Chinese government leaders published a policy document on 22 April – Earth Day – calling for stricter controls on fossil-fuel consumption and greater oversight of heavy emitters.
It has been interpreted by experts as a signal of China’s ongoing commitment to climate action and a bridging policy between the 15th five-year plan, published in March, and future thematic and sectoral five-year plans expected to be published in the months and years ahead.
While the policy document – known as “guiding opinions” – is not strictly binding, it bears the stamp of the two highest bodies in China’s political system, conveying a strong sense of authority.
One expert tells Carbon Brief that this is the first high-level document to explicitly link decarbonisation efforts with energy security and industrial development.
It was also followed on 23 April by a second document, which is binding, that strengthens environmental inspections of provincial governments and creates new metrics for future evaluations, such as total emissions and coal consumption.
Below, Carbon Brief examines how the policies could impact China’s approach to peaking its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions.
- Why are ‘guiding opinions’ important?
- What does the new ‘opinions’ document say about fossil fuels?
- How have climate evaluation rules been strengthened?
- What does the ‘opinions’ document say about energy security?
Why are ‘guiding opinions’ important?
Documents play an important role in disseminating political messages through China’s vast government bureaucracy. There is a well-defined hierarchy for different types of policies, each of which infer a different level of importance and flexibility.
“Opinions” are officially defined by the Chinese government as the “presentation of views and proposed solutions regarding important issues”.
They outline broad principles and general policy directions for lower levels of government to incorporate into more concrete policies.
Policy recommendations included in an opinion are implied to be non-binding, allowing officials more discretion in how they are implemented on the ground.
Prof Yuan Jiahai from the North China Electric Power University in Beijing previously told Carbon Brief that naming a document “guiding opinions” means it will have a “long-term, directional and systematic impact”.
An example is a set of opinions on a “green and low-carbon circular development economic system” issued in February 2021, which laid out broad policy recommendations across several economic sectors to spur “green planning, green design, green investment, green construction, green production, green circulation, green life and green consumption”.
“Following these opinions, China’s green growth accelerated significantly,” Prof Christoph Nedopil, professor at the University of Queensland, tells Carbon Brief. He adds:
“This is not to say that some of the developments would not have happened without such a guidance, but the guidance provided the clear direction and authority to various government departments and businesses to strengthen the support for the green and low-carbon transition.”
The new “opinions” document, on energy saving and carbon reduction, carries additional weight because of the bodies that issued it. Specifically, it was issued jointly by the general offices of the central committee of the Communist party of China (CCCPC), the highest party organ and headed by President Xi Jinping, and the state council, the highest government body and headed by Premier Li Qiang. This indicates that it has the approval of all of China’s most senior policymakers.
The document “signals China’s increasing confidence in its clean-energy sector”, says Yang Biqing, energy analyst for Asia at thinktank Ember.
The timing also makes the document important, says Hu Min, director and co-founder for the Beijing-based thinktank Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress.
She notes that the document, published soon after the close of the “two sessions” in March, is a “way to move things forward” in energy and climate policy. Hu adds that it sends a signal of the direction likely to be taken in upcoming thematic and sectoral five-year plans on topics such as peaking carbon emissions, renewable energy and coal.
“I’m quite excited about it,” she tells Carbon Brief.
What does the new ‘opinions’ document say about fossil fuels?
The opinions document includes a plethora of recommendations across several sectors, from promoting energy-saving measures in data centres and clean heating solutions to developing “integrated steel-to-chemicals” projects and “zero-carbon transport corridors”.
But some of the most interesting language was reserved for the use of coal.
China’s carbon reduction “situation…remains relatively severe”, says a government statement summarised by carbon-market information platform Tanpaifang, with the energy system still “reliant” on coal.
The “opinions” document is, therefore, of “great significance for building broader and stronger consensus across society”, it adds.
In 2025, developers in China submitted new or reactivated proposals to build a total of 161 gigawatts of new coal-fired power plants, as shown in the figure below.
The new document acknowledges the need to “strictly control fossil-fuel consumption”, in language significantly stronger than the 15th five-year plan published after the two-sessions meeting in March.
