Chinese government leaders published a policy document on 22 April – Earth Day – calling for stricter controls on fossil-fuel consumption and greater oversight of heavy emitters.
It has been interpreted by experts as a signal of China’s ongoing commitment to climate action and a bridging policy between the 15th five-year plan, published in March, and future thematic and sectoral five-year plans expected to be published in the months and years ahead.
While the policy document – known as “guiding opinions” – is not strictly binding, it bears the stamp of the two highest bodies in China’s political system, conveying a strong sense of authority.
One expert tells Carbon Brief that this is the first high-level document to explicitly link decarbonisation efforts with energy security and industrial development.
It was also followed on 23 April by a second document, which is binding, that strengthens environmental inspections of provincial governments and creates new metrics for future evaluations, such as total emissions and coal consumption.
Below, Carbon Brief examines how the policies could impact China’s approach to peaking its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions.
- Why are ‘guiding opinions’ important?
- What does the new ‘opinions’ document say about fossil fuels?
- How have climate evaluation rules been strengthened?
- What does the ‘opinions’ document say about energy security?
Why are ‘guiding opinions’ important?
Documents play an important role in disseminating political messages through China’s vast government bureaucracy. There is a well-defined hierarchy for different types of policies, each of which infer a different level of importance and flexibility.
“Opinions” are officially defined by the Chinese government as the “presentation of views and proposed solutions regarding important issues”.
They outline broad principles and general policy directions for lower levels of government to incorporate into more concrete policies.
Policy recommendations included in an opinion are implied to be non-binding, allowing officials more discretion in how they are implemented on the ground.
Prof Yuan Jiahai from the North China Electric Power University in Beijing previously told Carbon Brief that naming a document “guiding opinions” means it will have a “long-term, directional and systematic impact”.
An example is a set of opinions on a “green and low-carbon circular development economic system” issued in February 2021, which laid out broad policy recommendations across several economic sectors to spur “green planning, green design, green investment, green construction, green production, green circulation, green life and green consumption”.
“Following these opinions, China’s green growth accelerated significantly,” Prof Christoph Nedopil, professor at the University of Queensland, tells Carbon Brief. He adds:
“This is not to say that some of the developments would not have happened without such a guidance, but the guidance provided the clear direction and authority to various government departments and businesses to strengthen the support for the green and low-carbon transition.”
The new “opinions” document, on energy saving and carbon reduction, carries additional weight because of the bodies that issued it. Specifically, it was issued jointly by the general offices of the central committee of the Communist party of China (CCCPC), the highest party organ and headed by President Xi Jinping, and the state council, the highest government body and headed by Premier Li Qiang. This indicates that it has the approval of all of China’s most senior policymakers.
The document “signals China’s increasing confidence in its clean-energy sector”, says Yang Biqing, energy analyst for Asia at thinktank Ember.
The timing also makes the document important, says Hu Min, director and co-founder for the Beijing-based thinktank Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress.
She notes that the document, published soon after the close of the “two sessions” in March, is a “way to move things forward” in energy and climate policy. Hu adds that it sends a signal of the direction likely to be taken in upcoming thematic and sectoral five-year plans on topics such as peaking carbon emissions, renewable energy and coal.
“I’m quite excited about it,” she tells Carbon Brief.
What does the new ‘opinions’ document say about fossil fuels?
The opinions document includes a plethora of recommendations across several sectors, from promoting energy-saving measures in data centres and clean heating solutions to developing “integrated steel-to-chemicals” projects and “zero-carbon transport corridors”.
But some of the most interesting language was reserved for the use of coal.
China’s carbon reduction “situation…remains relatively severe”, says a government statement summarised by carbon-market information platform Tanpaifang, with the energy system still “reliant” on coal.
The “opinions” document is, therefore, of “great significance for building broader and stronger consensus across society”, it adds.
In 2025, developers in China submitted new or reactivated proposals to build a total of 161 gigawatts of new coal-fired power plants, as shown in the figure below.
The new document acknowledges the need to “strictly control fossil-fuel consumption”, in language significantly stronger than the 15th five-year plan published after the two-sessions meeting in March.
