The UK will need to almost double the climate finance it gives for nature conservation annually in order to meet one of its flagship international targets, according to Carbon Brief analysis of data released under freedom of information (FOI) rules.
As part of the UK’s pledge to provide £11.6bn of climate aid between 2021 and 2026, the previous Conservative government promised that £3bn of this money would be used to protect nature and, specifically, £1.5bn of that would be for forests.
A series of FOI requests and additional analysis by Carbon Brief reveal that the UK spent an average of around £450m each year on nature for the first three years of the commitment.
This will need to rise to more than £800m a year for the next two years to hit the target, amounting to nearly £1.7bn by 2026.
The new Labour government has made much of the “fiscal constraints” it is facing in office. Years of cuts to the foreign aid budget under the Conservatives have threatened the UK’s climate finance targets.
Senior Labour ministers, including foreign secretary David Lammy in a speech last week, have said they will stick to the £11.6bn goal. However, so far, they have not committed to the sub-goals set by their predecessors. When asked by Carbon Brief, the government did not confirm if the sub-goals would be honoured.
In the FOI responses, the government said it would “consider all spending plans inherited from the last government” as it undertook its spending review, which is set to conclude in spring next year.
Nature and forests
In 2019, the Conservative government led by Boris Johnson committed to spending £11.6bn on climate finance between 2021-22 and 2025-26. This is the UK share of the annual $100bn that developed countries agreed to give to developing countries from 2020.
At the start of 2021, the same government pledged to spend £3bn of the £11.6bn goal on “climate change solutions that protect and restore nature and biodiversity”. It said the money would support various projects, including marine conservation, tackling the illegal timber trade and conserving mangroves.
Later that year, as the UK hosted the COP26 climate summit, the government announced that £1.5bn of its climate finance – half of the £3bn nature target – would specifically support efforts to “halt and reverse deforestation and land degradation”.
This funding was part of the “global forest finance pledge”, which, in turn, was a significant announcement at COP26, where the UK had centred nature as one of its key themes.
These sub-goals have received less attention than the overarching £11.6bn target, which came under pressure during Rishi Sunak’s leadership. Notably, Sunak’s government changed the rules for calculating climate finance, making it easier for the UK to meet its goals.
Nevertheless, the Conservative government had retained its commitment to nature and forests, telling the Environment Audit Committee earlier this year, while still in power, that it “remained steadfast” in its commitment to the forest target.
Scaling up
Three years into the five years covered by its climate finance pledge, the UK has provided £1.34bn of climate finance for nature, of which £590m has gone to forest projects, according to Carbon Brief’s figures.
This means the UK has met around 45% of each sub-target, with only two years remaining to make up the remainder.
To meet these targets, the UK would, therefore, have to accelerate its spending on nature and forests in order to provide the remaining 55% in two years.
As the chart below shows, nature funding has steadily increased since the target was set in 2021 – a trend that would need to continue over the next two years in order to meet the goal.
This is in line with broader spending to meet UK climate finance targets, which tends to be “backloaded”, with more spending towards the end of each five-year period.
The UK provided, on average, £448m of nature finance each year from 2021, and needs to raise this to £828m, on average, in each of the periods 2024-25 and 2025-26 to reach £3bn.
A large chunk of nature funding given to date is money that the government has paid into large international funds, particularly the UN’s Green Climate Fund (GCF).
Reasoning that the GCF supports nature-related activities, the government has been marking 40% of its GCF contributions as nature finance – accounting for around a quarter of the total nature finance over the past three years.
Other big recipients so far include a project working with forest communities in Colombia, efforts to address water scarcity in the Middle East and international initiatives based on “public-private partnerships” and “market reforms” to avert deforestation.
As for forests specifically, climate finance for them has also increased. The UK has provided, on average, £222m each year, and needs to raise this to £417m, on average, in each of the periods 2024-25 and 2025-26 to hit its £1.5bn pledge.
These figures are based predominantly on FOI responses from the three major departments responsible for the UK’s overseas climate-related development projects: the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO); the Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) and the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ).
Earlier this month, Carbon Brief obtained FOI responses with figures for DESNZ and Defra covering all three years from 2021-22 to 2023-24.
