Solar geoengineering has been suggested as a temporary measure to buy time for the emissions cuts needed to stabilise global temperatures.
These arguments have generally considered geoengineering as an independent component of the “toolbox” of options for climate change mitigation.
However, this perspective overlooks the knock-on effects that pursuing solar geoengineering could have on reaching net-zero.
The idea of solar geoengineering is to reduce global temperatures by reflecting more of the sun’s incoming radiation away from the Earth’s surface. One of the most talked-about approaches is stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI), which involves the injection of aerosols in an upper layer of the atmosphere.
In a pair of studies, published in Earth System Dynamics and Earth’s Future, we explore the potential impact that deploying SAI could have on the potential to generate wind and solar energy.
Our findings show that SAI could slow decarbonisation efforts by reducing the output of these energy systems. In this way, solar geoengineering could create an additional challenge to reaching net-zero, thus creating further obstacles for avoiding dangerous warming.
Buying time with temporary geoengineering
One of the criticisms of solar geoengineering is that its pursuit could obstruct or discourage ongoing and future efforts to cut emissions, sometimes referred to as mitigation deterrence. While the evidence of this is limited, what about the technological implications that could constrain efforts to reduce emissions?
To tackle this question, we have undertaken two studies into how SAI could affect the potential for solar and wind energy – key renewable sources in the transition to net-zero.
Our experiments focus on a scenario where SAI is used to bring global temperatures down from a very high-warming pathway (SSP5-8.5) that represents a failure of climate policy – to a moderate-warming pathway broadly in line with current policies (SSP2-4.5).
We compare the scenarios in the last decade of the simulations, the 2090s, where the signal of human-caused climate change is strongest.
The chart below illustrates the absolute warming levels for these pathways – showing climate model simulations for the moderate (grey lines), high (black) and SAI (red). The red bar shows the decade of interest at the end of the 21st century.
Under these pathways, end of century warming would be 2.2C lower in the SAI scenario than under high warming.

We focus on three different dimensions that help determine renewable energy potential and calculate these for each grid cell and each timestep of our simulations:
- A politico-economic dimension that assesses suitability based on land cover, regulatory restrictions and distance to population.
- The physical entity that represents the unconstrained energy resource, such as radiation, wind speed and temperature.
- The technical aspects related to conversion losses from turning energy from the sun or wind into electricity. This depends on characteristics related to solar panels or wind turbines and the density of their placement in a wind or solar farm.
These dimensions, and their interactions, are illustrated in the figure below, divided between politico-economic (green), technical (blue) and physical (purple).

Extended periods of low solar
Our results indicate that the potential for solar energy, whether compared to a moderate emissions scenario or the high emissions baseline, would be reduced in almost all parts of the world if SAI is used.
The maps below show the increase (green shading) and decrease (purple) in solar energy potential in the SAI scenario relative to the moderate (left) and high (right) warming scenarios.
We find typically larger differences under moderate warming than high warming because solar energy potential is larger in a world where global temperatures are not raised as high. Solar panel efficiency is reduced substantially in a much-warmer world.
Geographically, the largest relative reductions are in the mid-to-high latitudes. (This is due to solar geometry, which dictates that the sun’s rays arrive at a lower angle for higher latitudes, meaning they have to pass through more aerosol particles on their way to the surface.)
However, perhaps even more importantly, using SAI enhances the frequency of extended periods with low solar potential.

As the principle of SAI is to reduce incoming solar radiation, a fall in solar energy potential is to be expected.
Yet, there are actually two impacts of SAI that favour solar power: a thinning of tropical clouds, which compensates for some of the direct reduction of incoming sunlight, and lower ambient temperatures compared to the high-warming scenario, which benefit the efficiency of solar panels.
However, neither of these two impacts outweighs the overall reduction in solar power potential.
SAI may also affect how solar panels are positioned. Typically, panels are tilted to maximise the amount of direct radiation reaching the panels surface. However, under SAI, we find that radiation reaching the panels is less direct and increasingly diffuse. Therefore, tilting solar panels may become less useful.
Regional reductions in wind potential
Our findings suggest that changes in on- and offshore wind potential under SAI can be of a similar magnitude to those for solar, but whether the impact causes an increase or decrease in energy potential is highly variable depending on the location and season.
Overall, these changes lead to a negligible global impact on wind potential, but the regional charges can still be significant – with particular reductions in China and central Asia, along with Mexico, western US and many parts of the southern hemisphere.
