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In a cosy cinema room at the Bełchatów coal-fired power station in central Poland, a promotional video played to curious visitors boasts that the open-pit mine which feeds the power station is one of the largest holes ever dug in the ground. 

The caverns of the Bełchatów coal mine are wide enough to fit around 5,000 full-sized football pitches and are rich in lignite – a soft, brown and wet type of coal which looks and feels like tree bark but is particularly damaging to human health when burned.

After more than 40 years of mining, the lignite is running out and plans are being made to wind down operations at the site.

PGE, the Polish state-owned utility which runs the mine and adjacent power plant – the largest and dirtiest in Europe – has a 45-year plan to turn the mining pits into the country’s deepest lake and the coal heaps into a series of hills for recreational use. 

In 2070, PGE envisions visitors will be able to ski in the winter, golf, cycle, kayak, quad-bike, horse ride, climb and even scuba dive down to see the soon-to-be-underwater old mining machines.

PGE’s visualisation of what the redeveloped Bełchatów site will look like (Photos: PGE)

But local governments officials and researchers warn that the plans risk failing to deliver the green and economically fair transition deserved by Bełchatów communities whose livelihoods have depended on coal. They argue the plans could waste the site’s huge renewable energy potential while the tourist attraction fails to replace the at least 7,500 jobs that will be lost when the mine and power plant close, potentially driving away the region’s young people.  

As deputy director of the Just Transition Fund Department of Łódź province where Bełchatów is located, Malgorzata Misiak’s job is to cushion the blow of the region’s transition away from coal and make sure the benefits of what replaces it are shared as equally as possible.

She told Climate Home PGE’s plan to let the mine gradually fill over decades overlooks the many more jobs that could be created in a much shorter time-frame with renewable energy investment.

Anabella Rosemberg, a senior adviser on just transition at Climate Action Network International, said: “PGE is pledging an investment on a timeline by which time all its executives will be retired, so won’t be held accountable if it fails. By then, the communities dependent on Bełchatów would have already joined the thousands considering that the transition is paid by poor people.”

Forum Energii analyst Aleksandra Gawlikowska-Fyk warned that PGE’s plan would also overlook the region’s need for clean energy.

PGE did not respond to a request from Climate Home for comment for this article, while a spokesperson for the white-collar Kadra trade union declined to comment by the time of publication.

Europe’s biggest polluter

Opened in what was then the Polish Peoples’ Republic in 1980, Bełchatów (pronounced Bel-hat-ov) grew to become the biggest coal mine and coal power station in Europe. It still employs about 7,500 people directly today and sustains many more jobs indirectly. 

In recent years, the power plant has produced nearly a fifth of Poland’s electricity. Its importance to the nation’s energy security is such that, given the perceived threat from Russian spies, visitors including Climate Home News, are warned not to publish any photos of the site. 

Because of its size, and coal’s status as the top polluting fossil fuel, Bełchatów is also by far Europe’s biggest greenhouse gas emitter. Its power plant pumps out 35 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent a year – more than Mozambique’s total emissions. 


But its coal is running out and because lignite is very difficult to transport, both the mine and power plant will soon shut down although exactly when is unclear.

The local government’s 2021 just transition plan says the coal plant will gradually scale down operations through the 2030s until its closure in 2036, while mining will end by 2038.

For Misiak, this is the “official reality” – but in practice, things could turn out differently. “The real pace is dependent on many factors,” she said.

Two hours down the road from Bełchatów, Rybnik coal power plant was scheduled to close in 2030. Last month, PGE announced it would shut by the end of 2025 instead. The chair of Poland’s Solidarity trade union called it a “catastrophe for the region” as about 500 jobs will be lost at the plant, with more in the nearby mines and other suppliers. 

People in Bełchatów fear the same fate, Misiak said. Researchers at the University of Łódź and a women’s community group called ‘Yes for Bełchatów’ conducted a survey of over 350 local women earlier this year for a report on the gender aspects of the region’s transition away from coal. It found they “are really afraid of negative consequences”.

From pits to ponds

Turning the mine into a leisure park offers a “nice picture” of what environmental rehabilitation can achieve, said Misiak. But the timescale involved is so long that it doesn’t offer the thousands of people who still earn their living from coal jobs any viable alternatives. 

“People will not wait for work in tourism,” she said, adding “they will die” before then. 