Defra noted that its figures for 2023-24 were “provisional as they have not been finalised”. Separately, DESNZ also provided some additional numbers for payments into international funds that were not included in the original FOI response.
The figures for FCDO 2021-22 and 2022-23 come from another FOI response, provided in March of this year, and not including 2023-24 data. Carbon Brief understands that the figures for FCDO in 2023-24 have not yet been finalised within the department.
The 2023-24 FCDO figures are, therefore, estimates, based on Carbon Brief analysis of all UK-backed climate finance projects provided in another FOI request earlier this year. (Carbon Brief calculated the share of climate finance the government deemed relevant for nature and forests in projects that are known to count towards these sub-goals.)
This means the FCDO figure for 2023-24 will not include any new nature projects that started in that year. Also, in some cases, the share of nature funding from each project may change from year to year, which would affect the final numbers. (It is worth noting that project shares for nature tended to remain very stable between 2021-22 and 2022-23.)
‘Difficult choices’
Senior ministers including net-zero secretary Ed Miliband and foreign secretary David Lammy have said the UK remains committed to the £11.6bn goal under Labour.
In a speech delivered last week at Kew Gardens in London, Lammy emphasised the UK’s role in providing climate aid to developing countries and said “we must unlock much, much more climate and nature finance”.
However, he also said that his government was operating during “times of fiscal constraint” and alluded to the difficulty of achieving the UK’s existing climate finance goals:
“The reality is that the British contribution to this [$100bn climate finance] target was a promise which the Tories casually made, but for which they did not have a plan. In contrast, my focus is on how we can actually deliver that promise, given the dire financial inheritance from the last government. Ahead of the spending review, we’re carefully reviewing our plans to do so.”
Lammy appeared to leave some flexibility for the government by emphasising that climate finance commitments were in the hands of the Treasury. In a response to an audience question, he added:
“Meeting the £11.6bn remains our ambition as we undertake the spending review, and we’ll consider all of those spending plans, and it’s important that I and others in government continue to make the case, as [chancellor] Rachel Reeves makes those difficult choices.”
As part of its FOI requests, Carbon Brief specifically asked if the government intended to retain the nature and forests sub-goals within the broader £11.6bn target. The government response stated:
“Meeting the £11.6bn remains our ambition as we undertake the spending review, which will consider all spending plans inherited from the last government.”
Climate and nature campaigners tell Carbon Brief that they were pleased to see Lammy prioritising international climate action. “It is really encouraging to see the new UK government willing to play a leading role on climate and nature globally,” says Clement Metivier, acting head of international advocacy at WWF-UK.
With nations gathering at COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan, later this year to discuss a new global climate finance target, Harry Camilleri, a climate diplomacy and geopolitics researcher at E3G, tells Carbon Brief the UK would “lose credibility” if the £11.6bn goal slips:
“Global climate agreements are built on trust. There is an expectation that the new goal will be significantly higher than the current $100bn target. Backtracking on existing commitments, which add up to a fraction of the costs faced by vulnerable countries, will not help.”
The UK’s nature and forest climate funding is also an important part of its contribution to biodiversity finance. This will be high on the agenda at the upcoming biodiversity summit, COP16, in Cali, Colombia, in October, as developed countries have pledged to raise at least $30bn in nature finance a year by 2030.
With this in mind, Alice Jay, international director at the Campaign for Nature, tells Carbon Brief:
“Now we need to see [Lammy] follow up on his words by re-committing to the existing international nature finance pledge to developing countries. We know the FCDO understands the urgency. But does the Treasury? This is the key issue that will decide whether this new UK nature leadership will be credible at the upcoming COP16.”
When asked about the government’s nature finance commitments, an FCDO spokesperson tells Carbon Brief:
“As the foreign secretary set out in his speech at Kew Gardens last week, the climate and nature emergency is a central geopolitical challenge of our age. Tackling the scale of the threat is necessary to achieve clean and secure energy, lower bills and drive growth for the UK, and to preserve the natural world around us.
“We have already begun to turn this ambition into action. The climate and nature crisis will be central to all that the Foreign Office does.”
