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China’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions fell by 1% in the second quarter of 2024 in the first quarterly fall since the country re-opened from its “zero-Covid” lockdowns in December 2022.

The new analysis for Carbon Brief, based on official figures and commercial data, shows China remains on track for a decline in annual emissions this year.

This annual outlook depends on electricity demand growth easing in the second half of the year, as expected in projections from sector group the China Electricity Council.

However, if the latest trends in energy demand and supply continue – in particular, if demand growth continues to exceed pre-Covid trends – then emissions would stay flat in 2024 overall.

Other key findings from the analysis include:

  • China’s energy demand grew by 4.2% year-on-year in the second quarter of 2024. This is slower than the growth seen in 2023 and in the first quarter of this year, but is still much higher than the pre-Covid trend.
  • CO2 emissions from energy use and cement production fell by 1% in the second quarter. When combined with a sharp 6.5% increase in January-February and a monthly decline in March, there was a 1.3% rise in CO2 emissions across the first half of the year, compared with the same period in 2023.
  • Electricity generation from wind and solar grew by 171 terawatt hours (TWh) in the first half of the year, more than the total power output of the UK in the same period of 2023.
  • China’s carbon intensity – its emissions per unit of GDP – only improved by 5.5%, well short of the 7% needed to meet the country’s intensity target for 2025.
  • This was despite a one-off boost from China’s hydropower fleet recovering from drought.
  • Compared with a year earlier, the increase in the number of electric vehicles (EVs) on China’s roads cut demand for transport fuels by approximately 4%.
  • Manufacturing solar panels, EVs and batteries was only responsible for 1.6% of China’s electricity consumption and 2.9% of its emissions in the first half of 2024.

A slew of recent policy developments, summarised below, hint at a renewed focus in Beijing on the country’s energy and climate targets.

Yet the precise timing and height of China’s CO2 emissions peak, as well as the pace of subsequent reductions, remain key uncertainties for global climate action.

First post-Covid fall in CO2

China’s CO2 emissions fell by 1% in the second quarter of 2024, the first quarterly fall since the country re-opened from zero-Covid, as shown in the figure below.

Within the overall total, power sector emissions fell by 3%, cement production fell by 7% and oil consumption by 3%.

Year-on-year change in China’s quarterly CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement, million tonnes of CO2. Emissions are estimated from National Bureau of Statistics data on production of different fuels and cement, China Customs data on imports and exports and WIND Information data on changes in inventories, applying emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory and annual emissions factors per tonne of cement production until 2023. Sector breakdown of coal consumption is estimated using coal consumption data from WIND Information and electricity data from the National Energy Administration.

The reduction in CO2 emissions was driven by the surge in clean energy additions, which is driving fossil fuel power into reverse. (See: Clean energy additions on track to top 2023 record.)

However, rapid energy demand growth in sectors such as coal-to-chemicals diluted the impact of changes in the electricity sector. (See: Rapid energy demand growth.)

Clean energy additions on track to top 2023 record

The additions of new clean power capacity in China have continued to boom this year.

China added 102 gigawatts (GW) of new solar and 26GW of wind in the first half of 2024, as shown in the figure below. Solar additions were up 31% and wind additions up 12% compared with the first half of last year, so China is on track to beat last year’s record installations.

China's wind and solar growth continues to break records in 2024.
Newly added solar and wind power capacity from the beginning of each year, cumulative by month. Source: National Energy Administration monthly releases.

As a result of the strong capacity growth – and despite poor wind conditions – solar and wind covered 52% of electricity demand growth in the first half of 2024 and 71% since March. (The fall in wind speeds can be seen from NASA MERRA-2 data averaged for all of China.)

Indeed, the increase in power generation from solar and wind reported by the National Energy Administration in the first half of the year, at 171 terawatt hours (TWh), exceeded the UK’s total electricity supply of 160TWh in the first half of 2023.

Rapid demand growth in January–February, at 11%, had outpaced even the clean energy additions. But combined with a rebound in hydropower generation, the increase in non-fossil electricity supply exceeded power demand growth in the March to June period.

These shifts are shown in the figure below, illustrating how clean power expansion started to exceed electricity demand growth in recent months, pushing coal and gas power into reverse.

China's clean power expansion is now pushing coal into reverse
Year-on-year change in China’s monthly electricity generation by source, terawatt hours, 2016-2024. Source: Wind and solar output, and thermal power breakdown by fuel, calculated from capacity and utilisation reported by China Electricity Council through Wind Financial Terminal; total generation from thermal power and generation from other sources taken from National Bureau of Statistics monthly releases.

After stopping the publication of capacity utilisation data by technology in May, the National Energy Administration released data in July on power generation by technology for renewable sources – solar, wind, hydro and biomass.

