The “wealthiest 10%” of people on the planet are “responsible” for 65% of the 0.61C increase in global average temperatures over 1990-2020, according to new research.
The study, published in Nature Climate Change, uses a field of climate science called “attribution” to determine the contribution of the world’s “wealthiest population groups” to climate change through the greenhouse gases they emit.
The authors also calculate the contribution of these high-income groups to the increasing frequency of heatwaves and droughts.
For example, the study finds the wealthiest 10% of people – defined as those who earn at least €42,980 (£36,605) per year – contributed seven times more to the rise in monthly heat extremes around the world than the global average.
In another finding, the Amazon rainforest faced a threefold increase in the likelihood of droughts over the period studied, most of which was driven by the wealthiest 10% of the world’s population.
The authors also explore country-level emissions, finding that from the wealthiest 10% in the US produced the emissions that caused a doubling in heat extremes across “vulnerable regions” globally.
One scientist not involved in the study tells Carbon Brief that efforts to attribute global warming to individual income groups is an “important step towards targeted policies” and could support climate litigation.
Emissions inequality
Humans emit more than 40bn tonnes of CO2 into the atmosphere every year. Developed countries are responsible for the majority of global emissions, as a result of the typically more carbon-intensive lifestyles of their residents.
Meanwhile, the most severe impacts of climate change are disproportionately felt by the poorest and most vulnerable people.
The new study uses an income and wealth inequality dataset from the World Inequality Database to track inequality over 1990-2019, showing how much the world’s wealthiest 10%, 1% and 0.1% of society have contributed to warming over 1990-2020. (For details on the method, see the modelling inequalities section below.)
The world’s wealthiest 10% all earn more than €42,980 (£36,605) per year, according to the database. Meanwhile, the world’s wealthiest 0.1% earn more than €537,770 (£458,011) per year.
Of the 0.61C increase in global average temperatures over 1990-2020, the authors estimate that 65% was due to the emissions of the wealthiest 10% of people on the planet. For the wealthiest 0.1%, the estimate is 8%.
The graph below shows how much global temperatures would have risen over 1990-2020 if everyone in the world emitted as much as the world’s poorest 50% (purple), middle 40% (green), richest 10% (orange), richest 1% (blue) and richest 0.1% (pink) people. The grey bar shows how much global temperatures actually rose.
How global temperatures would have risen if everyone in the world emitted the world produced the same amount of emissions, on average, as individuals in the bottom 50% (purple), middle 40% (green), top 10% (orange), top 1% (blue) and top 0.1% (pink) of the world’s emitters. Source: Schöngart et al (2025).
The authors find that if the whole world had emitted as much as the wealthiest 10% of people over 1990-2020, global average temperatures would have risen by 2.9C, instead of 0.61C. If the global population had emissions as large as the wealthiest 0.1%, temperatures would have risen by 12.2C.
Meanwhile, the study calculates that if the whole world had emissions as low as the poorest 50%, global temperatures would have remained close to 1990 levels.
Hot and dry extremes
As greenhouse gas emissions cause the climate to warm, extreme weather events such as heatwaves and droughts are becoming more intense, frequent and long-lasting.
The authors use attribution – a field of climate science that aims to identify the “fingerprint” of global warming on these events – to determine the contribution of the emissions of the world’s wealthiest people to the increasing frequency of heatwaves and droughts.
The authors assess “extremely hot” and “extremely dry” months, defined as the most extreme 1% of months in a pre-industrial climate during the hottest month of the year regionally. (In a pre-industrial climate, only one of each extreme would be expected every 100 years on average.)
The graphs below show the number of additional heatwaves (left) and droughts (right) that have occurred since 1990 due to climate change in different regions of the world.
The full bar shows the total number of additional heatwaves due to human-cased climate change in each region. The green bar shows additional occurrences due to the wealthiest 1%. The green and orange bars combined show the wealthiest 10%.
The numbers in green and orange show how much the wealthiest 1% and 10% of the planet contributed to the extreme, compared to the global average. (For example, an orange number of 7.0 means that the wealthiest 10% of people contributed seven times more to the extreme event than the global average.)
The study finds that an average of 11.5 additional heat events observed in August – the month where the rise in heat extremes is, on average, most pronounced – are attributable to the wealthiest 10%.
