Connect with us

Published

on

Developing countries are receiving just a fraction of the international finance they need to prepare citizens and adapt infrastructure for escalating climate impacts.

That is according to the latest adaptation gap report from the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), which calculates that developing nations will need more than $310bn annually between now and 2035 to prepare for the impacts of climate change.

And yet, in 2023, developed nations provided just $26bn in international adaptation finance to developing nations, according to the report.

UNEP warns that, under current trends, developed nations are on track to miss their goal – agreed at the COP26 climate summit in Glasgow – of doubling 2019 international adaptation finance by 2025.

It cautions that countries’ more recent climate-finance pledge for 2035 – the new collective quantified goal (NCGQ) – will be “insufficient” to meet adaptation finance needs.

The UN report – entitled, “Running on empty: The world is gearing up for climate resilience without the money to get there” – also explores how countries are integrating adaptation priorities into national climate plans, policies and practices.

It finds that 87% of countries have at least one national adaptation plan or strategy in place, but warns that gaps remain in the implementation of measures.

Inger Andersen, the executive director of UNEP, says: “Even amid tight budgets and competing priorities, the reality is simple: if we do not invest in adaptation now, we will face escalating costs every year.”

Below, Carbon Brief summarises some of the key takeaways from the report.

Developed countries are on track to miss their 2025 adaptation finance goal

Climate change adaptation refers to a range of measures that reduce society’s and infrastructure’s vulnerability to climate change, from planting crop varieties that can withstand greater heat through to building stronger defences against floods.

Spending from the public funds of developed nations is a key source of finance for these actions in developing nations, especially for low-income countries that are vulnerable to climate impacts.

Under Article 9 of the Paris Agreement, developed countries agreed to achieve a “balance” in the amount of climate finance raised for emissions reduction and adaptation. However, more money has been raised for cutting emissions than preparing for climate impacts.

UNEP’s adaptation gap report notes that, in 2023, the amount of public money channelled to developing countries from richer nations for adaptation measures fell.

In total, developed countries raised $25.9bn in international adaptation finance – marking a decline on the $27.9bn recorded in 2022.

The report authors attribute the fall to a decline in funding from multilateral development banks, such as the World Bank, which provided more than half – 57% – of international adaptation finance.

The table below shows how adaptation finance provided by developed countries for developing countries (orange) dipped in 2023 – despite an uptick in climate finance as a whole.

Chart showing international public finance commitments from developed countries towards developing countries per year for the period 2019-2023, disaggregated into adaption, mitigation and cross-cutting finance (US$ billions, constant 2023 prices)
International adaptation finance commitments from developed countries towards developing countries for the period 2019-23, broken down into adaptation (orange), mitigation (green) and cross-cutting finance (blue). Source: UNEP adaptation gap report (2025).

The UN warns that, if current trends continue, developed nations are set to miss their goal of doubling 2019 adaptation finance flows by 2025.

This goal – set out in the Glasgow Climate Pact agreed at the COP26 climate summit in 2021 – commits developed nations to providing $40bn in adaptation funding for developing nations by 2025.

Official climate-finance figures from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) for 2025 will not be available for several years. However, the report notes that, over 2019-23, international adaptation finance grew at a compound rate of 7% – falling short of the 12% rate required to meet the Glasgow Climate Pact goal.

Cuts to international aid budgets since 2023 are also threatening the Glasgow Climate Pact goal, according to the report authors. They note that, globally, foreign aid fell by 9% in 2024 and predict that reductions announced in 2025 are “likely” to lead to a further 9-17% decline.

Meanwhile, countries’ more recent pledge to help raise $300bn a year by 2035 for both tackling and adapting to climate change – set out in the new collective quantified goal for climate finance (NCQG), agreed last year at COP29 in Baku – is also under threat, according to the report.

In the introduction of the report, UNEP’s Anderson writes:

“While the numbers for 2024 and 2025 are not yet available, one thing is clear: unless trends in adaptation financing do not turn around, which currently seems unlikely, the Glasgow Climate Pact goal will not be achieved, the NCQG will not be achieved and many more people will suffer needlessly.”

‘Adaptation investment trap’

The report also breaks down international adaptation finance in 2023 by funding type. It finds that that 70% was either grants, which allow countries to address climate impacts without exacerbating debt, or “concessional” loans, which are provided at below market rate.

