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India has set a new target to reduce its “emissions intensity” – greenhouse gas emissions per unit of economic output – to 47% below 2005 levels by 2035.

The much-awaited announcement comes within India’s delayed new nationally determined contribution (NDC) for 2035 under the Paris Agreement, which had been due last year.

The pledge, which has not yet been published by the UN, was approved by India’s cabinet and issued as a government press release on 25 March.

The updated NDC from the world’s third-largest emitter lands amid the global energy crisis triggered by the Iran war, which has already led to Indians grappling with gas shortages.

In its pledge, India has committed to non-fossil energy making up 60% of its installed electricity-generating capacity by 2035.

The country has also announced an increase to its target for the amount of CO2 that will be absorbed by carbon sinks, such as forests – the first such rise since India made its first pledge to the Paris Agreement.

Some climate experts in India have welcomed the new pledge, saying the country “is pulling more than its weight given its minimal historical contribution to emissions” and “despite recent geopolitical headwinds”.

However, others point out that the targets “underestimate India’s potential” for clean-energy growth and “allow for an acceleration” of emissions, while “hiding” deforestation.

Below, Carbon Brief outlines India’s new climate pledge for 2035 and its implications for the nation’s energy sector, emissions and adaptation efforts.

This article will be updated once the full NDC has been formally published by the UN.

What is in India’s updated climate pledge?

The 1,200-word press release announcing the approval of India’s new NDC for 2035 is thin on detail. For example, it does not spell out any climate-finance needs for adaptation, mitigation or climate change-induced loss and damage.

The details provided in the press release include three headline quantified targets for three areas:

  1. GDP emissions intensity
  2. “Non-fossil fuel” share of electricity generation
  3. Land and forestry

First, India commits to cutting the “emissions intensity” of its GDP to 47% below 2005 levels by 2035, a small increase from the 45% target for 2030 set out in its previous pledge in 2022.

Emissions intensity is defined as the total amount of greenhouse gas emitted for each unit of GDP, which means it applies to all sectors of the economy and covers all gases, such as methane and nitrous oxide, as well as carbon dioxide (CO2).

However, there is no globally agreed benchmark to measure this type of target.

According to the Indian government’s fourth “biennial update report” submitted to the UN on 30 December 2024, India had already reduced its emissions intensity by 36% between 2005 and 2020.

By setting an intensity target, India would be able to continue increasing its emissions as its economy grows, as Carbon Brief has previously explained. This target, therefore, depends on the size of India’s economy in 2035, as well as its total emissions.

(Under the terms of the Paris Agreement and the first “global stocktake” agreed in 2023, only developed countries are expected to set “absolute” targets to cut their emissions. Developing countries are “encouraged” to move towards such targets “over time”.)

The two-point increase in India’s intensity target, to 47% by 2035, “will not bring any real emission reductions, given India’s fast-growing GDP”, says a statement from climate research group Climate Action Tracker.

It says this new goal is ‘unlikely to drive significantly more ambitious action”.

India’s GDP is expected to grow by an average 6.1% per year out to 2035, which is “more than any other major country or region”, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA).

The 2,050MW Pavagada solar park in Karnataka is among the world’s largest solar power plants. Credit: Associated Press / Alamy Stock Photo. Image ID: 2MCXMD5.
The 2,050MW Pavagada solar park in Karnataka is among the world’s largest solar power plants. Credit: Associated Press / Alamy Stock Photo.

Second, the country has pledged to raise the share of “non-fossil fuel-based energy resources in installed electric power capacity” to 60%. (India defines “non-fossil sources” as including large-scale hydropower, nuclear, bioenergy, solar and wind power.)

The target is a 10-percentage point increase from the previous goal of “about 50%” by 2030.

In July 2025, the Indian government announced that it had achieved this target, five years ahead of schedule. As of February 2026, non-fossil sources already made up 52.6% of installed capacity.

The IEA estimates that India’s existing policies would be sufficient to achieve the newly targeted 60% share as early as 2030, reaching 70% by 2035.

Third, the country has raised its land and forestry sector target for the first time since 2015.

According to the press release description of the new pledge:

“[India has] further enhanced the ambition of creating [a] carbon sink through forest and tree cover to 3.5-4.0bn tonnes of CO2-equivalent [GtCO2e] by 2035 from 2005 level[s].”

However, the baseline from which India calculates its emissions reductions from forests was only clarified in 2024 and its metrics for measuring forest and tree cover remain controversial. (See: What does India’s pledge mean for its land sector?)

Additionally, the target corresponds to a “business-as-usual scenario”, according to India’s own forest authorities, with no additional policies required to achieve it.

Beyond the three quantitative headline goals, the NDC pledge also contains five qualitative targets. The government release says these are “intended to embed sustainability into everyday life and governance systems, promote climate-resilient development pathways and enable a just and inclusive transition for all sections of society”.

They include a target to “mobilise domestic, and new and additional finance from developed countries”.

Another qualitative target is a commitment to develop “resilient infrastructure” in order to “adapt to climate change in various sectors like agriculture, water resources, health, disaster management and fragile ecosystems”.

The government release does not explicitly mention the 1.5C aspirational global warming limit agreed as part of the Paris Agreement, but it does “recogni[se] that climate change impacts are already being felt”. It also says the government has “placed strong emphasis on adaptation and disaster resilience across the key actors of its economy”.

The release lists a range of adaptation actions and initiatives that the government is engaged in, from mangrove restoration to “heat action plans” and monitoring glacial lake outburst floods. However, it does not set any new adaptation goals.

According to India’s national economic survey for 2025/26, adaptation and “resilience-related” domestic spending “surged” to 5.6% of the country’s GDP in 2022-23, from 3.7% in 2016-17, with 98% of adaptation finance sourced domestically.

The Indian government says that the NDC “mark[s] a significant step towards the goal of achieving net-zero by 2070”, but does not offer further explanation.

Additionally, it does not mention two targets announced by president Narendra Modi in 2021 at COP26 in Glasgow. These were to install 500 gigawatts (GW) of non-fossil capacity by 2030 and to reduce cumulative emissions between 2021-30 to 1bn tonnes of CO2 (GtCO2) below expected levels.

India’s prime minister Narendra Modi holds hands with thenformer UK prime minister Boris Johnson at COP26 in Glasgow, where Modi announced India’s net-zero target. Credit: Colin Fisher / Alamy Stock Photo. Image ID: 2H4GC7C.
India’s prime minister Narendra Modi holds hands with then UK prime minister Boris Johnson at COP26 in Glasgow, where Modi announced India’s net-zero target. Credit: Colin Fisher / Alamy Stock Photo.

However, the release does reiterate that the “achievement of our targets ahead of time…provides strong confidence in the country’s ability to deliver on future commitments”.

The release also says that India has “considered” the outcomes of the first ”global stocktake” and the “need for greater ambition” in line with the Paris Agreement’s long-term temperature goal in “shaping” India’s 2035 NDC.

