The EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) has been touted as a key policy for cutting emissions from heavy industries, such as steel and cement production.
By taxing carbon-intensive imports, the EU says it will help its domestic companies take ambitious climate action while still remaining competitive with firms in nations where environmental laws are less strict.
There is evidence that the CBAM is also driving other governments to launch tougher carbon-pricing policies of their own, to avoid paying border taxes to the EU.
It has also helped to shift climate and trade up the international climate agenda, potentially contributing to a broader increase in ambition.
However, at a time of growing protectionism and economic rivalry between major powers, the new levy has proved controversial.
Many developing countries have branded CBAMs as “unfair” policies that will leave them worse off financially, saying they will make it harder for them to decarbonise their economies.
Analysis also suggests that the EU’s CBAM, in isolation, will have a limited impact on global emissions.
In this Q&A, Carbon Brief explains how the CBAM works and the impact on climate policies it is already having in the EU and around the world, as nations such as the UK and the US consider implementing CBAMs and related policies of their own.
- What is a carbon border adjustment mechanism?
- Why was the CBAM introduced in the EU?
- How will the EU’s CBAM work?
- How is the mechanism expected to cut emissions?
- What are the reactions from developing countries?
- Are other countries introducing their own mechanisms?
What is a carbon border adjustment mechanism?
A carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) is a tax applied to certain imported goods, based on the amount of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions released during their production.
It targets industries that are typically emissions-intensive and relatively easy to trade internationally, such as steel, aluminium and cement.
CBAMs work on the basis that climate laws and standards in some nations – usually those in the global north – are tighter than those found elsewhere.
This means that the producer of a particular emissions-intensive product might have to pay a domestic carbon price, for example, whereas an overseas competitor might not.
Under a CBAM, a nation that applies a carbon price to its domestic steel industry would apply an equivalent charge at the border, to steel imported from overseas.
This is meant to “level the playing field” between producers in different countries. Those that make goods at a lower cost, but without a domestic carbon price of their own, would have to pay an equivalent fee when exporting to the country imposing a CBAM. This would allow domestic industries in the importing country to compete, while still curbing their own emissions.
CBAMs have been proposed as a response to fears of “carbon leakage”.
If nations lose carbon-intensive businesses because they close down or choose to do business elsewhere, this could harm the economies of nations trying to implement carbon pricing. At the same time, it could increase global emissions, if domestic manufacturing is simply replaced by more carbon-intensive imports.
This issue has risen to prominence in recent years, as the EU has become the first actor to introduce a CBAM.
CBAMs have been discussed ever since the early days of international climate action in the 1990s. There was recognition at that time of the risks of carbon leakage, as developed countries were being tasked with cutting their emissions under the Kyoto Protocol.
In particular, the EU launching its emissions trading system (ETS) in 2005 prompted what one study describes as “heated discussion” of the role that border taxes could play in preventing high-emitting industries moving away from EU member states to other countries.
(Despite these concerns, there has to date been essentially no evidence of carbon leakage. However, researchers have noted that this could be because high-emitting industries are yet to face strict carbon pricing: those in the EU generally receive free emissions allowances.)
The EU frames its CBAM as not only a means of placing a “fair price” on emissions bound up in imported goods, but also a way to “encourage cleaner industrial production” in the nations it imports goods from.
However, critics say variously that it is more to do with economic protectionism, or that it will harm trade, or that it will exacerbate existing inequalities between nations.
Why was the CBAM introduced in the EU?
The EU CBAM was brought in as part of the European Green Deal, the EU’s strategy to reach net-zero emissions by 2050.
A CBAM has been under consideration in the EU for years. The European Commission informally proposed a border adjustment in 2007, following the launch of the ETS. In the years that followed, France suggested such a scheme on two more separate occasions.
In her 2019 manifesto to become European Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen raised the issue again, saying she would “introduce a carbon border tax to avoid carbon leakage” to “ensure our companies can compete on a level playing field”.
In recent years, there has been much concern around how the EU can avert “deindustrialisation” and maintain its competitive edge against other major powers, such as the US and China. The CBAM is one of the measures launched under Von der Leyen’s leadership in an effort to tackle these threats, whether perceived or real.
The idea came to fruition in 2021, when it was presented by the commission as part of its “Fit for 55” package to drive the EU’s transition to net-zero. Following negotiations with EU member state governments and members of the European Parliament, the CBAM became law in May 2023.
One reason the CBAM was finally adopted in the EU was because of a perceived need to avoid carbon leakage, while also ramping up overall emissions reductions. Emissions from heavy industry in the EU have not fallen considerably since 1990, despite being covered by the EU ETS for two decades.
This is partly because these sectors, many of which are considered “exposed” to international trade – and, therefore, carbon leakage – are handed free allowances in the EU ETS. These allowances enable businesses to continue emitting greenhouse gases at no extra cost – or even to profit from selling free allowances, if their own production falls.
Companies in these sectors are, therefore, able to compete with foreign imports from countries that do not have carbon-pricing systems. However, the free allowances also mean those companies have less of a financial incentive to decarbonise.
The CBAM is explicitly described as a replacement for the free allowances given to companies making steel, cement and other trade-exposed goods. It will be phased in as those allowances are phased out, a process that will be complete in 2034.
The CBAM has been framed as an “enabling policy” that boosts the political acceptability of higher carbon prices within the EU and, in doing so, drives industrial decarbonisation.
However, it has also been described as a policy to encourage global emissions cuts. After Von der Leyen took over as commission president, a communication concerning the European Green Deal said the CBAM would be introduced “should differences in levels of ambition worldwide persist, as the EU increases its climate ambition”.
Finally, another reason for the measure is that the European Commission estimates it will raise €1.5bn in revenue in 2028 – and this will increase as the mechanism expands. Of this total, 75% will go to the EU budget and the rest to member states.
How will the EU’s CBAM work?
The EU CBAM is being rolled out gradually. Between October 2023 and the end of 2025, any company that imports goods covered by the CBAM into the EU will have to declare them in quarterly reports.
The products covered by the CBAM include those deemed “at most significant risk of carbon leakage” by the EU, initially including cement, iron, steel, aluminium, fertilisers and hydrogen, as well as electricity transmitted from other countries.
This list is expected to expand, following further assessments by the EU, to cover sectors such as ceramics and paper.
Reporting will cover all of the emissions generated when those products are made. This includes “direct” emissions, such as the carbon dioxide (CO2) released during cement production, and “indirect” emissions, such as those from the fossil-fuel generated electricity used to power cement factories.
The full compliance phase of the CBAM will begin from the start of 2026. From this point, companies bringing CBAM-covered goods into the EU will have to purchase enough CBAM certificates to cover their associated emissions. The cost of these certificates will be the same as the EU ETS market price.
If companies can demonstrate that they have paid a carbon price for goods in their country of origin, they will be able to deduct a corresponding amount from their certificate purchases to avoid taxing the products twice.