However, it notes that “non-consessional” finance – which is provided at, or near, market rates – is on the rise, growing at an annual compound rate of 7% over 2019-23. In 2023, non-concessional loans exceeded concessional ones for the first time, the report notes.

The “increasing proportion” of non-concessional finance raises “long-term affordability and equity” concerns, the authors warn. They also point to the risk of an “adaptation investment trap” – whereby rising climate disasters increase developing countries’ “indebtedness”, which subsequently makes it harder for them to invest in adaptation.

The report also finds that loans and other forms of “debt instruments” comprised “58% on average” of international adaptation finance in 2022-23.

The NCQG text highlights the need for “concessional” and “non-debt creating” finance.

(This came after strong calls from many developing countries to exclude “non-concessional” loans – which result in wealth flowing back to the donor countries as loan repayments and interest – as a form of climate finance. Analysis has shown that many developing countries are spending more on servicing debts than they receive in climate finance.)

Elsewhere, the authors also find that funding for new adaptation projects through UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) funds (the adaptation fund, green climate fund (GCF) and the least developed countries fund (LDCF) and special climate change fund (SCCF) managed by the Global Environment Facility) saw a “large spike” in 2024, with grants reaching around $920m.

However, they note that the recent increase “may not be a trend, with financial constraints likely to rise beyond 2025”.

Developing nations’ adaptation finance needs are 12 times greater than current flows

While previous UN adaptation gap reports have investigated adaptation finance shortfalls through to 2030, this latest analysis extends its estimates through to 2035.

This is in light of the NCQG, which states that developed countries should “take the lead” in raising “at least $300bn” a year for climate action in developing countries by 2035.

The report calculates that the costs of adaptation by 2035 for developing countries sit in a “plausible central range” of $310-365bn annually. It explains that it has arrived at this range based on “two lines of evidence”:

  • A modelled estimate of the additional costs of adaptation, calculated using “global sectoral models with national-level resolution”. This exercise pins the cost of adaptation for developing countries at $310bn a year by 2035 under an intermediate emissions scenario.
  • An analysis of the climate finance needs set out by developing countries in 97 national adaptation plans and nationally determined contributions (NDCs) submitted to the UNFCCC – with “extrapolation” of this data to all 155 developing countries. This results in the upper figure of $365bn per year up to 2035.

The chart below shows the disparity between existing finance flows (dark blue bar) and adaptation finance needs and modelled costs (red bars).

Chart showing the comparison of adaptation financing needs, modelled costs and international public adaptation finance flows in developing countries
Comparison of 2035 adaptation financing needs, 2035 modelled costs and international adaptation finance flows in developing countries. Domestic and private finance flows are excluded. Source: UNEP adaptation gap report (2025).

With current levels of international adaptation finance estimated at $26bn a year, the report calculates that developing countries are facing an “adaptation finance gap” in the range of $284-339bn per year by 2035.

As such, it calculates that the adaptation finance needs of developing countries by 2035 are “12-14 times” as much as current finance flows.

Of the public adaptation finance that has been issued, a higher proportion currently goes to the countries most exposed to climate hazards, according to the report. It notes that, in 2022-23, $10.4bn and $1.2bn was allocated to least-developed countries (LDCs), including Afghanistan and Rwanda, and small island developing states (SIDS), such as Tuvalua and the Marshall Islands, respectively.

Nevertheless, finance provided to these climate-vulnerable nations is still “modest relative to needs”, the report warns. It estimates that the adaptation finance needs of LDCs and SIDS are $50bn a year.

It also finds that per-capita adaptation finance to both country groups was lower in 2022-23 than previous years, at $9 for LDCs and $20 in SIDs.

A majority of countries have a national adaptation plan or strategy in place

Under the framework for the global goal on adaptation agreed at COP28, countries said they would put in place “national adaptation plans, policy instruments and planning processes and/or strategies” by 2030.

To assess the “global status” of national adaptation planning, the authors of the report tracked the publication of national plans, strategies and policies for adaptation in each country.

According to the report, the first national adaptation policy was published in 2002. It finds that there was a “notable acceleration” in countries developing national adaptation planning instruments over 2011-21, but says that, since then, progress has “slowed significantly”.

According to the report, 87% of countries had at least one national adaptation policy, strategy or plan in place as of 31 August 2025. However, 36 of these 172 countries’ plans are “expired” or “outdated”.

