China is backing a Beijing-based startup called Orbital Chenguang with about 57.7 billion yuan ($8.4 billion) in credit lines to build space-based data centers, according to media reports. The funding comes from major state-linked banks and signals one of the largest known investments in orbital computing infrastructure.
The move highlights a growing global race to build computing systems in space. It also puts China in direct competition with companies like SpaceX, which is exploring space-based data infrastructure, too.
Orbital Chenguang Builds State-Backed Space Computing System
Orbital Chenguang is a startup in Beijing supported by the Beijing Astro-future Institute of Space Technology. This institute works with the city’s science and technology authorities.
The company has received credit line support from major Chinese financial institutions, including:
- Bank of China,
- Agricultural Bank of China,
- Bank of Communications,
- Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, and
- CITIC Bank.
These are credit lines, not fully deployed cash. But the scale shows strong institutional backing.
The project is part of a wider national strategy focused on commercial space, AI infrastructure, and advanced computing systems.
China’s state space contractor, CASC (China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation), has shared plans under its 15th Five-Year Plan. These include ideas for large-scale space computing systems, aiming for gigawatt power.
Space Data Center Plan Targets 2035 Gigawatt Capacity
According to Chinese media reports, Orbital Chenguang plans to build a constellation in a dawn-dusk sun-synchronous orbit at 700–800 km altitude. The long-term target is a gigawatt-scale space data center by 2035.
The development plan is divided into phases:
- 2025–2027: Launch early computing satellites and solve technical barriers.
- 2028–2030: Link space-based systems with Earth-based data centers.
- 2030–2035: Scale toward large orbital computing infrastructure.
The design relies on continuous solar energy and natural cooling in space. These features could reduce reliance on land-based power grids and cooling systems.
China has proposed two satellite constellations to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). These plans include a total of 96,714 satellites. This shows China’s long-term goals for space infrastructure and spectrum control.
The AI Energy Crunch Pushing Computing Into Orbit
The push into orbital data centers is closely linked to rising AI demand. Global data centers consumed about 415–460 terawatt-hours (TWh) of electricity in 2024, equal to roughly 1.5%–2% of global power use. This figure is rising quickly due to AI workloads.
Some industry projections show demand could exceed 1,000 TWh by 2026, nearly equal to Japan’s total electricity consumption.
AI systems require massive computing power, which increases energy use and cooling needs. In many regions, electricity supply—not hardware—is now the main constraint on AI expansion.
China’s strategy aims to address this by moving part of the computing load into space, where solar energy is more stable and continuous.
Carbon Impact: Earth vs Space Computing Trade-Off
Data centers already create a large carbon footprint. In 2024, they emitted about 182 million tonnes of CO₂, based on global electricity use of roughly 460 TWh and an average carbon intensity of 396 grams of CO₂ per kWh. This is according to the International Energy Agency report, as shown in the chart below.
Future projections show even faster growth. The sector could generate up to 2.5 billion tonnes of CO₂ emissions by 2030, driven by AI expansion. This is where orbital systems come in. They aim to reduce emissions during operation by using:
- Continuous solar energy,
- Passive cooling in vacuum conditions, and
- Reduced dependence on fossil-fuel grids.
However, space systems also introduce new emissions. Rocket launches used about 63,000 tonnes of propellant in 2022, producing CO₂ and atmospheric pollutants. Lifecycle studies suggest that over 70% of emissions from space systems typically come from manufacturing and launch activities.
In addition, hardware in orbit often has a lifespan of only 5–6 years, which increases replacement cycles and launch frequency. This creates a key trade-off:
- Lower operational emissions in space, and
- Higher lifecycle emissions from launches and manufacturing.
Research suggests that, in some scenarios, orbital computing could produce up to 10 times higher total carbon emissions than terrestrial systems when full lifecycle impacts are included.
China’s Expanding Space-Tech Ecosystem
Orbital Chenguang is not operating alone. Several Chinese companies are working on similar in-orbit computing systems, including ADA Space, Zhejiang Lab, Shanghai Bailing Aerospace, and Zhongke Tiansuan.