It adds that, when formulating the pledge, the government took into account the principles of equity and common, but differentiated responsibility, as well as development and energy security priorities.

What does India’s pledge mean for its energy sector?

India’s new target for non-fossil sources to make up 60% of installed electricity generating capacity builds on its 2022 NDC target to reach “about 50%” by 2030.

Although not specified in the latest release, the previous goal was said to have been conditional on the availability of low-cost international finance. In July 2025, India announced that it had already achieved this 50% target, five years ahead of schedule.

When this announcement was made in June last year, India’s installed non-fossil capacity comprised 38.1% renewables, 10.2% of large hydropower and 1.8% nuclear energy.

In January 2026, India’s non-fossil installed capacity reached 50.6% and, per the announcement, had already reached 52.6% in February.

Meeting the new 2035 target would, therefore, require only another 8 percentage-point increase in the non-fossil share of installed capacity over the next nine years.

This is much less ambitious than India’s own national generation adequacy plan, published in March 2026, which says that non-fossil fuel-based installed capacity would reach “70% of the total installed capacity by 2035-36”.

According to estimates from the Centre for Science and Environment (CSE), India could hit the 60% target as early as 2028.

Beyond the overall non-fossil capacity target, the NDC release does not include specific goals for domestic renewable generation or capacity installation.

According to the Central Electricity Authority, renewable energy, including large hydropower, only accounted for 22.4% of total electricity generation – a far lower share than the installed capacity percentage.

As of January 2026, coal-fired power still accounted for 69% of total generation.

India is still planning to add approximately 56GW of new coal-fired power generation capacity by 2030, because of the expected growth in peak electricity demand.

According to a report by government thinktank Niti Aayog, India’s coal consumption for all uses “could more than double by mid-century before plunging sharply”.

On the other hand, research for Carbon Brief by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) shows that electricity generation from coal in India fell by 3% year-on-year in 2025. It suggests that power-sector emissions could peak before 2030, if clean-energy capacity and electricity demand grow as expected.

The analysis found that the fall in coal-fired power was partly a result of accelerated clean-energy growth, which played a significant role in driving down coal generation for the first time.

Nevertheless, a range of challenges are holding back the growth of India’s grid-based solar power, according to a 2025 report by the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA), which points to issues including delays in power supply agreements and transmission challenges.

Solar manufacturing has seen a “13-fold jump” that has outpaced domestic demand. In September, it was reported that India had 44GW of renewable energy “ready for deployment”, but challenges around secure long-term power contracts were holding back its deployment.

Experts tell Carbon Brief that off-grid solar might absorb some of this glut, which could explain additional outlays for rooftop solar in India’s February budget. In 2025, India added 7.1GW of rooftop solar capacity, a 122% increase from the previous year.

However, Reuters reports that this rooftop solar push “is falling short of targets despite heavy subsidies” because of poor financing and limited support from state utilities and vendors.

The country is expanding its hydropower fleet in the high eastern Himalayan region – near a disputed border with China – despite biodiversity concerns, drought and flood impacts on dams and reservoirs.

According to Down To Earth, the country is also “prioritising pumped hydropower storage projects over battery systems”, expecting to add around 50GW of such capacity by 2032.

India is also looking to nuclear energy to serve as a steady source of power to complement variable renewable output.

In December 2025, the government enacted a landmark new nuclear law, dubbed the “Shanti” act – an acronym for “sustainable harnessing and advancement of nuclear energy for transforming India”.

It aims to help India increase its nuclear capacity more than tenfold, from 8GW in 2024 to 100GW by 2047. (India has some 6GW of nuclear capacity under construction.)

However, given high costs, extended timescales and India’s long history of public protests against nuclear energy over safety and land-acquisition concerns, it remains to be seen how quickly this capacity can be ramped up.

What does India’s pledge mean for its land sector?

For the first time since issuing its first target in 2015, India has raised its land and forestry carbon-sink goal in its updated NDC.

This target aims to create an additional annual carbon sink of 3.5GtCO2e through “additional tree and forest cover” by 2035, compared with 2005 levels.

This is a 1GCO2e increase from its target for 2030, which was to sequester 2.5-3GtCO2e through additional forest and tree cover by 2030. This time, India finally spells out a clear 2005 baseline from which these targets are to be measured.

According to the Forest Survey of India’s (FSI) last India state of forest report, the country had “already reached 2.29Gt of additional carbon sink” against its 2005 baseline in 2023.

Dr Sharad Lele, professor of environmental policy and governance at the Ashoka Trust for Research in Ecology and the Environment, tells Carbon Brief that the increase in India’s forest NDC target is “concerning” for several reasons.

First among these, Lele says, is that the FSI’s official claim of sequestration so far “is based on shaky methods and non-transparent datasets”. He continues:

“Second, the country continues to lose dense forests of high conservation and livelihood value to development projects while sequestration seems to be done through plantations.

Third, and most important, carbon as well as conservation goals should not bypass the rights of Indigenous and local communities, [which] continues to result in both forest destruction and plantation happening in ways that disregard community concerns and priorities.”

Credit: ZUMA Press, Inc. / Alamy Stock Photo. Image ID: 3B91FD5. ZUMA Press, Inc.
Sambati Darro looking for fruits and flowers near a mining area in Madpa, Chhattisgarh. Indigenous communities are economically dependent on the forest near the mining area. Credit: Elke Scholiers, ZUMA Press, Inc. / Alamy Stock Photo.

In recent years, the Modi government clarified two key missing components of India’s carbon-sink target, which had confused even forest authorities.

In 2024, the Indian government clarified the baseline year against which its carbon sink is measured, setting it to 2005.

Second, India retrospectively adopted an interpretation of annual forest cover metrics that allow it to meet its carbon sequestration target “without implementing additional measures per se for increasing forest carbon sink”, according to the FSI.

The FSI’s metrics have been questioned by the UN, scientists and the media for their lack of transparency and for “masking” deforestation. In addition, its definition of what constitutes forest cover is seen as controversial because it includes monocultures, commercial plantations and urban parks.

The FSI defines the term “forest cover” in India as follows:

“All lands, more than or equal to one hectare in area, with a tree canopy of more than or equal to 10%, irrespective of ownership and legal status; and includes orchards, bamboo and palm.”

Because of this definition and how it is measured, India’s forest cover has “shown a gradual and steady trend of increase in the last one and a half decades”, according to the FSI.

Souparna Lahiri, a climate and land-use expert with the Climate Land Ambition and Rights Alliance (CLARA), tells Carbon Brief that this approach means deforestation is “hidden”:

“When you choose a carbon sequestration target, what you’re trying to mask is the real health of India’s forests.…This is a self-rewarding scheme for when you have compensatory afforestation schemes for many, many years that are basically raising plantations.”

The chart below shows the FSI’s estimates of forest carbon stocks from 2005 to 2023 (orange) and its projections for further carbon sequestration out to 2030 (dotted line).

