China has strengthened its hold on the world’s lithium supply chain. The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) updated China’s catalogue of technologies prohibited or restricted from export. They added important battery and lithium processing technologies. This includes lithium carbonate and hydroxide preparation, along with cathode material manufacturing.
The metal is essential for electric vehicles (EVs) and battery storage. With control over lithium mining, processing, and manufacturing, China now dominates nearly every part of this fast-growing sector.
The move lets Beijing control what technical know-how leaves China. It also strengthens its grip on the clean energy supply chain. This control affects global lithium prices, investment, and clean energy goals across Europe, the U.S., and Asia.
China’s Expanding Role in Lithium Production
Lithium demand has soared as countries push for cleaner transport and renewable energy. The International Energy Agency (IEA) says global lithium demand jumped almost 30% in 2024. This rise came mainly from EV production and big battery storage needs.

China produces about 18% of the world’s mined lithium, but its real strength lies in refining. Chinese companies hold about 65% of the world’s lithium chemical processing. They also account for over 75% of global battery cell production. These numbers show that even if lithium ore is mined in Chile, Argentina, or Australia, most of it ends up in Chinese refineries, which process it into battery-grade material.

China also leads in midstream and downstream battery manufacturing. In 2024, China made more than 1,200 gigawatt-hours (GWh) of lithium-ion batteries. That’s around three-quarters of the world’s total, as reported by BloombergNEF.
Major producers like CATL and BYD supplied both domestic and foreign automakers, including Tesla, BMW, and Toyota.
The country’s major players, such as Ganfeng Lithium and Tianqi Lithium, have spent years investing in foreign mines. They invest in lithium projects in South America, Africa, and Australia. This helps them secure long-term access to raw materials. This strategy ensures China’s industry gets the feedstock it needs, supports local gigafactories, and boosts global exports.
How Beijing’s Moves Sway Global Lithium Markets
Lithium prices have been on a roller coaster. After record highs in 2022, prices dropped sharply in 2023 and early 2024 due to oversupply. But by mid-2025, prices in China began to rebound. Lithium carbonate traded between CNY 59,000 and 69,000 per metric ton (roughly US$8,500–9,000).

Industry analysts say Chinese producers used this price flexibility to outcompete foreign suppliers. When prices drop, many non-Chinese mining firms, especially in Australia and Africa, struggle to stay profitable.
Some market experts think China oversupplied the market on purpose. They believe this was to keep global influence and slow down rival producers.
Despite recent rebounds, volatility remains high. The IEA warns that lithium demand may double by 2030. It could reach over 1.3 million tonnes of lithium carbonate equivalent (LCE) each year. Without new mines and processing capacity, global shortages might return. This could lead to price spikes that impact battery and EV production worldwide.
- SEE LITHIUM PRICES here…
Technology and Export Controls
China’s advantage goes beyond production scale. It now leads in processing technology, equipment, and battery chemistry. Beijing is now limiting exports of lithium-processing machines and technology. This move aims to protect local industries and manage intellectual property.
In 2025, several Chinese equipment suppliers limited shipments abroad. This makes it harder for competitors in the U.S. and Europe to build their own refining systems. These export limits are part of a broader strategy to keep the high-value stages of the supply chain inside China.

Meanwhile, the U.S. IRA provides up to $369 billion for climate and energy. It includes strong incentives for local battery and mineral production. Europe’s Critical Raw Materials Act aims for 40% of critical minerals used in the EU to come from local or allied sources by 2030. But industry analysts say it could take up to a decade for these efforts to significantly reduce dependence on China.
The Global Response: Diversifying Supply Chains
Governments and companies are now racing to reduce dependence on China. The United States, Canada, and Australia are expanding domestic mining and refining. Chile and Argentina, along with other South American nations, are building local industries. They aim to process lithium instead of just exporting raw materials.
- RELATED: U.S. Lithium Push: How Washington’s Bet on Lithium Americas Could Reshape the Global Market
The IEA warns that global lithium supply must increase sevenfold by 2035 to meet climate goals. That means bringing new mines and refineries online faster while maintaining environmental standards.
In 2024, the World Bank estimated that over €680 billion (US$730 billion) was invested in renewable power and storage. However, only a small part funded the raw material supply. If supply growth lags, battery shortages could slow EV production by the late 2020s.
However, challenges persist. Lithium extraction can strain water resources and ecosystems. Building new facilities also requires stable regulation and financing, which can take years to secure.
Surge Battery Metals: Strengthening North American Supply
In North America, one of the emerging players helping to diversify lithium supply is Surge Battery Metals (CSE: NILI). The company is developing the Nevada North Lithium Project. This project is in one of the U.S.’s most promising lithium-rich areas.
Surge aims to produce battery-grade lithium for the growing North American EV market. Its exploration results have shown strong potential for large-scale, high-grade lithium clay deposits. Projects like Surge’s align with U.S. efforts to build a secure domestic supply chain and reduce reliance on imports from China.
Surge helps ensure supply security and meet environmental goals by creating cleaner extraction and processing methods. Its work supports the U.S. Department of Energy’s plan to create a domestic battery materials supply chain. It seeks to meet 90% of the country’s lithium demand by 2035.
What’s Ahead: Competition, Cooperation, and Climate Goals
The global lithium race is about more than profits. It shapes the pace of the clean energy transition. China’s dominance gives it both economic power and geopolitical influence. Western economies are investing a lot to find new supplies and to lower strategic risks.
The market outlook suggests demand will remain strong throughout the decade. Analysts expect lithium prices to stabilize as new supply enters the market, but competition will remain intense.
For the world to meet its climate goals, cooperation will be as important as competition. Shared technology, recycling, and sustainability standards could help reduce emissions and stabilize supply chains.
Surge Battery Metals and other new miners are working to localize production. They aim to boost transparency and ensure lithium supply helps the clean energy transition, not hinders it.
China now controls the heart of the global lithium industry, from mining and refining to battery exports. This dominance brings both opportunity and risk. The rest of the world is responding, but catching up will take time, investment, and innovation.
The post China’s Grip on Lithium Tightens as Global Supply Struggles to Keep Up appeared first on Carbon Credits.
Carbon Footprint
Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L
The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.
Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.
Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.
You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.
Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings
The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.
Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.
Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.
What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.
The three commodity exposures that hit margin first
For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.
- Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
- Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
- Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.
TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes
The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.
For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.
The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.
What procurement and finance can do now
Three actions matter near-term.
Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.
Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.
Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.
Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.
If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.
Carbon Footprint
Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?
More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.
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Carbon Footprint
Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets
The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.
The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.
This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.
The two definitions, in plain English
Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.
Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.
The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.
What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says
The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).
For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.
For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.
A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.
When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)
Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:
- The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
- The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
- The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
- It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.
The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.
When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.
The procurement and supplier engagement question
Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.
To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.
The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.
Choosing the right tool for the right target
A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.
The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.
If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.
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