It also calculates that emissions from this group resulted in, on average, an additional 2.3 droughts in the Amazon in October – the month with the strongest attributable drying trend in the region.
Highest emitters
The authors also assess the contributions of the wealthiest people to climate extremes on a country level, identifying the US, the EU, China and India as the world’s four highest emitting regions.
The graphic below shows the increase in frequency of one-in-100 year peak summer heat extremes in selected regions attributable to the wealthiest 10% of people (left) and 1% of people (right) in China (red), the US (pink), the EU (peach) and India (blue).
Emissions from the wealthiest 10% in the US resulted in an average of 1.3 extra heat events globally, the authors find. However, this increase is distributed unevenly across the globe.
For example, the authors find this income group was responsible for the emissions that contributed to 2.7 additional heat events in “heat-affected areas” such as the Amazon and south-east Africa.
Emissions from the wealthiest 10% of people in the EU resulted in an additional 1.5 heatwaves in both the Amazon and south-east Africa.
Meanwhile, the Amazon faces 2.1 more heat extremes in 2020 than in 1990 due to the emissions of the richest 1% in the US, China, EU and India.
While inequalities between one country or region and another are well documented, it should also be noted that “inequalities within developing countries are increasing”, Dr Carl Schleussner, study author and leader of the integrated climate impacts research group at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), tells Carbon Brief.
For example, he notes that the paper shows “very high levels” of emissions from “the Chinese middle and upper classes”.
However, he says that many existing global frameworks to address climate change “treat countries as a whole” and fail to “differentiate” between income groups within countries.
Schleussner argues that the study highlights the need for “progressive policies” for climate action, which involve “tackling particularly high emitters” in all countries.
Dr Sarah Schöngart, a researcher at ETH Zurich and lead author of the study, tells Carbon Brief that studies such as this could provide important evidence in loss and damage litigation.
Prof Jakob Zscheischler, an Earth system scientist at the Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research who was not involved in the study, also highlights the ways the findings could be used in climate-change lawsuits. He tells Carbon Brief:
“Quantifying the contribution of individual income groups to global warming and changes in climate extremes is an important step towards targeted policies and further supports climate litigation. Supporting climate injustice with concrete numbers will hopefully help the most vulnerable and least responsible strengthen their case.”
Modelling inequalities
The study uses a range of methods to attribute changes in heat and drought to the emissions of particular wealth groups. To model global greenhouse gas emissions by wealth group, the paper uses a “wealth-based carbon inequality assessment” from a 2022 study.
(See Carbon Brief’s coverage of the 2022 study.)
The study uses income and wealth inequality dataset from the World Inequality Database to track inequality over 1990-2019. It combines economic data with information on per-capita carbon footprints – calculated using “input-output” methodologies combined with data from the “distributional national accounts” project.”
The model considers three factors. The first is private consumption – made up of emissions from the direct use of fossil fuels and emissions embedded into goods and services. The second includes emissions from government spending in that person’s country – such as government administration, public roads or defence. The final component of a person’s carbon footprint is from their investments.
The authors then created a series of “counterfactual” emissions pathways, which imagine the world without the emissions of the wealthiest 10%, 1% and 0.1% of society, respectively. The emissions pathways include CO2, methane and nitrous oxide emissions, expressed as CO2-equivalent.
Lead author Schöngart tells Carbon Brief that including methane in the models is important, because it has “really high potency and near-term warming”. However, she notes that the team needed to make some assumptions about methane emissions – for example, assuming that each income group emits the same relative amount of methane compared to other greenhouse gas emissions.
Using a “simple” climate model called MAGICC, the authors model global average temperatures under these counterfactual emissions pathways. This allows them to calculate how much the planet would have warmed over 1990-2020 without the emissions of the 10%, 1% and 0.1% of society, respectively.
The authors use the global average temperature trends to produce temperature and rainfall data for every land-based grid square on Earth via a climate model emulator called MESMER.
Schöngart tells Carbon Brief that an emulator is “an approximation of an Earth system model” which “allows us to generate incredible amounts of data”, while using less computing power and taking less time to run.
The study authors then use attribution methods to identify how the emissions from the world’s wealthiest members of society have affected the frequency of heatwaves and droughts, by comparing the world as it is to a “counterfactual” world without human-caused climate change.
The graphic below shows these steps.
Earth system scientist Zscheischler praises the methods in the study. He tells Carbon Brief that “the main innovation of work lies in its novel combination of relatively simple emulators that capture the most important relationships between emissions and global warming and changes in extremes”.