The NEA’s data shows renewable electricity generation covering 35% of demand in the first half of 2024 and growing 22% year-on-year. This is much higher than the previously-published National Bureau of Statistics numbers – which under-report wind and particularly solar power generation – but is closely aligned with estimates previously published by Carbon Brief.

In terms of other clean energy technologies, the production of electric vehicles, batteries and solar cells – the so-called “new-three” due to their recently acquired economic significance – continued to grow strongly in the first half of the year, at 34%, 18% and 37%, respectively.

This growth in production indicates strong demand from China and overseas. The growth of solar cell production halted in June, however.

Rapid energy demand growth

While clean technologies continue to surge in China, energy consumption has also continued to grow at a fast rate relative to GDP. This indicates that the energy-intensive growth pattern that China followed during zero-Covid is continuing.

In the second quarter of 2024, total energy consumption increased by 4.2%, while GDP grew by 4.7%, marking an energy intensity gain of only 0.5%. This energy demand growth is much faster than the pre-Covid trend.

China’s target is an annual improvement of 2.9%, a rate that was exceeded consistently until Covid-era economic policies shifted the country’s growth pattern. Economic growth during and after zero-Covid has been reliant on energy-intensive manufacturing industries.

The main structural drivers of recent energy consumption growth were the coal-to-chemicals industry, and industrial demand for power and gas.

The coal-to-chemicals industry produces petrochemical products from coal instead of oil, supporting China’s energy security goals but at a great cost to climate goals, as the coal-based production processes have far higher carbon footprints. 

China’s energy security drive and falling coal prices relative to oil prices have driven a boom in this industry. When coal supply was tight in 2022–23, the government was controlling coal use by the chemical industry to increase supply to power plants. As the coal supply situation has eased in 2024, this has enabled coal-to-chemicals plants to increase production, with coal consumption in the chemical industry growing 21% in the first half of the year.

Gas consumption increased 8.7% in the first half of the year, with industrial and residential gas consumption rising strongly, even as power generation from gas fell. Residential demand was driven up by extreme cold in the winter, however, rather than by structural factors.

On the flipside, the demand for oil products continued to fall, with a 3% drop in the second quarter that accelerated in the summer.

There are multiple factors driving the reduction: the shift to electric vehicles is contributing to the drop, with the share of EVs in cumulative vehicle sales over the past 10 years – an indicator of the mix of vehicles on the road – reaching 11.5% in June, up from 7.7% a year ago. This means that the increase in EVs cut the demand for transport fuels by approximately 4%.

The ongoing contraction in construction volumes, which is apparent in the fall in cement production, also affects oil demand, as the construction sector is a major source of demand for oil products for freight and machinery.

Another key driver is weak demand for oil as a petrochemical feedstock, which the rapidly increasing coal-to-chemicals production attempts to displace with the use of coal, albeit at a cost of increased CO2 emissions.

The contraction in construction volumes, caused by a slowdown in real estate that began in 2021, is weighing on the demand for cement and steel. Besides the direct effect of less real estate construction, local government revenues are dragged down by a fall in land sales, affecting their ability to spend on infrastructure construction.

These changes in demand for energy can been seen in the figure below, which shows contributions to the change in China’s CO2 emissions in the second quarter of this year.

Falling oil, coal power and cement helped China's emissions fall 1% in Q2 2024
Change in CO2 emissions in the second quarter of 2024 relative to the same period in 2023, broken down by sector and fuel, millions of tonnes. Emissions are estimated from National Bureau of Statistics data on production of different fuels and cement, China Customs data on imports and exports and WIND Information data on changes in inventories, applying emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory and annual emissions factors per tonne of cement production until 2023. Sector breakdown of coal consumption is estimated using coal consumption data from WIND Information and electricity data from the National Energy Administration.

While CO2 emissions did fall in the second quarter, the rate of CO2 intensity improvements fell short of the level needed to meet China’s 2025 carbon intensity commitment.

The country’s goal is to reduce emissions relative to GDP by 18% from 2020 to 2025, with progress until 2023 falling far short of the target.

As reported GDP growth slowed to 4.7% in the second quarter, and CO2 emissions fell by 1%, CO2 intensity improved by 5.5%, short of the 7% annual improvement needed in 2024-25 to get back on track.

Improvements are also easier to achieve this year than they will be in 2025, as the rebound of hydropower from the low availability in 2022–23 helps reduce emissions. This is a one-off tailwind that is not likely to be present in 2025.

One part of the energy-intensive industry that China has been relying on to drive economic growth is the manufacturing of clean energy technologies. In response, some commentators have exaggerated the CO2 impact of Chinese factories making solar panels, EVs and batteries.

In reality, however, the manufacturing of these goods was responsible for 1.6% of China’s electricity consumption and 2.9% of its emissions in the first half of 2024, based on calculations using publicly available data.