The figure shows that the FSI expects India to exceed its 2030 target of boosting forest carbon stocks by 2.5-3.0GtCO2e over 2005 levels, with a projected 3.57GtCO2e increase. Indeed, this projected increase would see the new 2035 target, for a 3.5GtCO2e increase over 2005 levels, being met by 2030, five years early.

Observed (orange) and projected (dotted line) forest carbon stocks in India, GtCO2e.Original figure from pg.232 of the FSI report. Credit: India State of Forest Report, Forest Survey of India (2024).
Observed (orange) and projected (dotted line) forest carbon stocks in India, GtCO2e. Original (blurred) figure from page 232 of the FSI report. Credit: India State of Forest Report, Forest Survey of India (2024).

Meanwhile, according to the forest data platform Global Forest Watch, India lost 1.3m hectares (mha) of tree cover from 2015 to 2024, equivalent to 5% of the forested area in 2010. It says this area would have sequestered 830MtCO2e prior to being deforested.

The country’s climate ministry has prioritised granting and fast-tracking permits for forest clearance for strategic infrastructure and energy projects, with further exemptions for critical minerals, exploration and other projects.

The Indian government has also allowed for private monoculture plantations on public forest land without compensating for the loss of primary forest.

Ashish Kothari, veteran environmentalist and founder of non-profit Kalpavriksh, tells Carbon Brief:

“There are so many contradictions. We’re currently fighting the Great Nicobar case, where the government wants to clearfell 130sqkm of rainforest and believes it can compensate for this with plantations 2,400km away in Haryana in north India. All of this never makes it to India’s NDC.”

A long-tailed macaque endemic to the Great Nicobar islands. Credit: Wikimedia Commons
A long-tailed macaque endemic to the Great Nicobar islands. Credit: Wikimedia Commons.

At the same time, new research warns that increasing “ecological droughts” induced by climate change could weaken India’s forest carbon sinks.

Another study estimates that carbon uptake of India’s forests fell by 5-12% in the decade from 2010 to 2019, compared to the previous one.

Land availability for afforestation and restoration to meet India’s carbon-sink target is another key contention.

In a recent Carbon Brief guest post, researchers estimated that less than 0.5% of the country’s area is “immediately available for forest restoration”, which, if regenerated, could sequester less than 10% of India’s 2030 pledge.

Carbon markets under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement were a key priority for India in the run-up to COP30 and the country has been setting up its own domestic forest carbon market.

Lahiri points out that India’s carbon market is “still restricted” within the energy sector, but now has a “green credit scheme” for the land sector – spanning afforestation, mangrove restoration and wetland conservation – where one tree can equal one “green credit” unit.

Lahiri says that this shows India is intending to “balance the energy sector emissions from carbon sequestration”.

What are the political considerations behind India’s new climate pledge?

India’s climate pledges have been delayed in the past, so the late arrival of its latest NDC is not necessarily a significant sign. However, the new pledge was announced amid an energy shock triggered by the US-Israel war on Iran.

This means that India is trying to secure energy supplies from different sources, as people around the country face widespread shortages. Additionally, key state elections are being held in April.

While the country was hailed in 2022 for proposing language to “phase out all fossil fuels” and not just coal, recent events indicate less tolerance for such a stance.

Men and women wait in long queues for cooking gas refills at a depot in Noida. Credit: Alamy Stock Photo. Image ID: 3E2CRC9.
Men and women wait in long queues for cooking gas refills at a depot in Noida. Credit: ZUMA Press, Inc. / Alamy Stock Photo.

A key consideration for India’s level of climate commitment within its latest NDC has also been the $300bn a year climate-finance target agreed at COP29 in Baku. Since then, many developed countries have cut their aid budgets.

At COP29, India called the climate-finance outcome “a joke” and accused the presidency of pushing the deal through without proper consent, following chaotic last-minute negotiations.

Bluesky post by Aruna Chandrasekhar, handle @arunacsekhar.bsky.social. Bluesky post says: INDIA: "We informed the #COP29 presidency we wanted to make a statement prior to any decision on the adoption lof the #NCQG finance goal]." "This has been stage-managed, and we are extremely disappointed." "This document is nothing more than an optical illusion. India opposes [its] adoption." There is a photo attached of a woman speaking at COP29.

According to government sources quoted in the Indian Express earlier in 2026, India’s NDC was expected to “reflect the disappointment of COP29 outcome on climate finance”.

In addition, the US exit from the Paris Agreement, the UNFCCC, IPCC, climate funds and even the India-led International Solar Alliance has fuelled fears around the future of multilateral environmental governance.

War and conflict have also contributed to an increased emphasis on energy security.

Finally, India’s climate diplomacy position has historically been to “underpromise and overdeliver”. In this wider context, some experts welcomed the fact that India had announced an NDC with higher targets than the previous version, in the current geopolitical climate.

For example, according to Dhruba Purkayastha, consultant to the UNFCCC’s standing committee on finance, the announcement “is a clear sign of leadership” on climate action at a time when “it is evident that the west is not going to lead”. Puryakastha said in a statement:

“At a time when the world order stands diminished and when there is little traction for climate – which seems to have lost its standing as a global public good – it is good to see that India is staying on track. And, given that India is the BRICS chair, this announcement probably paves the way for a BRICS-led climate action.

On the other hand, Dr Nandini Das – climate economist and India lead at Climate Action Tracker – said in a statement that the country “missed an opportunity to come up with a national, economy-wide 2035 target to cut greenhouse gas emissions.”

How have India’s new pledges been received?

The new pledge has received a positive response from many climate experts in India, but a more cautious reception from overseas commenters.

Avantika Goswami, programme manager of climate change at CSE, tells Carbon Brief that the new targets stand out “in the current context” and “represent a commitment” to climate multilateralism. She tells Carbon Brief:

“At a time when developed countries are backtracking on ambition, deepening their fossil-fuel entrenchment and dragging the world towards military conflict, the signal from India shows that global south leadership on climate ambition is concrete and real.”

Prof Navroz K Dubash, professor of public and international affairs at Princeton University, tells Carbon Brief that India’s new pledge falls into an “ongoing pattern” of NDCs that “under-commit and will overcomply”, a description he says also fits China’s recent pledge.

Dubash elaborates:

“This pattern suggests that statements of ambition are no longer the driver of climate action, if indeed they ever were. Instead, indications of implementation on the ground – real domestic policy and investment trends – are the more useful benchmark of progress.”

In a statement, Dr Arunabha Ghosh, director at the Council on Energy, Environment and Water (CEEW), says that the pledge balances “energy security and resilience”, as the country faces “macroeconomic shocks and climate extremes”.

Ghosh points out that India’s power markets are evolving rapidly and, if “supply chain disruptions” ease, India could exceed its targets again. He says:

“A targeted 60% share of non-fossil electricity capacity in 2035 suggests that, while India has raised its ambition to decarbonise the power sector, it is also doubling down on energy security and affordability for hundreds of millions of its citizens.”

