic also shows whether carbon is captured through biological or chemical processes, as well as how “ready” the method is and for how long it can store carbon, among other features.

CDR techniques and their characteristics. Credit: Edwards et al. (2026)

The report says that CDR is “needed alongside deep and rapid emissions reductions” to give Earth a chance of limiting global warming to 1.5C. It continues:

“It should play a smaller role than emissions reductions given uncertainty around the feasible levels of scaling, sustainability limits, storage availability and the risk of reversal, among other constraints.

“In general, CDR should be seen as a limited resource that will need to be used prudently.”

It adds that CDR can “fulfil three major functions”.

In the near term, CDR can help reduce “net emissions”, it says.

In the medium term, CDR can “counterbalance residual emissions” to achieve net-zero CO2 or net-zero greenhouse gas emissions, the report continues.

(“Residual emissions” are those that cannot be eradicated through technologies or societal changes, such as methane emissions from rice production.)

Research suggests that global warming is likely to stop, more or less, once net-zero is achieved globally.

In the long term, CDR can “help achieve net-negative emissions”, a state where CO2 removal exceeds emissions, says the report.

In this state, humans could lower global temperatures. This may allow the world to limit global warming to 1.5C by 2100, even if the temperature target is surpassed earlier on in the century.

Future trajectories where temperatures exceed the 1.5C limit before being brought back down again through CDR techniques are known as “overshoot” pathways.

Back to top

What are current levels of CDR?

The report says that, at present, “99.9%” of existing CDR is conventional, land-based techniques such as tree-planting and ecosystem restoration.

The world currently removes 2.2GtCO2 per year, equivalent to around 5% of gross global CO2 emissions, it continues.

The largest contributors to removing CO2 from the atmosphere are China, the US, the EU, Brazil and Russia.

The chart below shows the amount of CO2 removed each year over 2014-23 by the largest contributors, through tree-planting (afforestation) and forest restoration (reforestation).

Chart showing country-level CDR through afforestation and reforestation
CO2 removed via afforestation and reforestation each year by the world’s largest contributors to current CDR. Credit: Edwards et al. (2026)

“Novel” CDR, such as biochar and direct air capture, currently removes just 2m tonnes of CO2 annually at present, according to the report.

However, these methods have been growing at a rate of 40% per year – “similar to successful technologies like solar energy, but insufficient for the scale-up required to meet the Paris temperature goal”, says the report.

The graphic below illustrates how the contribution of conventional CDR currently dwarfs novel CDR, but how the latter techniques are quickly growing.

Infographic showing current CDR are almost entirely from conventional, but novel methods are growing
A graphic illustrating the contribution of “conventional” and “novel” to current CDR methods. Credit: Edwards et al. (2026)

The report says that investment in CDR companies recovered in 2025 following a dip – and its “share of all climate-tech funding” grew to 2.6%.

The report also notes that, at present, most CDR efforts are unevenly distributed across the world.

For example, two-thirds of conventional CDR in voluntary carbon markets is in Latin America, according to the report. (Voluntary carbon markets are where companies can buy credits for carbon-reducing or removing projects, such as tree-planting, to claim that they have “offset” some of their own emissions.)

In addition, most pilot projects that aim to demonstrate novel CDR methods are located in only a few countries, such as Sweden, Denmark and the US, says the report.

The chart below shows the location and timeline of demonstration projects that have been announced, are under construction or in operation globally.

Chart showing demonstration projects announced, under construction or in operation 2020-2030
Location and timeline of demonstration projects that have been announced, are under construction or in operation globally. Credit: Edwards et al. (2026)

The report continues:

“While first-movers play important roles, if their actions do not diffuse more widely, vulnerability emerges, as evidenced by the impact of US climate policy dismantling.”

(For more, see: How is policy impacting CDR demand?)

Back to top

How much CDR is needed to reach net-zero goals?

The report examines three scenarios where global temperature rise is limited to “well below” 2C by 2100:

  • A current ambition scenario, based on national climate pledges (but omitting the US);
  • A highest-possible ambition scenario;
  • A delayed ambition scenario, which is consistent with current targets until 2035 and then switches to the highest ambition scenario.