Even if the project did get off the ground, activities such as scuba diving and kayaking might not be an economic match for what the coal industry has been to the region in recent times, she said. 

Over a lunch of dumplings and cheesecake in a hotel near the mine, Misiak delivered a presentation on Bełchatów’s transition to researchers who had travelled to Poland from around the world to learn about its approach to supporting communities affected by the shift away from coal.

The word “depopulation” followed by three exclamation marks stood out on one of her slides. The University of Łódź study found that young women in the region are already leaving for big cities inside Poland or going abroad, leaving behind an ageing community.

And the outflow of people could get worse. The researchers surveyed 65 women working in the energy industry – of which nearly a third said they were planning to leave the region when the mine and power plant shut down.

Listening to Misiak’s presentation in the hotel was Martha Mendrofa, of the Indonesian Institute for Essential Services Reform. Indonesian coal companies too have rehabilitated old mines as tourism assets, she saidfrom opening mining museums to eco-tourism experiences.

But the number of jobs and revenue generated has not met locals’ expectations nor made-up for the lost coal industry, she said.

The Geierswalder lake in Germany is on the site of an old coal mine, photographed on August 24, 2024 (Photo: IMAGO/Max Gaertner/via Reuters Connect)

In Germany and Australia, old coal mines have also been turned into lakes.

But converting the Polish site into a clean-energy generation hub would be a better long-term investment for the region, Misiak said.

A 2022 analysis by BloombergNEF (BNEF) lays out what replacing the coal mine and plant with solar and wind power, along with a bit of nuclear or gas generation, might look like.

It found that 6-11 gigawatts (GW) of renewable energy capacity could be built on the site, exceeding the coal plant’s 5 GW. But currently PGE plans to install just 0.7 GW of renewables capacity. Gawlikowska-Fyk said this was “far less than needed in the region and far less than possible”.

The BNEF report said solar panels could be installed on the shallower edges of the mine and around the main pits. As rainwater fills the deeper pits, floating solar farms could also be considered. “PGE could go significantly beyond its current plan to build [0.6 GW] of solar at Bełchatów,” the BNEF report concluded. The region could produce 5-15 GW of wind power too, it found.

Australian renewables pioneer Adelaide bids to host COP31 climate summit

Like all fossil-fuel power plants, Bełchatów is already equipped with infrastructure like transmission lines designed to transport electricity from where is is produced to where it is needed, such as the nearby steel mill in Częstochowa.

Permanently ending power generation on the site would let this expensive infrastructure go to waste, the BNEF analysis warned. 

Outside of energy

Installing renewable energy infrastructure might create more local jobs than PGE’s lake plans, but even this might not be enough to replace lost coal employment, Misiak said. 

Ensuring the region isn’t left behind in the energy transition would require attracting other investors and stimulating small businesses, she added.

Fortunately, Poland has access to European pots of funding for that purpose. The European Union’s Just Transition Fund is giving the province €369 million ($400m) to invest in activities like support for small businesses, research laboratories, retraining coal workers and deploying electric buses. Poland as a whole will get €3.85 billion ($4.16bn) to move to a lower-carbon economic model.

To capture renewable energy gains, Africa must invest in battery storage

The EU’s funds will stretch to pay for training, including driving lessons, to help local people find new jobs and cover entrepreneurs’ childcare so they can keep their businesses open longer, said Misiak. 

The Polish government offers coal miners “generous” retraining opportunities, severance payments and pension schemes, she said, adding that the Belchatów miners will be comfortable in their retirement. But money isn’t everything – and many will feel “frustrated” at being jobless after years of hard graft, she explained.

Elsewhere around the world, governments are trying to transition communities away from coal without the huge resources Belchatów can tap into to help them.

Indonesia, for example, has a donor-backed Just Energy Transition Partnership bringing in billions of dollars from wealthy governments like the EU and international investors – but that money is likely to come mostly as loans for energy infrastructure. According to researcher Mendrofa, there is nothing like the EU’s Just Transition Fund with its emphasis on social justice.

“The money we do have right now is not really focused on the socioeconomic aspect of coal transitions,” she said, “so it’s very interesting for me to see how the money can be a catalyst for the economic transformations agenda.”

(Reporting by Joe Lo; editing by Chloe Farand and Megan Rowling)

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Germany election 2025: What the manifestos say on energy and climate change

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A federal election is taking place in Germany on 23 February, following the collapse of the coalition government at the end of last year.