Madhura Joshi, programme lead at climate change thinktank E3G, says the NDC shows “strong intent to bet on clean energy at home as part of a strategic move to improve its energy security and prosperity”.

In a statement, she adds:

“India’s raising of ambition on non-fossil fuel capacity, emissions intensity and on carbon sinks reflects a measured and meaningful step forward, but India’s strong track record suggests that it will surpass these targets ahead of schedule.”

Others have been more cautious about the NDC targets, with Lauri Myllyvirta, lead analyst and co-founder at CREA, saying in a statement that the targets “underestimate the country’s potential for transformative clean energy growth”.. He adds:

“Under current plans, the target of 60% clean-power capacity will be achieved before 2030, rather than by 2035. Continuing the current clean-energy growth at rates already achieved in 2024-25 would enable India to peak power-sector emissions well before 2030 and significantly slow down its CO2 emission growth rates.

“Yet, the carbon-intensity target…allows for an acceleration of emissions growth compared with past rates, if GDP growth is at target. India’s booming clean-energy industry is highly likely to deliver much faster progress than policymakers were prepared to commit to today.”

The post Q&A: What does India’s new Paris Agreement pledge mean for climate action? appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Q&A: What does India’s new Paris Agreement pledge mean for climate action?

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Factcheck: 10 flaws in the Conservative report on ‘cheap power’

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In a new report, the opposition Conservatives argue that UK electricity prices are too high and that it would be better for the climate to have cheap electricity, even if that means using more gas.

The idea is that cheap power would encourage people to use more electric vehicles (EVs) and heat pumps, leading to higher electrification of the economy and lower emissions.

This is at the heart of a Conservative push to abandon the UK’s net-zero by 2050 target and various climate policies, which the party says are “bankrupting” the country.

Now, the party is using a report by centre-right thinktank Onward to advance this argument, claiming that the UK could save “over £320bn” by scrapping net-zero policies.

In the report foreword, shadow energy secretary Claire Coutinho says this approach would make electrification “more attractive”, ensuring both “prosperity and a better environment”.

However, the report fails on these terms, as its alternative scenario ends up with less electrification of heat and transport and an extra 524m tonnes of carbon dioxide (MtCO2) emissions by 2050.

Moreover, the report relies on a series of questionable assumptions to claim that gas and nuclear will be cheaper than renewables – including the idea that gas prices will be low and stable.

Experts tell Carbon Brief that with credible assumptions, the report’s conclusions would be flipped on their head, such that renewables – not gas and nuclear – would bring the “lowest total costs”.

Iain Staffell, an associate professor of sustainable energy at Imperial College London, tells Carbon Brief that while the report “tells a good story”, the modelling underpinning it “has more holes than a Swiss cheese”.

In this factcheck, Carbon Brief speaks to experts and identifies flaws in the report, explaining why they undermine the anti-net-zero rhetoric of the Conservatives and their supporters.

The plan would increase UK emissions

The report by Onward is based on modelling by advisory firm Transira Energy, which compares two pathways out to 2050.

One is a “business-as-usual” scenario based on current “net-zero” policies. (Nevertheless, this only achieves a clean power system by 2045 – far short of the 2030 Labour target.)

The other is an “alternative policy pathway” (APP), developed by Onward, which assumes the UK’s 2050 economy-wide net-zero target is abandoned after the next election in 2029.

The latter says it places “greater emphasis on reducing the cost of electricity”, which includes fewer renewables, no electrification goals and more gas and nuclear power capacity.

This mirrors the policy platform set out by the Conservatives, who argue that “net-zero” drives up energy costs and that climate change can be tackled without such targets.

In fact, the Conservatives say their “common sense” approach would make it easier to cut emissions, as shadow energy secretary Claire Coutinho states in the report foreword:

“If we want those emissions to fall, then we need people to want to use electric cars and electric heating – then our priority should be to make electricity cheap.”

Yet, this argument is firmly contradicted by the report itself.

The APP results in an extra 524MtCO2 being emitted between 2030 and 2050 – equivalent to the annual emissions of South Africa.

The Transira Energy analysts say this is “explained by an increased share of unabated gas-fired capacity”.

Finally, it is worth noting that the UK’s net-zero target is based on the fact that the planet will continue warming until global emissions reach net-zero. Without such targets, climate change – and its impacts – will get worse.

The plan would slow electrification

Contrary to Conservative claims, uptake of heat pumps and electric vehicles is actually expected to be slower in the alternative scenario, “despite lower electricity costs”.

This is due to the removal of supportive government subsidies and mandates, such as the boiler upgrade scheme and the 2030 ban on the sale of new petrol and diesel cars.

Overall electricity consumption is 7% lower in the APP, compared to the current pathway.

Daniela Quiroga, a senior associate at Copenhagen Infrastructure Partners, questions this reliance on lower electricity demand in the APP, telling Carbon Brief:

“While this is an interesting scenario to explore, it overlooks potentially important feedback effects – mainly, as electricity prices and the capital costs of electrification technologies fall, uptake would be expected to increase.”

A related point was made in a LinkedIn post by Tara Singh, chief executive of trade body RenewableUK, who noted:

“APP makes the electricity system cheaper partly by electrifying Britain less – while leaving the fuel costs that replace electricity outside the model.”

For example, Singh estimates that the extra petrol and diesel fuel expenditure to replace the missing electric vehicles (EVs) on the road could be around £65-95bn over two decades. These costs are not included in the APP scenario.

The only sector that sees increased power demand is data centres, due to policy support to “prioritise” new grid connections for these facilities.

Quiroga notes that the costs of accelerating data centre connections “are not mentioned at all” in the report.

In short, the proposed pathway involves removing grants that help households buy EVs and heat pumps, while providing more policy support for the AI industry.

Josh Gabbatiss on Bluesky: Buried at the heart of the Conservative party's pitch to scrap net-zero is this

Finally, Onward stresses the UK’s “high spark gap” – referring to the electricity-to-gas price ratio. This makes switching from gas boilers to heat pumps less appealing for consumers, given the relatively high price of electricity, compared to gas.

However, Matt Elliott, lead economic analyst at the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit (ECIU), says the analysis does not indicate this gap would substantially change in the proposed APP. He tells Carbon Brief:

“The report claims that electrification would happen even without specific policies, simply due to lower retail electricity prices driving consumer choice. However, its own modelling indicates that the gas-electricity price ratio would actually rise in the early years and end up only marginally lower than today by 2050.”

In other words, in the APP the price of electricity compared to gas would not fall sufficiently to drive consumers towards heat pumps without subsidies or other incentives.

Rather than scrapping net-zero policies, analysts have suggested shifting tax and policy levies from electricity to gas, or breaking the link between wholesale gas prices and electricity, as more effective ways to reduce the spark gap.

Gas prices are unlikely to remain low and stable

The “alternative” scenario pushed by the Conservatives continues to rely heavily on gas for both electricity generation and heating.

This includes constructing new gas power plants in a bid to lower electricity prices, despite the fact that gas is the main driver of high electricity prices in the UK.

