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Welcome to Carbon Brief’s China Briefing.

China Briefing handpicks and explains the most important climate and energy stories from China over the past fortnight. Subscribe for free here.

Key developments

China to play major role in global energy shift

ELECTRIFICATION: As the world moves into the “age of electricity”, China’s per-capita demand for electricity will grow to overtake that of all advanced economies combined by 2030 under current policy settings, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA)’s World Energy Outlook (WEO) 2024. The report said this is due to the country’s rising electrification, pushed forward by adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) and other low-carbon technologies, as well as economic growth. 

LOW-CARBON POWER: China accounted for 60% of worldwide renewable installations in 2023 and its solar power generation alone will, by 2035, exceed the US’ current total electricity demand, WEO said. A separate IEA report released last week found that China will add 60% of new renewables installations globally between 2024 and 2030. This rapid expansion, according to WEO, will help China lead a global decline in carbon emissions after 2030, with China’s emissions falling to 8% below 2023 levels by 2030 and 24% below by 2035, based on current policy settings. (These figures rise to 17% and 45%, respectively, if China meets its announced pledges.) However, to align with the IEA’s scenario for net-zero emissions by 2050, China’s clean power would need to expand 1.5-times faster than current rates and investment – particularly in grids and energy storage – would need to double.

OIL SLOWS, COAL RISING: China, the world’s largest importer of oil, is currently spurring a “major slowdown” in oil demand growth, largely due to its rapid adoption of EVs, said the report. However, the IEA also said that China will overtake the US as the world’s largest oil consuming country by 2030 and remain the largest oil importer until 2050. Similarly, China is also the largest coal user. It consumed around 55% of the coal used to generate electricity globally and added 73% of the world’s new coal-fired power capacity in 2023, WEO said. (Bloomberg reported that China is also still developing new coal-fired power overseas.) Nevertheless, WEO added that China’s coal consumption for power is likely to peak “in the next few years”.

High-level environmental meeting held 

ANNUAL MEETING: The China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED), a high-level environmental advisory body to the Chinese government, held its annual general meeting on 10-12 October, Earth Negotiations Bulletin reported. About 400 people, including global experts, such as WWF director general Kirsten Schuijt, and high-profile Chinese officials attended the meeting, said China Environment News. Following discussions supervised by the Ministry of Ecology and Environment, CCICED revised a series of draft recommendations, which included: combining “ambitious goals with pragmatic actions” in China’s “nationally determined contribution” under the Paris Agreement and establishing an absolute emissions reduction goal for 2035; setting a target of 2,400 gigawatts (GW) of solar and wind capacity by 2030 and 6,000GW by 2040; and accelerating the expansion of the national carbon market and shifting to auctions for carbon allowances, which are currently given for free. 

HEAVY HITTERS: Several influential political figures spoke at the meeting, including executive vice-premier Ding Xuexiang, who reiterated China’s willingness to “work with all parties” on building “a clean and beautiful world” and said it will follow the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” in “global environmental challenges”, according to the Communist party-affiliated newspaper People’s Daily. Environment minister Huang Runqiu told delegates that, to advance climate goals, China will focus on six key areas: better “prevention” of emissions; more “precise” emissions control; building “norms” and standards in climate policy; “market guidance”; scientific and technological “empowerment”; and “openness and win-win cooperation”, state news agency Xinhua said. Chinese climate envoy Liu Zhenmin said that “many of the concerns of developing countries at COP28 have not been adequately addressed”, adding that “developed countries…[need to take] the lead in reducing emissions”, according to news outlet China News. Liu’s predecessor, Xie Zhenhua, said in a speech that, “compared with mitigation, in developing countries, adaptation…needs to be solved more than anything else”, said the Paper, a Shanghai-based newspaper. 