Initially, exporters in relevant sectors will only have to buy certificates equivalent to 2.5% of the emissions associated with producing their goods. This obligation will rise to 100% by 2034, in line with the removal of free allowances for EU industries.
The EU says that, when “fully phased in”, the CBAM will apply to more than half of the emissions covered by the ETS overall.
How is the mechanism expected to cut emissions?
The CBAM will add a carbon cost to EU imports that could encourage emissions cuts both domestically and internationally.
The mechanism is supposed to drive industrial decarbonisation by facilitating the removal of free EU ETS allowances for industries such as steel and cement.
Maintaining domestic industries in the EU is also intended to avoid an increase in global emissions due to carbon leakage.
Yet various calculations of the overall impact of the EU CBAM on global emissions have produced fairly modest results.
An initial 2021 assessment by the European Commission estimated that its proposed CBAM design would reduce emissions from affected EU industries by 1% by 2030. It calculated that global emissions from these industries would be cut by 0.4% over the same timescale.
More recent analysis, conducted by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), considers the impact of the CBAM at a carbon price of €100 per tonne of CO2 – a level that was reached for the first time last year before falling again.
It concludes that the CBAM would reduce global emissions by less than 0.2%, relative to the ETS on its own. This would be accompanied by a 0.4% drop in global exports to the EU.
Ian Mitchell, a senior policy fellow and co-director of the Europe programme at the Center for Global Development (CGD), tells Carbon Brief:
“It’s not so surprising that CBAM has a modest impact on global emissions. As a unilateral measure, most of the trade in carbon it affects will be diverted to other jurisdictions without similar charges.”
However, he adds that CBAM is still “extremely important and valuable”, because it establishes the principle of carbon pricing and a “level playing field” globally.
Another key way that the CBAM could drive emissions cuts is by encouraging other nations to implement their own climate measures, including carbon pricing.
A recent report by the NGO Resources for the Future says the hope is that CBAMs will “lead to a virtuous cycle, where more and more countries adopt carbon pricing”. It explains that CBAMs can allow governments to overcome domestic political constraints to carbon pricing:
“The external pressure of a CBAM can provide both impetus and a scapegoat, akin to pushing an open door, as policymakers can point out that exporting firms would have to pay these fees when they export regardless of domestic policy action.”
The EU CBAM has already sparked a wave of responses from other countries. These have ranged from threats of retaliatory measures (see: What are the reactions from developing countries?) to plans for domestic CBAMs of their own (see: Are other countries introducing their own mechanisms?).
Yet there is some debate about how much the EU’s policy is spurring on climate action.
Analysis by CGD at the end of 2023 concluded that the “vast majority of lower income countries are a long way from implementing any carbon price”. At that time, no low-income countries were considering carbon pricing and only 11% of lower-middle income countries had one “scheduled or under consideration”, the group concluded.
Others assessments have been more optimistic. One early report from thinktank Clingendael linked new climate policies from nations including Turkey and Russia to the looming threat of CBAM.
A more recent report for the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA), which speaks for companies involved in global carbon markets, tracks responses from countries trading with the EU.
Julia Michalak, EU policy head at IETA, tells Carbon Brief that, ultimately, the CBAM is “not in itself a global mitigation policy tool”. However, she points to evidence of impacts, including Turkey, India and Brazil advancing work on their own ETSs, as well as China moving to expand its ETS to include cement, steel and aluminium – mirroring the EU CBAM.
Critical experts from global-south institutions have argued that sharing emissions-cutting technologies and scaling up climate finance would be more effective measures to decarbonise industries in developing countries.
(The EU CBAM text includes language about supporting “efforts towards the decarbonisation and transformation of…manufacturing industries” in developing countries.)
There has been discussion around using CBAM revenues to support industrial decarbonisation in other countries, although there has so far been no formal agreement to do this.
A report by the Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) argues that CBAM revenues could be a new form of climate finance for developing countries. The thinktank suggests that this could function in a similar way to the EU’s modernisation fund, which is financed with ETS revenue and supports clean energy in low-income EU states.
What are the reactions from developing countries?
Some of the most vocal opponents of the EU’s CBAM are among those expected to be most exposed to its impacts.
The map below is colour-coded according to nations’ relative exposure, according to the World Bank, based on the carbon intensity of their industries and how much they rely on exporting CBAM-covered products to the EU.
Nations shaded green could gain export competitiveness to the EU, while those shaded red could lose competitiveness.
Many of the most exposed nations have vocally opposed what they describe as “unilateral” trade measures, both at UN climate negotiations and at the World Trade Organization (WTO), where they have questioned their compatibility with international trade rules.
Some of them have argued that the costs of compliance will leave less money for dealing with poverty and meeting their Paris Agreement targets.
Observers have cited the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”, arguing that the EU is penalising developing countries despite its historic – and current – high levels of emissions, relative to much of the global south. Avantika Goswami, climate change programme lead at CSE, tells Carbon Brief:
“You are imposing these external standards onto developing countries whilst not specifically earmarking funding that would enable this decarbonisation effort.”
China is one of the developing countries affected by the CBAM that has criticised the EU’s new policy.
China’s steel and aluminium sector would see the biggest impacts, according to an analysis from the Center for Eco-Finance Studies at Renmin University. It estimated a 4-6% ($200m-400m) increase in export costs for the steel industry, for example.
(The analysis does not appear to account for potential price rises in EU steel markets, which could allow producers to recoup higher costs at the expense of consumers within the bloc.)
Li Chenggang, China’s ambassador to WTO, said at a meeting last June:
“We fully understand the EU’s environmental goals and appreciate its efforts…However, it is regrettable that the [CBAM] measures…fail to follow the basic principles of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement [the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”], as well as WTO rules. In fact, this measure may cause discrimination and market access restrictions on imported products, especially those from developing members.”
A report by the China office of consultancy PwC says about $35bn of trade between China and the EU could eventually be affected by the CBAM.
African countries have raised similar concerns. According to Akinwumi Adesina, president of African Development Bank, the continent could lose up to $25bn per year as a “direct result of CBAM”.
However, the $25bn figure cited by Adesina comes from a modelling scenario that does not correspond to the EU’s actual approach, says Tennant Reed, director of climate change and energy at the Australian Industry Group, in a post on LinkedIn.
In his post, Reed points to a series of issues with the underlying modelling in this and other studies of the impact of the EU’s CBAM on developing countries’ economies. He tells Carbon Brief:
“CBAM analysis can easily go awry if it: considers higher supply costs for covered products but not higher selling prices; assumes manufacturers and nations have static emissions intensities; or fails to represent the actual structure of policy. A genuinely non-discriminatory border adjustment should not disadvantage developing country exporters at all. Instead it can create a firmer commercial basis for clean industrial investment everywhere and a chance for developing countries that price carbon to effectively raise tax revenue from Europe.”