The five-year plan only pledged to “promote the peaking” of coal and oil use.
The document also outlines several other measures for managing fossil-fuel CO2 emissions, including “deepening efforts to reduce coal and oil use”, “actively promoting the clean replacement” of coal-fired equipment and “advancing” the replacement of “dispersed coal” use in an “orderly” manner.
However, it stops short of a complete rejection of coal-fired power, saying, for example, that policymakers should “reasonably control the scale of coal-fired power generation capacity and output”.
Nevertheless, Hu tells Carbon Brief, the document represents efforts by China’s leaders to “articulate” what controlling fossil fuels might look like.
Yang agrees, saying that the shift in the language on coal was “encouraging”.
She notes the granularity of the recommendations around coal, such as a line urging policymakers to “determine the dispatch sequence and load regulation for coal-fired power”.
“It is very interesting that, at this high level [of government], they have so clearly outlined this obstacle in coal’s [changing] role…from baseload to flexibility,” she says.
Experts interviewed by Carbon Brief said the language on renewable energy, which signalled ongoing support for China’s clean-energy buildout, was positive but unsurprising.
The document urges officials to “vigorously develop non-fossil energy sources and new-energy storage technologies”, highlighting the need for technologies such as pumped-storage hydropower and microgrids to boost consumption.
For Hu, market conditions, investment and local policies are now more important than central government signals for China’s clean-energy buildout.
The main debate is fossil fuels, she says, and any signals that encourage limiting coal use will “make a difference”.
How have climate evaluation rules been strengthened?
The guiding opinions document also dedicates significant space to outlining measures for reviewing and evaluating carbon-reduction efforts.
It states that local officials should undertake “comprehensive” evaluations of the energy consumption, coal consumption and carbon emissions of new projects, with plans to reduce or offset emissions becoming a “key component” of evaluating the project.
Similarly, the plan pledges to strengthen the review by the central government of local governments’ annual reports on energy use and carbon emissions, with warnings issued to local governments for “lagging progress” or “unreasonable increases in indicators”.
The central government will also strengthen supervision through “regular special inspections”, the “opinions” document says.
For regions that are “severely” falling behind on targets or are found to have “insufficient” ability to run their own inspections, the opinions threaten to “adjust or suspend their authority” for conducting evaluations and “delay or restrict” approvals for new projects.
The document also makes “local party committees and governments” responsible for their jurisdictions’ carbon reduction work. Party members and state-owned enterprises must “lead by example”, it adds.
The day after the opinions were released, the CCCPC and state council also issued a series of measures for “comprehensive evaluation” of local efforts to peak and reduce carbon emissions.
Unlike the guiding opinions, this document is considered binding policy – in this case overseen primarily by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), China’s powerful economic planning agency.
Under the new rules, central government officials – led by the NDRC with significant input from the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (MEE), National Energy Administration (NEA) and other departments – will grade local governments on their carbon-reduction efforts.
The measures largely align provinces’ emissions reduction evaluations with China’s existing climate pledges for 2030.
Key targets include reducing carbon intensity by more than 65% by 2030, compared to 2005 levels, “reasonably” controlling coal-fired power generation, achieving a “25% share of non-fossil energy consumption by 2030” and “gradually” covering all new power demand with clean energy.
The government also sets out 14 indicators, shown in the table below. At the top of the list are five key “control indicators”: total carbon emissions; reductions in carbon intensity; total coal consumption; total oil consumption; and the share of non-fossil energy consumption.
The NDRC is responsible for evaluating all five of the key indicators, with the MEE also overseeing the first three.
Provinces that fail to meet any of the control indicators will receive an “unsatisfactory” rating, leading to “corrective measures”, according to solar news outlet Zhihui Photovoltaic.
In a comment article in finance news outlet Caixin, Chen Lihao says that the two documents together “form the institutional foundation” for China’s “full-scale transition” to a dual control of carbon system.
Chen is the deputy director of the special committee on resources and environment at the Jiusan Society, the political party that environment minister Huang Runqiu belongs to.