Germans will vote to elect 630 members of the nation’s parliament.

Polling suggests there will be a political shift to the right, with the centre-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in the lead and far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) set to make significant gains.

A “traffic light” coalition of parties has ruled since 2021, led by the centre-left Social Democratic Party (SPD), alongside the Green Party and the Free Democratic Party (FDP).

However, successive crises led to its breakup at the end of 2024, when the liberal, free market-oriented FDP split from the rest.

This prompted a vote of no confidence by the German parliament, which, in turn, triggered a snap election several months earlier than previously scheduled.

The coalition government has been plagued by ideological differences, particularly between the FDP and its two centre-left partners.

Climate policies were at the heart of many of the disputes. 

The centre-left SPD and Greens have broadly favoured more public spending on climate issues, while the FDP is opposed to state intervention of any sort.

In the interactive grid below, Carbon Brief tracks the commitments made by each of the main parties in their election manifestos, across a range of issues related to climate and energy.

The parties covered are:

  • Christian Democratic Union (CDU)/Christian Social Union (CSU): The centre-right CDU and its regional Bavarian “sister party”, CSU, has been the dominant political force in modern Germany and is currently polling highest ahead of the election.
  • Social Democratic Party (SPD): The centre-left SPD has led the ruling coalition in Germany since the last election in 2021 and has traditionally been the other dominant party in the nation’s politics.
  • Green Party: The centre-left and environmentalist Greens have been part of the coalition government since 2021.
  • Free Democratic Party (FDP): The FDP is an economically liberal party that prioritises free markets and privatisation. It was part of the coalition government, but its departure at the end of 2024 ultimately triggered the federal election.
  • Left Party: In recent years, this left-wing, democratic-socialist party has lost much of its support base in the east of the country.
  • Alternative for Germany (AfD): The far-right party has become a major force in the country’s politics over the past decade, particularly in eastern Germany.
  • Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW): The party was only founded last year, as an offshoot of the Left Party, but it has rapidly risen in popularity with a left-wing economic message and a conservative approach to some social and cultural issues.

Each entry in the grid represents a direct quote from a manifesto document.

Net-zero and climate framing

Climate action has become a divisive topic in German politics.

This is evident in the major parties’ manifestos, which range from supporting more ambitious net-zero goals to outright climate scepticism.

Germany is currently aiming to reach net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2045, with interim targets including a 65% cut by 2030.

Government climate advisors on the Council of Experts on Climate Change have stated that the nation is on track to miss the 2030 target.

Despite starting out with ambitious aims, the coalition’s climate progress has faltered, with the FDP successfully pushing for weaker climate policies. Moreover, a major court ruling curtailed the government’s climate spending by enforcing Germany’s limit on debt. 

Amid these wider tensions, Germany’s two traditionally dominant parties still want to retain the nation’s headline climate target. The CDU, which is leading the polls in the run-up to election day, commits to meeting the Paris Agreement goals in its manifesto, saying its sights are “firmly set” on net-zero by 2045.

The SPD, which is currently third in the polls and likely to end up in coalition with the CDU, also supports the 2045 net-zero target, as well as the interim goals.

However, the two parties differ substantially in their approach to meeting the 2045 target. The CDU prioritises carbon pricing and rejects the tougher policies to decarbonise heating and transport favoured by the SPD. (See: Heating dispute and Combustion engine phaseout.)

Meanwhile, the AfD manifesto repeatedly questions the “supposed scientific consensus” on “man-made climate change”. The party, which is currently second in the polls, “therefore rejects every policy and every tax that is related to alleged climate protection”.

Mainstream German parties across the spectrum have long agreed to a “firewall” against far-right groups, meaning they will not form coalitions with the AfD. However, the CDU recently sparked controversy when it backed an anti-immigration policy with the AfD.

The Green Party also supports the 2045 net-zero target in its manifesto, emphasising Germany’s status as the EU member state with the highest emissions. The Left Party goes further, calling for a 2040 net-zero goal.

As for the FDP, its manifesto argues for the 2045 net-zero goal to be pushed back to 2050, stating that this would align Germany with the EU target. Prior to exiting the coalition government last year, the party had demanded this policy change, claiming that it would be a way to boost the German economy.