Meanwhile, 25 countries had no national adaptation plan at all, according to the report. It explains that these are “predominantly developing countries, suggesting that financial, technical and human resource constraints inhibit national adaptation planning”.

Of these countries without plans, 21 have “initiated a process to develop” a national adaptation plan, according to the report. However, it notes that many of these countries have “been in this process for a long time”.

The chart below shows the percentage of countries from different “country classifications” that have no national adaptation planning instrument in place (red), an expired adaptation planning instrument in place (yellow) and a valid instrument in place (green).

Chart showing status of national adaptation planning instruments across different country classification commonly used under the UNFCCC
Percentage of countries from different “country classifications” that have no national adaptation planning instrument in place (red), an expired instrument in place (yellow) and a valid instrument in place (green). Source: UNEP adaptation gap report (2025).

The report also discusses different types of adaptation “mainstreaming”. This is defined by the report authors as the “integration of adaptation objectives and climate risk considerations into the established functions, policy and practice of government institutions to build climate resilience”.

The authors list six different mainstreaming strategies. For example, “directed” mainstreaming means “dedicating funding, staff capacity-building and resources specifically to adaptation, including through financial frameworks and fiscal processes such as budget planning”.

Another example is “regulatory mainstreaming”, which means “modifying the formal or informal policy instruments such as legislation, frameworks, strategies and plans by integrating adaptation”.

According to the report, only regulatory mainstreaming is captured by the framework for the global goal on adaptation’s target related to planning.

The report also outlines the different “levels” of mainstreaming. These range from “prioritisation”, which it describes as a strong level of mainstreaming in which adaptation takes precedence over existing policy goals, to “coordination”, in which adaptation “is recognised as a policy goal, but is secondary to existing priorities”.

However, the report says there is “presently no agreement on how to measure and assess the outcomes of mainstreaming”.

Implementation of adaptation measures is progressing – but gaps remain

Under the UN “enhanced transparency framework”, countries are required to submit information about their climate progress in biennial transparency reports (BTR). The first report was due at the end of 2024.

The adaptation gap report calls BTRs the “most comprehensive national source of information on adaptation implementation worldwide available”.

The report says that 105 countries had submitted BRTs as of 31 August 2025, of which 94 include details about adaptation

The authors find that 75 of these BTRs mention gender in relation to adaptation. However, only 4% of the results reported through BTRs are directly related to “gender and social inclusion”.

The report also highlights the “uneven coverage” of BTRs globally. According to the report, 88% of developed countries have submitted a BTR, compared to only 37% of developing countries.

It adds that there are further inequalities within the bracket of “developing countries”. Only 21% of SIDS and 14% of LDCs have submitted BTRs with “detailed information on climate impacts and adaptation”, according to the report.

This could “indicate that preparing national reports such as BTRs is most burdensome for the countries with the least capacity”, the report authors suggest.

The map below shows the countries that have submitted a BTR including “detailed information on climate impacts and adaptation” (blue) and those that have not (grey). For the former category, darker blue indicates that the country’s BTR includes more segments of text (data points) about climate impacts and adaptation.

Global map showing the global distribution of countries that have submitted a BTR with detailed information on climate impacts and adaptation, and the number of data points per country
Countries that have submitted a biennial transparency report (BTR) including “detailed information on climate impacts and adaptation” (blue) and those that have not (grey). Source: UNEP adaptation gap report (2025).

The report finds that countries are “disproportionately reporting on climate hazards, systems at risk, climate change impacts and adaptation priorities” in BTRs. Meanwhile, only 15% and 7% of the data points in the map above discuss adaptation “actions” and “results” respectively.

In total, the report identifies 1,640 “adaptation actions” across 68 BTRs. It says that 23% of these are related to “biodiversity and ecosystems”, 18% to “infrastructure and human settlements”, 16% to “water and sanitation” and 14% to “food and agriculture”.

However, it finds that actions targeting health and poverty alleviation or livelihoods are each accounting for only 5%, while those addressing cultural heritage are “nearly absent” and account for less than 1% of all reported actions.

In a separate analysis, the report explores documents submitted by developing countries to the UNFCCC to understand how adaptation needs break down by sector. It finds that the 55 plans submitted by developing countries which include “detailed sectoral information” reveal that the agriculture and food sector and water supply are “common priorities across all regions, though they vary in terms of their relative importance”.

The NCQG is insufficient on its own to meet adaptation finance needs

At COP29 last year, developed nations pledged to raise at least $300bn per year under the NCQG for both mitigation and adaptation.