The same calculations show that their CO2 emissions and electricity consumption increased by approximately 27% in the same period, contributing a 0.6% increase in China’s total fossil CO2 emissions and 0.4% increase in electricity consumption.

Looking ahead to the rest of this year, energy consumption growth is expected to cool. The China Electricity Council projects electricity demand growth of 5% in the second half of the year, compared with 8.1% in the first half, and the National Energy Administration expects full-year gas demand growth to moderate to 6.5–7.7%, from 8.7% in the first half.

If these projections are accurate, then the continued growth of clean energy consumption would be sufficient to push China’s CO2 emissions into decline this year.

However, the faster-than-expected energy demand growth in the first half of the year dilutes the emission reductions from the country’s record clean energy additions, and adds uncertainty to whether China’s emissions will indeed fall in 2024 compared with 2023.

If the growth rates of energy demand, by fuel and sector, seen in the second quarter of this year continue into the third and fourth quarter, with similar continuity in the growth rates of non-fossil electricity generation, then China’s emissions would stay flat in 2024 overall.

Recent policy developments

Energy consumption growth could also be moderated by a renewed policy focus on energy and climate targets. In May of this year, the State Council, China’s top administrative body, issued an action plan on energy conservation and CO2 emission reductions in 2024–25.

This plan is notable both for the unusual time period, covering the last two years of the five-year plan period, and for its high-level nature – energy conservation would normally fall under the jurisdiction of the energy and environmental regulators, rather than the State Council.

This suggests that the government recognises the shortfall against the 2025 carbon intensity and energy intensity targets. The action plan calls for meeting both of these targets, and lists numerous measures to be undertaken in response.

Yet the plan did not set numerical targets for 2024 that would be consistent with meeting the 2025 targets, which could be seen as taking a hedged approach of pushing for more action but not guaranteeing that sufficient results will be achieved.

Another State Council plan, released in late July, calls for speeding up the creation of a “dual control system” to control total CO2 emissions and emissions intensity. (Historically, China has never set numerical targets for total CO2 emissions, only aiming to limit CO2 intensity.)

According to the July release, the 15th five-year plan will set a binding carbon intensity target in the 2026-30 period, in line with previous five-year plans. For the first time, there will also be a non-binding, “supplementary” target for China’s absolute emissions level in 2030. Then, for each of the following five-year periods, there will be a binding absolute emissions target.

After the shortfall against the 2025 intensity target, the 15th five-year plan period would need to set a demanding intensity target to fulfil China’s 2030 commitments under the Paris Agreement.

The most important political meeting of the year, the “third plenum” of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, took place in July. The readout of the meeting mentioned carbon emissions reduction for the first time, but did not signal a shift to stimulating consumption. This could have driven less emissions-intensive economic growth, reducing reliance on higher-carbon manufacturing or infrastructure expansion.

The key focus of the meeting was promoting “new quality productive forces”, meaning advanced manufacturing and innovation. In practice, this likely implies a continued emphasis on manufacturing, with the potential for the energy-intensive economic growth pattern to continue.

Another indication that carbon emissions are receiving more policy emphasis is that the government appears to have stopped permitting new coal-based steelmaking projects since the beginning of 2024.

Hundreds of coal-based “replacement” projects were permitted in previous years, preparing to replace up to 40% of China’s existing steelmaking capacity with brand-new furnaces.

The shift away from new coal-based capacity is consistent with China’s target of increasing the use of electric arc furnaces – but progress towards that target had been lagging.

On coal-fired power, the government issued a new policy on “low-carbon transformation” of coal plants, aiming to initiate “low-carbon” retrofitting projects of a batch of coal power plants in 2025, with the target of reducing the CO2 emissions of those plants 20% below the average for similar plants in 2023, and another batch in 2027 aiming for emission levels 50% below 2023 average.

Under this transformation plan, emissions reductions at targeted coal plants are supposed to be achieved by “co-firing” coal with either biomass or “green” ammonia derived from renewables-based hydrogen, or by adding carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS).

However, there are no targets for how many coal plants should be retrofitted, or what the incentives will be to do that, which will obviously determine the direct impact of this policy.

The impact could be small as biomass supply is limited, while the costs of ammonia and CCUS are high. For example, the International Energy Agency – among the more optimistic on power generation from biomass – sees its share rising from 2% in 2022 to 4.5% in 2035, if China meets its pledges on energy and climate IEA’s.

Furthermore, much of China’s coal-fired generation is already unprofitable, with almost half of the firms in the sector operating at a loss – even before taking on costly new measures.

The policy does however constitute Beijing’s first attempt at reconciling the recent permitting spree of new coal-fired power plants with its CO2 peaking goal for 2030, and looking for alternatives to early closure or under-utilisation of at least a part of the coal power fleet.