Diversifying critical mineral supply chains 

GROWING FRUSTRATION: The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) confirmed that it is “courting new investors” in order to “diversify ownership” in its mining industry, currently dominated by China, Bloomberg reported. It quotes mines minister Kizito Pakabomba saying the country “is looking to make strategic choices about who runs Congo’s mines”. The outlet added that the DRC has “grown increasingly frustrated by its lack of influence over its mining industry, particularly in cobalt”, a mineral central to the production of some types of EV batteries. The Wall Street Journal said the US is encouraging companies to purchase cobalt producer Chemaf in DRC, after blocking its sale to the Chinese state-backed Norin Mining.

MINERALS ALLIANCE: Meanwhile, the US and India have agreed to “cooperate on strengthening supply chains in India and US for lithium, cobalt and other critical minerals”, the Indian Express reported, adding that the agreement “still fall[s] short of a full critical minerals trade deal” allowing India to access US tax credits for EVs. The newspaper also noted that India’s commerce minister Piyush Goyal aimed to “include other countries in the partnership, especially those who are already mineral rich like countries in Africa and South America”. In response to the agreement, an editorial in the state-run newspaper China Daily said the US, “understandably, does not want to put all its eggs in one basket in the face of rising tensions with China” and described a similar minerals deal with Vietnam as “lip service”, adding that “the US helps none but itself”.

HARSH RHETORIC: Meanwhile, the US Department of State’s under secretary for economic growth, energy and the environment Jose Fernandez criticised China for producing too much lithium for global consumption and alleged it was triggering a “predatory” price drop in an “intentional response” to the US’ Inflation Reduction Act, in comments covered by Reuters

Spotlight 

China’s birth policy ‘could raise emissions 20% by 2060’

A study published in Nature Climate Change finds that China’s current population policies – allowing families to have three children – could increase its future carbon emissions. 

However, lead author Prof Zhifu Mi, who researches climate change economics at University College London’s (UCL) Bartlett School of Sustainable Construction, tells Carbon Brief that this finding is not to imply that China should reverse its demographic policies.

In an interview, Mi says that, in response to the findings, China could consider a “synergistic approach” to both “fertility policies” and “climate action strategies”.

Carbon Brief: What impact does China’s current population size and demographic makeup have on its carbon emissions?

Zhifu Mi: Population size and demographic composition significantly influence a country’s carbon emissions. Population is one of the primary drivers of greenhouse gas emissions. China has long been the most populous nation, contributing to its status as the largest carbon emitter all over the world. [In 2023, India overtook China as the world’s most populous nation.]

Age structure also plays a role in emissions. The per-capita carbon footprint of younger people (under 30) in China is approximately 1.8 times that of older people (60 and above). This pattern contrasts with developed countries, where older individuals often have higher carbon footprints.

CB: To avoid demographic pressures, China is encouraging families to have three children and its workforce to delay retirement. You found that relaxing limits on family size would make it harder to meet China’s carbon neutrality goal. Could you explain these findings?

ZM: Both relaxing fertility policies and delaying retirement would increase carbon emissions via boosting the labour force. The impact of relaxing fertility policies [and allowing families to have more children] is notably greater than delaying retirement. Shifting from a two-child to a three-child policy would result in a roughly 20% increase in China’s total carbon emissions by 2060.

CB: How are the emissions profiles of China’s young people different to its elderly?

ZM: Younger individuals in China have higher per-capita carbon footprints due to age-related income differences. Their higher per-capita carbon footprints are related to clothing, goods and transport, while older Chinese have higher per-capita carbon footprints related to healthcare.

CB: Some previous research, suggesting that having fewer children is one of the best ways for individuals to cut their carbon footprints, has been criticised for ignoring the impact of climate action, which could reduce the per-capita emissions of the next generation. What do you think about the wider debate on population growth and climate change? 

ZM: I disagree with the idea that having fewer children is one of the best ways to cut carbon footprints. Beyond climate change mitigation, we have many other Sustainable Development Goals to consider. While reducing population growth can lower carbon footprints to some extent, population also drives socio-economic development. 

Our research indicates that relaxing fertility policies would increase China’s household carbon footprint. We present this objective phenomenon with the hope that this impact of fertility policy will be integrated into climate action strategies.

