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Kenya’s latest national climate plan reflects its ambitions to raise millions of dollars in climate finance by tapping into the voluntary carbon market, even as two of its biggest offsetting projects face scrutiny over tensions with local Indigenous communities.

Verra, the main global certifier of carbon credits, this week suspended the Northern Kenya Rangelands Carbon Project (NKRCP) for the second time for a review following a ruling by a Kenyan court earlier this year.

In a case brought by 165 community members, the court decided in January that two of the conservancies established by the project’s manager, Northern Rangelands Trust (NRT), had been set up unconstitutionally, according to Survival International, a charity that works to protect tribal peoples.

The case followed a 2023 report by the human rights group, which found flaws in the process for obtaining consent from participating communities and breaches of the Community Land Act. It also questioned the project’s carbon storage calculations, saying they were based on monitoring information that was “unfit for the purpose”.

That prompted Verra’s first suspension of the project, which was lifted eight months later following a review that identified areas in need of improvement but not more serious failings.

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NRT, which announced leadership changes this week, said the new review “reflects due diligence following (the) recent court ruling that raised broader questions about land governance in Kenya”.

“The review does not stem from new concerns about the project’s methodology or technical foundations. The project remains fully compliant with the requirements of the Verified Carbon Standard,” Communications Director Moses Wakhisi added in an emailed statement.

Kajiado County protest

Verra’s latest move on Tuesday came weeks after protests by villagers opposed to another soil carbon project on Indigenous-owned grazing land in the East African country, which is still awaiting certification.

Stretching across swathes of grazing land in southern Kenya, the Kajiado Rangeland Carbon Project (KRCP) is billed by its developers as a way to remove millions of tonnes of carbon from the atmosphere and protect its inhabitants, and biodiversity, for decades to come.

In Kenya and elsewhere in Africa, such projects are an “immense opportunity” that can provide a critical source of much-needed climate finance, according to the Africa Carbon Markets Initiative (ACMI), a UN-backed initiative launched at COP27.

But just as the government’s updated Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) plan was being submitted to the United Nations climate body on April 30, a protest by some villagers from the Oldonyo-Nyokie Group Ranch in Kajiado County, home to the pastoralist Maasai people, spotlighted tensions within local communities over the leasing of ancestral lands for carbon-offsetting initiatives.

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The opposition of dozens of community members, who shouted “No carbon” and waved sticks during the meeting, prevented the signing of a 40-year lease on some 68,000 hectares (168,000 acres) of land as part of the much larger KRCP, Kenya’s Daily Nation newspaper reported.

Locals opposed to the initiative said the Kenya-based company that is leading it, Soils for the Future Africa (SftFA), had not followed the right process of obtaining consent from community members and accused it of getting some signatures under false pretences.

Herders who support it say better pasture management would help them deal with climate change impacts, and give them an additional income source.

SftFA did not respond to requests for comment. A company official has previously blamed a “misinformation campaign” for linking existing land tensions in the community to the project.

Sustainable development?

Kenya has been hard hit by climate-related losses in recent years, with floods and droughts in particular taking a heavy toll on the livelihoods.

It is targeting international funds, including from the voluntary carbon market, for about 80% of the cost of the climate change policies outlined in its NDC, which include cutting emissions by 35% and reaching 100% renewable energy generation by 2035.

President William Ruto has called carbon credits his country’s “next significant export” and said a new legal framework for engagement in the voluntary carbon market will mean host communities will see at least 40% of the proceeds.

But across the continent, questions about the credibility of carbon credit projects pose a threat to their development, according to the ACMI.

Most cookstove carbon credits ruled out of quality scheme in integrity push

On top of the unease among some Indigenous communities, carbon offsetting has faced mounting scepticism around the world. Critics say the approach fails to deliver real-world emissions reductions, and gives polluters a licence to continue burning fossil fuels, while “greenwashing” the damage they cause.

They also point to the global inequalities perpetuated by the system – with big global companies based in the Global North buying offsets from projects in the Global South that often fail to benefit local communities.

Soil project’s US backers

According to a KRCP document seen by Climate Home, the 1.5-million hectare (3.7-million acre) soil carbon initiative in Kajiado is expected to store more than 48 million metric tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) over the project’s 40-year lifetime, and will generate carbon credits for Climate Asset Management (CAM), a UK-based joint venture of HSBC Asset Management and Pollination.