In recent years, the largest spikes in energy prices have been triggered by wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, which have disrupted fossil-fuel supplies and sent gas prices spiralling.

(Indeed, the report was published on the same day the Office for National Statistics announced that inflation had jumped to its highest rate in four months, due to energy costs surging because of the impact of the Iran war on global oil and gas supply chains.)

Despite this, the scenario set out by Onward assumes that gas prices drop to pre-conflict levels and remain that way for the next two decades.

Ashutosh Padelkar, research lead at Aurora Energy Research, tells Carbon Brief that the gas price assumptions are “hard to fathom” and significantly at odds with future expectations, from both Aurora and other market analysts.

Simon Evans on Bluesky: Relying more on gas power will save money, as long as gas is cheap – and stays cheap in the future.

Analysis by E3G and ECIU in 2025 concluded that four years of energy spikes caused by the post-pandemic demand surge and Russia-Ukraine war had cost the UK £183bn.

The Onward report acknowledges that the new scenario is “more exposed to a future gas price shock” than the current net-zero scenario. It suggests that a new spike could increase fuel costs in the gas-reliant scenario by another £6bn in 2040.

However, Onward argues that the impact of gas price spikes on consumers would be “significantly smaller” than the shock following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This is owing to existing renewable energy contracts and future nuclear power construction in the APP.

In the press release accompanying the new report, Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch is clear that “our plan means using our own oil and gas in the North Sea”.

This mirrors rhetoric that has been widespread on the right of UK politics, stressing the importance of expanding North Sea drilling as a way to cut energy bills.

However, given the relatively small volumes remaining in the North Sea, the UK will likely remain reliant on gas imported from the US and the Middle East.

Gas prices will still be set globally and remain subject to geopolitical turmoil, no matter where the UK sources its supplies.

Given this, Johnny Gowdy, director of the thinktank Regen, tells Carbon Brief that the scenario presented by the Conservatives is “a call to rely on imported gas, with global gas prices”.

The plan assumes gas plants are cheap to build

The Conservative plan involves building new gas power plants, in order to meet part of the nation’s growing electricity demand without relying on renewables.

Onward states that the UK “has lost firm generation capacity” – such as gas and nuclear plants – and replaced it with “intermittent”, or variable, power in the form of wind and solar.

To remedy this, its alternative pathway involves building an extra 21 gigawatts (GW) of gas power plants by 2050 – equivalent to around 20 new facilities. This is roughly a 70% increase from the UK’s current capacity.

However, the small print in the accompanying Transira Energy report explains that it assumes capital expenditure – the cost of building the power plants – is £650 per kilowatt (kW).

This is considerably lower than other recent analyses, which tend to cite capital expenditure figures that are more than double this estimate.

For example, a 2025 GridLab report notes that new US gas power plants set for completion in 2026 and 2027 had a cost range of $1,116/kW (£819/kW) to $1,427/kW (£1046kW).

However, it adds that more recent projects are “routinely reporting” costs of $2,000/kW (£1467/kW) or more. Other sources have reported up to $2,800/kW (£2054/kW).

Gas power plant costs have increased significantly in recent years – a trend that has been attributed to a tight supply of gas turbines worldwide.

This, in turn, is the result of increased demand for gas turbines to power data centres and countries transitioning from coal to gas.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) says data-centre demand in the US is “limiting the availability of turbines for near-term deployment elsewhere in the world”.

Nuclear faces high costs and delivery challenges

The Onward report champions a substantial increase in nuclear power capacity.

However, it fails to explain how this could be facilitated or why its cost assumptions are lower than the most recent nuclear projects in the UK.

Within the report’s net-zero scenario, there is 13.3GW of nuclear power by 2050, roughly double the current capacity. It notes that this will be financed under the regulated asset base (RAB) model – a government-backed funding approach announced in 2022.

Under the APP scenario, nuclear power capacity more than triples from current levels to 20GW by the middle of the century, all backed by the RAB model.

The report adds:

“Reducing nuclear construction costs and timelines becomes the core energy priority of the UK government, with measures to improve the availability of sites and grid connections.”

The report acknowledges that the APP scenario “faces significant cost headwinds from expensive nuclear capacity”.

However, it suggests that large-scale nuclear power stations built in the 2040s could cost £122-£138 per megawatt hour (MWh) in 2025 terms.

Hinkley Point C – which in 2018 became the first new nuclear power plant to begin construction in the UK since the 1980s – has a “strike price” of £138/MWh for 2030. (This is the fixed price for the electricity it will generate, guaranteed by the power plant’s contracts for difference agreement.)

This price is at the top end of Onward’s forecast range for “levelised cost of electricity” (LCOE) – the average total cost of building and operating an asset over its lifetime.

Hinkley Point nuclear power station.
Hinkley Point nuclear power station. Credit: Rory Hailes / Alamy Stock Photo

As such, the report suggests, on average, costs will fall over the course of the decade from 2030, but provides little detail as to how this would happen.

As Richard Howard, global research director at Aurora, wrote on LinkedIn, the cost assumptions for nuclear are “optimistic”. He adds:

“It assumes that the LCOE of nuclear will fall 10-20% below the *original* cost of Hinkley Point C, when we know that nuclear costs escalated massively since the HPC deal was struck. The UK does not have a great track record of managing down the costs of nuclear.”

In fact, Sizewell C – a replica of Hinkley Point C in the early stages of construction in Suffolk, which received a final investment decision in 2025 – has a considerably higher strike price of £150/MWh in 2039.

Hinkley Point C is the first new nuclear power plant to be built in 30 years in the UK. It has been beset by delays and nearly doubled in cost since it was originally approved.

A footnote in the Transira Energy report adds that its calculations for the cost of nuclear include expected capital expenditure for new large-scale plants ranging from £10,000/kW to £12,500/kW.

While the 3.26GW Hinkley Point C was originally supposed to have a price tag of £18bn, which would equate to £5,521/kWh, costs have repeatedly increased. More recent estimates from developer EDF suggest a figure of £10,736/kW, closer to Onward’s figure.

However, if this is adjusted for inflation for 2026, this jumps closer to £14,724/kW.

As such, the upfront cost of new nuclear is already around £2,500 more per kilowatt than the assumptions in the report for 10 years from now.

The report provides limited information about how these costs would fall so substantially.

It suggests that the recommendations from the 2025 Fingleton review should be implemented in full to cut the cost of the technology.

The Fingleton report – a full review of the UK’s nuclear sector by the Nuclear Regulatory Taskforce, led by John Fingleton – found an “overly complex” and “bureaucratic” system was holding back the nuclear industry. It advocated for “smarter regulation”, as an overhaul of the planning regime.

In March 2026, the Labour government committed to full implementation of the Fingleton review by the end of 2027. Despite this, the Onward report includes the implementation of the Fingleton review in the APP scenario, but not the net-zero scenario.

