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It is well understood that human-caused climate change is causing sea levels to rise around the world.

Since 1901, global sea levels have risen by at least 20cm – accelerating from around 1mm a year for much of the 20th century to 4mm a year over 2006-18. 

Sea level rise has significant environmental and social consequences, including coastal erosion, damage to buildings and transport infrastructure, loss of livelihoods and ecosystems.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has said it is “virtually certain” that sea level will continue to rise during the current century and beyond.

But what is less clear is exactly how quickly sea levels could climb over the coming decades.

This is largely due to challenges in calculating the rate at which land ice in Antarctica – the world’s largest store of frozen freshwater – could melt.

In this article, we unpack some of the reasons why projecting the speed and scale of future sea level rise is difficult.

Drivers of sea level rise

There are three principal components of sea level rise.

First, as the ocean warms, water expands. This process is known as thermal expansion, a comparatively straightforward physical process. 

Second, more water gets added to the oceans when the ice contained in glaciers and ice sheets on land melts and flows into the sea.

Third, changes in rainfall and evaporation – as well as the extraction of groundwater for drinking and irrigation, drainage of wetlands and construction of reservoirs – affect how much water is stored on land.

In its sixth assessment cycle (AR6), the IPCC noted that thermal expansion and melting land ice contributed almost equally to sea level rise over the past century. Changes in land water storage, on the other hand, played a minor role. 

However, the balance between these three drivers is shifting.

The IPCC projects that the contribution of melting land ice – already the largest contributor to sea level rise – will increase over the coming decade as the world continues to warm. 

The lion’s share of the Earth’s remaining land ice – 88% – is in Antarctica, with Greenland accounting for almost all of the rest. (Mountain glaciers in the Himalaya, Alps and other regions collectively account for less than 1% of total land ice.)

However, it is difficult to project exactly how much Antarctic ice will make its way into the sea between now and 2100.

As a result, IPCC projections cover a large range of outcomes for future sea level rise.

In AR6, the IPCC said sea levels would “likely” be between 44-76cm higher by 2100 than the 1995-2014 average under a medium-emissions scenario. However, it noted that sea level rise above this range could not be ruled out due to “deep uncertainty linked to ice sheet processes”.

The chart below illustrates the wide range of sea level rise projected by the IPCC under different warming scenarios (coloured lines) as well as a possible – but unlikely – worst-case scenario (dotted line).

The shaded areas represent the “likely range” of sea level rise under each warming scenario, calculated by analysing processes that are already well understood. The worst-case scenario dotted line represents a future where various poorly understood processes combine to lead to a very rapid increase in sea levels.

The graph shows that sea level rise increases with warming – and would climb most sharply under the “low-likelihood, high-impact” pathway.

Projections of global sea level rise
Projections of global sea level rise in very high (dark red), high (red), intermediate (orange), low (dark blue) and very low (light blue) warming scenarios, based on IPCC projections. The shaded areas represent the “likely range” of sea level rise, which only takes into account processes that are already well understood. The dotted line represents a worst-case scenario where various poorly understood processes combine. Adapted from IPCC (2023)

Retreat of glacier grounding lines

In Antarctica, the melting of ice on the surface of glaciers is limited. In many locations, warmer temperatures are leading to increases in snowfall and greater snow accumulation, which means the surface of the ice is continuously gaining mass.

Most of Antarctica’s contribution to global sea level rise is, therefore, not linked to ice melt at the surface. Instead, it occurs when giant glaciers push from land into the sea, propelled downhill by gravity and their own immense weight.

These huge masses of ice first grind downhill across the land and then along the seafloor. Eventually, they detach from the bedrock and start to float.

These floating ice shelves then largely melt from below, as warm ocean water intrudes into cavities on its underside. This is known as “basal melting”.

The boundary between grounded and floating ice is known as the “grounding line”.

In many regions of Antarctica, grounding lines typically sit at the high point of the bedrock, with the ice sheet deepening inland. This is illustrated in the graphic below.