CB: The paper states that your results should not be read to imply that China must reverse its three-child and retirement-delay policies, but that the policies should be synergised with emissions reductions targets. In your view, what steps could the Chinese government take to do so?

ZM: Yes, our result is not to imply that such policies should be avoided to reduce environmental pressure. We recommend a synergistic approach, considering both population policies and climate goals.

First, climate policies should be tailored to the specific demographic structures of different regions in China – promoting greener consumption and sustainable lifestyles among younger people is crucial. Second, addressing income and consumption disparities across age groups can help mitigate the carbon impacts of fertility and retirement policies. Third, when setting climate targets for each province, population size and demographic composition should be key considerations.

CB: Your paper talks about the need to explore what would happen if China misses its 2060 target, which, as China’s NDC notes, is a challenging goal to meet. What do you see as the key hurdles in this effort?

ZM: Achieving carbon neutrality is a significant challenge for China, particularly because the country has only 30 years to reduce its net carbon emissions to zero after peaking. In contrast, developed countries have had much longer timelines. For instance, the EU…[has allowed] for about 70 years to reduce emissions [from its peak to net-zero]. The US, with a peak in 2005, has 45 years to reach net-zero. China’s more compressed timeline, coupled with the higher volume of emissions to be reduced, makes the challenge more daunting.

Furthermore, China’s energy mix, which is dominated by coal and lacks sufficient oil and gas resources, poses another significant hurdle…Finally, China’s regional economic development is uneven. Eastern regions have witnessed rapid economic growth and industrialisation, while central and western regions lag behind. This imbalance…further complicates China’s path to carbon neutrality.

Responses have been edited for length and clarity.

Watch, read, listen

SUNNY DISPOSITIONS: State broadcaster CCTV’s flagship interview programme Duihua (Dialogue, 对话) aired a discussion of the state of the solar industry with major Chinese solar manufacturers, including Tongwei, LONGi and JingkoSolar. 

FIVE-YEAR PLAN: The California-China Climate Institute, a research institute housed at UC Berkeley, issued recommendations for ways Chinese policymakers can take climate goals into account as they prepare for the 15th “five-year plan” (2026-2030).   

NDC WATCH: China must avoid setting “conservative near-term climate goals”, an opinion article in Foreign Policy by Lauri Myllyvirta, senior fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute, and Byford Tsang, senior fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, argued. 

GREEN FINANCE: Yuan Yuan, a climate and energy campaigner at Greenpeace East Asia, wrote in the Shuang Tan newsletter how the asset management industry can improve climate-related risk management and disclosure standards.


51%

The percentage of Chinese citizens who believe that the US and China have “common objectives” on environment and climate change issues, according to a public opinion poll carried out by Tsinghua University on China’s outlook on international security. Respondents also ranked climate change as the 8th most concerning risk from a list of 18 global security challenges. 


New science

Can combined wind and solar power meet the increased electricity load on heatwave days in China after the carbon emission peak? A case study in southern Hebei
Journal of Cleaner Production

A new study revealed that wind and solar power generation could meet the increase in electricity consumption in China’s Hebei province on heatwave days from 2039, in part because heatwaves would raise wind and solar power generation as well as power demand. Using data from the south of Hebei province, which boasts the highest combined wind and solar capacity in China, researchers developed load and wind power models and calibrated “a boosting ensemble learning model to simulate solar generation”. Results showed Hebei could “harness” wind and solar energy to address demand but energy storage capacity would be needed to ensure full coverage.

Comparative analysis of embodied carbon in modular and conventional construction methods in Hong Kong
Scientific Reports

Using modular integrated construction, where parts of new buildings are prefabricated elsewhere and brought to be installed on-site, rather than conventional construction methods, reduced embodied carbon in a Covid-19 isolation facility in Hong Kong by 21%, according to a new study. The study used an embodied carbon assessment of the isolation facility. It found that the reduction in embodied carbon was primarily due to “shortened construction timelines, decreased waste generation and optimised material usage”. 