The report’s high network cost estimates do not ‘add up’

The biggest drop in costs outlined in the Onward APP scenario comes from a reduction in network costs, but experts have said that this “just doesn’t add up”.

Network costs are broadly made up of the price of building, maintaining and operating the transmission and distribution systems.

A reduction in network spending accounts for £137bn of the £320bn in “savings”, compared to the net-zero scenario that sees significant network expansion to help facilitate more renewables on the grid.

This drop is “thanks to a higher utilisation of firm power system with supply located closer to demand”, the report says.

In particular, the report points to discrepancy between the “best wind resources” being located in the north of Scotland, while the major centres of demand are in the southeast of England. As such, currently grid expansion is needed to avoid constraints or the requirement to curtail generation in windy periods with low demand. 

By avoiding the connection of geographically dispersed generation assets, such as 78GW of generation, storage and interconnectors, the APP scenario can reduce total network costs by 43%, according to the report.

Staffell tells Carbon Brief that the £137bn saving has “a convincing story to it – if we build more fossil and nuclear capacity we can utilise the system better”.

However, he adds that Onward gives “so little detail about how this works that it’s hard to comment”.

The Transira Energy report notes that the APP still includes £19bn in investment for the electricity network, covering the cost to maintain the existing system and connect new gas and nuclear generation.

However, this 86% drop in new transmission investment compared to the BAU scenario leans on “flawed logic”, according to Tara Singh from RenewableUK.

On LinkedIn, she explained that it “rests on an extraordinarily aggressive assumption about how little grid Britain will need”, adding: 

“Onward assumes £137bn of new transmission assets under BAU between 2030 and 2050, but only £19bn under their plan, even though by 2050 it still has 32m EVs/hybrids, more than 6m additional heat pumps, 45GW gas, 20GW nuclear and – particularly strikingly – 62 terawatt hour (TWh) a year of datacentre demand. Is this grid figure credible…?”

Beyond this, the report also attributes a significant portion of the proposed savings to cuts in “balancing costs”. These are the costs to the system operator of balancing electricity supply and demand.

It claims that having more firm generation located closer to demand and existing transmission infrastructure will “save billions of expenditure on network expansion and balancing costs”.

Onward suggests that under the APP scenario, the cost of keeping generation and demand balanced would fall by £67bn.

However, claiming savings by both cutting network expansion and balancing costs amounts to “double counting” and “just doesn’t add up”, according to Aurora’s Padelkar.

He tells Carbon Brief that including both high capital expenditure for the electricity network and high balancing costs in the BAU scenario is “difficult to reconcile”.

Expanding the electricity network would reduce constraints, reducing the need for constraint management. Such a move would lower balancing costs.

As noted by the National Energy System Operator (Neso), retaining the current transmission network into 2030, with no expansion, would mean constraint costs could reach around £12.7bn a year. But building new network capacity could cut costs by as much as 75%.

Padelkar says:

“They’re saying ‘we continue to invest in the network’…But somehow the network [balancing] costs just don’t come down…This is basically saying ‘we’re paying both to fix the problem and to have the problem’. You can have one of the two, but you can’t have both.”

Despite the claim that the APP approach will lead to the cheapest electricity, Padelkar says that the report does not present a “consistent picture” as to how the system would operate, pointing to the approach to network and balancing costs. He adds:

“Overall, we would expect that once these figures are correctly accounted for, that renewable energy would remain the cheapest form of a form of decarbonisation. I would even further flip the argument around, to say that decarbonisation is not a prerogative [on] its own, but because it also achieves lowest total costs.”

The system integration costs are ‘far out of line with mainstream thinking’

A central argument in the Onward report is that the costs of renewables are higher than often claimed by proponents, due to the wider system costs of having a large amount of “intermittent” generation.

As such, it proposes pulling back support for wind and solar, and instead putting focus on “firm generation” sources, particularly gas and nuclear power.

This relies heavily on the claim that “system integration costs” for wind and solar are much higher than is being “properly revealed” in either contracts for difference (CfD) auctions or levelised costs estimates.

(CfD’s are power contracts between generators and the government, which work as the UK’s main method for supporting the development of renewables by providing long-term price certainty to developers.)

Therefore, when assessing the overall cost of renewable energy, the cumulative network investment, balancing and ancillary services system costs necessary to manage such variable generation must be considered, it suggests.

The existence of integration costs is not widely understood, but the scale of their impact is disputed.

The report continues that if these costs are taken into account, the “marginal system integration costs” of renewables are “much higher than their individual levelised costs”.

Onward suggests that the cost to integrate additional offshore wind, onshore wind and solar onto the electricity system is £125/MWh. This is far higher than the cost of generating electricity from these sources in the first place.

The figure has been challenged by a number of commentators, with Staffell telling Carbon Brief that this is “very far out of line with mainstream thinking”.

Analysis published in Nature suggests that if 80% of the electricity mix comes from renewables, the system integration cost is around €30/MWh (£26/MWh).

Elsewhere, engineering firm Afry put the total cost of electricity at around £55-75/MWh in a high-renewable system. This is “less than [Onward’s] integration cost alone”, Staffell adds.

The high price tag of the £128/MWh marginal integration “is derived by apportioning additional balancing and transmission costs solely to 60GW of new wind and solar deployed from 2030 onwards”, explains Callum MacIver, research fellow at the University of Strathclyde and the UK Energy Research Centre.

He adds:

“[This figure] only looks at the cost side and there is not enough published detail on where the renewables are deployed and the transmission upgrades it triggers to critique the scale of the numbers presented.

“It also excludes potential wider system benefits of further renewables deployment, including reduced wholesale prices, avoided fuel and carbon costs and reduced exposure to future external gas price shocks, which are properly examined by looking at overall system costs and testing various sensitivities including different gas price futures.”

Writing on LinkedIn, Adam Bell – a partner at consultancy Stonehaven – suggests that the £125/MWh system costs are “really egregious”. He explains:

“The ‘system costs’ of renewables…rests on assuming that all additional network upgrades and balancing costs for a net-zero system after 2029 are attributable to additional renewables deployed in that net-zero system.

“Many of those costs relate to existing renewables as well as nuclear, so this likely overstates system costs by an order of magnitude [roughly 10-fold].”

Furthermore, the system costs for the APP scenario are not fully accounted for in the report. Regardless of the technology mix, old network and generation assets will need replacing, adding additional costs to the system.

The proposed changes could undermine investor confidence

The APP scenario involves stripping back all support for renewables going forward.

It calls for the CfD scheme to end in 2030. Pre-existing CfD contracts would continue under APP, but after this decade, all further support would “exclusively” be for nuclear power.

Additionally, the renewable obligation (RO) payments for existing wind and solar would end from 2033. These are legacy contracts signed ahead of the scheme closing to new applicants in 2017. Payments are expected to continue until 2037.

(Onward makes an exception for the large-scale biomass power plant owned by Drax, which already has a contract with the UK government to switch from an RO to a low-carbon “dispatchable CfD”. This switch is included under both the net-zero and APP scenarios, in recognition of the “importance of its contribution to generation and to system stability”.)