In July 2024, India’s economic affairs secretary Ajay Seth commented that the EU’s CBAM was “unfair and detrimental to domestic market costs”.
There have even been reports of India planning “retaliatory” trade measures and the Indian government has indicated its concerns will feed into discussions around India’s prospective free-trade agreement with the EU.
In addition, Simon Göss, managing director of the Berlin-based consulting firm carboneer, tells Carbon Brief that, for smaller companies, “hir[ing] [data] experts and set[ting] up monitoring systems…might make the end product more expensive”. He adds:
“In the short-term – until the end of 2024 – monitoring and reporting real emissions for producers of CBAM-goods in non-EU countries represents a huge challenge for smaller companies in technologically less advanced countries.”
Despite their criticisms, some developing country analyses have pointed to positive steps that their industries can take in response to the EU’s CBAM.
Beijing-based thinktank iGDP, for example, says, “looking at the long-term trend, China’s steel industry striv[ing] to reduce emissions is more economical than to pay the CBAM adjustment fee”.
Similarly, Renmin University says in a CBAM analysis that China’s steel industry should accelerate its shift to lower emissions and the country’s own carbon market “should be improved”.
Are other countries introducing their own mechanisms?
Other nations are expected to implement CBAMs and related measures of their own in response to the EU’s new policy.
Progress on this has been fairly slow, but there are signs that some nations in the global north are considering this approach in order to protect trade with the EU and support their own industrial decarbonisation.
Perhaps the most advanced CBAM outside of the EU is the UK’s effort. The UK government announced at the end of 2023 that it would implement the mechanism by 2027.
Unlike the EU’s CBAM, the UK’s version, in its initial stage, will include ceramics and glass. It will also not include the electricity the UK imports from its European neighbours via interconnectors. Some observers have called for greater harmonisation with the EU, suggesting that this would reduce the economic risk to the UK.
The Canadian government also announced plans to establish its own CBAM in the 2021 budget and launched a consultation to this effect.
Australia has also been considering a CBAM, with the government launching a review in 2023 to assess its potential to prevent carbon leakage – especially targeting steel and cement.
As for the US, there has been much debate around how it could implement a CBAM, despite lacking a domestic carbon-pricing system. (Carbon pricing has long proved controversial in the US. In fact an early form of CBAM was blocked in 2010 by Senate Republicans in the infamous Waxman-Markey bill, along with a national carbon pricing scheme.)
US leaders were initially hostile to the EU’s CBAM, even though the nation does not export large amounts of CBAM-covered products to the bloc. However, in the context of industrial rivalry with China, US lawmakers have proposed various CBAM-like policies in recent years, with a view to avoiding carbon leakage and ensuring global competitiveness.
These include the Clean Competition Act, backed by Democrats, and the Foreign Pollution Fee Act, backed by Republicans, both of which involve adding a carbon-intensity fee to imports.
Analysis by NGO Resources for the Future describes these proposals as a “significant sign of bipartisan interest in climate and trade policy”. Moreover, it says these actions can be attributed to the EU’s leadership in this area:
“Just as it is hard to imagine the EU coming up with as extensive a green industrial policy as it has without the [Inflation Reduction Act], it is equally hard to imagine the US devising specific climate and trade proposals without the impetus of CBAM.”
Ellie Belton, a senior policy advisor on trade and climate at the thinktank E3G, tells Carbon Brief that, while the EU CBAM “may well have kickstarted a new wave of climate ambition globally”, there is a need for “better diplomacy” to avoid disrupting multilateral progress:
“There is also an emerging risk of divergent CBAM schemes creating a patchwork of disjointed regulations worldwide, which would disproportionately impact developing countries and exacerbate the inequity in climate outcomes.”
Reflecting concerns about the impact such a “patchwork” could have on businesses, the International Chamber of Commerce has released a set of “global principles” to guide countries in introducing their own CBAMs.
Among other things, they include compliance with WTO rules and the principles of the Paris Agreement, as well as exemptions for least developed countries and small island states.
The post Q&A: Can ‘carbon border adjustment mechanisms’ help tackle climate change? appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: Can ‘carbon border adjustment mechanisms’ help tackle climate change?
Drought and heatwaves occurring together – known as “compound” events – have “surged” across the world since the early 2000s, a new study shows.
Compound drought and heat events (CDHEs) can have devastating effects, creating the ideal conditions for intense wildfires, such as Australia’s “Black Summer” of 2019-20 where bushfires burned 24m hectares and killed 33 people.
The research, published in Science Advances, finds that the increase in CDHEs is predominantly being driven by events that start with a heatwave.
The global area affected by such “heatwave-led” compound events has more than doubled between 1980-2001 and 2002-23, the study says.
The rapid increase in these events over the last 23 years cannot be explained solely by global warming, the authors note.
Since the late 1990s, feedbacks between the land and the atmosphere have become stronger, making heatwaves more likely to trigger drought conditions, they explain.
One of the study authors tells Carbon Brief that societies must pay greater attention to compound events, which can “cause severe impacts on ecosystems, agriculture and society”.
Compound events
CDHEs are extreme weather events where drought and heatwave conditions occur simultaneously – or shortly after each other – in the same region.
These events are often triggered by large-scale weather patterns, such as “blocking” highs, which can produce “prolonged” hot and dry conditions, according to the study.
Prof Sang-Wook Yeh is one of the study authors and a professor at the Ewha Womans University in South Korea. He tells Carbon Brief:
“When heatwaves and droughts occur together, the two hazards reinforce each other through land-atmosphere interactions. This amplifies surface heating and soil moisture deficits, making compound events more intense and damaging than single hazards.”
CDHEs can begin with either a heatwave or a drought.
The sequence of these extremes is important, the study says, as they have different drivers and impacts.
For example, in a CDHE where the heatwave was the precursor, increased direct sunshine causes more moisture loss from soils and plants, leading to a drought.
Conversely, in an event where the drought was the precursor, the lack of soil moisture means that less of the sun’s energy goes into evaporation and more goes into warming the Earth’s surface. This produces favourable conditions for heatwaves.
The study shows that the majority of CDHEs globally start out as a drought.
In recent years, there has been increasing focus on these events due to the devastating impact they have on agriculture, ecosystems and public health.
In Russia in the summer of 2010, a compound drought-heatwave event – and the associated wildfires – caused the death of nearly 55,000 people, the study notes.
The record-breaking Pacific north-west “heat dome” in 2021 triggered extreme drought conditions that caused “significant declines” in wheat yields, as well as in barley, canola and fruit production in British Columbia and Alberta, Canada, says the study.
Increasing events
To assess how CDHEs are changing, the researchers use daily reanalysis data to identify droughts and heatwaves events. (Reanalysis data combines past observations with climate models to create a historical climate record.) Then, using an algorithm, they analyse how these events overlap in both time and space.