He adds that emulators have been evaluated in other studies and are “trustworthy for this type of delicate analysis”.
Prof Wim Thiery – an associate professor at Vrije Universiteit Brussel, who was not involved in the study – also commends the use of emulators. He tells Carbon Brief that “producing the information presented in this study with a suite of full-blown Earth system models is impossible from a computational cost and human effort perspective”.
The post Two-thirds of global warming since 1990 caused by world’s ‘wealthiest 10%’ appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Two-thirds of global warming since 1990 caused by world’s ‘wealthiest 10%’
Weather extremes fuel wildfires that have burned through tens of thousands of acres across Georgia, Florida and other states.
Drought and fire are a dangerous duo. The Southeastern United States is witnessing this firsthand as several major blazes burn tens of thousands of acres across the parched region, destroying homes and prompting evacuations in some areas. Florida and Georgia have been particularly hard hit, and strong winds and unusually low humidity have made it difficult to combat the flames.
Drought Turns Southeastern US Into ‘Tinderbox’ as Wildfires Rage
Climate Change
Night Skies and Shifting Stars: How Indigenous Celestial Knowledge Tracks a Changing Climate
When the land no longer answers the stars the way it once did, Indigenous peoples are among the first to notice — and the first to ask why.
A Sky Full of Knowledge
Look up on a clear night on Turtle Island and you’re seeing a sky that has guided human life for thousands of years. Across Indigenous nations in Canada, detailed systems of celestial knowledge developed not as abstract science but as living, practical guides —telling people when to plant, when to harvest, when herds would move, and when ice would come. This astronomical knowledge was woven into language, ceremony, and everyday life, passed down through generations with remarkable precision.
The Mi’kmaq and the Celestial Bear
Among the Mi’kmaq of Atlantic Canada, star stories are ecological calendars, precise and functional. The story of Muin and the Seven Bird Hunters connects the annual movement of what Western astronomy calls Ursa Major to the seasonal cycle of hunting and harvest: the bear rises in spring, is hunted through summer, and falls to earth in autumn. This knowledge was brought to broader public attention in 2009 during the International Year of Astronomy, when Mi’kmaq Elders Lillian Marshall of Potlotek First Nation and Murdena Marshall of Eskasoni First Nation shared the story through an animated film produced at Cape Breton University narrated in English, French, and Mi’kmaq.¹ The story encodes specific observations about when and where to hunt, and which species to expect at which time of year. It is science in narrative form.
The Anishinaabe and the Seasonal Star Map
Among the Anishinaabe peoples of the Great Lakes and northern Ontario, celestial knowledge forms part of a comprehensive seasonal understanding. Knowledge keepers like Michael Wassegijig Price of Wikwemikong First Nation have described how Anishinaabe constellations quite different from those of Western astronomy connect the movement of the heavens to naming ceremonies, seasonal gatherings, and land practices.² The Royal Astronomical Society of Canada now offers planispheres featuring Indigenous constellations from Cree, Ojibwe, and Dakota sky traditions, recognizing their value as both cultural heritage and ecological knowledge systems.³
When the Stars and the Land Fall Out of Rhythm
Here’s the challenge that climate change has introduced: the stars still move on their ancient, reliable schedule. But the land no longer always responds as expected. Migratory birds that once arrived when certain constellations appeared are now showing up earlier or later. Ice that once formed in predictable windows is forming weeks late, or not at all. Berry harvests, fish runs, animal migrations, all once timed by celestial cues accumulated over millennia are shifting. Indigenous knowledge holders across Canada describe this as a kind of dissonance: the sky remains faithful, but the land has changed.⁴
Long-Baseline Ecological Records
Far from being historical curiosity, Indigenous celestial knowledge systems are now being recognized by researchers as long-baseline ecological calendars —records of how nature behaved over centuries, encoded in story and ceremony. When an Elder observes that a particular star rising no longer predicts the arrival of certain geese, that observation represents a departure from a pattern that may have held true for hundreds of years. The Climate Atlas of Canada integrates Indigenous knowledge observations alongside western climate data, recognizing that both contribute meaningfully to understanding ecological change.⁵
Keeping the Knowledge Alive
Language revitalization and land-based education programs are helping ensure this knowledge reaches the future. From youth astronomy nights on-reserve to the integration of Indigenous sky stories in school curricula, there is growing recognition that these knowledge systems belong to what comes next, not only what came before. As Canada grapples with accelerating ecological change, the quiet precision of thousands of years of skyward observation offers something no satellite can fully replicate: a continuous record of the relationship between the cosmos and a living land.