Energy transition in China: Is there a role for climate policy uncertainty?
Journal of Environmental Management

New research found that climate policy uncertainty in China “significantly hinders the progress” of China’s energy transition, particularly by “reducing the level of green finance development and hindering the optimisation of [the] energy structure”. The study used data from 277 Chinese cities to assess this dynamic, discovering that in regions with “weak environmental regulations, high fiscal decentralisation and low administrative levels”, uncertainty has a higher impact on energy transitions. It also stated that climate policy uncertainty further limited the “high-quality development” of China’s economy and levels of “green innovation”.

China Briefing is compiled by Wanyuan Song and Anika Patel. It is edited by Wanyuan Song and Dr Simon Evans. Please send tips and feedback to china@carbonbrief.org

The post China Briefing 17 October 2024: China’s electrification to disrupt oil; High-level environment meeting; Aligning China’s population and climate policies appeared first on Carbon Brief.

China Briefing 17 October 2024: China’s electrification to disrupt oil; High-level environment meeting; Aligning China’s population and climate policies

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Colorado River Faces ‘Devastating Consequences’ If Another Dry Winter Lands, Experts Warn

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Even a huge snowpack during the coming winter would only give the river basin states less than two years of storage before reservoirs returned to historic lows.

Another warm, arid winter could leave Colorado River reservoirs nearly dry.

Colorado River Faces ‘Devastating Consequences’ If Another Dry Winter Lands, Experts Warn

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Q&A: The current state of ‘carbon dioxide removal’ around the world

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Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies will need to be deployed at rates even faster than those seen for solar power, if the world is to have a chance of limiting global warming to 1.5C by 2100, says a new report.

Nearly all pathways to meeting the Paris Agreement’s highest ambition of keeping global temperatures to 1.5C above pre-industrial levels in 2100 involve CDR techniques – ranging from tree-planting to sucking CO2 from air with machines.

This is in addition to steep and immediate emissions cuts.

Scientists expect carbon emissions to push warming beyond 1.5C in the decade ahead, meaning that the target can only be achieved “from above” via large-scale CDR that brings down global temperatures.

These temperature trajectories are known as “overshoot” pathways.

The third “state of CDR” report, written by more than 50 scientists, says that countries’ current CDR plans would fall short of what is needed to limit warming to 1.5C by more than 5bn tonnes of CO2 (GtCO2) per year by 2050.

Global CDR would have to increase fourfold – from 2.2GtCO2 in 2026 to 8.75GtCO2 by 2050 – to have a chance of meeting the 1.5C target by 2100, according to the report.

It adds that deploying CDR can be a “gradual process”, making the period 2026-30 “crucial” for “establishing CDR’s role in limiting climate damages” in the future.

Below, Carbon Brief covers the key findings of the third state of CDR report. (This follows from Carbon Brief’s coverage of the first report in 2023 and second report in 2024.)

What is CDR?

According to the report, the definition of CDR is:

“Human activities capturing CO2 from the atmosphere and storing it durably in geological, terrestrial or ocean reservoirs, or in products. This includes human enhancement of natural removal processes but excludes natural uptake not directly caused by anthropogenic [human-caused] activities.”

In addition to this, the report includes “three key principles” for CDR, which are:

  1. The captured CO2 must come from the atmosphere, not from “fossil sources”.
  2. The subsequent storage “must be durable”, so that the CO2 is not soon reintroduced to the atmosphere.
  3. The removal must result from human intervention that is in addition to Earth’s natural processes.

In this report, a CDR method is considered durable if it is able to lock up carbon for “decades or more”.

The report classifies CDR techniques as either “conventional” or “novel”.

“Convential” CDR techniques are “well established, already deployed at scale and widely reported by countries as part of [land-use] activities”.

The methods included in this group are tree-planting, ecosystem restoration, agroforestry (trees in agriculture), improving soil carbon in croplands and natural lands, and durable wood production.