(Germany already revised its net-zero target, bringing it forward by five years, following a supreme court ruling in 2021 that its 2050 goal was insufficient. Moreover, even with a later goal, Germany would still need to align with wider EU targets, meaning its climate policies may not change much due to its “effort sharing” obligations.)

Finally, the BSW is not specific about when the net-zero goal should be achieved, but pushes for a “departure from the wishful thinking of quickly achieving complete climate neutrality”.

It does not reject climate policies outright, stating that climate change should be “taken seriously”. However, it frames many climate policies as being “extremely expensive and often unrealistic”.

Heating dispute

Home heating has become a major political issue in Germany. Along with transport, buildings make up one of the key German sectors that have repeatedly missed their decarbonisation goals, prompting the coalition government to take action.

Towards the end of 2023, the German parliament passed an amendment to the Building Energy Act, meaning that newly installed heating systems had to be powered by at least 65% renewable energy. 

This covered heat pumps, “hydrogen-ready” gas boilers and other low-carbon systems. There are caveats to ensure the law is phased in gradually in different areas and types of homes, starting with new builds.

The amendment had been watered down compared to the coalition’s initial proposal, with allowances for people to keep gas boilers for longer. This followed relentless campaigning by the AfD and the right-leaning tabloid newspaper Bild, which dubbed the policy the “heizhammer” – or “heating hammer”.

There were also attacks from within the coalition, with the FDP criticising the law proposed by its partners in the Greens and SDP. Opponents framed the policy as an excessive burden on consumers.

These disputes are reflected in the election manifestos, with many parties outright rejecting the amended law. The CDU, FDP and AfD all say they would abolish it, as does the populist left BSW.

Meanwhile, the Green Party pledges to provide more government support for the installation of new heating systems by covering up to 70% of the price. The Left Party commits to covering 100% of the cost for low-income households.

(The current law covers 30% of the cost as a starting subsidy, with more available for low-income households and people who replace their boilers before 2028.)

Combustion engine phaseout

Several German political parties are pushing back against the EU-wide ban on the sale of new petrol and diesel cars, which is set to come into effect in 2035.

The CDU says the “ban on combustion engines must be reversed”, while the AfD says the “one-sided preference for electromobility must be stopped immediately”.

(EVs are “likely crucial” for tackling transport emissions, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC].)

The FDP and the BSW also argue that the 2035 phaseout date should be dropped, with less focus on the transition to electric cars. (This is in spite of Germany being the second-biggest manufacturer of electric cars in the world.)

These parties also favour getting rid of supposed “anti-car” policies. For example, they oppose speed limits on the German “autobahns” and support funding for alternative fuels, such as synthetic fuels.

The issue with ending the 2035 ban on new combustion-engine cars is that this policy is set at the EU level. Far-right and centre-right coalitions within the EU, including German parties, have been pushing hard to weaken the ban across the bloc. 

However, the centre-left parties that may end up forming a coalition with the CDU, notably the SPD, stand by the 2035 phaseout date.

There is growing pressure on Germany’s car industry, linked to global competition and slow economic growth. Some German industry figures have stressed the need for consistent policy signals from the government, regarding the transition to electric vehicles.

Clean energy and fossil fuels

Broadly speaking, German parties on the left tend to be more supportive of renewables, while strongly opposing nuclear power. Those on the right are generally more open to nuclear and in some cases coal power.

Germany, which uses more coal than any other EU member state, has a coal power phaseout date of 2038. This is supported by the CDU and the FDP, but the Greens and the Left Party want a quicker phaseout by 2030.

(When the coalition government formed in 2021, the parties agreed to “ideally” move the coal phaseout date to 2030, but this has not happened formally. The SPD manifesto does not include any mention of coal power,)

Only the AfD advocates for the construction of new coal power plants, framing them as filling a gap until new nuclear plants are built.

Last year, Germany closed down its final nuclear reactors, bringing an end to a long-term plan to phase out the power source. However, nuclear power continues to be a politicised topic, with some arguing that its continued use is necessary to ensure the nation’s energy security.

Notably, the CDU suggests in its manifesto that it is open to reviving nuclear power in the future. It proposes an “expert review” around restarting closed plants and advocates for research on advanced nuclear technologies, such as small modular reactors.

Despite this wording, CDU leader Friedrich Merz has conceded that it is unlikely any old reactors will be restarted. This echoes views expressed by German utility companies and energy experts.