The five-year plan only pledged to “promote the peaking” of coal and oil use.
The document also outlines several other measures for managing fossil-fuel CO2 emissions, including “deepening efforts to reduce coal and oil use”, “actively promoting the clean replacement” of coal-fired equipment and “advancing” the replacement of “dispersed coal” use in an “orderly” manner.
However, it stops short of a complete rejection of coal-fired power, saying, for example, that policymakers should “reasonably control the scale of coal-fired power generation capacity and output”.
Nevertheless, Hu tells Carbon Brief, the document represents efforts by China’s leaders to “articulate” what controlling fossil fuels might look like.
Yang agrees, saying that the shift in the language on coal was “encouraging”.
She notes the granularity of the recommendations around coal, such as a line urging policymakers to “determine the dispatch sequence and load regulation for coal-fired power”.
“It is very interesting that, at this high level [of government], they have so clearly outlined this obstacle in coal’s [changing] role…from baseload to flexibility,” she says.
Experts interviewed by Carbon Brief said the language on renewable energy, which signalled ongoing support for China’s clean-energy buildout, was positive but unsurprising.
The document urges officials to “vigorously develop non-fossil energy sources and new-energy storage technologies”, highlighting the need for technologies such as pumped-storage hydropower and microgrids to boost consumption.
For Hu, market conditions, investment and local policies are now more important than central government signals for China’s clean-energy buildout.
The main debate is fossil fuels, she says, and any signals that encourage limiting coal use will “make a difference”.
How have climate evaluation rules been strengthened?
The guiding opinions document also dedicates significant space to outlining measures for reviewing and evaluating carbon-reduction efforts.
It states that local officials should undertake “comprehensive” evaluations of the energy consumption, coal consumption and carbon emissions of new projects, with plans to reduce or offset emissions becoming a “key component” of evaluating the project.
Similarly, the plan pledges to strengthen the review by the central government of local governments’ annual reports on energy use and carbon emissions, with warnings issued to local governments for “lagging progress” or “unreasonable increases in indicators”.
The central government will also strengthen supervision through “regular special inspections”, the “opinions” document says.
For regions that are “severely” falling behind on targets or are found to have “insufficient” ability to run their own inspections, the opinions threaten to “adjust or suspend their authority” for conducting evaluations and “delay or restrict” approvals for new projects.
The document also makes “local party committees and governments” responsible for their jurisdictions’ carbon reduction work. Party members and state-owned enterprises must “lead by example”, it adds.
The day after the opinions were released, the CCCPC and state council also issued a series of measures for “comprehensive evaluation” of local efforts to peak and reduce carbon emissions.
Unlike the guiding opinions, this document is considered binding policy – in this case overseen primarily by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China’s powerful economic planning agency.
Under the new rules, central government officials – led by the NDRC with significant input from the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE), National Energy Administration (NEA) and other departments – will grade local governments on their carbon-reduction efforts.
The measures largely align provinces’ emissions reduction evaluations with China’s existing climate pledges for 2030.
Key targets include reducing carbon intensity by more than 65% by 2030, compared to 2005 levels, “reasonably” controlling coal-fired power generation, achieving a “25% share of non-fossil energy consumption by 2030” and “gradually” covering all new power demand with clean energy.
The government also sets out 14 indicators, shown in the table below. At the top of the list are five key “control indicators”: total carbon emissions; reductions in carbon intensity; total coal consumption; total oil consumption; and the share of non-fossil energy consumption.
The NDRC is responsible for evaluating all five of the key indicators, with the MEE also overseeing the first three.
Provinces that fail to meet any of the control indicators will receive an “unsatisfactory” rating, leading to “corrective measures”, according to solar news outlet Zhihui Photovoltaic.
In a comment article in finance news outlet Caixin, Chen Lihao says that the two documents together “form the institutional foundation” for China’s “full-scale transition” to a dual control of carbon system.
Chen is the deputy director of the special committee on resources and environment at the Jiusan Society, the political party that environment minister Huang Runqiu belongs to.
