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Nornickel

As reported by Bloomberg, Russia’s largest mining company, Nornickel is negotiating to establish a major copper smelting facility in Fangchenggang, a port city in China’s Guangxi region. The proposed plant will use raw copper concentrate transported from Russia and will have the capacity to refine up to 500,000 tons of copper annually. This project aims to bring the final processing a step closer to China’s vast metal market.

Nornickel’s Push for Joint Ventures in China Amid Western Sanctions

Nornickel is Russia’s leading metals and mining company and the world’s largest high-grade nickel and palladium producer. President, Vladimir Potanin said that the company has been exploring options in copper for joint projects in China since earlier this year.

Strategic ambitions for 2030+ metal production

Nornickel copper

Source: Nornickel

Lately, Western sanctions on Russian commodities have made global trade more difficult. These restrictions limit where and how Russian goods, like metals (aluminum, copper, and nickel) and energy resources, can be sold. As a result, Nornickel has been seeking joint ventures in China since earlier this year even though it is not directly sanctioned by the West.

The mining giant has not disclosed the name of the Chinese partner they are in talks with but they hint at constructing a greenfield plant at the mentioned location.

The smelter project represents a strategic shift for Nornickel, which previously explored partnerships with established Chinese smelters to process Russian concentrate. However, those plans were abandoned in favor of a new, purpose-built facility.

China’s Copper Dominance: Too Much of a Good Thing?

Demand for copper is going high due to renewables, electric vehicles, and grid infrastructure. According to Bloomberg, China’s refined copper output rose by over 5% in 2024 despite certain production curbs. Furthermore, in recent years, the country has rapidly constructed smelters which has led to an increase in its global share for copper.

This burst in capacity is certainly not favorable for the Chinese copper market. Rather it has put tremendous pressure on domestic smelters to slow expansion. This is the outcome of the fierce competition and limited raw materials which have shrunk the profits of the copper industry.

China copper

Source: Bloomberg

Grant Sporre, head of metals and mining research at Bloomberg Intelligence had cautioned that China’s excesses threaten the future of copper refining beyond its borders and operations from Chile to Europe and India could be at risk.

The above analysis is based on the fact that ore supply has intensified as new smelters open in India and Indonesia. India is rapidly building plants to cut down on copper imports and strengthen domestic production. Meanwhile, Indonesia has taken steps to keep its ore resources within the country by curbing exports on which many smelters in Asia rely. This shift forces copper smelters in Asia to secure new sources or risk production slowdowns, further straining the already tight market.

However, interestingly some analysts suggested that state-owned Chinese smelters may handle the market downturn better than global competitors. This is simply because of the cost advantages and more modern facilities the country is equipped with.

Is Nornickel’s Entry A Threat to China’s Copper Giants?

Fangchenggang, where the plant would be built, already has a large smelter with a 600,000-ton capacity and is operated by China’s state-owned Jinchuan Group. On top, this project comes at a time when the country is dealing with an oversupply of copper refining capacity.

As a consequence, Nornickel’s project has met substantial resistance from Chinese copper producers, who feel the extra capacity could harm their domestic output.

China’s refined copper imports from Russia have declined by over one-third year-on-year, totaling about 165,000 tons in the first nine months of 2024. The new smelter, if finalized, would help stabilize the flow of Russian copper into China and offer Nornickel an opportunity to circumvent Western trade restrictions while accessing the world’s largest copper market.

Operational performance

nornickel operational

Source: Nornickel Sustainability Report

Thus, it’s too early to comment on whether Nornickel’s entry will be a boon or a bane for China’s copper market. The study is speculative and the picture will be clear eventually as the mining company reveals more details of their expansion plans.

Expanding on Critical Resources: Alaska’s Role in U.S. Energy Independence

The challenges Nornickel faces in China underscore the broader global race to secure critical mineral resources, especially as countries like the U.S. strive for energy independence. Alaska, a state rich in mineral deposits, is at the center of efforts to boost domestic production of essential metals. Canadian mining company Alaska Energy Metals Corporation (AEMC) is one such player making strides by exploring Alaska’s underground deposits of nickel, a metal critical for energy transition technologies, particularly electric vehicle batteries.

AEMC President Greg Beischer has highlighted the importance of building a sustainable, domestic supply chain for nickel and other key minerals. With AEMC’s flagship project, the 23,000-acre Nikolai deposit, the company aims to help reduce the U.S.’s reliance on imports and support a shift towards a low-carbon economy. The Nikolai deposit holds substantial nickel reserves and also contains copper, cobalt, platinum, and palladium—metals deemed critical by the U.S. Department of Energy.

AEMC’s activities in Alaska mirror Nornickel’s efforts in Fangchenggang. Both companies recognize the growing need to secure a stable supply of strategic minerals, given geopolitical pressures and the global focus on energy security. For AEMC, overcoming challenges posed by fluctuating nickel prices and securing project funding are priorities to advance the Nikolai project, which they aim to assess economically by 2025. This project also aligns with U.S. initiatives to establish local sources for critical minerals, a strategy that could mitigate reliance on overseas production.

Data and Content Sources:

  1. Russian Miner Moves Closer to Deal for New Copper Plant in China – Bloomberg
  2. China’s Copper Production Boom Threatens to Crowd Out the Rest of The World – Bloomberg

Disclosure: Owners, members, directors, and employees of carboncredits.com have/may have stock or option positions in any of the companies mentioned: AEMC.

Carboncredits.com receives compensation for this publication and has a business relationship with any company whose stock(s) is/are mentioned in this article.

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The post Nornickel’s Big Copper Bet: Will It Disrupt China’s Smelting Power? appeared first on Carbon Credits.

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Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?

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More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.

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Carbon Footprint

Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets

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The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.

The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.

This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.

The two definitions, in plain English

Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.

Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.

The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.

What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says

The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).

For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.

For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.

A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.

When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)

Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:

  • The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
  • The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
  • The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
  • It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.

The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.

When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.

The procurement and supplier engagement question

Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.

To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.

The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.

Choosing the right tool for the right target

A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.

The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.

If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.

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Carbon Footprint

Net zero needs nature: a carbon credit guide

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Net zero is often described as a balancing act: cut what you can, account for the rest, and reach zero on the ledger. That framing is useful, but it leaves something out. It treats every tonne of carbon as interchangeable and every route to zero as equally sound, while the science tells a more specific story.

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