Prospects for a 2023 emissions peak and beyond

China’s emissions fell year-on-year in March and in the second quarter, as expected in my analysis for Carbon Brief last year.

Faster-than-expected growth in coal demand for the chemical industry, however, as well as industrial demand for power and gas, has diluted the emission reductions from the power sector, making the fall in emissions smaller than expected.

Nevertheless, China is likely still on track to begin a structural decline in emissions in 2024, making 2023 the peak year for CO2 emissions.

In order for this projection to bear out in reality, clean energy growth would need to continue and the expected cooling in energy demand growth in the second half of the year would need to materialise, with the new policy focus on energy savings and carbon emissions proving lasting.

The trends that could upset this projection include the economic policy focus on manufacturing, and the expansion of the coal-to-chemicals industry.

The surge in coal use for coal-to-chemicals is also a demonstration that even if power sector emissions begin to fall, as long as China’s climate commitments allow emissions to increase, there is the potential for developments that increase emissions in other sectors.

China has committed to updating its climate targets for 2030 and releasing new targets for 2035 early next year. These targets will be key in cementing the emissions peak and specifying the targeted rate of emission reductions after the peak – both of which have seismic implications for the global emissions trajectory and the level at which temperatures can be stabilised.

About the data

Data for the analysis was compiled from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, National Energy Administration of China, China Electricity Council and China Customs official data releases, and from WIND Information, an industry data provider.

Wind and solar output, and thermal power breakdown by fuel, was calculated by multiplying power generating capacity at the end of each month by monthly utilisation, using data reported by China Electricity Council through Wind Financial Terminal.

Total generation from thermal power and generation from hydropower and nuclear power was taken from National Bureau of Statistics monthly releases.

Monthly utilisation data was not available for biomass, so the annual average of 52% for 2023 was applied. Power sector coal consumption was estimated based on power generation from coal and the average heat rate of coal-fired power plants during each month, to avoid the issue with official coal consumption numbers affecting recent data. 

When data was available from multiple sources, different sources were cross-referenced and official sources used when possible, adjusting total consumption to match the consumption growth and changes in the energy mix reported by the National Bureau of Statistics for the first quarter and the first half of the year. The effect of the adjustments is less than 1% for all energy sources, and the conclusion that emissions fell in the second quarter holds both with and without this adjustment.

CO2 emissions estimates are based on National Bureau of Statistics default calorific values of fuels and emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory, for the year 2018. Cement CO2 emissions factor is based on annual estimates up to 2023.

For oil consumption, apparent consumption is calculated from refinery throughput, with net exports of oil products subtracted.

The post Analysis: China’s CO2 falls 1% in Q2 2024 in first quarterly drop since Covid-19 appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Analysis: China’s CO2 falls 1% in Q2 2024 in first quarterly drop since Covid-19

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UN seabed regulator defends authority as mining firms seek to halt inquiry

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The UN body that regulates mining in international waters has defended its authority over ocean governance after two subsidiaries of deep-sea mining firm The Metals Company (TMC) launched legal action to halt an investigation into their conduct.

Speaking at the International Seabed Authority’s (ISA) annual meeting in Kingston on Monday, secretary-general Leticia Carvalho said the regulator’s role “matters more than ever” as governments grapple with growing pressure to exploit the deep seabed for minerals needed for the energy transition.

“The deep seabed belongs to no single country and no corporation; it belongs to all of us,” Carvalho said, describing its resources as “the common heritage of humankind”.

“If we lose sight of this,” she added, “we risk repeating on the ocean floor the same injustices and destruction we still strive to remedy on land.”

The conflict stems from TMC’s attempt to bypass the UN process by applying for US-sponsored ocean mining permits offered last year by the Trump administration. The Canadian firm aims to become the first company to mine the seabed for minerals like nickel, rare earths and manganese used in the production of both clean energy technologies and military equipment.

Several governments, including China, condemned the move as a “violation of international law”. In response, ISA member states agreed to open an inquiry into its licence-holders – among them two of TMC’s subsidiaries – to make sure they have complied with international law. If they are ultimately found to have breached those obligations, their exploration contracts could be revoked.

In June, the two TMC subsidiaries – Tonga Offshore Mining Ltd (TOML) and Nauru Ocean Resources Inc (NORI) – filed claims against the ISA at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), asking the court to suspend the inquiry while the case proceeds. The companies argue they are being targeted “without lawful procedural basis”, “in breach of due process”, and without “good faith”.

Environmental groups have accused The Metals Company of using legal tactics to block the investigation into its subsidiaries.

“We find ourselves in this Orwellian situation where these companies are trying to effectively get an injunction against the ISA from continuing its inquiry,” said Louisa Casson, who leads Greenpeace’s global campaign against deep-sea mining.