It is supported by CarbonSolve, a US-based carbon project developer and Biodiversity Research Institute, a US non-profit.

Under the rotational grazing practice it promotes, herders are not allowed to graze more than once on one location during the wet or dry season. Locally hired grazing coordinators from the participating communities will be recruited to ensure compliance.

The aim of this process is to ensure that some areas are left fallow for one year to allow recovery from past grazing, or to serve as grass banks during the dry season or droughts.

Comment: New UN carbon market standards are a step change in protecting people and planet

Kenyan land rights activist Leonida Odongo said poor communication with local people was often an issue, with communities whose land is being leased for the initiatives sometimes unaware of exactly how they will be affected.

“Communities sign documents they don’t understand … and locals don’t get the chance to interrogate the potential impacts into the future,” she told Climate Home, adding that project backers sometimes gloss over the changes that pastoralists, for example, are required to make.

As Kenya looks to ramp up investment in offsetting projects, Mohamed Adow, founder of Kenya-based think-tank Power Shift Africa, said measures to protect local people’s rights are vital.

“It must protect community rights, prevent exploitation of land and prioritise environmental integrity and accountability,” he said.

The post Indigenous land disputes cloud Kenya’s carbon market ambitions appeared first on Climate Home News.

Indigenous land disputes cloud Kenya’s carbon market ambitions

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Climate Change

COP17: Key outcomes agreed at the UN biodiversity conference in Yerevan

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Article Contents

Countries have completed the first “global review” of their progress towards reversing nature loss by 2030 at the COP17 biodiversity talks in Yerevan, Armenia.

The review “notes with deep concern” that, unless action is “rapidly accelerated”, the goal to reverse nature loss and meet a set of 23 targets by 2030 “will not be achieved”.

It “urges” countries to accelerate action, including by “increased ambition in addressing the gaps”.

Much of the discussions in Yerevan focused on how to raise the necessary funds to help developing countries protect nature.

Some major economies pushed to expand the range of nations that are expected to provide finance, with countries agreeing at the end of the two weeks of talks that non-donors that want to contribute can “signal interest” before COP18.

This came after developed countries failed to meet a target to significantly ramp up nature finance over the last few years.

It also came as a landmark fund agreed at COP16 in Colombia to pay communities for the genetic resources derived from nature stands nearly empty two years on.

The Yerevan talks marked the halfway point of the “Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework” (GBF), the “Paris Agreement for nature” first made in 2022 and due to be achieved by 2030.

During the nearly 12-hour-long final plenary, countries voted for Quito, Ecuador, to host the COP18 nature talks, which will be held in 2028.

Countries managed to sign off on all the major negotiation texts, marking a stark contrast to COP16, which ran so far over time that the Colombian presidency lost “quorum”, forcing talks to resume in Rome months later. 

Below, Carbon Brief has detailed analysis of all of the key outcomes from COP17.

Formal negotiations

Finance

Finance, predictably, was at the heart of the discord and deadlock at the Yerevan talks.

At COP17, discussions on finance had to achieve several outcomes.

The first part – to take stock of biodiversity finance mobilised so far to meet the nature deal’s goals – fell under the global review.

As the global report noted, developed countries failed to meet their commitments to raise “at least $20bn a year by 2025” for nature. Delegates pointed to falling aid levels and a sharp 27% decline in environmental funding for the 2026-30 period.

The second part was to agree on how to mobilise resources for the next four years, to meet the GBF’s goals and targets.

Calls to “broaden the contributor base” of who pays to protect nature – and whether that should include emerging economies – became the most fraught element of the talks.

Eventually, countries agreed on what Switzerland described as a “super, mega-delicate” text. It hinged on major “political compromises”, with “no major winner or loser”, according to Kenya. 

Per the decision, countries that want to be included on a list of developed country donors can “signal interest” through bilateral, confidential consultations before COP18 and every alternate COP after.

Finally, countries also agreed on criteria to shape and resource a new, permanent financial mechanism to protect nature after 2030.