This is shown in the maps below, which illustrate the increase (green) and decrease (purple) in offshore wind energy potential in the SAI scenario relative to the moderate (left) and high (right) warming scenarios.

The changes in wind potential under SAI are caused by changes in large-scale atmospheric circulation – mainly a result of the heat absorbed by the injected aerosols.
The impact on wind potential is more nuanced than for solar. For example, there is a general long-term slowing of surface winds under SAI. (This has also been observed in simulations using a different climate model from the one used in our study.)
However, due to the delicate range of wind speeds where wind turbines operate, slower winds can actually lead to either an increase or a decrease in potential.
Of course, changes in wind energy potential are only realised if the areas are actually exploited for wind energy. However, the large regional changes in wind potential may imply that a different strategy would be needed for siting windfarms in order to maximise the energy produced. However, this would cause problems later down the line if SAI is intended as a temporary measure.
Implications for decarbonisation
With a reduced potential for wind and solar when using SAI, there is a risk that deploying SAI would actually lead to a slowing of decarbonisation.
This, in turn, implies that solar geoengineering would need to be deployed for even longer – unless the gap could be met with higher amounts of carbon dioxide removal. Other research has found that, once started, geoengineering would be required for multiple centuries.
Such knock-on impacts put the concept of using geoengineering to “buy time” for climate change mitigation into question.
In fact, because of the reduced output of renewables under SAI, relatively more renewable capacity would need to be installed just to produce the same amount of energy as without SAI.
At the same time, renewable technology may also need to be adapted to SAI circulation and radiation conditions for optimal energy production. This could include adjusting the tilt of solar panels and adapting windfarm placement strategy and wind turbine characteristics.
The substantial impact geoengineering could have on mitigation – and vice versa – highlights the importance of considering such couplings when moving towards more comprehensive assessments of climate geoengineering.
The post Guest post: How solar geoengineering could disrupt wind and solar power appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Guest post: How solar geoengineering could disrupt wind and solar power
Greenhouse Gases
Germany election 2025: What the manifestos say on energy and climate change
A federal election is taking place in Germany on 23 February, following the collapse of the coalition government at the end of last year.
Germans will vote to elect 630 members of the nation’s parliament.
Polling suggests there will be a political shift to the right, with the centre-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in the lead and far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) set to make significant gains.
A “traffic light” coalition of parties has ruled since 2021, led by the centre-left Social Democratic Party (SPD), alongside the Green Party and the Free Democratic Party (FDP).
However, successive crises led to its breakup at the end of 2024, when the liberal, free market-oriented FDP split from the rest.
This prompted a vote of no confidence by the German parliament, which, in turn, triggered a snap election several months earlier than previously scheduled.
The coalition government has been plagued by ideological differences, particularly between the FDP and its two centre-left partners.
Climate policies were at the heart of many of the disputes.
The centre-left SPD and Greens have broadly favoured more public spending on climate issues, while the FDP is opposed to state intervention of any sort.
In the interactive grid below, Carbon Brief tracks the commitments made by each of the main parties in their election manifestos, across a range of issues related to climate and energy.
The parties covered are:
- Christian Democratic Union (CDU)/Christian Social Union (CSU): The centre-right CDU and its regional Bavarian “sister party”, CSU, has been the dominant political force in modern Germany and is currently polling highest ahead of the election.
- Social Democratic Party (SPD): The centre-left SPD has led the ruling coalition in Germany since the last election in 2021 and has traditionally been the other dominant party in the nation’s politics.
- Green Party: The centre-left and environmentalist Greens have been part of the coalition government since 2021.
- Free Democratic Party (FDP): The FDP is an economically liberal party that prioritises free markets and privatisation. It was part of the coalition government, but its departure at the end of 2024 ultimately triggered the federal election.
- Left Party: In recent years, this left-wing, democratic-socialist party has lost much of its support base in the east of the country.
- Alternative for Germany (AfD): The far-right party has become a major force in the country’s politics over the past decade, particularly in eastern Germany.
- Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW): The party was only founded last year, as an offshoot of the Left Party, but it has rapidly risen in popularity with a left-wing economic message and a conservative approach to some social and cultural issues.
Each entry in the grid represents a direct quote from a manifesto document.
Net-zero and climate framing
Climate action has become a divisive topic in German politics.
This is evident in the major parties’ manifestos, which range from supporting more ambitious net-zero goals to outright climate scepticism.