“The stakes are so high and that’s why we’re seeing this pretty extraordinary move to try to get an injunction against the ISA,” she added.

    Mining the deep ocean floor

    The ISA has been negotiating a mining code for the deep ocean floor for over 12 years without success. Nearly 40 governments, including the UK, France and Germany, have called for a moratorium or precautionary pause on deep-sea mining until there is sufficient scientific evidence that it can proceed without causing serious harm to marine ecosystems.

    Rather than wait for the UN process, industry frontrunner, The Metals Company, decided to apply for US permits offered by the Trump administration last year. In May, the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) certified TMC’s application to explore 120,000 square kilometers of sea floor.

    The firm wants to mine an area in the Pacific known as the Clarion-Clipperton Zone, which holds critical minerals inside potato-sized rocks found in the deep ocean floor known as polymetallic nodules. The minerals like manganese, nickel and rare earths are used in clean energy technologies like batteries and wind turbines.

    But the area is also a little-understood ecosystem inhabited by thousands of unnamed species. The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), the world’s largest environmental network, says mining this area would threaten the existence of over half of all molluscs reliant on deep-sea vents.

    A field of manganese nodules in the ocean floor. (Photo: photo by NOAA Office of Ocean Exploration and Research)
    A field of manganese nodules in the ocean floor. (Photo: photo by NOAA Office of Ocean Exploration and Research)

    Governments launch inquiry

    Seeking to discourage companies from bypassing the UN process, the ISA’s member states unanimously agreed to open an inquiry into whether holders of its exploration licences complied with their contractual obligations under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

    “The stage we’re at now is countries grappling with what they can do about this. What tools do they have to constrain this pathway that would go against international law,” Casson said.

    Both NORI and TOML continue to hold ISA exploration contracts in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone. NORI’s license, however, expires later this month on July 21st and is up for review.

    The inquiry is currently ongoing, but Casson said that if governments decide to cancel NORI’s license, other firms could apply for the ISA permit and compete for mining rights in the area.

    “If that happens, it could really put into jeopardy TMC USA’s application (for US permits) because then suddenly that area could be open for a competing claim,” she explained. “At the moment, TMC is trying to kind of play both sides and shore up the area so that there will be no competition.”

    Deep-sea mining firms push back

    The cases before ITLOS are the first contentious disputes over deep-sea mining to reach the court designed for maritime disputes and the first brought directly by private contractors against the ISA. Among the companies’ legal advisers is former ISA secretary-general Michael Lodge.

    Both NORI and TOML claimed that, unless the inquiry is suspended, there is a “real
    and imminent risk of prejudice” that “may have significant legal and practical consequences” for
    their activities.

    The claim was backed by the Pacific island nation of Nauru, which has sponsored TMC’s push to mine the Clarion-Clipperton Zone and would benefit from the economic activity. The country raised “concerns on the adherence of due process with respect to the treatment of NORI”.

    The mining companies allege that the ISA has singled them out among other applicants by requesting additional documentation, and that the UN auditors did not give them an opportunity to “meaningfully respond” to their concerns.

    The ISA rejected those allegations as “wholly unsupported assertions”. It added that, given TMC’s application for US mining permits, it had done “what any reasonable regulator would do”: with the unanimous support of member states, it opened an inquiry simply to establish the facts.

    A view of the International Seabed Authority council meeting in Kinston, Jamaica. (Photo: Andrés Felipe Carvajal Gómez/ ENB)
    A view of the International Seabed Authority council meeting in Kinston, Jamaica. (Photo: Andrés Felipe Carvajal Gómez/ ENB)

    Delay tactics

    A decision from the maritime court is now expected by July 18, which has added to a “climate of significant regulatory uncertainty”, according to global law firm HSF Kramer.

    As ISA countries meet in Kingston this week, the court’s president asked them “not to act in any way that could hinder any order” the court may make.

    At the hearing representing the ISA, renowned human rights lawyer Philippe Sands said the deep-sea mining firms were engaging in “strategic litigation” meant to delay the inquiry and send the ISA into a years-long legal process.

    “It’s a delaying tactic, and nothing would make them happier than for you to kick this into the long grass for two years while you sort out the merits. That is what they want this Tribunal, the Chamber, to do. You are being instrumentalized in this process,” Sands told the judges.

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    28 quotes from next UK leader Andy Burnham on climate, net-zero and fossil fuels

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    The UK’s incoming prime minister Andy Burnham has remained tight-lipped on his views on climate change during his leadership campaign.

    When asked his views on reversing Labour’s manifesto pledge to stop new North Sea drilling in June – a move that the oil-and-gas industry and right-wing media have pushed for in recent months – he said he had “something of an open mind” on the issue.

    But a trawl of Burnham’s past comments about climate change, net-zero and fossil fuels reveals a different picture.

