Shell Nederland Raffinaderij B.V., a subsidiary of Shell, is pausing construction at its massive biofuel facility in Rotterdam. The 820,000tpa capacity site at Shell Energy and Chemicals Park will halt work temporarily to focus on other vital aspects of the company. So, what is the exact reason behind Shell’s massive decision? Will this impact its operations, global market value, and employees by large? Read and discover more…
Why did Shell take this Bold Decision?
Explaining straightway, Wael Sawan, CEO of Shell wants to prioritize the company’s most profitable ventures, particularly in oil and gas. This approach has resulted in the company pulling out of less profitable renewable and hydrogen projects. The outcome of this decision is the temporary halt of the Rotterdam biofuels project. Shell is also conducting a thorough valuation review of this unit. The 820,000t unit was also set to produce sustainable aviation fuel (SAF), apart from renewable diesel. According to media reports, they aimed to start operations in 2025, but now it has been postponed to the end of the decade.
Another key reason for ceasing the unit is to slow down activities and reduce contractor strength for better cost control. They believe this will help optimize and streamline project sequencing. With this new amendment, Shell aims to reevaluate project delivery and maintain competitiveness in the current economic scenario.
Huibert Vigevano, Shell’s downstream head confirmed that,
“Temporarily pausing on-site construction now will allow us to assess the most commercial way forward for the project. We are committed to our target of achieving net-zero emissions by 2050, with low-carbon fuels as a key part of Shell’s strategy.”
UBS analyst Joshua Stone remarked,
“The pause was consistent with Shell’s strategy to focus on returns. The delays further highlight that the advanced biofuels market is not an easy one. The oil majors have dipped their toes and found it challenging.”
Shell Canada Greenlights Major Carbon Emission Cut
As this news came as a shock to many, there is a silver lining for our news readers. Meanwhile, Shell Canada recently achieved the final investment decision (FID) for CCS projects, including the Polaris project and the Atlas Carbon Storage Hub, in partnership with ATCO EnPower. The media release notes that Polaris (100% Shell-owned) can reduce Scope 1 CO2 emissions at Shell’s Scotford refinery by capturing and storing up to 40% and by up to 22% at the chemicals complex. The operations are slated to begin by the end of 2028.
Moving on, Shell Eastern Trading has acquired Pavilion Energy from Carne Investments, gaining 100% control. This is another significant milestone that happened last month. Pavilion Energy, based in Singapore, operates a global LNG trading business with 6.5 mtpa of contracted supply, alongside shipping, and gas supply activities in Asia and Europe. This acquisition manifests Shell’s LNG portfolio. It also provides strategic access to key markets, increasing flexibility to meet energy security needs in Asia and Europe.
Even though it might seem uncanny for companies to halt projects in progress, Shell is not the first company to announce it. Energy giant BP recently announced a pause on two biofuel projects in Germany and the U.S.
Media agencies like the Financial Times have reported that Biofuel prices have been under downward pressure recently. This is because of reduced demand in Europe following Sweden’s biofuel mandate cut, alongside increased supplies from the U.S. However, Shell shares increased by 1.3% at 1106 GMT, showing a rise of over 12.5% this year.
Shell has a market cap or net worth of $235.01 billion. The enterprise value is $277.77 billion. As of the most recent data, Shell’s stock price in the last 5 days was $73.25 per share, as shown in the image below.

source: stockanalysis
NYSE: SHEL · IEX Real-Time Price · USD 73.25
How Shell Uses Carbon Credits to Shape the Future
Shell’s carbon credits play a crucial role in their goal to become a net-zero emissions energy business. These credits help Shell and its customers offset emissions, adhering to the mitigation hierarchy: avoid, reduce, and compensate. Notably, Shell selects projects certified by the Verified Carbon Standard, Gold Standard, and the American Carbon Registry. In the ESG sphere, the company helps generate carbon credits from nature-based projects and technologies. In 2023, Shell’s net carbon intensity (NCI) included 20 m carbon credits, with 4 m linked to energy product sales.
Shell’s Net-zero emissions by 2050 (Scope 1, 2, and 3), reported by Shell’s Energy Transition Strategy, 2024
Emissions from internal operations (Scope 1 and 2)
- Halve Scope 1 and 2 emissions by 2030 (2016 baseline).
- Eliminate routine flaring from Upstream operations by 2025.
- Maintain methane emissions intensity below 0.2% and achieve near-zero methane emissions by 2030.
Emissions from sold products (Scope 3):
- Reduce the net carbon intensity (NCI) of the energy products we sell by 9–12% by 2024, 9–13% by 2025, 15–20% by 2030, and 100% by 2050 (2016 baseline).
- Ambition to reduce customer emissions from the use of our oil products by 15–20% by 2030 (Scope 3, Category 11) (2021 baseline)
Global Market Insights reports that the European biofuel market size exceeded USD 26.5 B in 2023 and is likely to register a 6.7% CAGR from 2024 to 2032, owing to the rising concerns about climate change and demand for sustainable energy sources. The European government aims to boost renewable fuels to approximately 14% of transport energy by 2030, with substantial demand. With this prediction, we can hope the future of energy giants like Shell is promising, amid the biofuel boom.
The post Why Shell Hit the Brakes on New Rotterdam’s Biofuel Plant appeared first on Carbon Credits.
Carbon Footprint
How to improve Scope 3 data accuracy for CSRD
For most businesses, the emissions that matter most sit outside their own walls. Scope 3 emissions, everything generated across your value chain, from the suppliers who make your inputs to the customers who use your products, typically make up the majority of a company’s total carbon footprint. Under the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), those value-chain emissions now have to be measured and disclosed with a rigour that spend-based estimates alone struggle to satisfy. This guide sets out how to improve Scope 3 data accuracy for CSRD: the calculation methods open to you, how to move from estimates to verified supplier data, and how to govern that data so it holds up to audit.