The study covers the period from 1980 to 2023 and the world’s land surface, excluding polar regions where CDHEs are rare.
The research finds that the area of land affected by CDHEs has “increased substantially” since the early 2000s.
Heatwave-led events have been the main contributor to this increase, the study says, with their spatial extent rising 110% between 1980-2001 and 2002-23, compared to a 59% increase for drought-led events.
The map below shows the global distribution of CDHEs over 1980-2023. The charts show the percentage of the land surface affected by a heatwave-led CDHE (red) or a drought-led CDHE (yellow) in a given year (left) and relative increase in each CDHE type (right).
The study finds that CDHEs have occurred most frequently in northern South America, the southern US, eastern Europe, central Africa and south Asia.
Threshold passed
The authors explain that the increase in heatwave-led CDHEs is related to rising global temperatures, but that this does not tell the whole story.
In the earlier 22-year period of 1980-2001, the study finds that the spatial extent of heatwave-led CDHEs rises by 1.6% per 1C of global temperature rise. For the more-recent period of 2022-23, this increases “nearly eightfold” to 13.1%.
The change suggests that the rapid increase in the heatwave-led CDHEs occurred after the global average temperature “surpasse[d] a certain temperature threshold”, the paper says.
This threshold is an absolute global average temperature of 14.3C, the authors estimate (based on an 11-year average), which the world passed around the year 2000.
Investigating the recent surge in heatwave-leading CDHEs further, the researchers find a “regime shift” in land-atmosphere dynamics “toward a persistently intensified state after the late 1990s”.
In other words, the way that drier soils drive higher surface temperatures, and vice versa, is becoming stronger, resulting in more heatwave-led compound events.
Daily data
The research has some advantages over other previous studies, Yeh says. For instance, the new work uses daily estimations of CDHEs, compared to monthly data used in past research. This is “important for capturing the detailed occurrence” of these events, says Yeh.
He adds that another advantage of their study is that it distinguishes the sequence of droughts and heatwaves, which allows them to “better understand the differences” in the characteristics of CDHEs.
Dr Meryem Tanarhte is a climate scientist at the University Hassan II in Morocco, and Dr Ruth Cerezo Mota is a climatologist and a researcher at the National Autonomous University of Mexico. Both scientists, who were not involved in the study, agree that the daily estimations give a clearer picture of how CDHEs are changing.
Cerezo-Mota adds that another major contribution of the study is its global focus. She tells Carbon Brief that in some regions, such as Mexico and Africa, there is a lack of studies on CDHEs:
“Not because the events do not occur, but perhaps because [these regions] do not have all the data or the expertise to do so.”
However, she notes that the reanalysis data used by the study does have limitations with how it represents rainfall in some parts of the world.
Compound impacts
The study notes that if CDHEs continue to intensify – particularly events where heatwaves are the precursors – they could drive declining crop productivity, increased wildfire frequency and severe public health crises.
These impacts could be “much more rapid and severe as global warming continues”, Yeh tells Carbon Brief.
Tanarhte notes that these events can be forecasted up to 10 days ahead in many regions. Furthermore, she says, the strongest impacts can be prevented “through preparedness and adaptation”, including through “water management for agriculture, heatwave mitigation measures and wildfire mitigation”.
The study recommends reassessing current risk management strategies for these compound events. It also suggests incorporating the sequences of drought and heatwaves into compound event analysis frameworks “to enhance climate risk management”.
Cerezo-Mota says that it is clear that the world needs to be prepared for the increased occurrence of these events. She tells Carbon Brief:
“These [risk assessments and strategies] need to be carried out at the local level to understand the complexities of each region.”
The post Heatwaves driving recent ‘surge’ in compound drought and heat extremes appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Heatwaves driving recent ‘surge’ in compound drought and heat extremes
Greenhouse Gases
DeBriefed 6 March 2026: Iran energy crisis | China climate plan | Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ wind turbine
Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed.
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.
This week
Energy crisis
ENERGY SPIKE: US-Israeli attacks on Iran and subsequent counterattacks across the Middle East have sent energy prices “soaring”, according to Reuters. The newswire reported that the region “accounts for just under a third of global oil production and almost a fifth of gas”. The Guardian noted that shipping traffic through the strait of Hormuz, which normally ferries 20% of the world’s oil, “all but ground to a halt”. The Financial Times reported that attacks by Iran on Middle East energy facilities – notably in Qatar – triggered the “biggest rise in gas prices since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine”.
‘RISK’ AND ‘BENEFITS’: Bloomberg reported on increases in diesel prices in Europe and the US, speculating that rising fuel costs could be “a risk for president Donald Trump”. US gas producers are “poised to benefit from the big disruption in global supply”, according to CNBC. Indian government sources told the Economic Times that Russia is prepared to “fulfil India’s energy demands”. China Daily quoted experts who said “China’s energy security remains fundamentally unshaken”, thanks to “emergency stockpiles and a wide array of import channels”.
‘ESSENTIAL’ RENEWABLES: Energy analysts said governments should cut their fossil-fuel reliance by investing in renewables, “rather than just seeking non-Gulf oil and gas suppliers”, reported Climate Home News. This message was echoed by UK business secretary Peter Kyle, who said “doubling down on renewables” was “essential” amid “regional instability”, according to the Daily Telegraph.
China’s climate plan
PEAK COAL?: China has set out its next “five-year plan” at the annual “two sessions” meeting of the National People’s Congress, including its climate strategy out to 2030, according to the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post. The plan called for China to cut its carbon emissions per unit of gross domestic product (GDP) by 17% from 2026 to 2030, which “may allow for continued increase in emissions given the rate of GDP growth”, reported Reuters. The newswire added that the plan also had targets to reach peak coal in the next five years and replace 30m tonnes per year of coal with renewables.
ACTIVE YET PRUDENT: Bloomberg described the new plan as “cautious”, stating that it “frustrat[es] hopes for tighter policy that would drive the nation to peak carbon emissions well before president Xi Jinping’s 2030 deadline”. Carbon Brief has just published an in-depth analysis of the plan. China Daily reported that the strategy “highlights measures to promote the climate targets of peaking carbon dioxide emissions before 2030”, which China said it would work towards “actively yet prudently”.
Around the world
- EU RULES: The European Commission has proposed new “made in Europe” rules to support domestic low-carbon industries, “against fierce competition from China”, reported Agence France-Presse. Carbon Brief examined what it means for climate efforts.
- RECORD HEAT: The US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has said there is a 50-60% chance that the El Niño weather pattern could return this year, amplifying the effect of global warming and potentially driving temperatures to “record highs”, according to Euronews.
- FLAGSHIP FUND: The African Development Bank’s “flagship clean energy fund” plans to more than double its financing to $2.5bn for African renewables over the next two years, reported the Associated Press.
- NO WITHDRAWAL: Vanuatu has defied US efforts to force the Pacific-island nation to drop a UN draft resolution calling on the world to implement a landmark International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling on climate, according to the Guardian.