Illustration of an Antarctic ice sheet, showing the grounding line where grounded ice transitions to floating ice, and how warm ocean water intrudes beneath the ice shelf, melting it from below.
Illustration of an Antarctic ice sheet, showing the grounding line where grounded ice transitions to floating ice, and how warm ocean water intrudes beneath the ice shelf, melting it from below. Credit: Freya Sykes, iC3.

When a grounding line is at a high point of the bedrock, it acts as a block which limits the area of ice exposed to basal melting.

However, if the grounding line retreats further inland, warm water could “spill” over the high point in the bedrock and carve out large cavities below the ice. This could dramatically accelerate the retreat of grounding lines further inland across Antarctica.

There is evidence to suggest that the retreat of grounding lines might cause a runaway effect, in which each successive retreat causes the ice behind the line to detach from the land even more quickly.

Recent climate modelling suggests that many grounding lines are not yet in runaway retreat – but some regions of Antarctica are close enough to thresholds that tiny increases in basal melting push model runs toward very different outcomes. 

Whether – and to what extent – grounding lines might retreat will depend on a wide range of factors, including the exact shape of the bedrock beneath the ice. However, the bedrock on the coast of Antarctica has not yet been precisely mapped in many places.

Ice shelves

Once Antarctic ice detaches from the seabed, it floats on the ocean surface. These floating ice shelves slow the flow of ice from land towards the sea, acting as a brake as they wedge between headlands and little hills on the seafloor.

If these ice shelves break apart, the flow of glaciers towards the sea can accelerate.

The image below on the left shows a present-day ice shelf that is pinned in place by bedrock, which slows the flow of the ice into the sea.

The image on the right shows a future scenario in which ocean water continues to intrude under the ice, accelerating basal melting on the underside of the floating ice until it completely detaches from the “pinning point” that had previously held it in place.

In this scenario, the bedrock is no longer acting as a break on glaciers pushing to the sea and the ice shelf starts flowing into the sea more quickly and begins breaking up. Ice masses inland then begin to push more rapidly towards the sea.

Illustration of an Antarctic ice shelf. On the left, the ice is being held in place by a “pinning point” – a bump in the bedrock which temporarily acts as an anchor.
Illustration of an Antarctic ice shelf. On the left, the ice is being held in place by a “pinning point” – a bump in the bedrock which temporarily acts as an anchor. On the right, the ice shelf has detached from the pinning point, meaning that both the ice shelf and the masses of ice piled up behind it start flowing into the sea more rapidly. Credit: Freya Sykes, iC3.

This dynamic was directly observed during the collapse of the Larsen-B ice shelf on the Antarctic Peninsula in 2002, which led to accelerated glacial ice flow and is believed to have contributed to a dramatic glacial retreat two decades later.

However, the factors affecting the stability of the floating ice shelves around Antarctica’s coast are complex. The strength of ice shelves depends on their thickness, how and where they are pinned to the seafloor, how cracks grow, as well as air and sea temperatures and levels of snow and rainfall. For example, meltwater at the surface can lever cracks further apart, in a process known as hydrofracturing. 

A 2024 review of the stability of ice shelves found big gaps in scientific understanding of these processes. There is currently no scientific consensus on how rapidly various ice shelves might collapse – the pace is likely to vary greatly from one ice shelf to the next.

Ice-cliff collapse

If, and when, ice shelves collapse and drift away from the coast, they will expose the towering ice cliffs that loom behind them directly to the sea. These ice cliffs can be more than 100 metres tall.

This exposure could potentially lead to those cliffs to become structurally unstable and collapse in a runaway process – further accelerating the advance of the glaciers pushing towards the sea. 

The images below illustrate how such a collapse might unfold. In the top image, a floating ice shelf buttresses the ice masses behind it. In the middle image, the ice shelf has largely broken apart and melted into the sea. In the bottom image, the ice shelf has completely disappeared, leaving a steep wall of ice towering over the sea. At this point, the exposed cliffs might collapse and crash into the water below.

Progressive disintegration of ice shelves over time (top and middle) may leave ice cliffs exposed
Progressive disintegration of ice shelves over time (top and middle) may leave ice cliffs exposed (bottom image). These tall cliffs might collapse and fall directly into the sea. Image credit: Freya Sykes, iC3.

Researchers are still debating whether or not this “marine ice cliff instability” is likely to happen this century.