Both the CDU and the SPD support the expansion of renewables in their manifestos. The Greens include a specific target to achieve a net-zero electricity grid by 2035. By contrast, the AfD calls for an end to wind power expansion, in favour of other technologies.

Finally, both the far-right AfD and the BSW say the German government should repair the damaged Nord Stream pipelines in order to import what the BSW refers to as “cheap” gas from Russia. (The Baltic Sea pipelines were blown up in 2022 under mysterious circumstances.)

Germany has tried to wean itself off Russian gas since the country’s invasion of Ukraine, with considerable success. However, both the AfD and the BSW are more open to cooperating with Russia, and less supportive of Ukraine, than mainstream German parties.

The post Germany election 2025: What the manifestos say on energy and climate change appeared first on Carbon Brief.

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Guest post: How atmospheric rivers are bringing rain to West Antarctica 

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“Atmospheric rivers” are bringing rain to the frozen slopes of the West Antarctic ice sheet, hitting the ice shelves that play a major role in holding back rapidly retreating glaciers.

In a new study, my colleagues and I show how rain is occurring in sub-zero temperatures due to these “rivers in the sky” – long, narrow plumes of air which transport heat and moisture from the tropics to the mid-latitudes and poles.

Rain in Antarctica is significant, not only because it is a stark indicator of climate change, but because it remains an under-studied phenomenon which could impact ice shelves.

Ice shelves in Antarctica are important gatekeepers of sea level rise.

They act as a buffer for glaciers that flow off the vast ice sheet, slowing the rate at which ice is released into the ocean.

In the study, we explore the causes of rain falling on ice shelves in the Amundsen Sea embayment region, which stand in front of the critically important Thwaites and Pine Island glaciers.

Researchers have warned the collapse of ice shelves in this region could trigger the loss of the entire West Antarctic ice sheet over several centuries.

Rivers in the sky

Atmospheric rivers are typically associated with bringing extreme rainfall to the mid-latitudes, but, in the frigid Antarctic, they can deliver metres of snow in just a few days. 

In West Antarctica, atmospheric rivers deliver a disproportionate quantity of the year’s snowfall. Research shows they account for around 13% of annual snowfall totals, despite occurring on just a few days per year.

But what makes atmospheric rivers in Antarctica so interesting is that snow is only part of the story. In extreme cases, they can also bring rain.

To explore how extreme precipitation affects the Amundsen Sea embayment region, we focused on two events associated with atmospheric rivers in 2020. The summer case took place over a week in February and the winter case over six days in June.

We used three regional climate models to simulate the two extreme weather events around the Thwaites and Pine Island ice shelves, then compared the results with snowfall observations.

During both the winter and summer cases, we find that atmospheric rivers dumped tens of metres of snow over the course of a week or so.

Meanwhile, the quantities of rain driven by these events were not insignificant. We observed up to 30mm of rain on parts of the Thwaites ice shelf in summer and up to 9mm in winter.

Amundsen sea, map.
A map of the Amundsen Sea embayment region in West Antarctica. Source: Produced by the British Antarctic Survey’s Mapping and Geographic Information Centre, 2025.

A mountain to climb

Antarctica’s cold climate and steep, icy topography make it unique. It also makes the region prone to rain in sub-zero temperatures.

The first reason for this is the foehn effect, which is when air forced over a mountain range warms as it descends on the downward slope.

Commonly observed across Antarctica, it is an important cause of melting over ice shelves on the Antarctic peninsula, the northernmost point of the continent. 

When air passes over the mountainous terrain of the West Antarctic ice sheet during atmospheric river events, temperatures near the surface of the ice shelves can climb above the melting point of 0C.

This can accentuate the formation of rain and drizzle that stays liquid below 0C – also known as “supercooled drizzle”.

Another factor which leads to liquid drizzle, rather than snow, in sub-zero conditions is a lack of dust and dirt – particles which are usually needed to trigger the formation of ice crystals in clouds.

In the pristine Antarctic, these particles – which act as “ice nuclei” – are few and far between. That means that pure liquid water can exist even when temperatures are below 0C.

The origins of rain over ice shelves

It is easy to assume that rain that reaches the surface in Antarctica is just snow that has melted after falling through a warm layer of air caused by the foehn effect. Indeed, this is what we initially supposed.