98
The number of nations that submitted their national reports on tackling nature loss to the UN on time – just half of the 196 countries that are part of the UN biodiversity treaty – according to analysis by Carbon Brief.
Latest climate research
- Sea levels are already “much higher than assumed” in most assessments of the threat posed by sea-level rise, due to “inadequate” modelling assumptions | Nature
- Accelerating human-caused global warming could see the Paris Agreement’s 1.5C limit crossed before 2030 | Geophysical Research Letters covered by Carbon Brief
- Future “super El Niño events” could “significantly lower” solar power generation due to a reduction in solar irradiance in key regions, such as California and east China | Communications Earth & Environment
(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)
Captured
UK greenhouse gas emissions in 2025 fell to 54% below 1990 levels, the baseline year for its legally binding climate goals, according to new Carbon Brief analysis. Over the same period, data from the World Bank shows that the UK’s economy has expanded by 95%, meaning that emissions have been decoupling from growth.
Spotlight
Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ community wind turbine
Following the recent launch of the UK government’s local power plan, Carbon Brief visits one of the country’s community-energy success stories.
The Lawrence Weston housing estate is set apart from the main city of Bristol, wedged between the tree-lined grounds of a stately home and a sprawl of warehouses and waste incinerators. It is one of the most deprived areas in the city.
Yet, just across the M5 motorway stands a structure that has brought the spoils of the energy transition directly to this historically forgotten estate – a 4.2 megawatt (MW) wind turbine.
The turbine is owned by local charity Ambition Lawrence Weston and all the profits from its electricity sales – around £100,000 a year – go to the community. In the UK’s local power plan, it was singled out by energy secretary Ed Miliband as a “pioneering” project.
‘Sustainable income’
On a recent visit to the estate by Carbon Brief, Ambition Lawrence Weston’s development manager, Mark Pepper, rattled off the story behind the wind turbine.
In 2012, Pepper and his team were approached by the Bristol Energy Cooperative with a chance to get a slice of the income from a new solar farm. They jumped at the opportunity.
“Austerity measures were kicking in at the time,” Pepper told Carbon Brief. “We needed to generate an income. Our own, sustainable income.”
With the solar farm proving to be a success, the team started to explore other opportunities. This began a decade-long process that saw them navigate the Conservative government’s “ban” on onshore wind, raise £5.5m in funding and, ultimately, erect the turbine in 2023.
Today, the turbine generates electricity equivalent to Lawrence Weston’s 3,000 households and will save 87,600 tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2) over its lifetime.
‘Climate by stealth’
Ambition Lawrence Weston’s hub is at the heart of the estate and the list of activities on offer is seemingly endless: birthday parties, kickboxing, a library, woodworking, help with employment and even a pop-up veterinary clinic. All supported, Pepper said, with the help of a steady income from community-owned energy.
The centre itself is kitted out with solar panels, heat pumps and electric-vehicle charging points, making it a living advertisement for the net-zero transition. Pepper noted that the organisation has also helped people with energy costs amid surging global gas prices.
Gesturing to the England flags dangling limply on lamp posts visible from the kitchen window, he said:
“There’s a bit of resentment around immigration and scarcity of materials and provision, so we’re trying to do our bit around community cohesion.”
This includes supper clubs and an interfaith grand iftar during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.
Anti-immigration sentiment in the UK has often gone hand-in-hand with opposition to climate action. Right-wing politicians and media outlets promote the idea that net-zero policies will cost people a lot of money – and these ideas have cut through with the public.
Pepper told Carbon Brief he is sympathetic to people’s worries about costs and stressed that community energy is the perfect way to win people over:
“I think the only way you can change that is if, instead of being passive consumers…communities are like us and they’re generating an income to offset that.”
From the outset, Pepper stressed that “we weren’t that concerned about climate because we had other, bigger pressures”, adding:
“But, in time, we’ve delivered climate by stealth.”
Watch, read, listen
OIL WATCH: The Guardian has published a “visual guide” with charts and videos showing how the “escalating Iran conflict is driving up oil and gas prices”.
MURDER IN HONDURAS: Ten years on from the murder of Indigenous environmental justice advocate Berta Cáceres, Drilled asked why Honduras is still so dangerous for environmental activists.
TALKING WEATHER: A new film, narrated by actor Michael Sheen and titled You Told Us To Talk About the Weather, aimed to promote conversation about climate change with a blend of “poetry, folk horror and climate storytelling”.
Coming up
- 8 March: Colombia parliamentary election
- 9-19 March: 31st Annual Session of the International Seabed Authority, Kingston, Jamaica
- 11 March: UN Environment Programme state of finance for nature 2026 report launch
Pick of the jobs
- London School of Economics and Political Science, fellow in the social science of sustainability | Salary: £43,277-£51,714. Location: London
- NORCAP, innovative climate finance expert | Salary: Unknown. Location: Kyiv, Ukraine
- WBHM, environmental reporter | Salary: $50,050-$81,330. Location: Birmingham, Alabama, US
- Climate Cabinet, data engineer | Salary: hourly rate of $60-$120 per hour. Location: Remote anywhere in the US
DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.
This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s weekly DeBriefed email newsletter. Subscribe for free here.
The post DeBriefed 6 March 2026: Iran energy crisis | China climate plan | Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ wind turbine appeared first on Carbon Brief.
China’s leadership has published a draft of its 15th five-year plan setting the strategic direction for the nation out to 2030, including support for clean energy and energy security.
The plan sets a target to cut China’s “carbon intensity” by 17% over the five years from 2026-30, but also changes the basis for calculating this key climate metric.
The plan continues to signal support for China’s clean-energy buildout and, in general, contains no major departures from the country’s current approach to the energy transition.
The government reaffirms support for several clean-energy industries, ranging from solar and electric vehicles (EVs) through to hydrogen and “new-energy” storage.
The plan also emphasises China’s willingness to steer climate governance and be seen as a provider of “global public goods”, in the form of affordable clean-energy technologies.
However, while the document says it will “promote the peaking” of coal and oil use, it does not set out a timeline and continues to call for the “clean and efficient” use of coal.
This shows that tensions remain between China’s climate goals and its focus on energy security, leading some analysts to raise concerns about its carbon-cutting ambition.
Below, Carbon Brief outlines the key climate change and energy aspects of the plan, including targets for carbon intensity, non-fossil energy and forestry.
Note: this article is based on a draft published on 5 March and will be updated if any significant changes are made in the final version of the plan, due to be released at the close next week of the “two sessions” meeting taking place in Beijing.
- What is China’s 15th five-year plan?
- What does the plan say about China’s climate action?
- What is China’s new CO2 intensity target?
- Does the plan encourage further clean-energy additions?
- What does the plan signal about coal?
- How will China approach global climate governance in the next five years?
- What else does the plan cover?
