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Tesla Sparks $2.1B Samsung Battery Deal as Global EV Demand Charges Ahead

Tesla (NASDAQ:TSLA) is reportedly in advanced talks with Samsung SDI for a $2.1 billion battery deal. This shows Tesla’s push for long-term access to cutting-edge battery technology. The deal will likely focus on cylindrical battery cells. It could boost Tesla’s supply chain as the company increases electric vehicle (EV) and energy storage production.

If finalized, the agreement would make Samsung SDI one of Tesla’s key suppliers alongside Panasonic and LG Energy Solution. Samsung batteries might power the EV maker’s new models and energy storage systems, such as the Powerwall and Megapack.

Tesla’s battery demand continues to rise with expanding production at Gigafactories in the U.S., Germany, and China. The company delivered over 1.8 million vehicles in 2024. With the new mass market compact EV coming, battery demand for Tesla may hit 400 GWh each year by 2030.

Why Tesla Needs More Battery Suppliers

Battery supply is the cornerstone of Tesla’s growth. The company’s 4680 cell production is moving more slowly than expected. This limits its ability to meet internal demand fully. As a result, Tesla continues to rely on external suppliers to meet its EV and storage targets.

The chart shows the EV giant’s most recent storage deployments. It reached almost 45 GW in the third quarter of 2025.

Tesla energy storage deployment Q3 2025
Source: Tesla

Samsung SDI supplies cylindrical cells to BMW and Rivian. The company is also expanding its manufacturing in South Korea, the U.S., and Europe. Tesla can partner with Samsung to diversify its sourcing. This way, it can access high-energy-density, nickel-rich batteries. These batteries improve driving range and performance.

This deal would also help Tesla reduce its exposure to raw material price swings. Battery-grade lithium and nickel prices fell by over 40% in 2024. However, volatility is still high because global demand for energy storage is rising fast.

battery grade lithium prices

The Global Battery Boom: A Trillion-Dollar Charge

The global battery market is expanding at a record pace. According to BloombergNEF, annual battery demand could exceed 4,500 GWh by 2035, compared to around 950 GWh in 2024. Electric vehicles account for most of this growth, with stationary storage and grid applications contributing an increasing share.

global energy storage market 2030 BNEF

China remains the largest producer, led by CATL and BYD, which together control over 50% of global battery supply. However, competition from South Korea and Japan is growing. Companies like Samsung SDI and Panasonic are investing billions in new factories in the U.S. and Europe.

The U.S. Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) has been a key driver of this shift. It provides tax credits for batteries and EVs made locally. This encourages foreign suppliers to set up production in North America. Samsung SDI is already building new facilities in Indiana and Tennessee, both of which could supply Tesla in the future.

Innovation at Full Voltage: From 4680 to Solid-State

The Tesla–Samsung deal aligns with broader trends in battery chemistry. Samsung SDI is working on high-nickel NCA and NCM cells. They are also looking at solid-state batteries. These batteries could offer better safety and higher energy density.

Tesla has focused heavily on innovation through its 4680 cells, designed to lower costs by 50% per kWh and improve vehicle range. However, scaling production has been challenging. By combining internal development with supplier deals, Tesla is able to stay flexible as battery technologies evolve.

Meanwhile, global research is exploring alternatives like lithium iron phosphate (LFP) for cost savings. It’s also looking into solid-state batteries for better performance in the future.

Analysts predict that commercial solid-state cells will enter mass production between 2028 and 2030. This timing matches Tesla’s future model plans.

The Broader Battery Market: Growth and Challenges

Battery storage has become central to the global clean energy transition. The International Energy Agency (IEA) says that installed battery capacity could jump from about 20 GW in 2020 to over 1,200 GW by 2030 in net-zero scenarios.