Blog by Rye Karonhiowanen Barberstock
Image Credit: Dustin Bowdige, Unsplash
References
[1] Marshall, L., Marshall, M., Harris, P., & Bartlett, C. (2010). Muin and the Seven Bird Hunters: A Mi’kmaw Night Sky Story. Cape Breton University Press. See also: Integrative Science, CBU. (2009). Background on the Making of the Muin Video for IYA2009. http://www.integrativescience.ca/uploads/activities/BACKGROUND-making-video-Muin-Seven-Bird-Hunters-IYA-binder.pdf
[2] Price, M.W. (Various). Anishinaabe celestial knowledge. Wikwemikong First Nation. Referenced in: Royal Astronomical Society of Canada Indigenous Astronomy resources.
[3] Royal Astronomical Society of Canada. (2020). Indigenous Skies planisphere series. RASC. https://www.rasc.ca/indigenous-skies
[4] Neilson, H. (2022, December 11). The night sky over Mi’kmaki: A Q&A with astronomer Hilding Neilson. CBC News. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/newfoundland-labrador/hilding-neilson-indigenizing-astronomy-1.6679072
[5] Climate Atlas of Canada. (2024). Prairie Climate Centre, University of Winnipeg. https://climateatlas.ca/
The post Night Skies and Shifting Stars: How Indigenous Celestial Knowledge Tracks a Changing Climate appeared first on Indigenous Climate Hub.
https://indigenousclimatehub.ca/2026/04/night-skies-and-shifting-stars-how-indigenous-celestial-knowledge-tracks-a-changing-climate/
A much-discussed “return to coal” by some countries in the wake of the Iran war is likely to be far more limited than thought, amounting to a global rise of no more than 1.8% in coal power output this year.
The new analysis by thinktank Ember, shared exclusively with Carbon Brief, is a “worst-case” scenario and the reality could be even lower.
Separate data shows that, to date, there has been no “return to coal” in 2026.
While some countries, such as Japan, Pakistan and the Philippines, have responded to disrupted gas supplies with plans to increase their coal use, the new analysis shows that these actions will likely result in a “small rise” at most.
In fact, the decline of coal power in some countries and the potential for global electricity demand growth to slow down could mean coal generation continues falling this year.
Experts tell Carbon Brief that “the big story isn’t about a coal comeback” and any increase in coal use is “merely masking a longer-term structural decline”.
Instead, they say clean-energy projects are emerging as more appealing investments during the fossil-fuel driven energy crisis.
‘Return to coal’
The conflict following the US-Israeli attacks on Iran has disrupted global gas supplies, particularly after Iran blocked the strait of Hormuz, a key chokepoint in the Persian Gulf.
A fifth of the world’s liquified natural gas (LNG) is normally shipped through this region, mainly supplying Asian countries. The blockage in this supply route means there is now less gas available and the remaining supplies are more expensive.
(Note that while the strait usually carries a fifth of LNG trade, this amounts to a much smaller share of global gas supplies overall, with most gas being moved via pipelines.)
With gas supplies constrained and prices remaining well above pre-conflict levels, at least eight countries in Asia and Europe have announced plans to increase their coal-fired electricity generation, or to review or delay plans to phase out coal power.
These nations include Japan, South Korea, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, Germany and Italy. Many of these nations are major users of coal power.
Such announcements have triggered a wave of reporting by global media outlets and analysts about a “return to coal”. Some have lamented a trend that is “incompatible with climate imperatives”, while others have even framed this as a positive development that illustrates coal’s return “from the dead”.
This mirrors a trend seen after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which many commentators said would lead to a surge in European coal use, due to disrupted gas supplies from Russia.
In fact, despite a spike in 2022, EU coal use has returned to its “terminal decline” and reached a historic low in 2025.
Gas to coal
So far, the evidence suggests that there has been no return to coal in 2026.
Analysis by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air found that, in March, coal power generation remained flat globally and a fall in gas-fired generation was “offset by large increases in solar and wind power, rather than coal”.