What is China’s 15th five-year plan?
Five-year plans are one of the most important documents in China’s political system.
Addressing everything from economic strategy to climate policy, they outline the planned direction for China’s socio-economic development in a five-year period. The 15th five-year plan covers 2026-30.
These plans include several “main goals”. These are largely quantitative indicators that are seen as particularly important to achieve and which provide a foundation for subsequent policies during the five-year period.
The table below outlines some of the key “main goals” from the draft 15th five-year plan.
| Category | Indicator | Indicator in 2025 | Target by 2030 | Cumulative target over 2026-2030 | Characteristic |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Economic development | Gross domestic product (GDP) growth (%) | 5 | Maintained within a reasonable range and proposed annually as appropriate. | Anticipatory | |
| ‘Green and low-carbon | Reduction in CO2 emissions per unit of GDP (%) | 17.7 | 17 | Binding | |
| Share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption (%) | 21.7 | 25 | Binding | ||
| Security guarantee | Comprehensive energy production capacity (100m tonnes of standard coal equivalent) |
51.3 | 58 | Binding |
Select list of targets highlighted in the “main goals” section of the draft 15th five-year plan. Source: Draft 15th five-year plan.
Since the 12th five-year plan, covering 2011-2015, these “main goals” have included energy intensity and carbon intensity as two of five key indicators for “green ecology”.
The previous five-year plan, which ran from 2021-2025, introduced the idea of an absolute “cap” on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, although it did not provide an explicit figure in the document. This has been subsequently addressed by a policy on the “dual-control of carbon” issued in 2024.
The latest plan removes the energy-intensity goal and elevates the carbon-intensity goal, but does not set an absolute cap on emissions (see below).
It covers the years until 2030, before which China has pledged to peak its carbon emissions. (Analysis for Carbon Brief found that emissions have been “flat or falling” since March 2024.)
The plans are released at the two sessions, an annual gathering of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). This year, it runs from 4-12 March.
The plans are often relatively high-level, with subsequent topic-specific five-year plans providing more concrete policy guidance.
Policymakers at the National Energy Agency (NEA) have indicated that in the coming years they will release five sector-specific plans for 2026-2030, covering topics such as the “new energy system”, electricity and renewable energy.
There may also be specific five-year plans covering carbon emissions and environmental protection, as well as the coal and nuclear sectors, according to analysts.
Other documents published during the two sessions include an annual government work report, which outlines key targets and policies for the year ahead.
The gathering is attended by thousands of deputies – delegates from across central and local governments, as well as Chinese Communist party members, members of other political parties, academics, industry leaders and other prominent figures.
What does the plan say about China’s climate action?
Achieving China’s climate targets will remain a key driver of the country’s policies in the next five years, according to the draft 15th five-year plan.
It lists the “acceleration” of China’s energy transition as a “major achievement” in the 14th five-year plan period (2021-2025), noting especially how clean-power capacity had overtaken fossil fuels.
The draft says China will “actively and steadily advance and achieve carbon peaking”, with policymakers continuing to strike a balance between building a “green economy” and ensuring stability.
Climate and environment continues to receive its own chapter in the plan. However, the framing and content of this chapter has shifted subtly compared with previous editions, as shown in the table below. For example, unlike previous plans, the first section of this chapter focuses on China’s goal to peak emissions.
| 11th five-year plan (2006-2010) | 12th five-year plan (2011-2015) | 13th five-year plan (2016-2020) | 14th five-year plan (2021-2025) | 15th five-year plan (2026-2030) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chapter title | Part 6: Build a resource-efficient and environmentally-friendly society | Part 6: Green development, building a resource-efficient and environmentally friendly society | Part 10: Ecosystems and the environment | Part 11: Promote green development and facilitate the harmonious coexistence of people and nature | Part 13: Accelerating the comprehensive green transformation of economic and social development to build a beautiful China |
| Sections | Developing a circular economy | Actively respond to global climate change | Accelerate the development of functional zones | Improve the quality and stability of ecosystems | Actively and steadily advancing and achieving carbon peaking |
| Protecting and restoring natural ecosystems | Strengthen resource conservation and management | Promote economical and intensive resource use | Continue to improve environmental quality | Continuously improving environmental quality | |
| Strengthening environmental protection | Vigorously develop the circular economy | Step up comprehensive environmental governance | Accelerate the green transformation of the development model | Enhancing the diversity, stability, and sustainability of ecosystems | |
| Enhancing resource management | Strengthen environmental protection efforts | Intensify ecological conservation and restoration | Accelerating the formation of green production and lifestyles | ||
| Rational utilisation of marine and climate resources | Promoting ecological conservation and restoration | Respond to global climate change | |||
| Strengthen the development of water conservancy and disaster prevention and mitigation systems | Improve mechanisms for ensuring ecological security | ||||
| Develop green and environmentally-friendly industries |
Title and main sections of the climate and environment-focused chapters in the last five five-year plans. Source: China’s 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th five-year plans.
The climate and environment chapter in the latest plan calls for China to “balance [economic] development and emission reduction” and “ensure the timely achievement of carbon peak targets”.
Under the plan, China will “continue to pursue” its established direction and objectives on climate, Prof Li Zheng, dean of the Tsinghua University Institute of Climate Change and Sustainable Development (ICCSD), tells Carbon Brief.
What is China’s new CO2 intensity target?
In the lead-up to the release of the plan, analysts were keenly watching for signals around China’s adoption of a system for the “dual-control of carbon”.
This would combine the existing targets for carbon intensity – the CO2 emissions per unit of GDP – with a new cap on China’s total carbon emissions. This would mark a dramatic step for the country, which has never before set itself a binding cap on total emissions.
Policymakers had said last year that this framework would come into effect during the 15th five-year plan period, replacing the previous system for the “dual-control of energy”.
However, the draft 15th five-year plan does not offer further details on when or how both parts of the dual-control of carbon system will be implemented. Instead, it continues to focus on carbon intensity targets alone.
Looking back at the previous five-year plan period, the latest document says China had achieved a carbon-intensity reduction of 17.7%, just shy of its 18% goal.
This is in contrast with calculations by Lauri Myllyvirta, lead analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), which had suggested that China had only cut its carbon intensity by 12% over the past five years.
At the time it was set in 2021, the 18% target had been seen as achievable, with analysts telling Carbon Brief that they expected China to realise reductions of 20% or more.
However, the government had fallen behind on meeting the target.
Last year, ecology and environment minister Huang Runqiu attributed this to the Covid-19 pandemic, extreme weather and trade tensions. He said that China, nevertheless, remained “broadly” on track to meet its 2030 international climate pledge of reducing carbon intensity by more than 65% from 2005 levels.
Myllyvirta tells Carbon Brief that the newly reported figure showing a carbon-intensity reduction of 17.7% is likely due to an “opportunistic” methodological revision. The new methodology now includes industrial process emissions – such as cement and chemicals – as well as the energy sector.