The pledges considered in the report are “nationally determined contributions”, or NDCs, which countries submit periodically to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). NDCs lay out a country’s climate ambition.

Under the current ambition scenario, the report projects a total of 5.9GtCO2 of CDR by 2050 and 12GtCO2 by 2100.

This scenario would result in end-of-century warming of 1.7-2.7C. Importantly, the report says, this scenario does not result in the world reaching net-zero CO2 levels, “meaning that global temperatures would continue to rise, albeit at a much more gradual pace, beyond 2100”.

Under the highest-possible ambition scenario, CDR scales up to 8.8GtCO2 by mid-century and 15.3GtCO2 by the end of the century.

This scenario assumes “full buy-in by all nations”, with economics, scale-up and sustainability providing the main constraints on CDR deployment, the report says.

The highest ambition scenario results in global temperatures peaking at 1.7-1.8C around 2050 and the world achieving net-zero emissions around that time.

Under the delayed ambition scenario, CDR would scale up to 7GtCO2 by 2050 and 23.6GtCO2 by 2100. This scenario shows global temperatures peaking between 1.7C and 2.0C.

This scenario requires larger CDR deployment in the long term than the highest-ambition scenario does, due to the larger cumulative emissions caused by delaying deep emissions reductions.

In both the high ambition and delayed ambition scenarios, the world reaches “deeply net-negative CO2 emissions” by 2100, the report says. This continued deployment of CDR will further draw CO2 from the atmosphere, lowering global temperatures back down to 1.5C.

The chart below shows annual global greenhouse gas emissions through the end of the century under current ambition (red), highest ambition (green) and delayed ambition (blue) scenarios.

Annual emissions, in GtCO2e per year, for the three scenarios: current ambition (red), highest ambition (green) and delayed ambition (blue). Source: Edwards et al. (2026)
Annual emissions, in GtCO2e per year, for the three scenarios: current ambition (red), highest ambition (green) and delayed ambition (blue). Source: Edwards et al. (2026)

While global CDR capacity scales up more slowly in the first and third scenarios, the report notes that, in all three cases, “novel CDR reaches gigatonne-scale deployment by 2050”.

Back to top

What does the science say about the potential and costs of CDR?

There is a wide range of both carbon-removal potential and associated costs between different methods of CDR, according to the report.

However, it also notes that these numbers “range widely” in the scientific literature.

The discrepancies in estimates of carbon-removal potential are due to a number of factors, the report says, including a lack of available scientific data, inconsistencies in the assumptions made in assessing technical feasibility and a lack of agreement on what, exactly, “potential” means.

These elements also influence the cost of different CDR methods, but additional factors – such as deployment costs in different areas, technological approaches and scope – also play a role in establishing price differences. Because of this, the report says, “cost estimates are often difficult to compare across methods, complicating design and policy decisions”.

The chart below shows the reported range of mitigation potential (left) and reported range of costs (right) for different CDR methods. The top four rows indicate conventional CDR methods, while bottom 11 rows show novel CDR methods. The chart refers to “mitigation potential”, rather than removal potential, because some estimates do not distinguish between removals and avoided emissions.

(Avoided emissions refers to the difference in emissions from carrying out a project, compared to a hypothetical alternative – such as the reduced emissions from halting deforestation.)

The darker colours indicate estimates that are more constrained, meaning that they are either based on stricter assumptions or there is more agreement between different estimates.

Annual mitigation potential (left) and cost range per tonne of CO2 (right) for conventional and novel CDR methods. Orange bars indicate the range of values reported, with darker colours indicating less uncertainty about the estimates. Source: Edwards et al. (2026)
Annual mitigation potential (left) and cost range per tonne of CO2 (right) for conventional and novel CDR methods. Orange bars indicate the range of values reported, with darker colours indicating less uncertainty about the estimates. Source: Edwards et al. (2026)

The report notes that for most removal methods, the low end of the potential is around 1GtCO2 per year, while the upper limit of costs is more than $200/tCO2.