However, as some governments only announced their coal plans towards the end of March, these figures may not capture their impact.
To get a sense of what that impact could be, Ember assessed the impact of coal policy changes and market responses across 16 countries, plus the 27 member states of the EU, which together accounted for 95% of total coal power generation in 2025.
For each country, the analysis considers a maximum “worst-case” scenario for switching from gas to coal power in the face of high gas prices.
It also considers the potential for any out-of-service coal power plants to return and for there to be delays in previously expected closures as a result of the response to the energy crisis.
Ember concludes that these factors could increase coal use by 175 terawatt hours (TWh), or 1.8%, in 2026 compared to 2025.
(This increase is measured relative to what would have happened without the energy crisis and does not account for wider trends in electricity generation from coal, which could see demand decline overall. Last year, coal power dropped by 63TWh, or 0.6%.)
Roughly three-quarters of the global effect in the Ember analysis is from potential gas-to-coal switching in China and the EU.
Other notable increases could come from switching in India and Indonesia and – to a lesser extent – from coal-policy shifts in South Korea, Bangladesh and Pakistan.
However, widely reported policy changes by Japan, Thailand and the Philippines are estimated to have very little, if any, impact on coal-power generation in 2026. The table below briefly summarises the potential for and reasoning behind the estimated increases in coal generation in each country in 2026.
Dave Jones, chief analyst at Ember, stresses that the 1.8% figure is an upper estimate, telling Carbon Brief:
“This would only happen if gas prices remained very high for the rest of the year and if there were sufficient coal stocks at power plants. The real risk of higher coal burn in 2026 comes not from coal units returning…but rather from pockets of gas-to-coal switching by existing power plants, primarily in China and the EU.”
Moreover, Jones says there is a real chance that global coal power could continue falling over the course of this year, partly driven by the energy crisis. He explains:
“If the energy crisis starts to dent electricity demand growth, coal generation – as well as gas generation – might actually be lower than before the crisis.”
‘Structural decline’
Energy experts tell Carbon Brief that Ember’s analysis aligns with their own assessments of the state of coal power.
Coal already had lower operation costs than gas before the energy crisis. This means that coal power plants were already being run at high levels in coal-dependent Asian economies that also use imported LNG to generate electricity. As such, they have limited potential to cut their need for LNG by further increasing coal generation.
Christine Shearer, who manages the global coal plant tracker at Global Energy Monitor, tells Carbon Brief that, in the EU, there is a shrinking pool of countries where gas-to-coal switching is possible:
“In Europe, coal fleets are smaller, older and increasingly uneconomic, while wind, solar and storage are becoming more competitive and widespread.”
In the context of the energy crisis, Italy has announced plans to delay its coal phaseout from 2025 to 2038. This plan, dismissed by the ECCO thinktank as “ineffective and costly”, would have minimal impact given coal only provides around 1% of the country’s power.
Notably, experts say that there is no evidence of the kind of structural “return to coal” that would spark concerns about countries’ climate goals. There have been no new coal plants announced in recent weeks.
Suzie Marshall, a policy advisor working on the “coal-to-clean transition” at E3G, tells Carbon Brief:
“We’re seeing possible delayed retirements and higher utilisation [of existing coal plants], as understandable emergency measures to keep the lights on, but not investment in new coal projects…Any short-term increase in coal consumption that we may see in response to this ongoing energy crisis is merely masking a longer-term structural decline.”
With cost-competitive solar, wind and batteries given a boost over fossil fuels by the energy crisis, there have been numerous announcements about new renewable energy projects since the start of war, including from India, Japan and Indonesia.
Shearer says that, rather than a “sustained coal comeback” in 2026, the Iran war “strengthens the case for renewables”. She says:
“If anything, a second gas shock in less than five years strengthens the case for renewables as the more secure long-term path.”
Jones says that Ember expects “little change in overall fossil generation, but with a small rise in coal and a fall in gas” in 2026. He adds:
“This would maximise gas-to-coal switching globally outside of the US, leaving no possibility for further switching in future years. Therefore, the big story isn’t about a coal comeback. It’s about how the relative economics of renewables, compared to fossil fuels, have been given a superboost by the crisis.”
The post World ‘will not see significant return to coal’ in 2026 – despite Iran crisis appeared first on Carbon Brief.
World ‘will not see significant return to coal’ in 2026 – despite Iran crisis
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