The post Analysis: UK must spend £1.7bn more on nature by 2026 to meet climate-finance goal appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: UK must spend £1.7bn more on nature by 2026 to meet climate-finance goal
Drought and heatwaves occurring together – known as “compound” events – have “surged” across the world since the early 2000s, a new study shows.
Compound drought and heat events (CDHEs) can have devastating effects, creating the ideal conditions for intense wildfires, such as Australia’s “Black Summer” of 2019-20 where bushfires burned 24m hectares and killed 33 people.
The research, published in Science Advances, finds that the increase in CDHEs is predominantly being driven by events that start with a heatwave.
The global area affected by such “heatwave-led” compound events has more than doubled between 1980-2001 and 2002-23, the study says.
The rapid increase in these events over the last 23 years cannot be explained solely by global warming, the authors note.
Since the late 1990s, feedbacks between the land and the atmosphere have become stronger, making heatwaves more likely to trigger drought conditions, they explain.
One of the study authors tells Carbon Brief that societies must pay greater attention to compound events, which can “cause severe impacts on ecosystems, agriculture and society”.
Compound events
CDHEs are extreme weather events where drought and heatwave conditions occur simultaneously – or shortly after each other – in the same region.
These events are often triggered by large-scale weather patterns, such as “blocking” highs, which can produce “prolonged” hot and dry conditions, according to the study.
Prof Sang-Wook Yeh is one of the study authors and a professor at the Ewha Womans University in South Korea. He tells Carbon Brief:
“When heatwaves and droughts occur together, the two hazards reinforce each other through land-atmosphere interactions. This amplifies surface heating and soil moisture deficits, making compound events more intense and damaging than single hazards.”
CDHEs can begin with either a heatwave or a drought.
The sequence of these extremes is important, the study says, as they have different drivers and impacts.
For example, in a CDHE where the heatwave was the precursor, increased direct sunshine causes more moisture loss from soils and plants, leading to a drought.
Conversely, in an event where the drought was the precursor, the lack of soil moisture means that less of the sun’s energy goes into evaporation and more goes into warming the Earth’s surface. This produces favourable conditions for heatwaves.
The study shows that the majority of CDHEs globally start out as a drought.
In recent years, there has been increasing focus on these events due to the devastating impact they have on agriculture, ecosystems and public health.
In Russia in the summer of 2010, a compound drought-heatwave event – and the associated wildfires – caused the death of nearly 55,000 people, the study notes.
The record-breaking Pacific north-west “heat dome” in 2021 triggered extreme drought conditions that caused “significant declines” in wheat yields, as well as in barley, canola and fruit production in British Columbia and Alberta, Canada, says the study.
Increasing events
To assess how CDHEs are changing, the researchers use daily reanalysis data to identify droughts and heatwaves events. (Reanalysis data combines past observations with climate models to create a historical climate record.) Then, using an algorithm, they analyse how these events overlap in both time and space.
The study covers the period from 1980 to 2023 and the world’s land surface, excluding polar regions where CDHEs are rare.
The research finds that the area of land affected by CDHEs has “increased substantially” since the early 2000s.
Heatwave-led events have been the main contributor to this increase, the study says, with their spatial extent rising 110% between 1980-2001 and 2002-23, compared to a 59% increase for drought-led events.
The map below shows the global distribution of CDHEs over 1980-2023. The charts show the percentage of the land surface affected by a heatwave-led CDHE (red) or a drought-led CDHE (yellow) in a given year (left) and relative increase in each CDHE type (right).
The study finds that CDHEs have occurred most frequently in northern South America, the southern US, eastern Europe, central Africa and south Asia.
Threshold passed
The authors explain that the increase in heatwave-led CDHEs is related to rising global temperatures, but that this does not tell the whole story.
In the earlier 22-year period of 1980-2001, the study finds that the spatial extent of heatwave-led CDHEs rises by 1.6% per 1C of global temperature rise. For the more-recent period of 2022-23, this increases “nearly eightfold” to 13.1%.
The change suggests that the rapid increase in the heatwave-led CDHEs occurred after the global average temperature “surpasse[d] a certain temperature threshold”, the paper says.
This threshold is an absolute global average temperature of 14.3C, the authors estimate (based on an 11-year average), which the world passed around the year 2000.