However, this did not immediately take the form of a new fund under the COP that biodiverse countries have demanded since 2022, deferring the mechanism’s institutional structure to COP18.

Resource mobilisation discussions at the GBF’s halfway mark were supposed to agree on how to close the “biodiversity finance gap” and to “increase resources from all sources” to “at least” $200bn per year by 2030, as set out in target 19 of the GBF.

The talks were largely dominated by a push, led by the JUSCANZ bloc of developed countries, to “broaden the contributor base”. This could see emerging economies, such as Qatar, China, Saudi Arabia and India, being added to the list of countries that pay to protect nature.

BlueSky post by Aruna Chandrasekhar (@arunacsekhar.bsky.social): "COP17 was supposed to be a nature finance stocktake, ramping contributions to "at least $30bn/yr" and sketching the bones of post-2030 nature funding. "Broadening the contributor base" was an outlier, appearing exactly once in the COP16 decision. Now it's the headliner."

Article 20 of the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) states that developed countries “shall provide new and additional financial resources” to developing countries to meet the costs of implementing measures to protect nature. 

The second paragraph of Article 20 of the UN biodiversity convention. The text says: "The developed country Parties shall provide new and additional financial resources to enable developing country Parties to meet the agreed full incremental costs to them of implementing measures which fulfil the obligations of this Convention and to benefit from its provisions and which costs are agreed between a developing country Party and the institutional structure referred to in Article 21, in accordance with policy, strategy, programme priorities and eligibility criteria and an indicative list of incremental costs established by the Conference of the Parties. Other Parties, including countries undergoing the process of transition to a market economy, may voluntarily assume the obligations of the developed country Parties. For the purpose of this Article, the Conference of the Parties, shall at its first meeting establish a list of developed country Parties and other Parties which voluntarily assume the obligations of the developed country Parties. The Conference of the Parties shall periodically review and if necessary amend the list. Contributions from other countries and sources on a voluntary basis would also be encouraged. The implementation of these commitments shall take into account the need for adequacy, predictability and timely flow of funds and the importance of burden-sharing among the contributing Parties included in the list."
The second paragraph of Article 20 of the UN biodiversity convention. Source: UN CBD

The text states that other countries – including emerging economies – may “voluntarily assume” these obligations to pay. However, it adds that this list of developed countries “shall” be reviewed periodically and amended “if necessary”.

The list was last amended in 2006.

(See this “jargon buster” which explains the specific meaning and legal weight of various terms and verbs used in UN formal documents.)

Discussions around this fraught subject had reached a dead end at intersessional talks this year, but resurfaced in Yerevan.

The first “non-paper” had four different options for expanding the contributor base. These ranged from using the World Bank’s country income groups “as a proxy” to identify high-income countries, to commissioning a study on the impacts of being included on the list.

By 21 October, the number of options swelled to eight, including two from Saudi Arabia and one from Peru.

Some countries “expressed concern” that certain options were based on a CBD secretariat study on “what constitutes a developed country”, Earth Negotiations Bulletin reported.

By the end of the first week, it was clear that the finance deadlock would have to go into informal ministerial consultations for any consensus to emerge.

At a press conference on 28 October, Christopher O’Sullivan, Ireland’s nature minister and representing the EU delegation, told Carbon Brief:

“Our position isn’t that we want to pull back in terms of contributing…but it’s been 20 years since that list was added to, times have changed and there are new realities. We just simply want those new realities reflected. I don’t fully understand why there’s so much opposition to that.”

The EU chose not to comment on which countries it would like to see on that list.

Lim Li Ching from the Third World Network, meanwhile, called the push for others to “assume the obligations” of developed countries “sheer hypocrisy”, adding that any country could make a voluntary contribution. She told Carbon Brief:

“At a forum like the CBD, this linking of income status with finance does not take into account where historical and current responsibilities lie. If you want to generate more funding for biodiversity, let’s look at sovereign debt burdens and rules, which are inequitable for developing countries. But if you can fund wars, and provide resources for your defence industry, then you know where the priorities are.”

On 29 October – at a plenary meant to adopt final texts for the most contentious subjects – Norway’s Gaute Hanssen announced that resource-mobilisation discussions would go into a smaller “friends of the chair” meeting.