The report says that, although the target “appears significantly higher than the previous goal for developed countries to mobilise $100bn by 2020 for developing countries”, it is still “clearly insufficient” to meet adaptation finance needs in 2035.

The report sets out two reasons for this.

First, the authors explain that the $300bn target is not adjusted for inflation. It says that adaptation costs for developing countries are currently estimated at $310-365bn annually until 2035, based on costs in 2023. However, when adjusting for an inflation rate of 3% per year for the next decade, this number rises to US$440–520bn by 2035.

(In an analysis published last year, Carbon Brief noted that the $300bn target does not account for inflation.)

The plot below shows the effect of inflation on adaptation finance needs (dark blue) and modelled costs (light blue). It also shows the NCQG goal, accounting for inflation, based on 2023 costs (red) and without inflation based on 2035 costs (pink). It also shows the NCQG goal of $300bn by 2035 (yellow).

Chart showing the illustration of the effect of future inflation (illustrated with 3 per cent fixed) on the AGR estimates (in blue) and the US$300 billion NCQG goal (in red)
Effect of inflation on adaptation finance needs and goals. Source: UNEP adaptation gap report (2025).

Second, it notes that the NCQG covers both mitigation – namely, efforts to cut emissions – and adaptation. So far, it warns that no “subgoal” has been agreed to determine how much money goes to each.

The report authors have also developed two scenarios exploring how much the NCQG would bridge the adaptation finance gap, if the $300bn target is met, both of which account for inflation. These are:

  • A “minimum adaptation scenario”. The authors assume that 26% of the NCQG money will be used for adaptation finance as this is the percentage of all international climate finance that was spent on adaptation over 2011-20. Based on historical proportioning of finance, $3bn of the resulting $78bn this would go to SIDS and the rest to $25bn to LDCs.
  • A “maximum adaptation scenario”. Under this scenario, the Glasgow Pact and Baku to Belém Roadmap are achieved, meaning that adaptation funding reaches $40bn annually by 2025 and $120bn annually by 2030. They also assume that adaptation finance grows by 7% per year, reaching $166bn by 2035 – more than half of the NCGQ finance goal of $300bn. Under this scenario, SIDS would receive $6bn in adaptation funding by 2035 and LDCs would receive $55bn.

The report concludes that, even if the NCQG is achieved, a “significant adaptation finance gap” is likely to remain in 2035 “regardless of the share of international public climate finance that will flow towards adaptation”.

Meanwhile, the report notes that private-sector finance can help “fill the adaptation finance gap” – but cautions that its overall contribution is likely to be “modest”.

The “realistic” potential for private-sector investment, according to the report, is $50bn per year by 2035 – a figure it estimates would cover 15-20% of overall estimated needs.

Reaching this level of private-sector finance will require “targeted policy action” given that current private-sector flows to “publicly identified” adaptation priorities in 2023 are estimated at $5bn, it notes.

Furthermore, UNEP warns that many proposed approaches for raising private-sector funds for adaptation measures pass “most of the costs of adaptation back to developing countries or households”.

The post UN report: Five charts which explain the ‘gap’ in finance for climate adaptation  appeared first on Carbon Brief.

UN report: Five charts which explain the ‘gap’ in finance for climate adaptation 

Continue Reading

Climate Change

Explainer: Will AI data centres make or break the energy transition?

Published

on

For tech entrepreneur Elon Musk, the answer to the rocketing energy needs of artificial intelligence (AI) data centres is to launch them into space, where they could tap limitless energy from the sun. But until that happens, the places on Earth where these number-crunching mega-hubs are located face big spikes in electricity demand to run them.

In the US, this has sparked fears of higher energy prices for consumers. To allay those concerns, President Donald Trump will reportedly convene big tech firms this week to sign a pledge to provide or pay for the extra energy supplies they will need as their AI data centres expand.

According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), data centres accounted for 1.5% of electricity demand worldwide in 2024 – a share set to rise to about 3% by 2030. Overall, data centre demand is expected to more than double to about 945 terawatt-hours (TWh) by then, which is slightly above the electricity consumption of Japan today.

AI data centres, where AI models are trained and deployed, put far more strain on power supplies than traditional data centres, which each use between 10 and 25 megawatts (MW). In comparison, demand from a “hyperscale” AI centre can exceed 100 MW at any given time, which if running at full capacity could consume as much electricity in a year as 100,000 households.