The measures build on China’s existing inspection system to create a “much stronger accountability and compliance system”, says Qin Qi, China analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air.
The “real step forward”, she adds, is how climate and carbon targets – including China’s international commitments – have now been explicitly placed inside a “party-backed assessment framework” that uses pass-or-fail judgements on each indicator, rather than letting weak performance disappear inside a broad score.
Li Shuo, China climate hub director at the Asia Society Policy Institute echoes this, telling Carbon Brief that the new policy represents a “helpful step toward implementation, bringing greater clarity on tasks and responsibilities”.
Inspections are regarded as a powerful tool for the MEE in enforcing climate policy, allowing it to publicly identify non-compliant bodies, with state media often announcing results.
In 2021, inspection teams even publicly criticised the NEA, scolding it for “falling behind” on developing low-carbon energy in a move described at the time as “unprecedented”.
The emphasis that the opinions document places on evaluations and the stronger requirements that it represents “shows…the whole system that this is very important…it’s not just talk”, says Hu. (Hu spoke with Carbon Brief before the evaluation framework was released.)
However, both Li and Qin note that much depends on how the evaluations are enforced.
The strength of the system will “inevitably involve further political bargaining within the Chinese system”, says Li, shaped both by differences in the priorities of different ministries and geopolitical developments – particularly the outcomes of the conflict in the Middle East.
Qin highlights the greater capacity that the measures give the MEE to enforce inspections.
“The ministry has a more formal standing to push back on coal expansion and to speak on climate policy in a more direct way,” she says, but adds that the NDRC will still be the “central driver” of evaluating emissions.
She also notes that, while earlier central government inspections incorporated explicit instructions about making evaluation results public, the new measures place more emphasis on “internal” mechanisms, rather than public disclosure.
What does the ‘opinions’ document say about energy security?
The opinions document also settles a debate on energy security that has been playing out in the Chinese media since the start of the conflict in the Middle East.
It opens with a statement that “energy conservation and carbon reduction are key” both for China’s “dual-carbon” goals and energy transition and for “safeguarding national energy security”.
“The first sentence connects directly decarbonisation with energy security and industrial development, which is, if I’m not mistaken, the first time…that this has been linked and recognised [in such a high-level policy],” Yang tells Carbon Brief.
Although not always explicitly referencing the conflict, several outlets have run stories highlighting the importance of various energy technologies to China’s energy security.
Some outlets, including state broadcaster CCTV and the Communist Youth League’s official newspaper, China Youth Daily, focused on the positive role low-carbon energy plays in China’s energy system. Others have underscored the importance of fossil fuels, including state news agency Xinhua, which has run a series on becoming an “energy powerhouse” interviewing representatives of the fossil fuel industry.
On 20 April, NDRC head Zheng Shanjie wrote in the Communist party-affiliated People’s Daily that China should further strengthen energy security, including by increasing oil and gas reserves and production, reinforcing the role of coal-fired power as a “base-load guarantee” and expanding Sino-Russian oil and gas cooperation. He flagged “disruptions” in the Strait of Hormuz as a cause for concern.
Zheng’s article came out on the same day that Chinese premier Li Qiang held a “study session” meeting with other high-level officials discussing the need to implement a “new strategy for energy security”, deepening energy system reforms to support the country’s low-carbon transition.
The guiding opinions specifically instruct the NDRC, the country’s powerful economic planning agency, to “conscientiously fulfill its duties” in achieving China’s carbon goals, including across planning, implementation and evaluation.
It adds that “all relevant [government] departments shall perform their respective duties, cooperate closely and form a concerted effort”.
However, experts had differing opinions on whether this signalled heightened scrutiny of the NDRC, or if it emphasised its importance to emission reduction efforts.
“The mention…seems to highlight an elevated scrutiny of its work on energy transition”, says Nedopil, but “does not seem to signal an increase of its responsibilities in the energy transition, considering the mention of [the responsibilities of other departments]”.