These firms are developing satellite-based computing and AI processing systems. This shows that orbital computing is not a single project. It is part of a broader national push across government, industry, and research institutions.
China’s space strategy combines commercial space growth with national technology planning. It aims to build integrated systems that connect satellites, cloud computing, and terrestrial networks.
The Space-AI Arms Race: China vs SpaceX vs Google
China is not alone in exploring space-based computing. Companies in the United States are also developing orbital data infrastructure concepts. These include early-stage research and private sector projects by firms such as SpaceX and Google.
SpaceX is building one of the largest satellite networks through its Starlink constellation, with thousands of satellites already in orbit. While its main goal is global internet coverage, the network also creates a foundation for future edge computing in space. The company’s reusable rockets, including Starship, are designed to lower launch costs, which is a key barrier to scaling orbital data infrastructure.
Google, through its cloud division, has been investing in space data and satellite analytics. It partners with Earth observation firms to process large volumes of data using cloud-based AI tools. This work could extend to hybrid systems where data is processed closer to where it is generated, including in orbit.
Other players are also entering the field. Amazon is developing Project Kuiper, a satellite internet network that could support future space-based computing layers. Microsoft has launched Azure Space, which connects satellites directly to cloud computing services and supports real-time data processing.
Government agencies are also involved. NASA and the U.S. Department of Defense are funding research into orbital computing, edge processing, and secure data transmission in space. These efforts aim to reduce latency, improve data security, and enable faster decision-making for both civilian and defense applications.
Together, these developments show that space-based computing is moving beyond theory. While still early-stage, both public and private sector efforts are building the foundation for future data centers and processing systems in orbit.
However, these systems face major challenges:
- High launch costs,
- Heat and thermal control issues,
- Limited data transmission bandwidth, and
- Hardware durability in space.
Despite these challenges, interest is growing because AI demand is rising faster than Earth-based infrastructure can scale. The competition is now moving toward who can solve energy and computing limits first—on Earth or in space.
Market Outlook: AI, Energy, and Space Infrastructure Converge
The global data center industry is entering a period of rapid expansion. Electricity demand from data centers could double by 2030, driven mainly by AI workloads and cloud computing growth. Power supply is becoming a limiting factor in many regions.
At the same time, the global space economy is expanding into a multi-hundred-billion-dollar industry, supported by satellites, communications, and emerging technologies like orbital computing.
- Orbital data centers sit at the intersection of three major trends: rapid AI growth, rising energy constraints, and expansion of space infrastructure.
China’s $8.4 billion credit-backed push through Orbital Chenguang signals confidence in this convergence. However, key barriers remain, such as high cost of launches, engineering complexity, short satellite lifespans (5-6 years), and regulatory uncertainty in orbital systems.
Because of these limits, orbital data centers are unlikely to replace Earth-based systems in the near term. Instead, they may form a hybrid system where some workloads move to space while most remain on Earth.
Space Is Becoming the Next Data Center Frontier
China’s investment in Orbital Chenguang marks one of the most significant moves yet in the emerging field of space-based computing. Backed by major Chinese banks, municipal science institutions, and national space contractors like CASC, the project shows how seriously China is treating orbital infrastructure.
The strategy connects AI growth, energy demand, and climate pressures into a single long-term vision. But the trade-offs are complex. Orbital data centers may reduce operational emissions, but they also introduce high lifecycle carbon costs and major technical challenges.
The global race is now underway. With companies like SpaceX, Google, and Chinese tech firms exploring similar ideas, space is becoming a new frontier for digital infrastructure. The outcome will depend on whether orbital systems can scale efficiently—and whether their carbon benefits can outweigh the emissions cost of building them.
The post China’s $8.4B Orbital Data Center Push Sets Up Space-Based AI Showdown With SpaceX appeared first on Carbon Credits.
What auditors actually test, where projects actually fail, and the contract clauses that protect you before signature.