“Novel” CDR techniques have “lower level of readiness for deployment and, as a consequence, are currently deployed at smaller scales”, says the report.

Some examples of different CDR methods are listed on the graphic below.

The graphic also shows whether carbon is captured through biological or chemical processes, as well as how “ready” the method is and for how long it can store carbon, among other features.

CDR techniques and their characteristics. Credit: Edwards et al. (2026)

The report says that CDR is “needed alongside deep and rapid emissions reductions” to give Earth a chance of limiting global warming to 1.5C. It continues:

“It should play a smaller role than emissions reductions given uncertainty around the feasible levels of scaling, sustainability limits, storage availability and the risk of reversal, among other constraints.

“In general, CDR should be seen as a limited resource that will need to be used prudently.”

It adds that CDR can “fulfil three major functions”.

In the near term, CDR can help reduce “net emissions”, it says.

In the medium term, CDR can “counterbalance residual emissions” to achieve net-zero CO2 or net-zero greenhouse gas emissions, the report continues.

(“Residual emissions” are those that cannot be eradicated through technologies or societal changes, such as methane emissions from rice production.)

Research suggests that global warming is likely to stop, more or less, once net-zero is achieved globally.

In the long term, CDR can “help achieve net-negative emissions”, a state where CO2 removal exceeds emissions, says the report.

In this state, humans could lower global temperatures. This may allow the world to limit global warming to 1.5C by 2100, even if the temperature target is surpassed earlier on in the century.

Future trajectories where temperatures exceed the 1.5C limit before being brought back down again through CDR techniques are known as “overshoot” pathways.

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What are current levels of CDR?

The report says that, at present, “99.9%” of existing CDR is conventional, land-based techniques such as tree-planting and ecosystem restoration.

The world currently removes 2.2GtCO2 per year, equivalent to around 5% of gross global CO2 emissions, it continues.

The largest contributors to removing CO2 from the atmosphere are China, the US, the EU, Brazil and Russia.

The chart below shows the amount of CO2 removed each year over 2014-23 by the largest contributors, through tree-planting (afforestation) and forest restoration (reforestation).

Chart showing country-level CDR through afforestation and reforestation
CO2 removed via afforestation and reforestation each year by the world’s largest contributors to current CDR. Credit: Edwards et al. (2026)

“Novel” CDR, such as biochar and direct air capture, currently removes just 2m tonnes of CO2 annually at present, according to the report.

However, these methods have been growing at a rate of 40% per year – “similar to successful technologies like solar energy, but insufficient for the scale-up required to meet the Paris temperature goal”, says the report.

The graphic below illustrates how the contribution of conventional CDR currently dwarfs novel CDR, but how the latter techniques are quickly growing.

Infographic showing current CDR are almost entirely from conventional, but novel methods are growing
A graphic illustrating the contribution of “conventional” and “novel” to current CDR methods. Credit: Edwards et al. (2026)

The report says that investment in CDR companies recovered in 2025 following a dip – and its “share of all climate-tech funding” grew to 2.6%.

The report also notes that, at present, most CDR efforts are unevenly distributed across the world.

For example, two-thirds of conventional CDR in voluntary carbon markets is in Latin America, according to the report. (Voluntary carbon markets are where companies can buy credits for carbon-reducing or removing projects, such as tree-planting, to claim that they have “offset” some of their own emissions.)

In addition, most pilot projects that aim to demonstrate novel CDR methods are located in only a few countries, such as Sweden, Denmark and the US, says the report.

The chart below shows the location and timeline of demonstration projects that have been announced, are under construction or in operation globally.

Chart showing demonstration projects announced, under construction or in operation 2020-2030
Location and timeline of demonstration projects that have been announced, are under construction or in operation globally. Credit: Edwards et al. (2026)

The report continues:

“While first-movers play important roles, if their actions do not diffuse more widely, vulnerability emerges, as evidenced by the impact of US climate policy dismantling.”

(For more, see: How is policy impacting CDR demand?)

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How much CDR is needed to reach net-zero goals?

