The U.S. depends heavily on imported uranium to power its nuclear reactors, using about 50 million pounds each year while producing less than 1% at home. Boosting domestic uranium production is crucial for energy security and reducing reliance on foreign sources. In this context, Anfield Energy Inc. (NASDAQ: AEC; TSXV: AEC) is making progress with its Velvet-Wood uranium project in San Juan County, Utah.
The Utah Department of Oil, Gas, and Mining recently approved the project for construction. This allows Anfield to move quickly toward production.
Velvet-Wood Gains Green Light for Rapid Development
In May, Anfield Energy Inc. announced that the U.S. Department of the Interior approved its Velvet-Wood uranium project in San Juan County, Utah.
This project was the first mining initiative approved under a new fast-track permitting process by the U.S. Department of the Interior. This process, introduced after President Trump’s energy emergency declaration in January 2025, lets energy projects complete environmental reviews in just 14 days.
By selecting Velvet-Wood, federal agencies highlighted its importance for the domestic uranium and vanadium supply.
Notably, Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum said the Bureau of Land Management ensures safe and responsible extraction while protecting the environment.
With federal and state approvals in hand, Anfield plans to start mobilization immediately. The company expects to break ground within 30 days. They will:
- reopen the mine portal
- dewater the site
- build surface facilities
- develop a new mine incline.
These steps aim to bring Velvet-Wood into production quickly while keeping safety and environmental standards high.
Anfield Boots U.S. Energy Security with Domestic Production
Anfield acquired Velvet-Wood in 2015. The mine previously produced around 4 million pounds of uranium and 5 million pounds of vanadium from 1979 to 1984.
- A preliminary economic assessment shows 4.6 million pounds of uranium at a grade of 0.29% eU3O8, plus additional inferred resources.
CEO Corey Dias said the approvals clear the way for building the mine and starting production. The company also plans to increase its reclamation bond with the Bureau of Land Management to meet federal land restoration rules.
Anfield’s project helps the U.S. reduce dependence on foreign minerals. The country imports uranium from Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. Vanadium supply mainly comes from China, Russia, South Africa, and Brazil.
By producing uranium and vanadium domestically, Anfield enhances energy security and supports industries such as nuclear power, aerospace, and defense.

Uranium and Vanadium: Key Strategic Materials
Uranium powers nuclear reactors, fuels U.S. Navy submarines, and helps produce medical isotopes. It is also used in tritium production for national defense. Vanadium strengthens steel and titanium alloys used in both commercial and military aircraft. Together, these minerals are vital for energy, defense, and industrial security.
EIA’s Domestic Uranium Production Report Second-Quarter 2025 highlights that in Q2 2025, the U.S. produced 437,238 pounds of uranium concentrate (U3O8), up 41% from the first quarter’s 310,533 pounds.

Production came from the following mines:

Underground Mining Keeps Environmental Impact Low
Velvet-Wood will focus on underground mining. The company will use existing mine workings and develop new mineral areas. This approach keeps surface disturbance to just three acres and makes use of the old Velvet mine site.
Anfield also owns the Shootaring Canyon mill, one of only three licensed uranium mills in the U.S. Restarting this mill will allow the company to convert uranium ore into concentrate, reduce reliance on imports, and support domestic nuclear fuel production.
Economic and Strategic Benefits
Anfield combines strong assets with efficient operations. Its hub-and-spoke model links mining sites with processing mills, maximizing the value of Velvet-Wood’s resources. With measured resources, a licensed mill, and fast government approvals, the company is ready to meet growing demand for uranium and vanadium.
The project also brings jobs to Utah and supports local communities. Restarting the Shootaring Canyon mill adds processing capacity, lowers costs, and improves efficiency.
Moving Toward a Sustainable Energy Future
Anfield focuses on sustainable growth. Its operations balance environmental responsibility with energy and defense needs. By producing domestic uranium and vanadium, the company supports a carbon-free energy future while reducing reliance on imports.
Velvet-Wood shows how companies and supportive policies can address energy and security challenges. By using old mining assets and modern techniques, Anfield aims to become a leading U.S. uranium producer. It’s fast move from permitting to production sets an example for other critical mineral projects.
The post U.S. Uranium Production Set to Rise as Anfield Energy Gains Velvet-Wood Approval appeared first on Carbon Credits.
Carbon Footprint
Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets
The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.
The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.
This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.
The two definitions, in plain English
Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.
Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.
The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.
What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says
The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).
For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.
For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.
A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.
When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)
Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:
- The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
- The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
- The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
- It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.
The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.
When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.
The procurement and supplier engagement question
Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.
To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.
The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.
Choosing the right tool for the right target
A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.
The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.
If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.
Carbon Footprint
Net zero needs nature: a carbon credit guide
Net zero is often described as a balancing act: cut what you can, account for the rest, and reach zero on the ledger. That framing is useful, but it leaves something out. It treats every tonne of carbon as interchangeable and every route to zero as equally sound, while the science tells a more specific story.
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Carbon Footprint
Deforestation in Malawi: causes and solutions
Malawi has lost a striking share of its forests over the past three decades. Woodlands that once covered well over a third of the country now cover less than a quarter, and the pressure on what remains is increasing. Behind those figures sit two practical questions: what is driving the loss, and what reverses it?
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