The meeting happens about fourteen months after the contract was signed. Your assurance provider has reached the nature-based investment line in your Scope 3 file, and the partner across the table has exactly two questions. How do you know the reductions happened? And how do you know they would not have happened anyway?
The first question is MRV: measurement, reporting, and verification. The second is additionality. Between them, they decide whether your nature-based investment counts, in your inventory, in your disclosure, and in front of your board. Everything else in the project documentation is supporting material for these two answers.
This article walks through what each question actually tests, where projects most commonly fail, what digital MRV has changed (and what it has not), and the contract clauses that protect you. The goal is to give you the diligence framework before you sign, because after the credit issues is the wrong time to discover the answers were weak.
What MRV actually verifies
MRV is the machinery that turns a field intervention into a defensible number. Measurement covers the data: biomass surveys, soil sampling, remote sensing, activity records from participating farms. Reporting covers the translation of that data into claimed reductions under a recognised methodology. Verification covers the independent check: an accredited third party tests the reporting against the methodology and the evidence.
The methodologies live in registries. Verra’s Verified Carbon Standard and the Gold Standard are the two largest for nature-based projects, and each publishes the methodology documents, monitoring requirements, and verification protocols that a project must follow. The ICVCM Assessment Framework now sits above the registries, assessing whole methodologies against the Core Carbon Principles and granting the CCP label to those that pass.
For a buyer, the practical questions are concrete. What is the monitoring frequency, and is it specified in the project design document or left vague? Who is the verifier, how were they selected, and how often do they rotate? What raw data do you, the buyer, get access to, and in what format? A project that answers these in writing is a different procurement than one that answers them in a sales call.
What additionality actually proves
Additionality asks whether the intervention caused the reduction, or whether the reduction would have happened anyway. The test is a counterfactual: what would this landscape, this farm, this forest have done without the project’s money?
Three forms matter in practice. Financial additionality asks whether the project needed the carbon revenue to proceed. Regulatory additionality asks whether the activity was already required by law. Common-practice additionality asks whether the activity is already standard in the region, in which case paying for it buys you nothing the world was not getting for free.
The reason additionality dominates audit conversations is recent history. Research published in 2023, including the Science paper examined at length in our piece on conventional offsets and boardroom credibility, found that a large share of REDD+ credits failed the counterfactual test because baselines were inflated. The market response was a wave of methodology revisions at Verra and the arrival of independent ratings agencies whose entire business is re-testing additionality claims. The Carbon Credit Quality Initiative publishes transparent scoring of methodologies on exactly this dimension, and it is free to consult before you sign anything.
Where projects most commonly fail the test
Five failure modes account for most of the wreckage.
- Inflated baselines. The counterfactual assumes more deforestation, more degradation, or lower yields than the evidence supports. The claimed reduction is the gap between reality and the baseline, so an inflated baseline manufactures reductions from nothing.
- Unaccounted leakage. The project protects one forest and the logging moves to the next valley. The methodology is supposed to net this out; weak projects estimate it optimistically.
- Thin permanence protection. Nature-based carbon can reverse: fire, pest, drought, or a change of landowner. Buffer pools and insurance mechanisms exist for this, but their adequacy varies enormously between projects.
- Attribution and double counting. In supply chain settings, the same reduction can be claimed by the supplier, the buyer, and a credit purchaser unless contracts prevent it. Our Insetting vs Offsetting piece covers the inventory rules; the point here is that the auditor will ask who else is counting this tonne.
- Stale monitoring. Data collected at validation and never refreshed. The IPCC AR6 Working Group III land-sector chapter documents how quickly carbon stocks respond to disturbance; a three-year-old measurement is a historical artifact, not a current claim.
What digital MRV changes, and what it does not
Digital MRV is the genuine improvement in the field. Satellite remote sensing, including the free archives at NASA Earthdata, allows biomass and land-cover change to be monitored continuously rather than at multi-year verification intervals. Soil carbon models calibrated with physical sampling reduce the cost of agricultural measurement. The practical effect is more frequent data at lower cost, which compresses the window in which a problem can hide.