Data-centre electricity consumption in household electricity consumption equivalents (million households), 2024

(Source: IEA, Paris, 2025, Licence: CC by 4.0)

(Source: IEA, Paris, 2025, Licence: CC by 4.0)

We look at where this power might come from and whether, as some warn, AI is going to blow the world’s efforts to transition away from fossil fuels out of the water.

Why does AI need so much electricity?

AI data centres differ in how they use electric power. In a conventional data centre, data requests from businesses, individuals and other users come in a randomised way, translating into a steady load level on the servers, with relatively little fluctuation in demand.

But in an AI data centre, processors need to go through training or learning periods, using so-called “graphical processing units”. These are synchronised, being started up and switched off at the same time. This translates into “power bursts”, which last just a few seconds, but happen very frequently and concurrently, according to Gerhard Salge, chief technology officer at Hitachi Energy.

“That is a different challenge than just providing the power and the energy for the conventional data centres,” he told journalists at the International Renewable Energy Agency assembly in Abu Dhabi earlier this year.

Here, officials and business executives discussed how to meet those demand peaks, noting they cannot be dealt with just by installing huge batteries as those would wear out quickly.

Martin Pibworth, chief executive of SSE, a Scotland-based energy firm, said AI-led demand will put pressure on the power system, but “the problem we all have is no one really knows the pace and trajectory of that demand lift”. In the UK, the government’s Clean Power Plan will be needed to make sure electricity operators can meet demand from AI and other data centres as more come online, he added.

    In the US, meanwhile, the Trump administration is eager to ensure that communities that are home to data centres, as well as the wider public, do not turn against the industry due to its perceived unfairly high use of energy and water.

    Ahead of a meeting scheduled on March 4, where US tech titans are due to sign a pledge on powering their own data centres, White House spokesperson Taylor Rogers told CNBC: “Under this bold initiative, these massive companies will build, bring, or buy their own power supply for new AI data centres, ensuring that Americans’ electricity bills will not increase as demand grows.”

    Will electricity for data centres and AI come from clean or dirty sources of energy?

    The answer to this question is key to how countries tackle climate change, as it will affect their energy mix, how electricity is produced and distributed, and therefore the trajectory of their greenhouse gas emissions. Decisions made by governments and businesses will shape how the AI industry powers the technology on which it relies.

    Under pro-fossil fuel Trump, the US has walked away from policy support for clean energy, meaning data centre operators can choose their energy sources freely. In January, data from Global Energy Monitor (GEM) showed the US now has the most gas-fired power capacity in development, surpassing China and accounting for nearly a quarter of the world’s total.

    More than one-third of this capacity is set to directly power data centres on-site, in hotspots like Texas, and many more grid-connected gas-fired projects are planned to meet an expected increase in energy demand from AI, GEM said.

    On the other hand, some tech companies – especially multinationals – have set goals to cut their emissions to net zero, and so are choosing to power their data centres with renewables, including in the US.

    For example, French energy giant TotalEnergies recently signed two long-term Power Purchase Agreements (PPA) to deliver 1 gigawatt (GW) of solar capacity for Google’s data centres in Texas. This followed two other PPAs with Google for 1.2 GW secured by Clearway, a California-based renewables company 50%-owned by TotalEnergies.

    Sources of global electricity generation for data centres – base case, 2020-2035

    (Source: IEA, Paris, Licence: CC by 4.0)

    (Source: IEA, Paris, Licence: CC by 4.0)

    Some countries are also moving to ensure the power needed for AI and the data centre industry is produced using clean energy.

    In Ireland, an effective ban on new data centre connections was lifted in December, provided at least 80% of the centres’ annual energy demand is met by new renewable electricity sources. The government also plans to build Green Energy Parks, where data centres can be located alongside renewables plants to avoid straining the national grid.

    Salge of Hitachi Energy said that with big investors wanting to drive investment in AI data-crunching so fast, “there is no other power generation technology than variable renewables which you can build in such a timeline” of two to three years. “Anything else will be in the 2030s and later,” he added.

    Some governments – such as Sweden’s centre-right coalition have proposed nuclear as a clean energy solution for AI data centres, saying they could fuel a “renaissance”. But building nuclear power plants requires massive investment and long timelines, while new small-scale modular reactors are not yet commercially available.

    How are power systems and regulators coping so far?