The measures build on China’s existing inspection system to create a “much stronger accountability and compliance system”, says Qin Qi, China analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air.
The “real step forward”, she adds, is how climate and carbon targets – including China’s international commitments – have now been explicitly placed inside a “party-backed assessment framework” that uses pass-or-fail judgements on each indicator, rather than letting weak performance disappear inside a broad score.
Li Shuo, China climate hub director at the Asia Society Policy Institute echoes this, telling Carbon Brief that the new policy represents a “helpful step toward implementation, bringing greater clarity on tasks and responsibilities”.
Inspections are regarded as a powerful tool for the MEE in enforcing climate policy, allowing it to publicly identify non-compliant bodies, with state media often announcing results.
In 2021, inspection teams even publicly criticised the NEA, scolding it for “falling behind” on developing low-carbon energy in a move described at the time as “unprecedented”.
The emphasis that the opinions document places on evaluations and the stronger requirements that it represents “shows…the whole system that this is very important…it’s not just talk”, says Hu. (Hu spoke with Carbon Brief before the evaluation framework was released.)
However, both Li and Qin note that much depends on how the evaluations are enforced.
The strength of the system will “inevitably involve further political bargaining within the Chinese system”, says Li, shaped both by differences in the priorities of different ministries and geopolitical developments – particularly the outcomes of the conflict in the Middle East.
Qin highlights the greater capacity that the measures give the MEE to enforce inspections.
“The ministry has a more formal standing to push back on coal expansion and to speak on climate policy in a more direct way,” she says, but adds that the NDRC will still be the “central driver” of evaluating emissions.
She also notes that, while earlier central government inspections incorporated explicit instructions about making evaluation results public, the new measures place more emphasis on “internal” mechanisms, rather than public disclosure.
What does the ‘opinions’ document say about energy security?
The opinions document also settles a debate on energy security that has been playing out in the Chinese media since the start of the conflict in the Middle East.
It opens with a statement that “energy conservation and carbon reduction are key” both for China’s “dual-carbon” goals and energy transition and for “safeguarding national energy security”.
“The first sentence connects directly decarbonisation with energy security and industrial development, which is, if I’m not mistaken, the first time…that this has been linked and recognised [in such a high-level policy],” Yang tells Carbon Brief.
Although not always explicitly referencing the conflict, several outlets have run stories highlighting the importance of various energy technologies to China’s energy security.
Some outlets, including state broadcaster CCTV and the Communist Youth League’s official newspaper, China Youth Daily, focused on the positive role low-carbon energy plays in China’s energy system. Others have underscored the importance of fossil fuels, including state news agency Xinhua, which has run a series on becoming an “energy powerhouse” interviewing representatives of the fossil fuel industry.
On 20 April, NDRC head Zheng Shanjie wrote in the Communist party-affiliated People’s Daily that China should further strengthen energy security, including by increasing oil and gas reserves and production, reinforcing the role of coal-fired power as a “base-load guarantee” and expanding Sino-Russian oil and gas cooperation. He flagged “disruptions” in the Strait of Hormuz as a cause for concern.
Zheng’s article came out on the same day that Chinese premier Li Qiang held a “study session” meeting with other high-level officials discussing the need to implement a “new strategy for energy security”, deepening energy system reforms to support the country’s low-carbon transition.
The guiding opinions specifically instruct the NDRC, the country’s powerful economic planning agency, to “conscientiously fulfill its duties” in achieving China’s carbon goals, including across planning, implementation and evaluation.
It adds that “all relevant [government] departments shall perform their respective duties, cooperate closely and form a concerted effort”.
However, experts had differing opinions on whether this signalled heightened scrutiny of the NDRC, or if it emphasised its importance to emission reduction efforts.
“The mention…seems to highlight an elevated scrutiny of its work on energy transition”, says Nedopil, but “does not seem to signal an increase of its responsibilities in the energy transition, considering the mention of [the responsibilities of other departments]”.
The post Q&A: China’s leadership calls for ‘strict control’ of fossil fuels appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: China’s leadership calls for ‘strict control’ of fossil fuels
Global fossil-fuel emissions are set to fall by around 0.5% in 2026 amid the fallout from the Hormuz crisis, according to Carbon Brief analysis.