Germany is currently aiming to reach net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2045, with interim targets including a 65% cut by 2030.
Government climate advisors on the Council of Experts on Climate Change have stated that the nation is on track to miss the 2030 target.
Despite starting out with ambitious aims, the coalition’s climate progress has faltered, with the FDP successfully pushing for weaker climate policies. Moreover, a major court ruling curtailed the government’s climate spending by enforcing Germany’s limit on debt.
Amid these wider tensions, Germany’s two traditionally dominant parties still want to retain the nation’s headline climate target. The CDU, which is leading the polls in the run-up to election day, commits to meeting the Paris Agreement goals in its manifesto, saying its sights are “firmly set” on net-zero by 2045.
The SPD, which is currently third in the polls and likely to end up in coalition with the CDU, also supports the 2045 net-zero target, as well as the interim goals.
However, the two parties differ substantially in their approach to meeting the 2045 target. The CDU prioritises carbon pricing and rejects the tougher policies to decarbonise heating and transport favoured by the SPD. (See: Heating dispute and Combustion engine phaseout.)
Meanwhile, the AfD manifesto repeatedly questions the “supposed scientific consensus” on “man-made climate change”. The party, which is currently second in the polls, “therefore rejects every policy and every tax that is related to alleged climate protection”.
Mainstream German parties across the spectrum have long agreed to a “firewall” against far-right groups, meaning they will not form coalitions with the AfD. However, the CDU recently sparked controversy when it backed an anti-immigration policy with the AfD.
The Green Party also supports the 2045 net-zero target in its manifesto, emphasising Germany’s status as the EU member state with the highest emissions. The Left Party goes further, calling for a 2040 net-zero goal.
As for the FDP, its manifesto argues for the 2045 net-zero goal to be pushed back to 2050, stating that this would align Germany with the EU target. Prior to exiting the coalition government last year, the party had demanded this policy change, claiming that it would be a way to boost the German economy.
(Germany already revised its net-zero target, bringing it forward by five years, following a supreme court ruling in 2021 that its 2050 goal was insufficient. Moreover, even with a later goal, Germany would still need to align with wider EU targets, meaning its climate policies may not change much due to its “effort sharing” obligations.)
Finally, the BSW is not specific about when the net-zero goal should be achieved, but pushes for a “departure from the wishful thinking of quickly achieving complete climate neutrality”.
It does not reject climate policies outright, stating that climate change should be “taken seriously”. However, it frames many climate policies as being “extremely expensive and often unrealistic”.
Heating dispute
Home heating has become a major political issue in Germany. Along with transport, buildings make up one of the key German sectors that have repeatedly missed their decarbonisation goals, prompting the coalition government to take action.
Towards the end of 2023, the German parliament passed an amendment to the Building Energy Act, meaning that newly installed heating systems had to be powered by at least 65% renewable energy.
This covered heat pumps, “hydrogen-ready” gas boilers and other low-carbon systems. There are caveats to ensure the law is phased in gradually in different areas and types of homes, starting with new builds.
The amendment had been watered down compared to the coalition’s initial proposal, with allowances for people to keep gas boilers for longer. This followed relentless campaigning by the AfD and the right-leaning tabloid newspaper Bild, which dubbed the policy the “heizhammer” – or “heating hammer”.
There were also attacks from within the coalition, with the FDP criticising the law proposed by its partners in the Greens and SDP. Opponents framed the policy as an excessive burden on consumers.
These disputes are reflected in the election manifestos, with many parties outright rejecting the amended law. The CDU, FDP and AfD all say they would abolish it, as does the populist left BSW.
Meanwhile, the Green Party pledges to provide more government support for the installation of new heating systems by covering up to 70% of the price. The Left Party commits to covering 100% of the cost for low-income households.
(The current law covers 30% of the cost as a starting subsidy, with more available for low-income households and people who replace their boilers before 2028.)
Combustion engine phaseout
Several German political parties are pushing back against the EU-wide ban on the sale of new petrol and diesel cars, which is set to come into effect in 2035.
The CDU says the “ban on combustion engines must be reversed”, while the AfD says the “one-sided preference for electromobility must be stopped immediately”.
(EVs are “likely crucial” for tackling transport emissions, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC].)
The FDP and the BSW also argue that the 2035 phaseout date should be dropped, with less focus on the transition to electric cars. (This is in spite of Germany being the second-biggest manufacturer of electric cars in the world.)