Both the CfD and RO schemes have contributed significantly to the expansion of the renewable energy sector in the UK. For example, despite coming to an end in 2017, nearly 30% of current electricity supplies are still covered by RO contracts.

It is unclear from the report what the 10GW of capacity currently expected to receive the RO would do beyond 2033.

Writing on Bluesky, Tom Haddon, senior economist at Arup, says that if, as the APP scenario proposes, the UK “bin[s the] RO”, this could force 10GW of renewable capacity still on the system to simply shut down after 2033.

Such a dramatic change to a longstanding support system could have an impact on investor confidence.

Tom Haddon on Bluesky: The capacity has to shut down because their other idea is to close CfD auctions from 2030.

Padelkar tells Carbon Brief that energy investors are often involved in numerous technologies. He adds:

“You wouldn’t be able to say ‘yeah, not going to continue honouring this contract [for renewables], but I expect you to sign this new one for me [to build new nuclear]’. That just wouldn’t work.”

As such, there is no guarantee that investors would agree to enter into government-backed RAB contracts to develop nuclear power plants, having just seen government-backed RO contracts being reneged on four years early.

Carbon market ‘savings’ are ‘just rearranging things on a spreadsheet’

One of the large chunks of “savings” identified to bring down electricity prices in the Onward report is £94bn from “lower wholesale prices, thanks to the removal of carbon taxes”.

This refers to removing power plants from the UK emissions trading scheme (UK ETS) from 2031.

Onward argues that this reduces the cost of gas power plants, which frequently set wholesale power prices under the marginal pricing system.

Staffell tells Carbon Brief that this is a “concern” when considering the report’s findings:

“That is £94bn no longer going into the government coffers, so it’s not saving the country any money; it’s just rearranging things on a spreadsheet. This lowers electricity bills, but does that get compensated for by higher taxes elsewhere, or do we have to take on a larger national deficit, or does it go hand-in-hand with cutting public services?”

Tom Edwards, a consultant at Cornwall Insight, wrote on Bluesky that it would be “madness” to simply remove the UK ETS and “expect things to remain stable”.

The UK currently sources around a tenth of its electricity via interconnectors that link its grid up with Ireland and parts of mainland Europe. It also exports electricity to other European countries when it has surplus supply.

These relationships would be complicated if the UK abandoned its carbon price on electricity altogether.

The UK and EU have been negotiating over linking their carbon pricing systems, which would involve the UK navigating the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM).

Alongside ending support for renewables, the new Onward scenario also removes subsidies for new interconnectors, although it says “existing interconnectors will continue”.

The Transira Energy analysis says there would be “new cross-border trading arrangements” from 2031. Such “arrangements” would, presumably, need to be negotiated from scratch with the EU.

Specifically, the report proposes a “carbon reference price” for electricity sold to the EU to “prevent carbon leakage and the distortion of cross-border electricity flows”.

Adam Berman, policy director at Energy UK, pointed out that the post-Brexit trade and cooperation agreement between the UK and the EU includes a legal commitment by the UK to maintain a carbon price on electricity. He wrote that the Onward proposal “would run contrary to that agreement”.

The report ‘grossly simplifies’ long-duration energy storage

The Onward report states that it would cancel support for long-duration energy storage (LDES), such as large batteries and pumped hydropower.

This follows the government recently launching a “cap-and-floor scheme” to support the technology. In June 2026, the nation’s energy regulator Ofgem identified 16 LDES that it is “minded to” support under the new scheme.

LDES can store power across days, weeks or even seasons, helping to boost electricity system security. Analysis by analytics company LCP Delta suggests that rolling out LDES technologies could cut energy system costs in the UK by more than £24bn between 2030 and 2050.

Onward lists support for storage systems – including LDES, as well as smaller batteries, which are only briefly mentioned in the report – as one of the “costs of an intermittent-first, low-carbon electricity system”.

As such, alongside cuts to support for renewable energy technology, the APP scenario includes ending the cap-and-floor scheme for LDES. (See: The proposed changes could undermine investor confidence)

The report suggests that even if all 16 of the projects shortlisted by Ofgem were built, the total would only provide around five and a half hours of generation.

It adds: “This is not enough to make it through a winter spell of low wind and sun”.

This assertion is based on the total storage capacity of all the projects being 136GWh.

However, the report “grossly simplifies the operation of LDES”, explains Padelkar. He adds:

“This assumes a rate of discharge that the fleet doesn’t have. Further, this LDES capacity would play a key role in reducing the balancing and ancillary costs, even in the early 2030s, by helping absorb cheap wind generation in Scotland in constrained periods and then discharging it when the transmission from Scotland to the south of Great Britain is not constrained.”

The role of LDES is more complex than simply all projects providing the entire electricity demand for the nation in one go. The projects are designed to act together with other assets to absorb excess supply, smooth out peaks in demand and step in to provide cheaper power when prices spike.

The post Factcheck: 10 flaws in the Conservative report on ‘cheap power’ appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Factcheck: 10 flaws in the Conservative report on ‘cheap power’
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Climate Change

As marine heat breaks records, countries seek ocean roadmap at COP31

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With record-breaking ocean temperatures weakening the world’s largest carbon sink, a group of countries is pushing for the UN COP31 summit to deliver meaningful commitments to protect marine ecosystems. Yet this effort could be hobbled by a shrinking pool of climate finance, experts warn.

While discussions on oceans at UN climate talks have so far been limited to annual informal dialogues on the sidelines, African countries, the European Union, some Latin American nations and small island states have launched a bid for COP31 to incorporate ocean protection measures into “negotiated decisions”.

COP31 co-presidents Türkiye and Australia have responded to this call and are working with interested countries on a voluntary ocean roadmap, described as a “concise action plan” and expected to include regional and international steps to integrate measures to safeguard the planet’s ocean and climate.

    At a meeting in Türkiye in September, which plans to convene more than 25 ministers from Asia-Pacific, Africa, Europe and Latin America, governments will consider how to incorporate the recommendations of the informal UN ocean dialogues into global climate policy, according to the Turkish co-presidency.

    Whitney Berry, associate director of climate policy at the nonprofit Ocean Conservancy, said that even an informal “multi-year” plan, instead of a negotiated roadmap, could help guide the ocean dialogues series in the UN climate process towards more concrete results.

    “If this plan informed the following dialogues and made sure they were aligned with the Paris [Agreement] ambition cycle, including opportunities like the Global Stocktake, we’d have such a strengthened opportunity for ocean integration,” she said.

    The upcoming stocktake – an international assessment of countries’ climate policies that takes place every five years and will culminate at COP33 in 2028 – presents a “huge opportunity” to turn fragmented actions into a “globally recognised evidence base” that can inform the next round of climate plans, Berry added.

    Addressing rocketing ocean temperatures

    Influenced by this year’s projected “super El Niño” on top of climate heating, the world’s oceans have experienced the warmest July on record, according to both EU and US monitoring data. Scientists are warning of severe mass die-offs of key species like corals, sponges and macro-algae.