The post Q&A: China’s leadership calls for ‘strict control’ of fossil fuels appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: China’s leadership calls for ‘strict control’ of fossil fuels
The British government has notified the UN’s Green Climate Fund (GCF) that it will cut the contribution it pledged for 2024-2027 in half, a GCF spokesperson told Climate Home News.
The reduction, which is part of a wider UK shift from development aid to military spending, will restrict the GCF’s ability to fund projects that help developing countries cut emissions and adapt to climate change.
Harjeet Singh, director of the Satat Sampada Climate Foundation, called the UK’s decision “moral bankruptcy”, noting that Britain has a historical responsibility for climate change “as a nation built on fossil-fuelled industrialisation”.
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After US retreat, countries clash over who should make up Green Climate Fund shortfall
At this week’s board meeting, Germany and Sweden encouraged wealthier developing nations to step up – an idea rejected by Saudi Arabia -
UK cuts support for climate action abroad to fund military instead
The UK’s foreign minister said the cuts to the aid budget would “deliver the biggest increase in defence spending since the Cold War”
Liane Schalatek, who observes GCF board meetings for the Heinrich Böll Foundation, said the UK’s move was “an unfortunate signal”, especially as it comes just before the GCF launches its next fundraising round.
She noted that the UK has been the biggest contributor to the GCF, and “with the UK halving – where doubling would be needed – this will give permission to others to do the same”.
There are fears that other countries could follow suit as governments in Europe trim their aid budgets, while the US has refused to deliver any further money under climate change-sceptic President Donald Trump and has also given up its seat on the GCF board.
The GCF was established in 2010, and has since funded over $15 billion of climate projects across the developing world. Its financing comes mainly from developed countries pledging money in regular replenishment rounds.
During the last GCF replenishment round in 2023, the UK’s previous Conservative government promised £1.622 billion ($2.18 billion) for the 2024-27 period, with then development minister Andrew Mitchell saying the pledge “underlines our sustained commitment to tackling climate change”.
But, as of March 2026, the UK had only handed over £655 million ($885 million) of that pledge, which is its third to the fund, and has now informed the GCF it will only deliver £815 million ($1.1 billion). The GCF’s total funding for the 2024-2027 period is $10.149 billion.
The UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office has been contacted for comment.
Approved projects unaffected
A GCF spokesperson told Climate Home News that all current projects under implementation have guaranteed funding while the GCF is assessing what the cuts mean for the projects that are being prepared and are expected to come before the GCF board in 2026 and 2027.
“Our focus will continue to be delivering the greatest impact with the investments we make, working with the largest network of partners in the financial architecture and mobilizing the greatest amount of resources to fulfill GCF’s critical and unique mandate,” the spokesperson said.
Scientists warn El Niño could intensify climate extremes in 2026
In a separate email to GCF board members, seen by Climate Home News, the GCF’s executive director Mafalda Duarte warned that the cuts are “expected to have a material impact” on the fund’s work over the next two years.
Duarte said the cuts were part of the UK wider decision to reduce international development spending “and invest more in addressing growing security threats”.
Development to military
Announcing this decision in March, UK foreign minister Yvette Cooper said the cuts were a “hugely difficult decision” and “not ideological”, but necessary “to deliver the biggest increase in defence spending since the Cold War”. The US has been pressuring countries in the NATO alliance to boost military budgets as conflict surges around the world, from Ukraine to the Middle East.
Cooper reiterated Labour’s commitment to restore overseas development spending to 0.7% of gross national income (GNI) “when fiscal circumstances allow”, but did not provide a timeline when pressed by an opposition member of parliament. UK aid was reduced from 0.7% to 0.5% of GNI by the previous Conservative government in 2021, and is now set to fall further to 0.3%.
While the UK government has claimed it is only cutting international climate finance by around 13% compared to the previous government’s level of spending, analysis by Carbon Brief suggests that the real figure is close to 50% once inflation and accounting changes are considered.
The leadership of the UK is currently in doubt with several ministers from the ruling Labour Party calling on Prime Minister Keir Starmer to resign, with a challenge to his leadership of the party and country expected after poor local election results for Labour.
The post UK halves Green Climate Fund contribution, as it spends more on security appeared first on Climate Home News.