(This is not the first time China has redefined a target, with regulators changing the methodology for energy intensity in 2023.)
For the next five years, the plan sets a target to reduce carbon intensity by 17%, slightly below the previous goal.
However, the change in methodology means that this leaves space for China’s overall emissions to rise by “3-6% over the next five years”, says Myllyvirta. In contrast, he adds that the original methodology would have required a 2% fall in absolute carbon emissions by 2030.
The dashed lines in the chart below show China’s targets for reducing carbon intensity during the 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th five-year periods, while the bars show what was achieved under the old (dark blue) and new (light blue) methodology.
The carbon-intensity target is the “clearest signal of Beijing’s climate ambition”, says Li Shuo, director at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s (ASPI) China climate hub.
It also links directly to China’s international pledge – made in 2021 – to cut its carbon intensity to more than 65% below 2005 levels by 2030.
To meet this pledge under the original carbon-intensity methodology, China would have needed to set a target of a 23% reduction within the 15th five-year plan period. However, the country’s more recent 2035 international climate pledge, released last year, did not include a carbon-intensity target.
As such, ASPI’s Li interprets the carbon-intensity target in the draft 15th five-year plan as a “quiet recalibration” that signals “how difficult the original 2030 goal has become”.
Furthermore, the 15th five-year plan does not set an absolute emissions cap.
This leaves “significant ambiguity” over China’s climate plans, says campaign group 350 in a press statement reacting to the draft plan. It explains:
“The plan was widely expected to mark a clearer transition from carbon-intensity targets toward absolute emissions reductions…[but instead] leaves significant ambiguity about how China will translate record renewable deployment into sustained emissions cuts.”
Myllyvirta tells Carbon Brief that this represents a “continuation” of the government’s focus on scaling up clean-energy supply while avoiding setting “strong measurable emission targets”.
He says that he would still expect to see absolute caps being set for power and industrial sectors covered by China’s emissions trading scheme (ETS). In addition, he thinks that an overall absolute emissions cap may still be published later in the five-year period.
Despite the fact that it has yet to be fully implemented, the switch from dual-control of energy to dual-control of carbon represents a “major policy evolution”, Ma Jun, director of the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs (IPE), tells Carbon Brief. He says that it will allow China to “provide more flexibility for renewable energy expansion while tightening the net on fossil-fuel reliance”.
Does the plan encourage further clean-energy additions?
“How quickly carbon intensity is reduced largely depends on how much renewable energy can be supplied,” says Yao Zhe, global policy advisor at Greenpeace East Asia, in a statement.
The five-year plan continues to call for China’s development of a “new energy system that is clean, low-carbon, safe and efficient” by 2030, with continued additions of “wind, solar, hydro and nuclear power”.
In line with China’s international pledge, it sets a target for raising the share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption to 25% by 2030, up from just under 21.7% in 2025.
The development of “green factories” and “zero-carbon [industrial] parks” has been central to many local governments’ strategies for meeting the non-fossil energy target, according to industry news outlet BJX News. A call to build more of these zero-carbon industrial parks is listed in the five-year plan.
Prof Pan Jiahua, dean of Beijing University of Technology’s Institute of Ecological Civilization, tells Carbon Brief that expanding demand for clean energy through mechanisms such as “green factories” represents an increasingly “bottom-up” and “market-oriented” approach to the energy transition, which will leave “no place for fossil fuels”.
He adds that he is “very much sure that China’s zero-carbon process is being accelerated and fossil fuels are being driven out of the market”, pointing to the rapid adoption of EVs.
The plan says that China will aim to double “non-fossil energy” in 10 years – although it does not clarify whether this means their installed capacity or electricity generation, or what the exact starting year would be.
Research has shown that doubling wind and solar capacity in China between 2025-2035 would be “consistent” with aims to limit global warming to 2C.
While the language “certainly” pushes for greater additions of renewable energy, Yao tells Carbon Brief, it is too “opaque” to be a “direct indication” of the government’s plans for renewable additions.
She adds that “grid stability and healthy, orderly competition” is a higher priority for policymakers than guaranteeing a certain level of capacity additions.
China continues to place emphasis on the need for large-scale clean-energy “bases” and cross-regional power transmission.
The plan says China must develop “clean-energy bases…in the three northern regions” and “integrated hydro-wind-solar complexes” in south-west China.
It specifically encourages construction of “large-scale wind and solar” power bases in desert regions “primarily” for cross-regional power transmission, as well as “major hydropower” projects, including the Yarlung Tsangpo dam in Tibet.
As such, the country should construct “power-transmission corridors” with the capacity to send 420 gigawatts (GW) of electricity from clean-energy bases in western provinces to energy-hungry eastern provinces by 2030, the plan says.
State Grid, China’s largest grid operator, plans to install “another 15 ultra-high voltage [UHV] transmission lines” by 2030, reports Reuters, up from the 45 UHV lines built by last year.
Below are two maps illustrating the interlinkages between clean-energy bases in China in the 15th (top) and 14th (bottom) five-year plan periods.
The yellow dotted areas represent clean energy bases, while the arrows represent cross-regional power transmission. The blue wind-turbine icons represent offshore windfarms and the red cooling tower icons represent coastal nuclear plants.
The 15th five-year plan map shows a consistent approach to the 2021-2025 period. As well as power being transmitted from west to east, China plans for more power to be sent to southern provinces from clean-energy bases in the north-west, while clean-energy bases in the north-east supply China’s eastern coast.
It also maps out “mutual assistance” schemes for power grids in neighbouring provinces.
Offshore wind power should reach 100GW by 2030, while nuclear power should rise to 110GW, according to the plan.
What does the plan signal about coal?
The increased emphasis on grid infrastructure in the draft 15th five-year plan reflects growing concerns from energy planning officials around ensuring China’s energy supply.
Ren Yuzhi, director of the NEA’s development and planning department, wrote ahead of the plan’s release that the “continuous expansion” of China’s energy system has “dramatically increased its complexity”.
He said the NEA felt there was an “urgent need” to enhance the “secure and reliable” replacement of fossil-fuel power with new energy sources, as well as to ensure the system’s “ability to absorb them”.
Meanwhile, broader concerns around energy security have heightened calls for coal capacity to remain in the system as a “ballast stone”.
The plan continues to support the “clean and efficient utilisation of fossil fuels” and does not mention either a cap or peaking timeline for coal consumption.
Xi had previously told fellow world leaders that China would “strictly control” coal-fired power and phase down coal consumption in the 15th five-year plan period.
The “geopolitical situation is increasing energy security concerns” at all levels of government, said the Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress in a note responding to the draft plan, adding that this was creating “uncertainty over coal reduction”.
Ahead of its publication, there were questions around whether the plan would set a peaking deadline for oil and coal. An article posted by state news agency Xinhua last month, examining recommendations for the plan from top policymakers, stated that coal consumption would plateau from “around 2027”, while oil would peak “around 2026”.