What digital MRV does not change is judgment. Baselines are still human decisions about counterfactuals. Additionality is still an argument, not a measurement. Research groups such as the Oxford Smith School have been clear on this point: better sensors improve the M in MRV, but the integrity questions live in the assumptions, and assumptions need governance, not gadgets.
For a buyer, the test is simple. Ask the provider what is measured by instrument, what is estimated by model, and what is assumed by methodology. A provider who can answer that question crisply understands their own evidence chain. A provider who cannot is selling you their confidence rather than their data.
What to require in your contract
The diligence above converts into five contract clauses.
- Monitoring cadence and buyer data access, specified by dataset and frequency.
- Verifier independence, named accreditation, and rotation terms.
- Baseline revision triggers, so the counterfactual updates when the methodology or the evidence changes.
- Reversal liability and buffer adequacy, with the mechanism named and sized.
- Documentation handover in audit-ready form, so the evidence file your assurance provider needs already exists.
None of these clauses is exotic. All of them are absent from weak contracts, and their absence is the most reliable early signal that the MRV and additionality answers will be weak too.
If you are evaluating a nature-based investment and want the MRV and additionality stress-tested before signature rather than after, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can run that review against any project on your shortlist, and design nature-based supply chain investments where the evidence chain is built audit-first. Schedule a consultation.
Sources and further reading
- ICVCM: Core Carbon Principles Assessment Framework
- Verra: Verified Carbon Standard
- Gold Standard for the Global Goals
- Carbon Credit Quality Initiative: Methodology quality scores
- University of Oxford Smith School: Sustainable finance research
- IPCC AR6 Working Group III, Chapter 7: AFOLU
- NASA Earthdata satellite remote sensing archive
EU Directive: Empowering Consumers for the Green Transition (ECGT)
The EU Directive, Empowering Consumers for the Green Transition (ECGT), takes effect on September 27, 2026.(1) The goal of ECGT is to protect consumers by ensuring that environmental claims are fair, understandable, and reliable. This regulation does create a new compliance requirement for businesses, but it also provides sustainability and marketing teams with important guidance that helps create consistency in sustainability communications.
Key takeaways
- ECGT takes effect September 27, 2026, and prohibits claims that a product or service has a neutral, reduced, or positive environmental impact based on offsetting alone.
- Named example phrases the regulation prohibits include climate neutral, CO2 neutral certified, carbon positive, climate net zero, climate compensated, reduced climate impact, and limited CO2 footprint.
- ECGT does not want to deter investment in carbon credits. It wants companies to communicate the real benefits of the projects they support instead.
- SBTi’s guidance recommends framing carbon credits as taking responsibility for ongoing emissions, not as making a product or company neutral.
- Voluntary carbon projects deliver real climate progress: reducing super-pollutants, protecting and restoring ecosystems, and supporting communities.
Regarding carbon credits specifically, voluntary carbon projects deliver important climate progress and environmental benefits that provide many talking points for companies. They reduce climate super-pollutants by removing industrial emissions like methane, N2O, HFCs and others. They protect and restore valuable ecosystems and carbon sinks like forests, mangroves and grasslands. They help communities by reducing local pollution, creating employment opportunities, improving access to healthcare, and more.
The Science Based Targets Initiative (SBTi), a global leader in business climate action, concludes that alongside aggressive decarbonization, we should also use high quality carbon credits to take responsibility for our ongoing emissions. SBTi recognizes that carbon credits are important “to help limit temperature overshoot, mitigate transition risks, and support climate solutions.”(2)
ECGT language on carbon offsetting says that they do not want to deter investment in carbon credits. They just want companies to focus on communicating the benefits of the projects they support and avoid claims beyond the scope of carbon credits, which is good for everyone, companies and consumers alike.