UK halves Green Climate Fund contribution, as it spends more on security
The Santa Marta summit moved beyond the blockages in the UN climate process, building a coalition of around 60 countries that want to tackle a shift away from fossil fuels. The host countries said the outcomes would feed into the voluntary roadmap on the energy transition being put together by COP30 hosts Brazil, which is due to be presented before COP31.
June’s mid-year climate talks in Bonn, followed by London Climate Action Week, will be key moments to reflect on the progress so far and work out ways to bring the strands closer together. How might that happen while fossil fuels remain the elephant in the UNFCCC room and there’s no formal place for a roadmap on the agenda?
Tune in to hear our expert reporters discussing this and other key topics set to headline at the Bonn session, both in the negotiations and on the sidelines! Questions and comments will be welcome from participants and used to inform our future coverage.
Note: This event is exclusively for free essential users and paid subscribers of Climate Home News. If you’re not yet signed up, you can join us by clicking the “Subscribe Now” button.
The post Webinar: From Santa Marta to Bonn – where next for the fossil fuel transition? appeared first on Climate Home News.
Webinar: From Santa Marta to Bonn – where next for the fossil fuel transition?
Climate Change
China Briefing 30 April 2026: Fossil fuel ‘strict controls’ | El Niño approaches | Why cleantech exports have surged
Welcome to Carbon Brief’s China Briefing.
China Briefing handpicks and explains the most important climate and energy stories from China over the past fortnight. Subscribe for free here.
Key developments
New documents ramp up pressure on coal
‘STRICTLY CONTROL’ FOSSIL FUELS: On 22 April, China issued a set of “guiding opinions” on energy conservation and carbon reduction that urged local governments to “strictly control fossil-fuel consumption”, according to the text published by state news agency Xinhua. Hu Min, director and co-founder of the the Beijing-based Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress, said in comments to Carbon Brief that the document was a clear signal of China’s political leaders’ desire to reduce the country’s coal usage and a “way to move things forward” until more specific policies are published. Government officials noted that the opinions are of “great significance for building broader and stronger consensus across society”, reported information platform Tanpaifang.
INCREASED OVERSIGHT: The next day, the government announced new evaluation criteria for judging provinces on their efforts to meet China’s climate goals, including on raising “clean-energy consumption” and limiting “use of coal and oil”, reported Bloomberg. The 14 indicators underscore China’s “key priorities” and encourage broader carbon reduction efforts, said energy news outlet China Energy Net. They build on China’s existing inspection system to create a “much stronger accountability and compliance system”, Qin Qi, China analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, told Carbon Brief. For more detail see Carbon Brief’s Q&A on what the two policies mean for China’s energy transition.
‘RARE’ SIGNAL: Both documents were issued by the highest levels of the nation’s political system, which is “extremely rare” and “reflects the strategic importance” of China’s climate goals, Wu Hongjie, deputy secretary-general of the China Carbon Neutrality 50 Forum, told Jiemian News. In a comment article for finance news outlet Caixin, Chen Lihao – a member of the Jiusan Society, environment minister Huang’s political party – said the two documents “form the institutional foundation” for China’s “full-scale transition” to a “dual control of carbon” system.
Downpours in south China
‘RECORD-BREAKING’ RAIN: Heavy rainfall is hitting central and southern China, with Hunan, Guizhou and Jiangxi provinces reporting record-breaking levels of precipitation last week, reported the Communist party-affiliated People’s Daily. It added that the government is ramping up “flood control” measures in response. On 26-27 April, one part of Guangxi province received as much as 14cm of rain per hour, reported the state-supporting newspaper Global Times. Meanwhile, Chinese vice-premier Liu Guozhong met with the World Meteorological Organization secretary-general Celeste Saulo to discuss cooperation on global “meteorological governance”, said state news agency Xinhua, with the discussion touching on early warning systems and disaster relief.