The least expensive CDR approaches are forestry-based methods, soil-carbon sequestration and biomass burial. For forestry-based methods, the report puts the cost of CDR at $5-$53 per tonne of CO2 removed. Soil-carbon sequestration costs reach as high as $150 per tonne of CO2 removed, but could have negative overall costs “when accounting for crop yield increases potentially resulting” from changed farm-management practices, the report says.

However, it adds that “these CDR methods are typically associated with lower levels of permanence” than other methods.

Other relatively low-cost methods include coastal wetland restoration, biochar, bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) and enhanced rock weathering, while ocean alkalinity enhancement is a medium-cost option.

The most expensive methods include direct air carbon capture and storage (DACCS) and direct ocean carbon capture and storage (DOCCS).

The report also notes that a total estimate of CDR removals cannot be obtained by adding up the removal potential of all of the separate methods, since different methods can compete for scarce resources. For example, BECCS, biochar, biomass burial and biomass sinking all rely on the same base input – biomass – and therefore cannot all be maximised at the same time.

Back to top

What have governments pledged on CDR?

While many countries include some amount of CDR in their national climate plans, there is currently a large gap between the amount of CDR pledged in these plans and the amount that will be needed to limit global temperature rise to 1.5C by the end of the century, says the report.

This quantity is referred to as the “CDR gap” – the difference between what is pledged and what is needed.

The size of the CDR gap is dependent not just on the pledges made by countries, but also the choice of the “benchmark” scenario against which the pledges are measured. Lower – or delayed – emissions reductions lead to larger shortfalls in the long term, meaning “CDR must subsequently be scaled to very high levels”, says the report.

Current NDCs and other country submissions to the UNFCCC total 2.5GtCO2 per year of removals in 2030, 2.7GtCO2 per year in 2035 and 3.6GtCO2 per year in 2050.

This gives a CDR gap of 0.3GtCO2 in 2030, 1.2GtCO2 in 2035 and 5.2GtCO2 in 2050, according to the report. These figures are obtained using assumed “immediate, ambitious action at all levels to reduce emissions” and the most-ambitious estimates of CDR set out in national pledges. Together, this provides a “lower bound” for the CDR gap, says the report.

By comparison, a 10-year delay in implementing ambitious emissions reductions will result in the need to remove at least an additional 150GtCO2 from the atmosphere, compared to the most ambitious scenario. (See: How much CDR is needed to reach net-zero goals?)

The report says that the CDR gap has widened since the second state of CDR report was released in 2024, due to the US leaving the Paris Agreement. It adds that other countries have “not delivered a step change in ambition” in their latest round of climate pledges.

It also cautions that “credibility issues with national pledges may mean that the CDR gap is actually larger than what we assess here”.

The report notes that current CDR pledges by companies are “substantially higher than country pledges”, at 5GtCO2 per year in 2050. However, it adds, “credibility in these announcements is low”.

Back to top

What is the current funding and research landscape for CDR?

Funding of CDR research and development – as well as investment in CDR companies – has continued to increase in recent years.

In total, there has been around $5.6bn in grant funding distributed to CDR research since 2005, according to the report’s analysis. Roughly one-third of this has come in the past three years.

Funding for CDR research grants grew 13% each year between 2022 and 2025, the report says, and the corresponding number of research publications grew at a similar rate.

Funding was largely targeted at a handful of key areas, notably soil carbon sequestration, biochar and forest-based CDR.

DACCS and BECCS only make up a small number of active grants, but together account for around two-fifths of all funding due to “substantially larger” project sizes.

Despite the growth of research grants and scientific publications, the report concludes that early-stage innovation in CDR is “uneven” and says there is “no strong evidence of a step-change”.

It notes that much of the support for CDR has come from projects with a broader focus, rather than those that focus specifically on CDR.

The authors also point to a decline in “inventive activity”, as measured by patenting of CDR-related innovations. While patenting for emissions-cutting technologies in general has been on an upward trajectory, CDR patenting peaked in 2011.