The report examines three scenarios where global temperature rise is limited to “well below” 2C by 2100:

  • A current ambition scenario, based on national climate pledges (but omitting the US);
  • A highest-possible ambition scenario;
  • A delayed ambition scenario, which is consistent with current targets until 2035 and then switches to the highest ambition scenario.

The pledges considered in the report are “nationally determined contributions”, or NDCs, which countries submit periodically to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). NDCs lay out a country’s climate ambition.

Under the current ambition scenario, the report projects a total of 5.9GtCO2 of CDR by 2050 and 12GtCO2 by 2100.

This scenario would result in end-of-century warming of 1.7-2.7C. Importantly, the report says, this scenario does not result in the world reaching net-zero CO2 levels, “meaning that global temperatures would continue to rise, albeit at a much more gradual pace, beyond 2100”.

Under the highest-possible ambition scenario, CDR scales up to 8.8GtCO2 by mid-century and 15.3GtCO2 by the end of the century.

This scenario assumes “full buy-in by all nations”, with economics, scale-up and sustainability providing the main constraints on CDR deployment, the report says.

The highest ambition scenario results in global temperatures peaking at 1.7-1.8C around 2050 and the world achieving net-zero emissions around that time.

Under the delayed ambition scenario, CDR would scale up to 7GtCO2 by 2050 and 23.6GtCO2 by 2100. This scenario shows global temperatures peaking between 1.7C and 2.0C.

This scenario requires larger CDR deployment in the long term than the highest-ambition scenario does, due to the larger cumulative emissions caused by delaying deep emissions reductions.

In both the high ambition and delayed ambition scenarios, the world reaches “deeply net-negative CO2 emissions” by 2100, the report says. This continued deployment of CDR will further draw CO2 from the atmosphere, lowering global temperatures back down to 1.5C.

The chart below shows annual global greenhouse gas emissions through the end of the century under current ambition (red), highest ambition (green) and delayed ambition (blue) scenarios.

Annual emissions, in GtCO2e per year, for the three scenarios: current ambition (red), highest ambition (green) and delayed ambition (blue). Source: Edwards et al. (2026)
Annual emissions, in GtCO2e per year, for the three scenarios: current ambition (red), highest ambition (green) and delayed ambition (blue). Source: Edwards et al. (2026)

While global CDR capacity scales up more slowly in the first and third scenarios, the report notes that, in all three cases, “novel CDR reaches gigatonne-scale deployment by 2050”.

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What does the science say about the potential and costs of CDR?

There is a wide range of both carbon-removal potential and associated costs between different methods of CDR, according to the report.

However, it also notes that these numbers “range widely” in the scientific literature.

The discrepancies in estimates of carbon-removal potential are due to a number of factors, the report says, including a lack of available scientific data, inconsistencies in the assumptions made in assessing technical feasibility and a lack of agreement on what, exactly, “potential” means.

These elements also influence the cost of different CDR methods, but additional factors – such as deployment costs in different areas, technological approaches and scope – also play a role in establishing price differences. Because of this, the report says, “cost estimates are often difficult to compare across methods, complicating design and policy decisions”.

The chart below shows the reported range of mitigation potential (left) and reported range of costs (right) for different CDR methods. The top four rows indicate conventional CDR methods, while bottom 11 rows show novel CDR methods. The chart refers to “mitigation potential”, rather than removal potential, because some estimates do not distinguish between removals and avoided emissions.

(Avoided emissions refers to the difference in emissions from carrying out a project, compared to a hypothetical alternative – such as the reduced emissions from halting deforestation.)

The darker colours indicate estimates that are more constrained, meaning that they are either based on stricter assumptions or there is more agreement between different estimates.

Annual mitigation potential (left) and cost range per tonne of CO2 (right) for conventional and novel CDR methods. Orange bars indicate the range of values reported, with darker colours indicating less uncertainty about the estimates. Source: Edwards et al. (2026)
Annual mitigation potential (left) and cost range per tonne of CO2 (right) for conventional and novel CDR methods. Orange bars indicate the range of values reported, with darker colours indicating less uncertainty about the estimates. Source: Edwards et al. (2026)

The report notes that for most removal methods, the low end of the potential is around 1GtCO2 per year, while the upper limit of costs is more than $200/tCO2.