    In a February report forecasting electricity demand out to 2030, the IEA said AI and data centres are contributing to generation growth in advanced economies, which is now accelerating again after 15 years of stagnation. However, it flagged bottlenecks in connecting new data centres, because grids are not being built or improved fast enough to keep up with rising power demand, forcing big customers to wait.

    The report noted that at least 150 GW of queued data centre projects are estimated to be in the advanced stages, while one-fifth of the global data centre build-out is at risk of delay due to grid congestion.

    Comment: Using energy-hungry AI to detect climate tipping points is a paradox

    Planning, permitting and completing new grid infrastructure can take five to 15 years, whereas data centres need one to three years. Prices for key grid components have also nearly doubled over the past five years, the IEA noted.

    The European Commission, meanwhile, aims to support those operators that can save on energy use. It plans to adopt a “Data Centre Energy Efficiency Package” in April that will contain an assessment of data submitted under a reporting scheme, introduce a rating scheme for data centres in the EU, and start work on minimum performance standards.

    Can AI help to resolve the issue?

    Experts say it’s important to look at both sides of the coin, pointing to ways in which AI can contribute to more effective power grid management and integration of renewables into national power supplies.

    According to new analysis by energy think-tank Ember, AI applications such as short-term renewables forecasting, predictive maintenance, and real-time monitoring and adjustment of transmission line capacity can deliver operational improvements in power systems.

    It estimates that AI could enable Southeast Asian nations, for example, to reduce their power sector costs by $45 billion-$67 billion through to 2035, depending on how much renewable energy they deploy. Potential AI-driven efficiency gains could cut emissions by 290 million to 386 million tonnes of CO2 over the next decade in ASEAN countries, it adds.

    “While power-hungry AI might initially stress the power systems, with various powerful applications it has the potential to significantly accelerate the energy transition and offset consumed energy rapidly,” Ember data analyst Lam Pham said in a statement.

    The post Explainer: Will AI data centres make or break the energy transition? appeared first on Climate Home News.

    Explainer: Will AI data centres make or break the energy transition?

    Continue Reading

    Climate Change

    New Investigation Reveals Forced Labour Tied to Tuna Sold in Australia

    Published

    on

    A new investigative report released by Greenpeace Southeast Asia, in collaboration with the Uniting Church in Australia, Synod of Victoria and Tasmania, has uncovered disturbing links between suspected forced labour in the Indonesian tuna fishing industry and seafood sold in Australia.

    The investigation analysed testimonies from 25 fishers working on 17 Indonesian tuna fishing vessels that supply the Australian market. These vessels supply five Indonesian processing companies, which in turn export to 18 Australian seafood companies, including major brands seen on our supermarket shelves.

    The findings raise urgent questions about human rights protections at sea and the integrity of seafood supply chains reaching Australian supermarket shelves.

    The crew of an Asian-flagged tuna longliner at work during a transshipment to a carrier mothership. © Greenpeace

    What the Investigation Found

    Fishers interviewed described experiencing multiple internationally recognised indicators of forced labour.

    Of the 11 forced labour indicators identified by the International Labour Organisation, the most frequently reported were:

    • Abuse of vulnerability (56%)
    • Debt bondage (56%)
    • Deception (40%)

    The report reveals a multi-layered recruitment network in Indonesia that channels vulnerable workers from rural areas into exploitative situations. Labour brokers, known locally as calo, collaborate with vessel administrators and manage recruitment. Fishers reported being lured with promises of high salaries and advance loans, only to be charged illegal and inflated fees for travel, training and documentation.

    Diver Joel Gonzaga of the the Philippine purse seiner ‘Vergene’ at work in the international waters of high seas. © Alex Hofford / Greenpeace

    The investigation also found that labour exploitation at sea is intertwined with environmental crime. Companies allegedly pushed vessels and fishers to engage in illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing practices, including shark finning and the deployment of illegal fish aggregating devices.

    75 kilograms of shark fins from at least 42 sharks found in the freezer of the Shuen De Ching No.888. Under Taiwanese law and Pacific fishing rules, shark fins may not exceed 5% of the weight of the shark catch, and with only three shark carcasses reported in the log book, the vessel was in clear violation of both. © Paul Hilton / Greenpeace

    The link between labour abuse and environmental destruction is not accidental. It reflects an extractive system that externalises both human and ecological costs to sustain profit margins.