The regulation reinforces that carbon credits do not change the sustainability of your products, so carbon credit buyers should not suggest that their products are more sustainable because of carbon credits. Instead, companies need to promote their climate contributions as a way to compensate or take responsibility for their carbon emissions by supporting projects that do great things like reducing global carbon emissions, reducing pollution, preventing deforestation, restoring forests, and more.
ECGT language related to carbon offsetting
The regulation is particularly focused on prohibiting claims, based on offsetting greenhouse gas emissions, that a product or service has a neutral, reduced, or positive impact on the environment in terms of greenhouse gas emissions. These claims are prohibited in all circumstances because they mislead consumers into believing the claim relates to the product itself, or to how it was made and supplied, or into thinking that using the product carries no environmental impact at all.
Named examples of prohibited claims include:
- climate neutral
- CO2 neutral certified
- carbon positive
- climate net zero
- climate compensated
- reduced climate impact
- limited CO2 footprint
These claims are only allowed when they rest on a product’s actual lifecycle impact, not on offsetting emissions outside that product’s value chain, since the two are not equivalent. This prohibition does not stop companies from advertising their investments in environmental initiatives, including carbon credit projects, as long as they present that information in a way that is not misleading and that meets the other requirements of Union law.(1)
SBTi also provides guidance on climate contribution language in its Corporate Net Zero Standard Version 2.0 Draft for Second Public Consultation, November 2025. While the SBTi language is fairly technical, it has a good framework for crafting a climate contribution message.
SBTi Language for Carbon Credits(3)
- Take responsibility for ongoing emissions by delivering mitigation impact contributions
- Carbon credits certify the mitigation outcomes of projects that reduce, avoid, or remove carbon emissions
- Activities that reduce emissions from emission sources not located within the company’s value chain
- Activities that conserve, protect, and enhance natural carbon sinks
- Activities that capture and store carbon in storage pools
SBTi’s draft standard also walks through sample claim language for this kind of contribution. In general, the samples move from a simple percentage statement, to naming a specific verified tonnage tied to that percentage, to a fuller statement that breaks the tonnage into reductions versus removals. Across all three, the framing stays consistent: a company took responsibility for a defined share of its ongoing emissions over a set period, by funding a specific, verified amount of mitigation, achieved through emission reductions or removals.(3)
FAQ: ECGT and Carbon Credit Claims
When does the ECGT directive take effect?
The rules apply across the EU from September 27, 2026, after member states transposed the directive into national law by March 27, 2026.
Does ECGT ban carbon offsetting?
No. It bans specific marketing claims that a product or service is environmentally neutral, reduced impact, or positive based on offsetting. Advertising investment in carbon credit projects themselves is still allowed if it is not misleading.
What phrases does ECGT specifically prohibit?
Named examples include climate neutral, CO2 neutral certified, carbon positive, climate net zero, climate compensated, reduced climate impact, and limited CO2 footprint, when those claims are based on offsetting rather than a product’s actual lifecycle impact.
How should a company describe its carbon credit purchases instead?
SBTi’s guidance recommends stating the specific verified tonnage of emissions reductions or removals funded and describing that as taking responsibility for a defined share of ongoing emissions, rather than claiming the company or product is neutral.
Does this rule apply to company level sustainability claims too?
ECGT is focused on claims about specific products and services in consumer marketing. Broader company level sustainability communication is a separate matter still governed by other existing rules.
While ECGT does add a new compliance burden for businesses, it helps create consistency in sustainability messaging that is important to building confidence in voluntary carbon projects and scaling the industry to help us achieve progress on global carbon emissions.
Disclaimer: Terrapass does not provide legal or regulatory advice. Any interpretation of regulation must be approved by your legal representative.
References:
(1) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/825/oj
(2) https://files.sciencebasedtargets.org/production/files/Corporate-Net-Zero-Standard-version-2.pdf
(3) https://files.sciencebasedtargets.org/production/files/CNZS-V2-Second-Consultation-Draft.pdf
The post The EU’s New Green Claims Rules and Carbon Credits appeared first on Terrapass.
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