These parties also favour getting rid of supposed “anti-car” policies. For example, they oppose speed limits on the German “autobahns” and support funding for alternative fuels, such as synthetic fuels.
The issue with ending the 2035 ban on new combustion-engine cars is that this policy is set at the EU level. Far-right and centre-right coalitions within the EU, including German parties, have been pushing hard to weaken the ban across the bloc.
However, the centre-left parties that may end up forming a coalition with the CDU, notably the SPD, stand by the 2035 phaseout date.
There is growing pressure on Germany’s car industry, linked to global competition and slow economic growth. Some German industry figures have stressed the need for consistent policy signals from the government, regarding the transition to electric vehicles.
Clean energy and fossil fuels
Broadly speaking, German parties on the left tend to be more supportive of renewables, while strongly opposing nuclear power. Those on the right are generally more open to nuclear and in some cases coal power.
Germany, which uses more coal than any other EU member state, has a coal power phaseout date of 2038. This is supported by the CDU and the FDP, but the Greens and the Left Party want a quicker phaseout by 2030.
(When the coalition government formed in 2021, the parties agreed to “ideally” move the coal phaseout date to 2030, but this has not happened formally. The SPD manifesto does not include any mention of coal power,)
Only the AfD advocates for the construction of new coal power plants, framing them as filling a gap until new nuclear plants are built.
Last year, Germany closed down its final nuclear reactors, bringing an end to a long-term plan to phase out the power source. However, nuclear power continues to be a politicised topic, with some arguing that its continued use is necessary to ensure the nation’s energy security.
Notably, the CDU suggests in its manifesto that it is open to reviving nuclear power in the future. It proposes an “expert review” around restarting closed plants and advocates for research on advanced nuclear technologies, such as small modular reactors.
Despite this wording, CDU leader Friedrich Merz has conceded that it is unlikely any old reactors will be restarted. This echoes views expressed by German utility companies and energy experts.
Both the CDU and the SPD support the expansion of renewables in their manifestos. The Greens include a specific target to achieve a net-zero electricity grid by 2035. By contrast, the AfD calls for an end to wind power expansion, in favour of other technologies.
Finally, both the far-right AfD and the BSW say the German government should repair the damaged Nord Stream pipelines in order to import what the BSW refers to as “cheap” gas from Russia. (The Baltic Sea pipelines were blown up in 2022 under mysterious circumstances.)
Germany has tried to wean itself off Russian gas since the country’s invasion of Ukraine, with considerable success. However, both the AfD and the BSW are more open to cooperating with Russia, and less supportive of Ukraine, than mainstream German parties.
The post Germany election 2025: What the manifestos say on energy and climate change appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Germany election 2025: What the manifestos say on energy and climate change
Greenhouse Gases
Guest post: How atmospheric rivers are bringing rain to West Antarctica
“Atmospheric rivers” are bringing rain to the frozen slopes of the West Antarctic ice sheet, hitting the ice shelves that play a major role in holding back rapidly retreating glaciers.
In a new study, my colleagues and I show how rain is occurring in sub-zero temperatures due to these “rivers in the sky” – long, narrow plumes of air which transport heat and moisture from the tropics to the mid-latitudes and poles.
Rain in Antarctica is significant, not only because it is a stark indicator of climate change, but because it remains an under-studied phenomenon which could impact ice shelves.
Ice shelves in Antarctica are important gatekeepers of sea level rise.
They act as a buffer for glaciers that flow off the vast ice sheet, slowing the rate at which ice is released into the ocean.
In the study, we explore the causes of rain falling on ice shelves in the Amundsen Sea embayment region, which stand in front of the critically important Thwaites and Pine Island glaciers.
Researchers have warned the collapse of ice shelves in this region could trigger the loss of the entire West Antarctic ice sheet over several centuries.
Rivers in the sky
Atmospheric rivers are typically associated with bringing extreme rainfall to the mid-latitudes, but, in the frigid Antarctic, they can deliver metres of snow in just a few days.
In West Antarctica, atmospheric rivers deliver a disproportionate quantity of the year’s snowfall. Research shows they account for around 13% of annual snowfall totals, despite occurring on just a few days per year.
But what makes atmospheric rivers in Antarctica so interesting is that snow is only part of the story. In extreme cases, they can also bring rain.
To explore how extreme precipitation affects the Amundsen Sea embayment region, we focused on two events associated with atmospheric rivers in 2020. The summer case took place over a week in February and the winter case over six days in June.