The US-Iran war has severely disrupted trade through the strait of Hormuz, causing a spike in oil and gas prices that continues to ripple around the global economy.
Each month of disruption – and each new flashpoint, such as in Yemen – is increasing the incentive to switch to alternatives.
Those alternatives include coal, with the latest forecasts pointing to a 1.2% rise in coal demand this year – apparently supporting media claims of a “return to coal” in the wake of the crisis.
Yet Carbon Brief’s analysis shows the rise in emissions associated with this increased coal use, much of which is unrelated to Hormuz, is set to be more than offset by declines for oil and gas.
The estimated overall impact on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from fossil fuels in 2026 is shown in the figure below and amounts to a reduction of around 0.5% from 2025 levels.
(Fossil fuels account for two-thirds of global greenhouse gas emissions.)
The emissions estimates for each fossil fuel are based on the latest forecasts from the International Energy Agency (IEA) for coal, oil and gas, in light of the ongoing global energy crisis.
For example, the agency initially estimated that global coal demand would decline this year. In its 2025 coal report, published in mid-December, it said that declining coal demand in China would outweigh the impact of pro-coal policies under US president Donald Trump.
In contrast, the latest update, published in September 2026, said that global coal demand would rise by 1.2% in 2026, instead of the small decline that had been expected.
The report highlighted the boost to coal demand from higher gas prices in the wake of Hormuz. However, there are limits to this, because few countries can switch from gas to coal at large scale.
The IEA’s latest report also noted the role of a strong El Niño, which is pushing up the need for cooling and depressing hydropower output in key markets. Other short-term factors are also affecting coal demand this year, including a rising amount of “wasted” wind and solar in China.
For gas, the IEA did not initially update its previous forecast that global gas demand would rise by 2.0% in 2026, which had been published in January of this year.
Its most recent forecast – published in July – already pointed to a 0.6% drop in demand in 2026. Since then, pressure on gas demand from high prices has only grown stronger.
For oil, there has been an even more dramatic shift in forecasts since the start of the year.
In its January 2026 oil market report, the IEA forecast a rise in demand in 2026 of 930,000 barrels per day (bpd). As shown in the figure below, this has been steadily revised downwards over the course of the year, as the Hormuz crisis was first ignited – and then extended.
By September, the IEA was forecasting a 2,500,000bpd drop in oil demand in 2026, equivalent to a reduction of 2.4% from 2025 levels.
(A 15 September research note from Morgan Stanley, not available online, found a “consensus” forecast of a 2,415,000bpd drop in demand in 2026.)
While there are many short-term factors at play in the shifting forecasts for 2026, it is clear that the latest energy crisis will also affect fossil-fuel demand in the next year and beyond.
For example, whereas the IEA initially forecast that oil demand would rebound in 2027 to well above 2025 levels, it is now expecting use of the fuel to be effectively flat for two years.
This puts a question mark over its previous expectation – published in October last year – that global oil demand would not peak until as late as 2030.
“For every month the conflict lasts, the probability of permanent [oil] demand destruction increases,” wrote Sverre Alvik, vice president at consultancy DNV in a late August analysis.
As fuel prices have surged, electric vehicles (EVs) have captured record shares of major car markets, from Australia and China through to Europe, Indonesia and Thailand.
In July, EV sales nearly doubled year-on-year in “new markets”, noted Alvik, pointing to countries outside China, Europe and North America.
The IEA says the 2027 outlooks for coal and gas are interdependent, with coal demand potentially increasing again if gas prices remain elevated – or dropping back if gas prices ease.
At the same time, governments in countries that had planned to rely on imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) have been signalling shifts towards favouring domestic clean energy instead – or continuing to use coal for longer.
The current crisis, therefore, has the potential to not only lower fossil-fuel use and emissions in the short term, but also on a more lasting basis.
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The post Analysis: Global fossil-fuel emissions set to fall in 2026 amid Hormuz crisis appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: Global fossil-fuel emissions set to fall in 2026 amid Hormuz crisis
Aviation is on track to be responsible for 80% of the UK’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions by 2050, according to the Climate Change Committee (CCC).