    John Bruno, a marine ecologist at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, told journalists in a briefing that some organisms like coral reefs can only tolerate an increase of about 1 degree Celsius before they start experiencing heath declines. In some seas like the Mediterranean, marine heatwaves have caused temperature increases of up to 6C.

    As climate pressure mounts on ocean systems, a group of more than 150 top scientists has called on the COP31 Turkish and Australian presidencies to urgently “integrate ocean priorities into negotiation texts on mitigation, adaptation, and finance”.

    They also urged world leaders to issue a “clear political declaration and finance outcomes” on ocean-based climate solutions at the World Leaders Summit, a two-day event during COP where heads of states give speeches laying out their climate priorities.

    Measures to protect marine ecosystems have gathered more attention in recent years, as 90% of national climate plans submitted last year included at least one ocean-based target, compared to 62% in 2015. But countries have faced challenges implementing these commitments due to finance and governance constraints, according to a paper published in June by the World Resources Institute (WRI).

    Most of the current targets focus on protecting marine areas, but have so far lacked commitments to reduce emissions produced at sea, for example through offshore wind or cleaner maritime transport.

    Will the world’s drying lands get relief from COP17 in Mongolia?

    Rethinking ocean negotiations at COP

    At COP26 in Glasgow in 2021, countries agreed to “integrate and strengthen ocean-based action” across climate negotiations, which led to the creation of a yearly informal Ocean and Climate Dialogue. This dialogue does not produce a negotiated agreement like other parts of the COP.

    The dialogue’s informal nature is both an advantage and a challenge, said Jonathan Baines, ocean programme manager at WRI. It provides a more flexible space than formal negotiations and has helped raise the ambition of countries’ climate plans, but COP presidencies have not fully incorporated its outcomes into the official climate talks, he said.

    After five years of holding this dialogue at the mid-year climate negotiations in Bonn, countries called for more tangible outcomes in their submissions to this year’s Ocean and Climate Change Dialogue in June. Some proposed the creation of a roadmap to guide discussions on specific topics and feed them into the formal COP negotiations.

    In their submission, the African Group of Negotiators called for a “structured, multi-year roadmap” aligned with the next Global Stocktake. The EU also backed this roadmap proposal, while Pacific islands and some Latin American countries supported incorporating the dialogue outcomes into the negotiations without specifically endorsing the roadmap initiative.

    As part of a preparatory event before COP31 focused on oceans, Türkiye has confirmed to Climate Home News plans for a Blue COP31 roadmap, which will be discussed by the ministers attending the gathering in September.

    “In essence, this programme is designed to ensure that the ocean is no longer the missing link in climate action, but rather the driving force behind a more resilient, sustainable, and prosperous future for all coastal communities,” Türkiye’s COP31 presidency said in a written comment.

    Co-facilitators in the Ocean and Climate Change dialogue Ulrik Lenaerts from Belgium and Sivendra Michael from Fiji.
    Co-facilitators of the Ocean and Climate Change dialogue Ulrik Lenaerts from Belgium and Sivendra Michael from Fiji. (Photo: IISD/ENB/Maja Schmidt-Thomé)

    Opposition emerges to “additional burdens”

    Some regional groups have already started presenting their priorities publicly, with small island nations calling for more finance, ocean-based renewable energy and bolstering regional research institutes.

    African diplomats said “the core problem remains translating these paper commitments into real-world, on-the-ground implementation” and noted that while countries in the region have strengthened their climate plans, “the support required to implement these commitments has not kept pace”.

    “The truth is that ambition without implementation is an illusion,” the African submission reads, adding that nearly half of all ocean-related commitments in national climate plans are “strictly conditional on external support”.

    This year’s Ocean and Climate Dialogue, chaired by Fiji and Belgium, urged countries to discuss ways of “transitioning away from fossil fuels”, which generated pushback from big fossil fuel-producing and consuming countries who said they would not accept this as a negotiated agreement.

    Both the group of Arab nations and India, meanwhile, warned against “imposing additional burdens” on developing countries and rejected a dialogue with “prescriptive expectations”.

    The Arab group submission said its members oppose “any report that explicitly or implicitly targets specific energy sources, advocates sectoral restrictions, or fails to adequately reflect different national circumstances, development priorities, and energy security considerations”. This is a thinly veiled reference to singling out fossil fuels within the discussions.

    New coal mine openings slow as East Asian demand plateaus

    Climate finance constraints

    While developing countries are already seeking more funding to implement ocean-based conservation, carbon storage and clean energy measures, experts said this will be a “difficult discussion” at COP31, as developed countries will arrive in Antalya with shrinking aid budgets.

    Historically, ocean-related finance has accounted for only a small share of overseas development assistance (ODA), fluctuating between 0.8% and 1.4% of the total, according to data from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

    Berry of the Ocean Conservancy said one opportunity to “grow the pie” of available climate funds will come at a meeting of the UN climate convention’s Standing Committee on Finance, which this year will be held in September in Sydney and will concentrate on financing water systems and the ocean.

    “We haven’t had a focused conversation on ocean climate finance before from the UN climate process,” she said. “If they can clarify those financing pathways specific to ocean climate action and help provide the necessary support for countries to translate commitments into projects, that will be a real benefit.”

    The post As marine heat breaks records, countries seek ocean roadmap at COP31 appeared first on Climate Home News.

    As marine heat breaks records, countries seek ocean roadmap at COP31

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    Climate Change

    Test of nature law standards is major curb on deforestation

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    SYDNEY, Thursday 20 August 2026 — Commenting on the release of the government’s final nature law standards made today, including for Matters of National Environmental Significance, the following lines can be attributed to Glenn Walker, Head of Nature at Greenpeace Australia Pacific:

    “Ultimately the test of the new nature law standards will be whether they materially bring down Australia’s shockingly high rates of deforestation caused by bulldozing for beef and logging of native forests.

    “Deforestation severely threatens the forest homes of some of Australia’s most threatened species including the koala, greater glider and swift parrot. In Queensland the bulldozing of forests is causing mass erosion and the run off of hundreds of thousands of tonnes of muddy soil on the Great Barrier Reef each year.

    “Unless these standards deliver protection for the Great Barrier Reef from deforestation runoff and ensure the healthy recovery of wildlife under threat then they will have failed.

    “There’s clear improvement on the draft standards that were released, which we welcome, but what we have today still falls well short of what would be optimal. In particular, the heavy reliance on offsets and the failure to address the cumulative impacts of hundreds of instances of deforestation–death by a thousand cuts–create serious ongoing weaknesses in the way the standards work. The acid test will now be in the operation: will the standards succeed in stopping deforestation, or not.

    “The effectiveness of the nature law reforms hang heavily on these standards. We will be watching closely as they are implemented and raising the alarm on any failure to curb deforestation.”

    -ENDS-

    Test of nature law standards is major curb on deforestation

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