The least expensive CDR approaches are forestry-based methods, soil-carbon sequestration and biomass burial. For forestry-based methods, the report puts the cost of CDR at $5-$53 per tonne of CO2 removed. Soil-carbon sequestration costs reach as high as $150 per tonne of CO2 removed, but could have negative overall costs “when accounting for crop yield increases potentially resulting” from changed farm-management practices, the report says.

However, it adds that “these CDR methods are typically associated with lower levels of permanence” than other methods.

Other relatively low-cost methods include coastal wetland restoration, biochar, bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) and enhanced rock weathering, while ocean alkalinity enhancement is a medium-cost option.

The most expensive methods include direct air carbon capture and storage (DACCS) and direct ocean carbon capture and storage (DOCCS).

The report also notes that a total estimate of CDR removals cannot be obtained by adding up the removal potential of all of the separate methods, since different methods can compete for scarce resources. For example, BECCS, biochar, biomass burial and biomass sinking all rely on the same base input – biomass – and therefore cannot all be maximised at the same time.

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What have governments pledged on CDR?

While many countries include some amount of CDR in their national climate plans, there is currently a large gap between the amount of CDR pledged in these plans and the amount that will be needed to limit global temperature rise to 1.5C by the end of the century, says the report.

This quantity is referred to as the “CDR gap” – the difference between what is pledged and what is needed.

The size of the CDR gap is dependent not just on the pledges made by countries, but also the choice of the “benchmark” scenario against which the pledges are measured. Lower – or delayed – emissions reductions lead to larger shortfalls in the long term, meaning “CDR must subsequently be scaled to very high levels”, says the report.

Current NDCs and other country submissions to the UNFCCC total 2.5GtCO2 per year of removals in 2030, 2.7GtCO2 per year in 2035 and 3.6GtCO2 per year in 2050.

This gives a CDR gap of 0.3GtCO2 in 2030, 1.2GtCO2 in 2035 and 5.2GtCO2 in 2050, according to the report. These figures are obtained using assumed “immediate, ambitious action at all levels to reduce emissions” and the most-ambitious estimates of CDR set out in national pledges. Together, this provides a “lower bound” for the CDR gap, says the report.

By comparison, a 10-year delay in implementing ambitious emissions reductions will result in the need to remove at least an additional 150GtCO2 from the atmosphere, compared to the most ambitious scenario. (See: How much CDR is needed to reach net-zero goals?)

The report says that the CDR gap has widened since the second state of CDR report was released in 2024, due to the US leaving the Paris Agreement. It adds that other countries have “not delivered a step change in ambition” in their latest round of climate pledges.

It also cautions that “credibility issues with national pledges may mean that the CDR gap is actually larger than what we assess here”.

The report notes that current CDR pledges by companies are “substantially higher than country pledges”, at 5GtCO2 per year in 2050. However, it adds, “credibility in these announcements is low”.

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What is the current funding and research landscape for CDR?

Funding of CDR research and development – as well as investment in CDR companies – has continued to increase in recent years.

In total, there has been around $5.6bn in grant funding distributed to CDR research since 2005, according to the report’s analysis. Roughly one-third of this has come in the past three years.

Funding for CDR research grants grew 13% each year between 2022 and 2025, the report says, and the corresponding number of research publications grew at a similar rate.

Funding was largely targeted at a handful of key areas, notably soil carbon sequestration, biochar and forest-based CDR.

DACCS and BECCS only make up a small number of active grants, but together account for around two-fifths of all funding due to “substantially larger” project sizes.

Despite the growth of research grants and scientific publications, the report concludes that early-stage innovation in CDR is “uneven” and says there is “no strong evidence of a step-change”.

It notes that much of the support for CDR has come from projects with a broader focus, rather than those that focus specifically on CDR.