Emissions from flying have more than doubled since 1990 – driven by rising passenger numbers – even as the climate impact of every other sector in the UK economy has fallen.
The UK does not have “credible” policies in place to reverse this trend of rising emissions, says the CCC in new advice to the government on future aviation policy.
The government has signalled its support for expanding Heathrow, the nation’s largest airport, while relying on “techno-fixes” such as “sustainable aviation fuels” (SAFs) to cut emissions.
Yet, even without Heathrow expansion, the CCC says aviation emissions are on track to be higher in 2050 than they are today – reaching 38m tonnes of CO2 (MtCO2).
As the chart below shows, this would account for most of the remaining CO2 from the UK economy, all of which would need to be removed from the atmosphere in order to meet the legal target of net-zero emissions.
Expanding Heathrow would add another 2.4MtCO2 in 2050, amounting to around 5% of all the UK’s emissions. (This would increase to 4.5MtCO2 when expansion is complete in 2054.)
With a final decision on Heathrow expansion expected by 2029, the government asked the CCC for its advice on whether the plan is compatible with the UK’s climate targets.
The CCC has concluded that the UK simply lacks sufficient policies to reduce aviation emissions and “expanding Heathrow would compound the problem”. In a press briefing, CCC chair Nigel Topping told journalists:
“The UK does not currently have a credible plan to reduce [aviation emissions] in line with net-zero, so that creates a serious challenge for meeting our climate commitments.”
The “jet-zero strategy”, launched by the previous Conservative government in 2022, set out plans to cut aviation emissions. However, the Labour government has since accepted that the strategy’s expectations for SAFs, electric planes and fuel-efficiency improvements were unrealistic.
The CCC says a “credible and robust net-zero policy framework for aviation” should be set out in a revised strategy, which is planned for 2027. Only then could Heathrow expansion be aligned with the net-zero goal, adds the committee.
As part of this new strategy, the CCC says the “aviation sector needs to take responsibility for its emissions”. It says policies should be designed based on the “polluter pays” principle, requiring the aviation industry to fund its own SAFs and CO2 removal.
Specifically, the committee says funding will be needed for “engineered removal” technologies, such as direct air carbon capture and storage (DACCS).
These technologies are currently “not yet available at the scale required”, but are vital for the kind of permanent CO2 removal needed to mop up aviation emissions, says the CCC.
(“Natural solutions” such as tree planting are the other main way CO2 is expected to be removed from the atmosphere. However, the CCC envisages these removals offsetting the remaining methane emissions from livestock agriculture in the UK, whereas it says “engineered removals” would be required to remove and store CO2 from flights.)
The CCC acknowledges that placing decarbonisation costs on airlines would likely lead to higher ticket prices. It estimates that this could mean an increase, in 2024 prices, of around £150 for a return trip to Alicante, Spain, and £400 for a return trip to New York by 2050.
However, it says this is preferable to a public spending approach, which would result in the roughly 50% of the population who do not fly paying for flight-related CO2 removals.
In addition, the committee notes that higher costs would help to manage demand for flights, which would otherwise be expected to increase considerably over the coming decades.
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The post CCC: Heathrow expansion could push flights to ‘80% of UK emissions by 2050’ appeared first on Carbon Brief.
CCC: Heathrow expansion could push flights to ‘80% of UK emissions by 2050’
A fifth of the world’s greenhouse gas emissions are linked to international trade in goods and services, a new tracker shows, spotlighting a little-studied issue that researchers say should be tackled by the UN climate process.
Currently, as part of the Paris Agreement, every country is responsible for counting and reducing the planet-heating emissions that are produced within its territory. Manufacturing countries, for example, may have high emissions even if what they make is exported for consumption elsewhere.
But new analysis from the European Climate Foundation (ECF) and climate consultancy Matière, based on the tracker’s data, shows that some countries have a high footprint of “imported emissions” from goods and services they ship in. These emissions are often ignored in the places where the products are consumed because they are not formally counted under greenhouse gas inventories.