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Carbon Footprint
How community stewardship makes carbon credits durable
A carbon credit is a commitment that extends well into the future. The tonne of CO₂ compensated for today from a nature-based carbon project must remain out of the atmosphere for good, which means the forest behind the credit has to remain standing long after the transaction is complete. For any buyer, this raises a defining question: What ensures that the forest endures?
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Carbon Footprint
Why Conventional Carbon Offsets Are Losing Boardroom Credibility
What replaced the cheap REDD credit on the boardroom slide deck, and why procurement is leading the rewrite.
Three years ago, a corporate slide showing a portfolio of cheap REDD+ credits could carry a board meeting. The number was big, the price was low, and the press release wrote itself. Today, that same slide gets sent back with questions. The questions are uncomfortable, the answers are unclear, and your general counsel is suddenly in the room.
Conventional carbon offsets are not dead. The voluntary carbon market retired 202 million tonnes in 2025, and the Morgan Stanley Institute for Sustainable Investing survey published in January 2026 confirmed that interest from corporate buyers remains substantial. What changed is the credibility threshold. The integrity floor has risen, the disclosure scrutiny has tightened, and the buyer profile has shifted. This article tracks what changed, what sophisticated buyers now ask before signing, and what serious corporates are putting on the board slide instead.
What boards used to buy, and why it stopped working
The 2020 to 2022 model was simple: buy a large tranche of avoidance credits at low single-digit prices, retire them against the company footprint, announce the carbon-neutral claim, and move on. Most of those credits came from REDD+ projects, renewable energy installations in countries where the renewable energy was already economic, or methane projects with thin documentation.
Several things broke that model. Academic research published in 2023, including a widely cited Science paper, found that the majority of REDD+ credits issued under the most common methodologies did not represent additional reductions when tested against rigorous counterfactuals. The Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative published its Claims Code of Practice, which sets requirements for what companies can credibly claim from credit use. The European Union finalised its Green Claims Directive, restricting how companies can describe products as climate-neutral. France’s Décret 2022-539 already restricts carbon neutrality advertising. California’s AB 1305 imposes disclosure requirements on any company making net-zero or carbon-neutral claims while doing business in the state.
The collective effect: the cheap credit no longer buys the announcement, and the announcement now carries litigation risk.
The integrity reset: ICVCM, VCMI, and what changed
The Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market published the Core Carbon Principles in 2023 and began assessing methodologies against them in 2024. The first methodologies received the CCP label later that year. The point of the label is to give corporate buyers a defensible quality screen they can cite in disclosure.
The Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative complements this on the demand side. Its Claims Code of Practice defines what a buyer can say (Silver, Gold, or Platinum claims, with associated requirements) based on the quality of credits used and the underlying decarbonisation strategy. Together, CCP and VCMI build a quality stack: CCP on the supply, VCMI on the claim, with the science-based target sitting underneath both.
The reset is not a ban on offsets. It is a ratchet. Credits that meet the new bar continue to clear; credits that do not, do not. The Morgan Stanley survey found that 61% of current buyers like the CCP label concept but that supply of labelled credits remains limited. That supply constraint is now visible in pricing.
What sophisticated buyers ask before they sign
The questions on the procurement scorecard have changed. A 2022 buyer might have asked about price, vintage, and project type. A 2026 buyer asks five different questions before any of those.
- What does the counterfactual look like, and who validated it.
- What is the permanence regime, and what is the buffer pool exposure.
- What is the leakage risk, and how is it mitigated.
- What rating has the project received from the independent ratings agencies (Sylvera, BeZero, Calyx Global), and what was the rationale.
- What is the documentation discipline that survives an audit four years from now when the procurement team that signed the contract has moved on.
If the vendor cannot answer those five questions on a first call, the conversation ends. Conversely, if the vendor can answer them with documented specificity, the conversation often expands beyond a single transaction toward a multi-year engagement.
Where this leaves your near-term commitments
You probably have near-term commitments that pre-date the integrity reset. Public targets to be carbon neutral by 2025 or 2030. Product-level claims that ran in last year’s marketing. Disclosed reduction trajectories that assumed continued access to cheap credits.
You have three workable paths. The first is to re-baseline your strategy, replacing the most exposed credits with higher-quality alternatives and adjusting the public language to match what you can defend. The second is to shift the underlying spend from offsetting outside your value chain to investing inside your value chain, where reductions count against Scope 3 directly and the audit trail is cleaner. The third is to keep the strategy and absorb the risk, which is increasingly the most expensive option once you price in litigation, restatement, and reputational exposure.
Most serious buyers are choosing the second path. It moves the carbon spend from a compliance cost to a procurement and resilience investment, and it removes the central failure point of the legacy model: the disconnect between where the emissions occurred and where the reductions sat. Nature-based supply chain investments, structured under the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard and aligned to the SBTi FLAG Guidance, are the asset class that fits this brief. They generate inventory-grade reductions, they produce audit-grade documentation, and they survive the new claim restrictions because the carbon math sits inside the value chain that the disclosure already covers.
If you are reassessing a carbon strategy under the new integrity bar, or rebuilding a board narrative that has to survive a more skeptical audience, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help. The Dual-Value Model gives you a defensible alternative to legacy offset purchases, with the documentation and operational integration that survives the procurement scorecard and the audit. Schedule a consultation.
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