We used three regional climate models to simulate the two extreme weather events around the Thwaites and Pine Island ice shelves, then compared the results with snowfall observations.
During both the winter and summer cases, we find that atmospheric rivers dumped tens of metres of snow over the course of a week or so.
Meanwhile, the quantities of rain driven by these events were not insignificant. We observed up to 30mm of rain on parts of the Thwaites ice shelf in summer and up to 9mm in winter.

A mountain to climb
Antarctica’s cold climate and steep, icy topography make it unique. It also makes the region prone to rain in sub-zero temperatures.
The first reason for this is the foehn effect, which is when air forced over a mountain range warms as it descends on the downward slope.
Commonly observed across Antarctica, it is an important cause of melting over ice shelves on the Antarctic peninsula, the northernmost point of the continent.
When air passes over the mountainous terrain of the West Antarctic ice sheet during atmospheric river events, temperatures near the surface of the ice shelves can climb above the melting point of 0C.
This can accentuate the formation of rain and drizzle that stays liquid below 0C – also known as “supercooled drizzle”.
Another factor which leads to liquid drizzle, rather than snow, in sub-zero conditions is a lack of dust and dirt – particles which are usually needed to trigger the formation of ice crystals in clouds.
In the pristine Antarctic, these particles – which act as “ice nuclei” – are few and far between. That means that pure liquid water can exist even when temperatures are below 0C.
The origins of rain over ice shelves
It is easy to assume that rain that reaches the surface in Antarctica is just snow that has melted after falling through a warm layer of air caused by the foehn effect. Indeed, this is what we initially supposed.
But our research shows that more rain reaches the surface of Antarctica when the air near the ground is within a few degrees of freezing.
At times when the foehn effect is strongest, there is often little or no rainfall, because it evaporates before it gets a chance to reach the surface.
However, we saw rain falling well above the warm layer of air near the surface, where temperatures were universally below 0C – and, in some cases, as low as -11C.
Rare rain
Rain in Antarctica is a rare occurrence. The region’s normally frigid temperatures mean that most precipitation over the continent falls as snow.
However, exactly how rare rain is in the region remains relatively unknown, because there are virtually zero measurements of rainfall in Antarctica.
There are a number of reasons for this – rain falls infrequently, and it is very difficult to measure in the hostile Antarctic environment.
Our results show that extreme events such as atmospheric rivers can bring rain. And it is likely that rain will become a more common occurrence in the future as temperatures rise and extreme weather events occur more frequently.
However, until rain starts being measured in Antarctica, scientists will have to rely entirely on models to predict rain, as we did in this research.
It is also not yet known exactly how rain could impact ice in Antarctica.
We do know that rain falling on snow darkens the surface, which can enhance melting, leading to greater ice losses. Meanwhile, rain that refreezes in the snowpack or trickles to the base of the ice can change the way that glaciers flow, impacting the resilience of ice shelves to fracture.
So, if we want to understand the future of the frozen continent, we need to start thinking about rain too. Because while rain may be rare now, it may not be for long.
The post Guest post: How atmospheric rivers are bringing rain to West Antarctica appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Guest post: How atmospheric rivers are bringing rain to West Antarctica
Greenhouse Gases
Analysis: 95% of countries miss UN deadline to submit 2035 climate pledges
Around 95% of countries have missed a UN deadline to submit new climate pledges for 2035, Carbon Brief analysis shows.
Just 10 of the 195 parties signed up to the landmark Paris Agreement have published their new emissions-cutting plans, known as “nationally determined contributions” (NDCs), by the 10 February deadline.
Countries missing the deadline represent 83% of global emissions and nearly 80% of the world’s economy, according to Carbon Brief analysis.
The COP30 summit in Brazil this November is being billed as a key moment for countries to increase their efforts towards achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement.
In a 6 February speech, UN climate chief Simon Stiell said the “vast majority of countries have indicated that they [will] submit new plans this year” and “taking a bit more time to ensure these plans are first-rate makes sense”.
He added that countries need to submit their plans “at the latest…by September” in order to be included in the UN’s next global “synthesis” assessment of climate action ahead of COP30.
‘Quantum leap’
Back in 2015, almost every nation on Earth adopted the Paris Agreement, a landmark climate deal aimed at keeping temperatures “well-below” 2C above pre-industrial levels, with an ambition of keeping them at 1.5C, by the end of the century.