EL NIÑO RISK: Officials at China’s National Climate Center (NCC) have said that an El Niño weather pattern is “likely to set in around May” and “intensify during the summer and autumn”, said China Daily. The state-run newspaper also quoted NCC chief forecaster Chen Lijuan saying it was “premature” to conclude that the El Niño could be at its strongest in 140 years, or that it could lead to record-breaking heat, although he added that the risks of such weather are “clearly increasing”. Wang Yaqi, a senior engineer at NCC, noted that the phenomenon “could hit hydropower-dependent regions hard, pushing them to burn more fossil fuels”, according to the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post.
Solar capacity growth slows
CLEAN CAPACITY: China’s clean-energy grid capacity now exceeds 2,400 gigawatts (GW), as of March 2026, or 60% of the total power mix, said state broadcaster CGTN in coverage of comments from energy officials at a press conference. It added that, within this, total wind and solar capacity reached 1,900GW. Energy news outlet International Energy Net cited the officials saying that China’s operational capacity for “green hydrogen” stands at 250,000 tonnes, with another 900,000 tonnes under construction.
SOLAR SLOWS: However, a data release showed that China added 41GW of new solar capacity in the first three months of 2026, reported BJX News, down from 60GW of new capacity in January-March 2025. Bloomberg noted that new solar capacity additions “slowed sharply to hit a four-year low” in March, adding that wind and thermal capacity growth also both slowed.
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‘MOST AMBITIOUS GOAL’: In a separate press conference, Chinese officials confirmed to Bloomberg that a pledge in the 15th five-year plan to double “non-fossil energy” in 10 years referred to energy capacity – not generation or consumption – and would run from 2025-2035. These details were “unclear” in the five-year plan itself, the outlet added. The economic news outlet Economic Daily said that the doubling goal was “one of the most ambitious goals in China’s energy transition history”, adding that “accelerating” the energy transition would allow the country to both reduce its reliance on the international energy market and “seize the high ground in the global race” to develop low-carbon industries.
More China news
- NEW BLEND: China has begun a project to blend gas supplies with 10% hydrogen in a part of Shandong province, reported the South China Morning Post, which added that the shift could cut China’s annual carbon emissions by “roughly 30m tonnes”.
- SKY-HIGH: China launched a “high-precision” satellite to monitor greenhouse gas emissions, said Xinhua.
- SUNNY SPAIN: Chinese automaker SAIC plans to build an electric vehicle (EV) factory in Spain, reported Bloomberg.
- MING YANG: Bloomberg also said that wind turbine maker Ming Yang is considering Spain after plans for a factory in the UK were blocked.
- FORMAL COMPLAINT: China has “formally submitted a complaint” to the EU about its Industrial Accelerator Act, said China Daily.
- EU TARIFFS: China’s commerce minister said he reached a “soft landing” with EU officials on EU tariffs on imports of Chinese-made EVs, according to Reuters.
Spotlight
How war, silver and taxes propelled China’s cleantech exports
China’s export of clean-energy technologies surged in March, driven by a doubling in solar shipments, according to analysis by Carbon Brief of Chinese customs data.
The spike can be explained in part by the impact of the conflict in the Middle East, but analysts argue that a newly enacted solar export policy is also behind the figures.
In this issue, Carbon Brief explores the factors behind the export spike and whether or not it will be sustained.
China’s exports of the “new three” clean-energy technology surged by 70% year-on-year in March 2026, reaching $21.6bn, according to Carbon Brief analysis.
Exports of the three technologies – solar cells and panels, electric vehicles (EVs) and lithium-ion batteries – were also up 37% from February, the month before the Iran war.
The conflict in the Middle East is one explanation for the surge, as it has caused several countries to emphasise the need to increase non-fossil energy supplies.
However, there are also other important drivers, revealed by Carbon Brief analysis of customs data showing differences in exports between solar, EVs and batteries.
Solar exports were notably higher in March 2026 than in the previous two months, jumping 99.2% compared to February.
By contrast, neither batteries’ nor EVs’ March figures came close to the surge in solar cells.
China’s March exports of batteries rose 37% compared with the previous month, while month-on-month EV shipments increased just 1.4%.
(Figures from the China Passenger Car Association suggest a larger rise in percentage terms, but this is based on a narrower scope that does not capture all exports.)