Investigating the recent surge in heatwave-leading CDHEs further, the researchers find a “regime shift” in land-atmosphere dynamics “toward a persistently intensified state after the late 1990s”.
In other words, the way that drier soils drive higher surface temperatures, and vice versa, is becoming stronger, resulting in more heatwave-led compound events.
Daily data
The research has some advantages over other previous studies, Yeh says. For instance, the new work uses daily estimations of CDHEs, compared to monthly data used in past research. This is “important for capturing the detailed occurrence” of these events, says Yeh.
He adds that another advantage of their study is that it distinguishes the sequence of droughts and heatwaves, which allows them to “better understand the differences” in the characteristics of CDHEs.
Dr Meryem Tanarhte is a climate scientist at the University Hassan II in Morocco, and Dr Ruth Cerezo Mota is a climatologist and a researcher at the National Autonomous University of Mexico. Both scientists, who were not involved in the study, agree that the daily estimations give a clearer picture of how CDHEs are changing.
Cerezo-Mota adds that another major contribution of the study is its global focus. She tells Carbon Brief that in some regions, such as Mexico and Africa, there is a lack of studies on CDHEs:
“Not because the events do not occur, but perhaps because [these regions] do not have all the data or the expertise to do so.”
However, she notes that the reanalysis data used by the study does have limitations with how it represents rainfall in some parts of the world.
Compound impacts
The study notes that if CDHEs continue to intensify – particularly events where heatwaves are the precursors – they could drive declining crop productivity, increased wildfire frequency and severe public health crises.
These impacts could be “much more rapid and severe as global warming continues”, Yeh tells Carbon Brief.
Tanarhte notes that these events can be forecasted up to 10 days ahead in many regions. Furthermore, she says, the strongest impacts can be prevented “through preparedness and adaptation”, including through “water management for agriculture, heatwave mitigation measures and wildfire mitigation”.
The study recommends reassessing current risk management strategies for these compound events. It also suggests incorporating the sequences of drought and heatwaves into compound event analysis frameworks “to enhance climate risk management”.
Cerezo-Mota says that it is clear that the world needs to be prepared for the increased occurrence of these events. She tells Carbon Brief:
“These [risk assessments and strategies] need to be carried out at the local level to understand the complexities of each region.”
The post Heatwaves driving recent ‘surge’ in compound drought and heat extremes appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Heatwaves driving recent ‘surge’ in compound drought and heat extremes
Greenhouse Gases
DeBriefed 6 March 2026: Iran energy crisis | China climate plan | Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ wind turbine
Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed.
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.
This week
Energy crisis
ENERGY SPIKE: US-Israeli attacks on Iran and subsequent counterattacks across the Middle East have sent energy prices “soaring”, according to Reuters. The newswire reported that the region “accounts for just under a third of global oil production and almost a fifth of gas”. The Guardian noted that shipping traffic through the strait of Hormuz, which normally ferries 20% of the world’s oil, “all but ground to a halt”. The Financial Times reported that attacks by Iran on Middle East energy facilities – notably in Qatar – triggered the “biggest rise in gas prices since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine”.
‘RISK’ AND ‘BENEFITS’: Bloomberg reported on increases in diesel prices in Europe and the US, speculating that rising fuel costs could be “a risk for president Donald Trump”. US gas producers are “poised to benefit from the big disruption in global supply”, according to CNBC. Indian government sources told the Economic Times that Russia is prepared to “fulfil India’s energy demands”. China Daily quoted experts who said “China’s energy security remains fundamentally unshaken”, thanks to “emergency stockpiles and a wide array of import channels”.
‘ESSENTIAL’ RENEWABLES: Energy analysts said governments should cut their fossil-fuel reliance by investing in renewables, “rather than just seeking non-Gulf oil and gas suppliers”, reported Climate Home News. This message was echoed by UK business secretary Peter Kyle, who said “doubling down on renewables” was “essential” amid “regional instability”, according to the Daily Telegraph.
China’s climate plan
PEAK COAL?: China has set out its next “five-year plan” at the annual “two sessions” meeting of the National People’s Congress, including its climate strategy out to 2030, according to the Hong Kong-based