BloombergNEF expects 2025 to add 92 GW of new grid-scale storage. This shows how quickly the sector is growing. By 2030, global investment in batteries—across EVs, homes, and the grid—could exceed $1 trillion cumulatively.

global energy storage boom BNEF

Still, the industry faces several headwinds. Supply chain risks for critical minerals like lithium, nickel, and cobalt remain high. Recycling capacity also lags behind growing demand. Governments and automakers are now working to create closed-loop supply chains to recover metals and reduce environmental impacts.

In this landscape, Tesla’s influence remains large. The company’s early push for vertical integration—mining, refining, cell production, and energy storage—has set the pace for other automakers and battery firms.

Tesla’s Expanding Battery Network and Market Influence

Tesla’s collaboration with Samsung SDI is one of many major supply deals the company has formed in recent years. It has strong partnerships with Panasonic for 2170 cells and CATL for LFP batteries. These are used in Model 3 and Model Y vehicles in China.

In 2024, Tesla signed new deals with LG Energy Solution. These agreements provide more high-nickel cells. This supports Tesla’s expanding Megapack energy storage production in California.

Tesla’s global footprint in energy storage has also expanded sharply. The company’s Energy Generation and Storage division reported a 60% increase in deployment in 2024 than the previous year.

And as seen in the first chart above, it skyrocketed to over 40 GW in Q3 2025. Its Megapack systems are now used by utilities in the U.S., U.K., and Australia to stabilize power grids and support renewable integration.

Beyond its partnerships, Tesla plays a defining role in shaping global battery trends. Tesla’s Gigafactory in Nevada led the way in large-scale lithium-ion production. Meanwhile, the Texas and Berlin plants are placing Tesla at the heart of EV battery innovation in the West.

Tesla has driven scale, standardization, and efficiency. This helped make batteries cheaper for everyone. Pack prices dropped from about $1,100 per kWh in 2010 to under $140 in 2024, says BNEF.

As more nations set targets for carbon neutrality by 2050, battery demand will continue to surge. Tesla’s push to secure long-term supply through deals like the one with Samsung SDI ensures it remains a dominant force in this transformation.

The company’s reach goes beyond cars. It also impacts energy infrastructure, manufacturing systems, and the global clean energy economy.

The chart shows that global battery supply is projected to rise sharply through 2030, driven by massive factory expansions across China, the U.S., and Europe. In contrast, Tesla’s battery demand grows at a steadier pace, reflecting its focus on efficiency and diversified supplier partnerships rather than pure volume growth.

tesla battery demand vs global supply outlook

Outlook: Securing Supply, Scaling Sustainability

If the $2.1 billion deal with Samsung SDI moves forward, Tesla will strengthen its supply resilience and technological edge. The agreement shows a bigger industry trend: Automakers are forming key partnerships because demand for EVs and storage batteries is rising fast.

Global energy storage capacity is expected to grow tenfold by the end of the decade. With battery innovation speeding up, Tesla’s strategy of multi-sourcing and co-developing advanced chemistries could be key to maintaining its leadership.

Whether through partnerships, in-house innovation, or scaling renewable energy integration, Tesla continues to help define the direction of the global battery industry.

The post Tesla (TSLA Stock) Sparks $2.1B Samsung Battery Deal as Global EV Demand Charges Ahead appeared first on Carbon Credits.

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Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L

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The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.

Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.

Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.

You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.

Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings

The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.

Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.

Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.

What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.

The three commodity exposures that hit margin first

For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.

  • Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
  • Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
  • Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.

TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes

The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.

For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.

The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.

What procurement and finance can do now

Three actions matter near-term.

Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.

Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.

Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.

Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.

If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.

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Carbon Footprint

Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?

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More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.

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Carbon Footprint

Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets

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The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.

The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.

This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.

The two definitions, in plain English

Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.

Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.

The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.

What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says

The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).

For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.

For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.

A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.

When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)

Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:

  • The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
  • The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
  • The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
  • It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.

The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.

When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.

The procurement and supplier engagement question

Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.

To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.

The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.

Choosing the right tool for the right target

A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.

The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.

If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.

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