But our research shows that more rain reaches the surface of Antarctica when the air near the ground is within a few degrees of freezing.

At times when the foehn effect is strongest, there is often little or no rainfall, because it evaporates before it gets a chance to reach the surface.

However, we saw rain falling well above the warm layer of air near the surface, where temperatures were universally below 0C – and, in some cases, as low as -11C.

Rare rain

Rain in Antarctica is a rare occurrence. The region’s normally frigid temperatures mean that most precipitation over the continent falls as snow.

However, exactly how rare rain is in the region remains relatively unknown, because there are virtually zero measurements of rainfall in Antarctica.

There are a number of reasons for this – rain falls infrequently, and it is very difficult to measure in the hostile Antarctic environment.

Our results show that extreme events such as atmospheric rivers can bring rain. And it is likely that rain will become a more common occurrence in the future as temperatures rise and extreme weather events occur more frequently.

However, until rain starts being measured in Antarctica, scientists will have to rely entirely on models to predict rain, as we did in this research.

It is also not yet known exactly how rain could impact ice in Antarctica.

We do know that rain falling on snow darkens the surface, which can enhance melting, leading to greater ice losses. Meanwhile, rain that refreezes in the snowpack or trickles to the base of the ice can change the way that glaciers flow, impacting the resilience of ice shelves to fracture.

So, if we want to understand the future of the frozen continent, we need to start thinking about rain too. Because while rain may be rare now, it may not be for long.

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Colombia’s COP16 presidency in suspense as minister resigns

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Susana Muhamad, Colombia’s minister of environment since 2022 and president of the COP16 UN biodiversity negotiations, has announced she will step down from government, but has asked President Gustavo Petro to let her stay in her post to conclude the UN nature talks later in February.

In her resignation letter, addressed to the president and dated February 8, Muhamad said she was quitting as a minister but urged him to consider “the need to conclude COP16” – the summit left unfinished in Colombia last year and now scheduled to resume from February 25 to 27 in Rome.

“I’ve led the complex negotiations in progress and I exercise the role of president (of the COP). Therefore, if you so decide, this resignation could be made effective from March 3,” the letter reads.

Muhamad has been one of the most vocal opponents of the recent appointment of former senator Armando Benedetti as Petro’s chief of staff. Benedetti has faced allegations of domestic abuse and corruption, and was previously fired as ambassador to Venezuela by Petro himself.

In a televised session of the council of ministers held last week, Muhamad heavily opposed Benedetti’s appointment and threatened to resign if he remained in the cabinet. “As a feminist and as a woman, I cannot sit at this table of our progressive project with Armando Benedetti,” she told Petro.

According to Oscar Soria, veteran biodiversity campaigner and CEO of think-tank The Common Initiative, the Colombian government is likely to keep Muhamad as COP president, but her resignation could have a negative impact on the talks.

“To have a good result in Rome, proactive and energetic diplomatic work by the presidency was needed in the last months. However, some key issues have not been discussed recently. The internal political crisis (in Colombia) has likely been a great distraction,” Soria told Climate Home.

Since Muhamad’s announcement, several other ministers have also resigned, leading Petro to place all of his cabinet on hold and asking for “protocolary resignations” from every member.

“It’s not clear how much support from the president and ministers (Muhamad) can count on when her counterparts from other countries need to be approached by the Colombian foreign service,” Soria added.

Upcoming nature talks

The COP16 biodiversity negotiations are set to resume later this month, with important decisions coming up on finance for nature and a monitoring framework to track progress on nature restoration. These decisions were left pending after negotiators ran out of time in Cali, Colombia, last year.

One of the most pressing issues is the future of the Global Biodiversity Framework Fund (GBFF), which currently sits under the Global Environment Facility (GEF) until 2030. Some developing countries have called for the creation of a new fund, citing barriers at the GEF to access the funds.

Observers said COP16 could play an important role in the future of biodiversity finance, especially as the new US president, Donald Trump, cuts development funding for climate and nature projects.

“In Rome, countries must give a firm response to the measures and visions promoted by the Trump administration, reaffirming [their] commitment to protecting biodiversity,” said Karla Maas, campaigner at Climate Action Network (CAN) Latin America.

“This implies guaranteeing public resources for conservation instead of depending on the will of private actors or philanthropy,” Maas added.

(Reporting by Sebastian Rodriguez; editing by Megan Rowling)

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