Modelling ocean dynamics

The speed at which grounding lines retreat, ice shelves collapse and ice cliffs cascade into the sea partially depends on complex ocean dynamics.

The temperature and speed of water intrusion underneath the ice depends on multiple factors, including ocean currents, winds, sea ice, underwater ridges and eddies. These factors vary from one location to the next and can vary by season and by year. 

Once water reaches a given cavity, the ways in which turbulent flows and fresh meltwater plumes meet the ice can significantly affect melt levels – further complicating the picture.

In other words, predicting future melt depends on models that integrate macro-level ocean circulation with local-level turbulence. This remains a major modelling challenge that, despite ongoing progress, is unlikely to be conclusively resolved any time soon. 

Planning for future sea level rise

Scientists agree that human-caused climate change is causing sea levels to rise and that the oceans will continue to rise during the current century and far beyond.

However, the combination of the complexity of modelling ice-ocean interactions and the threat of potential runaway processes means that, for the foreseeable future, there is considerable uncertainty about the magnitude of future sea level rise.

(While this article focuses on Antarctica, it is worth noting that Greenland’s contribution to future sea level rise is also highly uncertain.)

To complicate matters further, the ocean does not rise like water in a bathtub, creeping up equally on all sides. Instead the Earth’s surface is highly dynamic.

For example, during the last ice age, the immense mass of the glaciers that covered much of northern Europe pressed the Earth’s surface downwards. Even though most of that ice disappeared millennia ago, much of Scandinavia is still rebounding today, causing the land to rise gradually. 

In contrast, the city of Jakarta in Indonesia is sinking at a rapid pace of 10cm per year due to sprawling urbanisation and extraction of groundwater for household and industrial uses. That rate may increase or decrease over the coming decades, depending on urban planning and water management decisions. 

This mix of natural and human-driven factors means that, even if researchers could perfectly predict average global sea level rise, calculating how much the sea will rise in any given location will remain challenging. 

Another key unknown is around future levels of human-caused greenhouse gas emissions which drive climate change. 

The scientific community is working to better understand the dynamics driving sea level rise and improve predictions, including through Antarctic sea bed mapping, field observations and improved models. Those advances in knowledge will not erase uncertainty, but they could reduce the range of possible outcomes. 

Nevertheless, while that range may narrow, it will not completely disappear.

Plans drawn up by policymakers and engineers to prepare society for future sea level rise should never be based on a single point estimate.

Instead, they should take into account a range of possible “likely” outcomes – and include contingency plans for less likely, but entirely possible, scenarios in which the oceans rise far faster than currently expected.

The post Guest post: The challenges in projecting future global sea levels appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Guest post: The challenges in projecting future global sea levels

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Climate Change

Minerals for the planet or for war and AI? COP31 must make clear what we prioritise

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Elisa Morgera is the UN Special Rapporteur on Climate Change and Human Rights.

For years, governments and international financial institutions have justified the mining boom by arguing that the energy transition cannot happen without critical minerals.

Increasingly, however, they are securing those minerals for something else: weapons and artificial intelligence (AI).

At COP31, governments must make clear what a sustainable and fair energy transition requires and reject demand for minerals that fuels war and other climate-harming uses. 

Independent research shows that mineral demand is increasingly driven by AI and militarisation. Yet, both undermine climate action.

Major armed conflicts are linked to fossil fuel expansion, generate emissions that are unaccounted for under the Paris Agreement, and deliver record profits to fossil fuel and petrochemical companies through price spikes and disrupted access to fuel and food.

Meanwhile, AI infrastructure risks undoing the progress of the renewable energy transition by driving fossil fuel expansion to meet data centres’ vast new energy demand.

    UN Secretary-General António Guterres and the head of UN Climate Change Simon Stiell have both warned of the climate harm of unchecked, fossil fuel-powered AI and data centre growth.

    In addition, AI equipment and infrastructure require huge amounts of copper – one of the minerals most in demand for the energy transition. A recent academic study found that copper makes up roughly 82-83% of the mineral mass in data centres.

    None of this demand serves the energy transition. Instead, the climate case for mining is being used to legitimise uses that undermine a sustainable future.