As part of the agreement, countries committed to submitting new plans describing what they will do to cut emissions and adapt to climate change every five years. These are known as NDCs.
Countries also agreed to assess their progress towards meeting the Paris goals in a five-yearly “global stocktake” and then increase their efforts accordingly.
This “review and ratchet” step is key to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement. This is because, when the agreement was adopted 10 years ago, it was clear that countries were far off track for meeting their goals.
They hoped this gap could be closed over time, based on future policy efforts and technologies. As such, the so-called “ratchet mechanism” requires each round of pledges to go further than the last and to represent countries’ “highest possible ambition”.
The first two rounds of NDCs took place in 2015 and 2020-21. The 10 February 2025 deadline for the third round of NDCs was confirmed as part of a “global stocktake” of climate action conducted in 2023. The deadline is nine months ahead of the start of COP30.

According to the most recent UN emissions gap report, countries remain largely off track for meeting the Paris goals, with 2035 climate pledges needing to deliver a “quantum leap in ambition” to give the world a chance of limiting global warming to 1.5C.
However, just 10 of the 195 parties to the Paris Agreement have met the UN deadline to publish 2035 climate pledges by 10 February.
Only two of the group of seven (G7) nations – the US and the UK – have come forward with new climate plans. However, the US submitted its NDC before the inauguration last month of Donald Trump, who has already begun the process of delivering his campaign promise to withdraw the nation from the Paris Agreement.
These countries, along with the other nations to meet the deadline – Brazil, the United Arab Emirates, New Zealand, Switzerland, Uruguay, Andorra, Ecuador and Saint Lucia – are visualised on the map below.

Analysis by climate research group Climate Action Tracker has found that the new 2035 NDCs of Brazil, the UAE, the US and Switzerland are “not compatible” with a pathway for limiting global warming to 1.5C.
It also found that the UK’s new NDC is “1.5C compatible”, but noted that the nation would need to increase its spending on helping other countries tackle their emissions in order to do its “fair share” towards reaching the Paris goals.
The group has not yet analysed New Zealand’s NDC, but a climate expert within the country described it as “shockingly unambitious”.
Major polluters missing
Many of the world’s largest emitters have cited technical issues, economic pressures and political uncertainty as reasons why they have not been able to meet the UN deadline.
EU officials said the bloc’s lengthy process for approving new legislation made it “basically impossible” to meet the deadline.
China has not confirmed when it will release its climate plan.
Unnamed Indian officials have said they are in “no hurry” to release the nation’s NDC and might submit it in the “second half of this year”, according to the Indian Express. They added that India’s NDC will “reflect the disappointment of the climate finance outcome at COP29 in Baku”, a “hint” that it is “unlikely to be a significant or ambitious upgrade of climate actions”.
Canada, Japan and Indonesia have all released draft versions of their 2035 climate plans, but have yet to submit them to the UN. Canada’s plan has faced criticism for setting an emissions pledge that is less ambitious than what its official climate advisors recommended.
Russia has not made any public comments about when it will release its new NDC. Its last major climate update came in 2021, when it pledged to reach net-zero emissions by 2060.
Australia has indicated it will delay the release of its NDC until after the country’s election in May, “in part due to uncertainty about the ramifications of the US presidential election”, the Guardian reported.
At the COP29 climate summit in Azerbaijan in 2024, a group including Canada, Chile, the EU, Georgia, Mexico, Norway and Switzerland pledged to release “1.5C-aligned” NDCs, but did not offer details on how this would be achieved or commit to meeting the February deadline.
History repeats
Seasoned COP watchers will note that it is the norm for the majority of countries to miss the deadline for their NDCs.
During the last round of pledges, only five countries met the February 2020 deadline, with most countries eventually publishing their pledges later in 2020 and 2021. (This was amid the Covid-19 pandemic.)
During a speech in Brazil on 6 February, UN climate chief Simon Stiell said the “vast majority of countries have indicated they will submit new plans this year” and that he believed “countries are taking this extremely seriously”, adding:
“So taking a bit more time to ensure these plans are first-rate makes sense, properly outlining how they will contribute to this effort and therefore what rewards they will reap. At the latest, though, the [UN climate change] secretariat team needs to have them on their desks by September to include them in the NDC synthesis report, which will come out before the COP.”
The post Analysis: 95% of countries miss UN deadline to submit 2035 climate pledges appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: 95% of countries miss UN deadline to submit 2035 climate pledges
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