Facilitated by Carolina Caceres from Canada and Imèn Meliane from Tunisia, the meeting would discuss the most contentious elements of a draft decision that had swelled to 112 brackets, denoting areas of disagreement on specific details in the text.

While the meeting was open to all, countries that were called to be present included Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, the EU, Fiji, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and the UK.

At the same time, a “non-paper” text by finance and environment ministers laid out countries’ red lines and compromises.

A key paragraphs from a minister’s non-paper on nature finance published on 29 October. The text says: "Operative paragraphs (the following paragraphs would replace options A-H in the CRP) 1. Emphasizes the importance of accelerating the implementation of the strategy for resource mobilization for the period 2025–2030; 2. Invites Parties not on the list of developed country Parties and other Parties that may voluntarily assume the obligations of the developed country Parties as adopted in Decision VIII/18, in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 20 of the Convention, to indicate to the Secretariat their interest in being included in the corresponding list established in accordance with that Article and invites Parties to provide their views on improving the modalities and timing of such invitations;"
A key paragraphs from a minister’s non-paper on nature finance published on 29 October. Source: UN CBD

At the end of COP17, countries welcomed a final compromise text, with Kenya thanking the “strong women” co-chairs who strove to strike a “delicate” balance.

China, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland and Fiji cautioned against any further interventions, with Brazil warning: “If we open this text, we will never close it again.”

While the final decision “recognises” that “contributions from more parties would improve the mobilisation” of biodiversity finance, it steered away from issuing criteria to expand the list of donor countries.

The text makes it clear that no additions to the list would be made without inviting and confidentially consulting with interested countries, to secure their explicit consent.

Instead, the CBD secretariat “invites” countries keen to be on the list and “assume the obligations” of developed countries to “signal interest” before COP18 and at every alternate COP thereafter.

At the same time, developing countries can contribute to meeting the GBF and biodiversity convention’s goals on a “voluntary basis”, with contributions not implying inclusion on the list.

A negotiator for China told Carbon Brief at the closing plenary:

“We welcome this balanced document. It was a very long discussion that has gone [on] since [2022 nature talks in] Nairobi. But actually this time, there were a lot of sensitive issues, [there were] a lot of critical things we didn’t open in the contact groups; it mainly went to the high-level discussion.”

The decision also establishes a financial mechanism for nature funding after 2030 under the governance of the COP, a key ask from developing countries.

However, it defers decisions on what form this mechanism would take – whether this would be a new fund or based on existing arrangements – until COP18.

Oscar Soria at the Common Initiative told Carbon Brief that the decision on the financial mechanism leaves things “very open”, with “no movement” towards a new fund or money and no upgrades to existing funding arrangements.

The text acknowledges the links between debt and biodiversity eight times, mentioning how debt-related instruments can be included in biodiversity plans, but does not go further.

“It is almost as if the debt studies they called for at COP16 didn’t happen,” said Soria, who had earlier flagged serious methodological issues with the first-ever COP-commissioned report on debt and biodiversity. 

Global review

In Yerevan, countries agreed on the first stocktake of progress towards the 2030 nature targets – known as the “global review”.

The review was one of the keenly anticipated outcomes from COP17 and was seen as less controversial than some of the other major negotiation strands.

It was swiftly signed off by countries at the start of the final COP17 plenary, with just one last-minute addition.

The concept of carrying out a global review on “collective progress” was set out in the GBF and its underlying documents.

The details of how this review would be carried out were supposed to be agreed at COP16, but it was not discussed before the plenary in Cali was suspended for loss of “quorum”. It was instead adopted at the resumed COP16 negotiations in Rome in February 2025.

The global review was based largely on the findings of the global report and other information provided by countries.

The final text “welcomes” and also “notes with deep concern” the findings of the global report. It then homes in on various ways countries can increase their biodiversity action to get on track to meet the targets.

As of 19 October, when COP17 officially began, the non-paper contained 152 brackets, which indicate areas of disagreement in UN texts.

Smaller “contact group” discussions took place to try and reduce the number of brackets throughout the first week. This group was co-chaired by Sanne Kruid from the Netherlands and Sivendra Michael from Fiji.

A few days into the talks, Kruid told Carbon Brief that the progress on the global review was “relatively posi