    Mining still relies heavily on fossil fuels and often harms the environment, so it must be limited to extracting the resources strictly necessary for the energy transition. Otherwise, states breach their binding obligations to protect the environment and human rights, as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has made clear. 

    National security is the new mining fast track

    Campaigners have long warned that when minerals become a matter of national security, governments are more tempted to deregulate and fast-track mining projects. Communities pay the price.

    Extraction without adequate consultation is a global pattern linked to killings of land and environmental defenders. More than half of transition mineral projects are located on or near Indigenous lands, and allegations of abuses linked to mining transition minerals surged 73% in 2025 alone.

    Security and climate are not separate problems. Both are rooted in the fossil fuel-based global economy, now joined by the unchecked growth of AI and data centres.

    Who should benefit from minerals?

    Not every demand for minerals can or should be met. Minerals are finite and must be used to address the worsening climate crisis as a priority.

    The COP31 presidency’s push for electrification will have significant implications for mineral demand. At the same time, electrification doesn’t necessarily help to phase out fossil fuels. Governments must be clear about how minerals are being used and prioritise uses that genuinely advance the energy transition.

    • Climate action comes first: Mineral demand for the wind and solar projects that power communities and essential public services such as local food systems should be met first. Priority uses should include community-led wind and solar projects and renewable power for public transport.
    • No support for climate-harming activities: Mineral demand projections for the energy transition should exclude the military-industrial complex and data centres, and governments should reconsider public spending on militarisation. Mineral demand for electrification should also be scrutinised to avoid deepening fossil fuel dependence.
    • Cut demand before expanding supply: High-consuming countries should use less primary material through efficiency, longer-lasting products and by reducing car dependence, rather than exporting waste and harm to the Global South.
    • Prioritise energy needs: Those without access to energy must be served first. Overproduction and overconsumption must be curbed, otherwise the transition will neither mitigate climate change nor reduce poverty.
    • No mining without consent: No project should receive financing or permits without the Free, Prior and Informed Consent of Indigenous Peoples and genuine consultations with affected communities.
    • No-go zones: States should establish no-go mining zones in ecologically sensitive areas, on land and at sea, and ensure that mining does not cause significant harm to biodiversity.

    What can COP31 do?

    Last year, governments agreed to develop a Just Transition Mechanism, but explicit provisions on transition mineral governance were dropped. At COP31, negotiators are reconsidering the issue. I urge negotiators in Antalya to: 

    • Reflect states’ obligations underpinning the ICJ Advisory Opinion and the UN Secretary-General’s Critical Energy Transition Minerals Panel principles in the Just Transition Work Programme.
    • Keep mineral demand for the military and digital infrastructure separate from demand that serves climate protection.
    • Require traceability and end-use disclosure, so it is publicly known whether a mineral ends up in a battery, a missile or a data centre.
    • Respect the human rights of Indigenous Peoples, peasants and environmental human rights defenders, including the right to say no, protection from reprisals and access to remedy.

    At COP31, transition minerals should be unequivocally linked to everyone’s human right to a safe climate and a healthy environment.

    The post Minerals for the planet or for war and AI? COP31 must make clear what we prioritise appeared first on Climate Home News.

    Minerals for the planet or for war and AI? COP31 must make clear what we prioritise

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    Climate Change

    Countries take up industry push to loosen UN carbon market rules at COP31

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    Dozens of countries – from big emerging economies to the world’s poorest nations – are calling for the UN’s new carbon market to reassess climate integrity rules, in a push that campaigners and researchers have blamed on industry lobbying.

    At COP31 talks on the Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism (PACM) this weekend, the Like-Minded Developing Countries – a group that includes Saudi Arabia, India and China – the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and landlocked developing countries raised concerns about the requirements project developers must meet, according to sources familiar with the closed-door discussions.

    They warned about the cumulative weight of those requirements developed under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement as barriers to implementation. Several countries, including Singapore and some Latin American states, said rules must keep projects financially viable, while South Korea asked for proportionate requirements, the sources said.

    Their demands closely track arguments from carbon market industry groups, which claim PACM’s conservative approach to counting emission reductions is so strict that few projects will ever come to fruition.