    Industrial fishing not only exploits vulnerable workers and undermines human rights, it also strips life from our oceans, degrading fragile ecosystems and pushing marine wildlife toward collapse.

    What Needs to Happen Now

    The report calls for urgent action from both governments and industry.

    The Indonesian Government must:

    • Enforce decent and effective work at sea policies aligned with international standards.
    • Ensure ethical recruitment practices.
    • Guarantee fair wages and protections for Indonesian fishers.

    The Australian Government must:

    • Prohibit seafood products linked to labour exploitation and forced labour from entering Australian markets.

    Seafood companies in both countries must:

    • Conduct robust human rights and environmental due diligence across their supply chains.

    These are not abstract policy fixes. They are necessary steps to prevent modern slavery at sea and to stop environmental crime from being embedded in global seafood trade.

    Environmental Justice and Ocean Protection Go Hand in Hand

    This investigation highlights something fundamental. Human rights and ocean protection are inseparable.

    Environmental justice means the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of everyone in creating a healthy environment. When workers are exploited and forced into dangerous conditions, environmental laws are often ignored too. Abuse at sea and ocean destruction are two sides of the same industrial system.

    Destructive industrial fishing methods such as longlining and bottom trawling continue to pillage and industrialise the ocean. They kill wildlife, destroy fragile habitats and undermine the resilience of marine ecosystems.

    If we want a thriving ocean, we must protect both the people who work on them and the ecosystems themselves.

    Why This Matters for Australia and the Global Ocean Treaty

    The Australian Government is on the cusp of ratifying the Global Ocean Treaty, the legal instrument allowing governments to create high seas ocean sanctuaries free from industrial fishing. Once Australia has ratified, it has the critical tool it needs to protect the ocean and safeguard beautiful and endangered species like whales, dolphins and sharks from destructive fishing methods in the high seas.

    A silky shark and other marine life. © Paul Hilton / Greenpeace

    Vast, robust ocean sanctuaries are a crucial solution to the ocean crisis. These high seas sanctuaries will provide a blue haven where wildlife can rest, recover and thrive. Greenpeace Australia Pacific is calling on the Australian government to champion multiple high sea ocean sanctuaries in our region, starting with a first generation ocean sanctuary in the South Tasman Sea between Australia and Aotearoa, free from industrial fishing, whaling and the threat of deep sea mining.

    As this investigation shows, the stakes are not only environmental, they are deeply human.

    Australia has an opportunity to lead by cleaning up seafood supply chains at home and by championing ambitious ocean protection globally by creating fully protected ocean sanctuaries. Protecting workers’ rights and protecting ocean wildlife must happen together.

    https://www.greenpeace.org.au/article/new-investigation-reveals-forced-labour-tied-to-tuna-sold-in-australia/

    Continue Reading

    Climate Change

    FORCED TO THE BOTTOM:SQUEEZING INDONESIAN FISHERSAND OCEANS FOR DIRTY TUNA PROFITS

    Published

    on

    Our colleagues at Greenpeace Southeast Asia, in collaboration with the Uniting Church in Australia, Synod of Victoria and Tasmania, launched a new investigative report, “Forced to the Bottom: Squeezing Indonesian Fishers and Oceans for Tuna Dirty Profits.” The report draws on testimonies from 25 fishers working on 17 Indonesian tuna vessels supplying the Australian market, documenting indicators of forced labour including abuse of vulnerability (56%), debt bondage (56%) and deception (40%). It also traces supply chain links to tuna sold here in Australian supermarkets. 

    Crucially, the investigation highlights that labour exploitation at sea is intertwined with illegal and destructive fishing practices, underscoring that human rights abuses and environmental degradation are part of the same extractive system. Industrial fishing not only undermines workers’ rights, it drives biodiversity loss and ecosystem damage. Vast, robust ocean sanctuaries are a crucial solution to the ocean crisis. These high seas sanctuaries will provide a blue haven where wildlife can rest, recover and thrive free from the hooks of industrial fishing. If Australia is serious about ocean leadership, it must ensure seafood linked to forced labour does not enter our markets and require robust human rights and environmental due diligence across supply chains. Protecting workers and protecting the ocean go hand in hand.

    REPORT: Forced To The Bottom – Squeezing Indonesian Fishers and Oceans For Dirty Tuna Profits

    Continue Reading

    Trending

    Copyright © 2022 BreakingClimateChange.com