    Just a year ago in June 2025, Burnham, while mayor of Greater Manchester, gave his support to the fossil fuel treaty – a proposed international pact on phasing out coal, oil and gas – calling it a “lifeline” that “all governments” should join.

    In a video message endorsing the treaty, he also said that “there should be no turning away from net-zero”.

    During his last bid to be Labour leader in 2015, he used similar language, saying:

    “Labour under my leadership will never turn our back on either our duty to tackle climate change or the prospects offered by the green economy.”

    Burnham has spoken about the threat of climate change since at least 2008, noting in 2021 that accelerated action could “create thousands of good jobs”, but also warning that net-zero risked becoming the “next Brexit”.

    Burnham is yet to appoint his cabinet, but there is much speculation that he will select current net-zero secretary Ed Miliband as his chancellor – with their ally Miatta Fahnbulleh having a “strong chance” of taking Miliband’s former position.

    Below, Carbon Brief recounts 28 things that Burnham has said about climate change, net-zero, fossil fuels, energy and transport.

    Climate change

    “Tackling climate change isn’t just about protecting the planet – it’s a powerful opportunity to build a fairer, greener future for our communities and businesses.”

    Calling for local councils to be given more power and money for climate action, 29 November 2025


    “There is little doubt that Greater Manchester’s biodiversity has taken a hit over the years, with habitats being lost, destroyed and becoming less diverse due to the impact of development, climate change, pollution and invasive species…We are committed to delivering a city-region for all residents to enjoy – a fairer, greener and more prosperous place for everyone.”

    Statement after Greater Manchester declared a “biodiversity emergency”, 25 March 2022


    “Over the next decade, if we accelerate our response to the climate crisis, we can create thousands of good jobs, improve homes, overhaul our transport system and make [Manchester] an even better place to live.”

    Greater Manchester Green Summit, 18 October 2021


    “The environment has never been higher on the national and international agenda.”

    Statement after visiting a peat bog restoration project in England, 9 January 2020


    Andy Burnham (left) and others, including members of Massive Attack, endorsing the Fossil Fuel Treaty in June 2025
    Andy Burnham (left) and others, including members of Massive Attack, endorsing the Fossil Fuel Treaty in June 2025. Credit: Fossil Fuel Treaty

    “I think climate change [action] will be driven more quickly from the bottom up, if I’m honest. It’s the will of evolution if you wait for the government to act…When governments aren’t listening you get out and get your voice heard…so I think [climate protesters] deserve our encouragement, not our criticism.”

    Speaking to Manchester Evening News at a student climate protest in Manchester, 24 May 2019


    “Labour under my leadership will never turn our back on either our duty to tackle climate change or the prospects offered by the green economy.”

    Labour leadership candidate speech, 15 July 2015


    “Climate change can seem a distant, impersonal threat – in fact the associated costs to health are a very real and present danger…We need well-designed climate change policies that drive health benefits.”

    Speaking to the Guardian about a study on climate and health, 25 November 2009


    “The Stern report on the economics of climate change has changed the debate, in this country and around the world. It made it clear that the people who could suffer most from a failure to tackle climate change, or from a lack of ambition in our approach to it, are those living in the developing countries. They are the most vulnerable…[and] Stern said that the cost of not acting would be large. That is why the government took various measures in the recent spending review to ensure that we are prepared to face the challenges posed by climate change.”

    Speaking in the UK parliament on the economic impacts of climate change on his final day as chief secretary to the Treasury, 24 January 2008

    Net-zero

    “There should be no turning away from net-zero.”

    Speaking after giving his support to the fossil fuel treaty – a proposed global pact to introduce laws to phase out coal, oil and gas – on behalf of Manchester, 6 June 2025

    Fossil Fuel Treaty Initiative on Bluesky: The Fossil Fuel Treaty is not just a plan, said Mayor Burnham

    “An opportunity is opening up for Britain as other countries move away from net-zero. We should seize that…We can make Britain a green leader. This is not the time to tiptoe, it is the time to commit to this path.”

    Speaking at Innovation Zero World Congress in London, 29 April 2025


    “[We] need a government that fully buys into the 2038 vision because the UK will not get to 2050 unless places like Greater Manchester are freed up to go faster – and we’re ready to go faster.”

    Speaking about Greater Manchester’s aim to reach net-zero by 2038, 19 October 2022


    “In Greater Manchester we have plans to build 30,000 net-zero social rented homes because we recognise that a successful city region needs good quality, affordable accommodation for everyone.”

    Speech on the future of cities, 24 June 2022


    “By building a broad consensus behind the drive to net-zero, we can ensure that the transition is a fair one that delivers social justice as well as climate justice. This is an opportunity for all of us to show how cutting carbon emissions in our cities can make a real difference to our communities – away from the abstractions and rooted in the real world.”