Meanwhile, the report highlights the “remarkable” sustained investment in CDR companies, against a backdrop of falling investment in climate-related technologies. It notes that CDR now accounts for around 3% of overall “climate-tech funding”.

Yet, again, it says future developments remain “uncertain”. Since the previous 2024 “state of CDR” report, companies have scaled back their ambitions and policy reversals – notably in the US – “underscore that funding uncertainty remains a key barrier”. (See: How is policy impacting CDR demand?)

An upward tick in funding in 2025 was driven primarily by a “surge” in grants from predominantly public institutions, as well as $0.5bn in debt financing for a single BECCS project in Sweden.

Reliance on such funding sources “highlight[s] the volatility of the CDR innovation ecosystem”, according to the report.

The report also has a chapter focusing on the voluntary carbon market, which it describes as “propelling most of the current demand for novel CDR”.

The scale of this market remains fairly small, with contracts for 0.04GtCO2 of removals signed last year.

Moreover, the concentration of sales within a small number of buyers – particularly Microsoft – remains a “critical vulnerability”, the authors note.

Back to top

How is policy impacting CDR demand?

The report analyses CDR policies in G20 nations – which together account for three-quarters of global emissions – to assess how they are acting to support CDR across their economies.

In total, 140 countries have announced net-zero targets, including virtually all of the world’s major emitters. In doing so, the report points out that the governments of these nations have “implicitly included a role for CDR in their climate plans”.

However, this does not always translate into measures specifically designed to scale up CDR.

Only the EU has adopted a binding, quantified removals target into law – namely, the goal to reach 310m tonnes of CO2 equivalent (MtCO2e) of annual net removals in the land sector by 2030.

Overall, conventional CDR is the main focus of policy, with various governments focusing on tree planting to absorb CO2 from the atmosphere.

Among G20 nations, only the UK and Australia have set specific goals to scale up novel CDR, such as BECCS and DACCS, over the coming decade.

The report highlights some nations, including Canada, Germany, Switzerland and the UK, as taking proactive steps to incentivise CDR.

The authors point to national strategies, financial support for CDR and efforts to integrate it into emissions trading systems (ETS) as examples of effective policy making.

(The report also stresses that the US, which was previously a “leader” on CDR, has now “frozen or dismantled funding and support” for CDR under the Trump administration.)

Most of the successful policies highlighted in the report focus on supporting the supply of CDR, with “less attention so far on creating demand”.

This is significant because CDR “generally lacks a natural market”, meaning there are not automatically buyers willing to spend money on emissions removals. Therefore, the authors say, policy interventions are important to create markets and boost demand.

“Compliance” carbon creditsreferring to credits that can be used to meet legally mandated emissions targets – provide a way to support demand, according to the report authors.

Only some ETSs, such as those used in New Zealand and Australia, allow the use of credits based on forest-related removals for compliance. (It is worth noting that such credits are controversial, as removals by forests are not always permanent.)

The report also highlights the need for “foundational policies to create a governance framework for CDR, including rules for quantification of removal, guidelines for community engagement and the minimisation of negative environmental impacts”.

Back to top

The post Q&A: The current state of ‘carbon dioxide removal’ around the world appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Q&A: The current state of ‘carbon dioxide removal’ around the world

Continue Reading

Climate Change

Alligator Alcatraz Emissions Threaten Human Health, Violate Clean Air Act, Lawsuit Claims

Published

on

The air pollution is associated with the more than 200 diesel-burning generators powering the Everglades migrant detention facility, along with 100 diesel-burning lighting towers.

A new federal lawsuit contends emissions at the Everglades migrant detention site known as Alligator Alcatraz, associated with more than 200 diesel-burning generators and 100 diesel-burning lighting towers, are harmful to human health and the environment and violate the Clean Air Act.

Alligator Alcatraz Emissions Threaten Human Health, Violate Clean Air Act, Lawsuit Claims

Continue Reading

Trending

Copyright © 2022 BreakingClimateChange.com