This may be because both technologies saw strong export performance throughout the first quarter of 2026. According to the customs data, more than one million EVs were exported from China between January and March, up 73% compared with the same period last year.
These quarterly exports may have helped meet growing interest in EVs due to the conflict, with BloombergNEF estimating that sales of EVs rose to 1.1m – up 2% year-on-year – in March. (Bloomberg said, within this total, sales “cooled” in China and the US but “surged” in Europe and parts of Asia.)
Solar surge
The chart below shows the export volumes of solar cells, EVs and batteries in March 2025, plus the first three months of 2026.
March’s solar exports were capable of generating 68 gigawatts (GW), equivalent to Spain’s entire installed solar capacity, according to energy thinktank Ember.
The Ember analysis showed that 50 countries set all-time records for Chinese solar imports in March, with another 60 reaching their highest levels in six months.
Exports to Asia doubled to 39GW, while shipments to Africa surged 176% to 10GW. Combined, these two regions accounted for three-quarters of the overall increase in exports.
The Middle East conflict has boosted demand, but a domestic policy deadline was a more immediate driver, analysts told Carbon Brief.
The Chinese government removed export tax rebates for solar products on 1 April, prompting manufacturers to rush out shipments before the change took effect.
Qin Qi, China analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, told Carbon Brief that such policy deadlines “can create a very sharp one-month jump in shipments”.
Batteries and EVs currently continue to receive export rebates.
Falling silver prices are another potential factor, as silver paste is used to make a key component in solar panels. The reversal of a recent price rally that had raised costs helped manufacturers make more panels ahead of the export switch, Marius Mordal Bakke, head of solar research at consultancy Rystad Energy told Reuters.
Temporary spike
Analysts predict that China’s April solar exports are unlikely to repeat March’s surge. Moreover, February exports were depressed by the Chinese New Year public holiday, making the March comparison unusually unfavourable.
“A month-on-month drop in April would not be surprising,” said Qin.
But she remains optimistic that global solar capacity additions outside China will continue to grow in 2026 due to energy supply concerns sparked by the Middle East conflict.
Dave Jones, chief analyst at Ember, said the removal of the export rebate will not “dramatically change demand”, especially as the conflict continues.
He argued that the policy could be positive, telling Carbon Brief: “This is what the global market needs: a more level playing field with China.”
This spotlight is by freelance China analyst Lekai Liu for Carbon Brief.
Watch, read, listen
TARGET ‘DIFFICULTIES’: Two researchers at the Energy Research Institute, a state thinktank, wrote in Economic Daily that China faces several “difficulties” in meeting its new carbon-intensity targets, including already-high renewable capacity installations and high levels of energy efficiency.
COMPARE AND CONTRAST: The US-China Podcast interviewed Prof Alex Wang on China’s approach to environmentalism and his view on the country’s energy transition.
GOVERNMENT CALLOUT: State broadcaster CCTV published a segment critiquing the massive investments and special treatment that local governments gave to their EV industries, fuelling intense competition.
‘THIN ARGUMENT’: A comment in Lawfare argued that the US should focus more on the “genuine geopolitical risks of climate change and [geoengineering] development”, rather than “thin” arguments around China weaponising weather modification technologies.
22.6%
The rate of “environmental health literacy” – or “recognition of the value of the ecological environment and its impact on health” – among China’s citizens, according to a government survey covered by Xinhua.
New science
- China will need to build more pipelines and push its carbon price above $100/tonne to make “green” ammonia a cost-competitive option for marine fuel | One Earth
- Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from China’s lakes increased from 41m tonnes to 51m tonnes of CO2 per year between 2000 and 2021, coinciding with “rapid lake expansion” across the country | Science Advances
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China Briefing is written by Anika Patel, with contributions from Lekai Liu, and edited by Simon Evans. Please send tips and feedback to china@carbonbrief.org
The post China Briefing 30 April 2026: Fossil fuel ‘strict controls’ | El Niño approaches | Why cleantech exports have surged appeared first on Carbon Brief.
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