    Panel discussion in Glasgow during the COP26 climate summit, 12 November 2021


    “To the extent that people have picked up anything from COP26, it’s a sense that the drive to net-zero will mean cost and inconvenience for ordinary people and offsetting for the wealthy and entitled. All of a sudden, you can feel how net-zero could become the new Brexit – a debate that gets very divided on class grounds…This has got to be a wake-up call. We cannot let this happen. We need to act now to build a broad social consensus behind the drive to net-zero. How to do that? It starts with taking control of the climate narrative from those steering it in the wrong direction and turning it around…We must show how, if done in the right way, the drive to net-zero is actually an opportunity to reduce the cost of living; to make people’s lives better and society fairer.”

    Writing for the London Standard, 5 November 2021

    
Andy Burnham on X: We need to use Week 2 of COP26

    “The drive to net-zero is a chance to re-industrialise the north of England, this time in a clean way. Create really good jobs, future-facing jobs for people, better public transport, improve people’s homes…If we go quickly towards net-zero, it’s the quickest way to level up the country.”

    ITV interview at COP26, 1 November 2021


    “If we really embrace the drive to net-zero, that is the route to level up the country…But it needs substantial investment, upfront, now, of the kind that Rachel Reeves, shadow chancellor [and chancellor under Keir Starmer’s government], has been talking about. We need long-term predictable funding.”

    Interview with GB News at COP26, 1 November 2021


    “I would have preferred to hear slightly less about carbonated wine and much more about a decarbonised economy.”

    Referencing a UK budget, which included tax cuts for sparkling wine and other drinks, 28 October 2021


    “Decarbonising is not just about lowering costs on to people. It’s the route to get better, cheaper public transport. It’s the route to getting homes that are cheap to run. It’s actually the way we can create thousands of good jobs for the people who live in Greater Manchester. This is the route to levelling up the country by going further and faster on decarbonisation.”

    Speaking to Manchester Confidential, 20 October 2021


    “[I am] asking people to stop seeing the environmental agenda as a cost and a burden agenda. I think this is a barrier that we’ve got to get over. Already in the media interviews I’ve done today, people are saying ‘can you afford it?’, ‘can it be achievable when times are tough?’.

    “My answer to that is, at some point in the 21st century, all homes will be zero-carbon. At some point in this century, all buildings of any kind will be zero-carbon…All cars will be zero-carbon, all public transport will be zero-carbon…The question is: when? And surely the places that embrace those things first are putting themselves in a position of economic strength when it comes to facing up to the future. Rather than seeing the whole agenda as a burden, we’ve got to see it for the benefits that it can bring.

    “There may be a greater upfront cost in a zero-carbon home, but let’s stop thinking, as we tend to do in Britain, of the short-term, the short-termist approach to life. Surely let’s start talking to the public about the lifetime cost.”

    Greater Manchester Green Summit, 21 March 2018


    Fossil fuels

    “I’ve got something of an open mind, you know. I don’t have a sort of fixed position.”

    Speaking on the issue of new North Sea oil and gas in a New Statesman interview, 3 June 2026


    “We would fight this in GM [Greater Manchester]…Communities across the north would face all the danger and disruption while big oil and gas walk away with all the profits.”

    In response to Reform’s call for fracking, on X, 25 August 2025

    Andy Burnham on X: We would fight this in GM

    “I am proud to endorse the fossil-fuel treaty proposal today on behalf of Greater Manchester. It’s not just a plan – it’s a lifeline. It’s a call to end coal, oil and gas, hold polluters accountable…I urge all governments, nationals and subnationals to join this fight.”

    Statement upon endorsing the fossil-fuel treaty, 5 June 2025

    Fossil Fuel Treaty Initiative on X: In a historic moment, Mayor Andy Burnham

    “Fracking is the past, it is not the future.”

    Speech at London climate protest, 20 September 2019


    “I have called for a moratorium on fracking. Far too many potential risks and unanswered questions.”

    On X, 22 June 2015

    Andy Burnham on X: This explains why I have called for a moratorium on fracking

    Energy and transport

    “What I would do, if successful, is lay out a plan for more public control over water, energy, transport, so that over the period we can get those bills down, fares down, and give people and give businesses breathing space.”

    LBC interview, 2 July 2026


    “I am all in favour of tough decisions at a national level. I don’t believe there should be a third runway at Heathrow, for instance. But I think those are decisions for national government.”

    Guardian interview, 13 June 2019


    “There is a debate to be had about aviation, isn’t there? There are changing public attitudes about aviation. Rather than just saying no to people flying, don’t we need to accelerate research into low and zero-carbon forms of aviation?”