In the European Union, for example, while domestic emissions have declined since 2015, imported emissions have remained unchanged, the analysis shows. In some countries, like Austria or Sweden, they are as high as the country’s entire annual carbon footprint.
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Former EU lead climate negotiator Jacob Werksman said that under the Paris Agreement, these traded emissions are accounted for in the countries where they are originally produced, but importing countries can also take responsibility for their consumption.
“It starts with a wide recognition by many jurisdictions around the world that we need to know the carbon content of these products, and we then need to agree what is a fair, effective, transparent and relatively easy-to-implement way of measuring that carbon in traded products,” he told a launch event for the trade emissions tracker, which contains data for different countries, sectors and gases.
Trade and its role in addressing climate change has become a higher priority at UN climate talks after a push led by emerging economies including China, India and South Africa led to the first trade and climate change dialogue held this year at the mid-year session in Bonn.
At the upcoming COP31 UN summit in Antalya, some voluntary initiatives like the Brazil-led Integrated Forum on Climate Change and Trade are expected to continue, but the issue does not feature in Türkiye’s Action Agenda of climate initiatives and formal negotiations are not scheduled on the topic.
China: the world’s top emissions exporter
As a manufacturing powerhouse, China ranks first in the new tracker as the world’s top-emitting country, but the data shows that a large chunk of the country’s carbon emissions – an amount larger than Brazil’s entire annual carbon footprint – are linked to products that are exported and consumed abroad.
Russia, Brazil, the US and the EU rank as the top destinations for Chinese trade-related emissions, which are mostly linked to components for power generation, basic metals like copper and lead, and non-metallic minerals like graphite and phosphorus.
Yet China is also the world’s top emissions importer, related mostly to agricultural products, fossil fuels and minerals brought from the US, the EU, Japan and India, among others. The US ranks second by a close margin, with both countries importing about 1.6 billion tonnes of CO2 equivalent.
China’s industrial engine starts to break its fossil fuel habit
Richard Baron, ECF’s industrial policy and trade director, said Chinese clean energy products are key for reducing emissions around the world, adding that Europe is “not able to do without those technologies” for its energy transition.
“China has an emissions trading system that counts CO2 differently there. But if China and the EU were to agree on some kind of translation mechanism to say ‘this is how we measure it’, and companies can understand the protocol to navigate both markets, that would set the tone for a lot of other conversations,” he said at the platform’s launch event last week.
The analysis suggests that if the EU and China aligned their climate requirements for products, the resulting standards could influence trade flows representing about 7% of global emissions.
Baron said there’s “a plethora” of multilateral spaces to hold these discussions, including the climate and trade dialogue at the UN climate talks or the Climate Club at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which seeks to cut industrial emissions.
Trade breaks into agenda of UN climate talks – but will it have teeth?
Controversial trade measures
Instruments like the Europe’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) – a recent piece of legislation that penalises emissions-heavy imported products – are one tool that could be used to address trade-related emissions, said Antoine Oger, executive director at the Institute for European Environmental Policy.
He said a significant portion of imported emissions in Europe are already covered by CBAM, as it includes sectors like cement, iron and steel, fertilisers and aluminium. This then allows the EU “to engage in constructive dialogue with our trade partners”, he added.
But across diplomatic summits, including at UN climate talks, emerging economies have pushed back heavily against the CBAM and other trade measures. The most recent BRICS declaration adopted on Saturday by 11 such countries – including China, India and Russia – condemns “protectionism under the guise of environmental objectives”.
The declaration calls for the “elimination of such unlawful measures”, which they argue have “far-reaching negative implications for the human rights, including the rights to development, health and food security” of vulnerable communities.
“The question of responsibility is a political question,” Oger said. “These emissions exist – they are emitted somewhere to make a product that will be consumed elsewhere. So you can debate responsibility but the idea is for the two parts to recognise there’s a problem.”
The aim, he added “is not to point fingers, but to accept this is a reality of our emissions profiles and ask what we can do about it”.
The post International trade linked to 20% of global emissions – but imports ignored appeared first on Climate Home News.
International trade linked to 20% of global emissions – but imports ignored
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