However, the plan does not lay out exact years by which the two fossil fuels should peak, only saying that China will “promote the peaking of coal and oil consumption”.
There are similarly no mentions of phasing out coal in general, in line with existing policy.
Nevertheless, there is a heavy emphasis on retrofitting coal-fired power plants. The plan calls for the establishment of “demonstration projects” for coal-plant retrofitting, such as through co-firing with biomass or “green ammonia”.
Such retrofitting could incentivise lower utilisation of coal plants – and thus lower emissions – if they are used to flexibly meet peaks in demand and to cover gaps in clean-energy output, instead of providing a steady and significant share of generation.
The plan also calls for officials to “fully implement low-carbon retrofitting projects for coal-chemical industries”, which have been a notable source of emissions growth in the past year.
However, the coal-chemicals sector will likely remain a key source of demand for China’s coal mining industry, with coal-to-oil and coal-to-gas bases listed as a “key area” for enhancing the country’s “security capabilities”.
Meanwhile, coal-fired boilers and industrial kilns in the paper industry, food processing and textiles should be replaced with “clean” alternatives to the equivalent of 30m tonnes of coal consumption per year, it says.
“China continues to scale up clean energy at an extraordinary pace, but the plan still avoids committing to strong measurable constraints on emissions or fossil fuel use”, says Joseph Dellatte, head of energy and climate studies at the Institut Montaigne. He adds:
“The logic remains supply-driven: deploy massive amounts of clean energy and assume emissions will eventually decline.”
How will China approach global climate governance in the next five years?
Meanwhile, clean-energy technologies continue to play a role in upgrading China’s economy, with several “new energy” sectors listed as key to its industrial policy.
Named sectors include smart EVs, “new solar cells”, new-energy storage, hydrogen and nuclear fusion energy.
“China’s clean-technology development – rather than traditional administrative climate controls – is increasingly becoming the primary driver of emissions reduction,” says ASPI’s Li. He adds that strengthening China’s clean-energy sectors means “more closely aligning Beijing’s economic ambitions with its climate objectives”.
Analysis for Carbon Brief shows that clean energy drove more than a third of China’s GDP growth in 2025, representing around 11% of China’s whole economy.
The continued support for these sectors in the draft five-year plan comes as the EU outlined its own measures intended to limit China’s hold on clean-energy industries, driven by accusations of “unfair competition” from Chinese firms.
China is unlikely to crack down on clean-tech production capacity, Dr Rebecca Nadin, director of the Centre for Geopolitics of Change at ODI Global, tells Carbon Brief. She says:
“Beijing is treating overcapacity in solar and smart EVs as a strategic choice, not a policy error…and is prepared to pour investment into these sectors to cement global market share, jobs and technological leverage.”
Dellatte echoes these comments, noting that it is “striking” that the plan “barely addresses the issue of industrial overcapacity in clean technologies”, with the focus firmly on “scaling production and deployment”.
At the same time, China is actively positioning itself to be a prominent voice in climate diplomacy and a champion of proactive climate action.
This is clear from the first line in a section on providing “global public goods”. It says:
“As a responsible major country, China will play a more active role in addressing global challenges such as climate change.”
The plan notes that China will “actively participate in and steer [引领] global climate governance”, in line with the principle of “common,but differentiated responsibilities”.
This echoes similar language from last year’s government work report, Yao tells Carbon Brief, demonstrating a “clear willingness” to guide global negotiations. But she notes that this “remains an aspiration that’s yet to be made concrete”. She adds:
“China has always favored collective leadership, so its vision of leadership is never a lone one.”
The country will “deepen south-south cooperation on climate change”, the plan says. In an earlier section on “opening up”, it also notes that China will explore “new avenues for collaboration in green development” with global partners as part of its “Belt and Road Initiative”.
China is “doubling down” on a narrative that it is a “responsible major power” and “champion of south-south climate cooperation”, Nadin says, such as by “presenting its clean‑tech exports and finance as global public goods”. She says:
“China will arrive at future COPs casting itself as the indispensable climate leader for the global south…even though its new five‑year plan still puts growth, energy security and coal ahead of faster emissions cuts at home.”
What else does the plan cover?
The impact of extreme weather – particularly floods – remains a key concern in the plan.
China must “refine” its climate adaptation framework and “enhance its resilience to climate change, particularly extreme-weather events”, it says.
China also aims to “strengthen construction of a national water network” over the next five years in order to help prevent floods and droughts.
An article published a few days before the plan in the state-run newspaper China Daily noted that, “as global warming intensifies, extreme weather events – including torrential rains, severe convective storms, and typhoons – have become more frequent, widespread and severe”.
The plan also touches on critical minerals used for low-carbon technologies. These will likely remain a geopolitical flashpoint, with China saying it will focus during the next five years on “intensifying” exploration and “establishing” a reserve for critical minerals. This reserve will focus on “scarce” energy minerals and critical minerals, as well as other “advantageous mineral resources”.
Dellatte says that this could mean the “competition in the energy transition will increasingly be about control over mineral supply chains”.
Other low-carbon policies listed in the five-year plan include expanding coverage of China’s mandatory carbon market and further developing its voluntary carbon market.
China will “strengthen monitoring and control” of non-CO2 greenhouse gases, the plan says, as well as implementing projects “targeting methane, nitrous oxide and hydrofluorocarbons” in sectors such as coal mining, agriculture and chemicals.
This will create “capacity” for reducing emissions by 30m tonnes of CO2 equivalent, it adds.
Meanwhile, China will develop rules for carbon footprint accounting and push for internationally recognised accounting standards.
It will enhance reform of power markets over the next five years and improve the trading mechanism for green electricity certificates.
It will also “promote” adoption of low-carbon lifestyles and decarbonisation of transport, as well as working to advance electrification of freight and shipping.
The post Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ mean for climate change? appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ mean for climate change?
-
Greenhouse Gases7 months ago
Guest post: Why China is still building new coal – and when it might stop
-
Climate Change7 months ago
Guest post: Why China is still building new coal – and when it might stop
-
Greenhouse Gases2 years ago嘉宾来稿：满足中国增长的用电需求 光伏加储能“比新建煤电更实惠”
-
Climate Change2 years ago
Bill Discounting Climate Change in Florida’s Energy Policy Awaits DeSantis’ Approval
-
Climate Change2 years ago嘉宾来稿：满足中国增长的用电需求 光伏加储能“比新建煤电更实惠”
-
Climate Change Videos2 years ago
The toxic gas flares fuelling Nigeria’s climate change – BBC News
-
Carbon Footprint2 years agoUS SEC’s Climate Disclosure Rules Spur Renewed Interest in Carbon Credits
-
Renewable Energy2 years ago
GAF Energy Completes Construction of Second Manufacturing Facility