    Guardian interview, 13 June 2019


    “Today, I stand alongside the mayors of some of the greatest cities in the world. I’m committed to a cleaner, greener and healthier future for Greater Manchester. Around a third of greenhouse gas emissions in our city-region come from transport.”

    When signing the C40 Fossil-Fuel-Free Streets Declaration, which includes support for zero-emissions vehicles and walking and cycling, on behalf of Manchester, 14 September 2018

    The post 28 quotes from next UK leader Andy Burnham on climate, net-zero and fossil fuels appeared first on Carbon Brief.

    28 quotes from next UK leader Andy Burnham on climate, net-zero and fossil fuels

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    Climate Change

    A strong El Niño spells more climate pain for the Philippines

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    Suresanathan Murugesu is the country director of Action Against Hunger in the Philippines

    The Philippines is caught in an extreme weather trap. Here, forecasts for a strong El Niño in the months ahead do not just indicate a period of drought – they also point to torrential rain and flooding.

    It could hardly come at a worse time, threatening communities that are still struggling to recover from previous typhoons, such as last year’s Typhoon Tino, as well as two strong earthquakes – in Cebu in September 2025 and last month’s 7.8-magnitude quake in Mindanao.

    Forecasts point to the arrival of one of the most intense El Niños in recent history this year and into 2027, with the United Nations warning that it could be the strongest in decades around the world.

    The peak of the El Niño is expected towards the end of the year, but the weather phenomenon is already estimated to have caused agricultural losses of nearly €30 million (£25.9 million), potentially affecting the livelihoods of 4 million farmers.

      On the climate frontline

      For many, El Niño is a figure in a report or a distant headline, but for those of us who live and work on the ground, it is a reality that is already hitting the most vulnerable families.

      When I travel through the communities of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region – in the south – or speak with families on the island of Siargao or in the Zamboanga region, I do not see data or graphs.

      I see a father looking at his cracked rice field, wondering how he will pay off the debts from a harvest that is already lost before it has even begun. I see a mother walking under a relentless sun because her village’s well has dried up, carrying the water that sustains the health of her children and her entire community.

      And what we are seeing today – 26 provinces experiencing drought and millions of dollars in agricultural losses – is only the beginning.

      Loss and damage fund delays first project approvals as needs dwarf resources

      Many Filipino families are still trying to rebuild and recover after last year’s typhoons and the two earthquakes. In Mindanao, where the recent magnitude 7.8 earthquake displaced more than 90,000 people and destroyed over 19,000 houses, uncertainty remains about when the people will be able to fully recover and return home. 

      Today, they are trying to protect the meagre possessions they have and, if they are lucky enough to have their home unscathed by typhoons and earthquakes, their homes from flooding; tomorrow, they will have to survive the hardship and impact of drought.

      The effects of El Niño threaten to exacerbate their troubles.

      Struggle for basic needs

      Many low-income Filipino families already face significant challenges to meet their basic needs.

      In our daily visits, we see how life is becoming increasingly difficult for millions of people. Rising fuel and transport costs are driving up the price of basic foodstuffs, making them unaffordable for many families. At the same time, crop failures and income losses are leaving households without livelihoods, while disasters contribute to further suffering.

      A farmer collects rice along the side of the road during a hot day in Candaba, Pampanga, Philippines, April 30, 2024. REUTERS/Eloisa Lopez

      A farmer collects rice along the side of the road during a hot day in Candaba, Pampanga, Philippines, April 30, 2024. REUTERS/Eloisa Lopez

      But we are not just talking about hunger. We are talking about health, safety and dignity. Water shortages are forcing many people to resort to unsafe sources, increasing the risk of disease. And, as is the case in so many crises, it is the most vulnerable who bear the heaviest burden: walking long distances every day to fetch water or food, enduring enormous physical strain and facing risks of violence and insecurity.

      Building resilience

      Faced with this reality, our response is based on a simple idea: to be there before the crisis reaches its most critical point. At Action Against Hunger, we work alongside communities to anticipate the situation, assessing the impact of the drought and activating early response mechanisms to protect their livelihoods and access to water.

      We translate climate forecasts into concrete action plans: from support for farmers to programmes ensuring safe water. All of this is done in coordination with local authorities and international partners, because we know that what we do today will make the difference tomorrow.

      A supercharged El Niño is coming – are we ready?

      The hardest months are yet to come. But the question is not just what will happen, but what we are doing now to prevent it. How many tables will remain empty and how many children will see their health compromised will depend on our ability to act in time.

      We cannot stop El Niño. But we can prevent it from becoming a crisis of human dignity. We cannot afford to look the other way whilst the earth cracks and opportunities disappear. Because behind every statistic, there is a family struggling to get by. And that is a reality we cannot ignore.

      The post A strong El Niño spells more climate pain for the Philippines appeared first on Climate Home News.

      A strong El Niño spells more climate pain for the Philippines

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