The authors also point to a decline in “inventive activity”, as measured by patenting of CDR-related innovations. While patenting for emissions-cutting technologies in general has been on an upward trajectory, CDR patenting peaked in 2011.

Meanwhile, the report highlights the “remarkable” sustained investment in CDR companies, against a backdrop of falling investment in climate-related technologies. It notes that CDR now accounts for around 3% of overall “climate-tech funding”.

Yet, again, it says future developments remain “uncertain”. Since the previous 2024 “state of CDR” report, companies have scaled back their ambitions and policy reversals – notably in the US – “underscore that funding uncertainty remains a key barrier”. (See: How is policy impacting CDR demand?)

An upward tick in funding in 2025 was driven primarily by a “surge” in grants from predominantly public institutions, as well as $0.5bn in debt financing for a single BECCS project in Sweden.

Reliance on such funding sources “highlight[s] the volatility of the CDR innovation ecosystem”, according to the report.

The report also has a chapter focusing on the voluntary carbon market, which it describes as “propelling most of the current demand for novel CDR”.

The scale of this market remains fairly small, with contracts for 0.04GtCO2 of removals signed last year.

Moreover, the concentration of sales within a small number of buyers – particularly Microsoft – remains a “critical vulnerability”, the authors note.

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How is policy impacting CDR demand?

The report analyses CDR policies in G20 nations – which together account for three-quarters of global emissions – to assess how they are acting to support CDR across their economies.

In total, 140 countries have announced net-zero targets, including virtually all of the world’s major emitters. In doing so, the report points out that the governments of these nations have “implicitly included a role for CDR in their climate plans”.

However, this does not always translate into measures specifically designed to scale up CDR.

Only the EU has adopted a binding, quantified removals target into law – namely, the goal to reach 310m tonnes of CO2 equivalent (MtCO2e) of annual net removals in the land sector by 2030.

Overall, conventional CDR is the main focus of policy, with various governments focusing on tree planting to absorb CO2 from the atmosphere.

Among G20 nations, only the UK and Australia have set specific goals to scale up novel CDR, such as BECCS and DACCS, over the coming decade.

The report highlights some nations, including Canada, Germany, Switzerland and the UK, as taking proactive steps to incentivise CDR.

The authors point to national strategies, financial support for CDR and efforts to integrate it into emissions trading systems (ETS) as examples of effective policy making.

(The report also stresses that the US, which was previously a “leader” on CDR, has now “frozen or dismantled funding and support” for CDR under the Trump administration.)

Most of the successful policies highlighted in the report focus on supporting the supply of CDR, with “less attention so far on creating demand”.

This is significant because CDR “generally lacks a natural market”, meaning there are not automatically buyers willing to spend money on emissions removals. Therefore, the authors say, policy interventions are important to create markets and boost demand.

“Compliance” carbon creditsreferring to credits that can be used to meet legally mandated emissions targets – provide a way to support demand, according to the report authors.

Only some ETSs, such as those used in New Zealand and Australia, allow the use of credits based on forest-related removals for compliance. (It is worth noting that such credits are controversial, as removals by forests are not always permanent.)

The report also highlights the need for “foundational policies to create a governance framework for CDR, including rules for quantification of removal, guidelines for community engagement and the minimisation of negative environmental impacts”.

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Q&A: The current state of ‘carbon dioxide removal’ around the world

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Alligator Alcatraz Emissions Threaten Human Health, Violate Clean Air Act, Lawsuit Claims

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The air pollution is associated with the more than 200 diesel-burning generators powering the Everglades migrant detention facility, along with 100 diesel-burning lighting towers.

A new federal lawsuit contends emissions at the Everglades migrant detention site known as Alligator Alcatraz, associated with more than 200 diesel-burning generators and 100 diesel-burning lighting towers, are harmful to human health and the environment and violate the Clean Air Act.

Alligator Alcatraz Emissions Threaten Human Health, Violate Clean Air Act, Lawsuit Claims

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