While government delegations and civil society representatives at the pre-COP in Brasilia this week had hoped for bigger advances on key topics, one stood out as winning broad backing for a leap forward at next month’s UN climate summit: adaptation.
Efforts to adapt to worsening extreme weather and rising seas have long trailed behind measures to cut planet-heating emissions in terms of political support and funding. But as storms, droughts, floods and extreme heat take an ever-higher toll across the world, that imbalance could shift significantly at COP30 this week’s discussions suggest.
COP30 president André Corrêa do Lago told Climate Home that he’s hoping for an adaptation package to be agreed in Belém, which would include a new goal to measure progress on adaptation and a new target to increase finance for climate resilience in developing countries.
“An adaptation package would be important. I said during a closed-door meeting that I would like for COP30 to be remembered as an adaptation COP,” Corrêa do Lago said in an interview on the sidelines of pre-COP30.
Natalie Unterstell, president of the Brazilian Talanoa Institute, told Climate Home conversations on adaptation showed clear progress. “Practically all delegations mentioned the need to elevate adaptation to a higher political level in Belém,” she said.
In Brasilia, which attracted delegations from nearly 70 countries, India said COP30 – the first UN climate summit to take place in the Amazon – needs to be a COP of adaptation. Island nation Barbados urged to increase ambition on adaptation, while Palau called for finance for adaptation to be scaled up.
The group of Least-Developed Countries (LDCs), meanwhile, reiterated a proposal to triple adaptation financing flows compared to 2022 – a year in which developed countries provided and mobilised $32.4 billion.
“For the first time at the pre-COP, we heard from more countries in favour of this proposal, but it still doesn’t have the support of everyone, especially not from developed countries,” said Unterstell, who has been following discussions on the topic.
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The context for boosting adaptation finance – which covers only a small share of identified needs – is difficult, with the US slashing most of its aid under Donald Trump and other key donor countries paring back their development spending amid wars and fiscal pressures.
That would be far short of the estimated $40 billion needed to honour the promise developed countries made four years ago at COP26 in Glasgow to double their adaptation finance from 2019 levels by this year.
Concerned about this trend, and the huge gap between the funding on offer and their adaptation needs, poorer countries want Belém to be the moment to set a new and ambitious adaptation financing goal for the coming years.
Unterstell said this could be discussed under the Global Goal on Adaptation and, particularly, the Baku Adaptation Roadmap agreed during COP29 to advance progress on the adaptation provisions of the Paris Agreement. Another option could be its inclusion in a text prepared by the presidency called a cover decision, but it’s still unclear if COP30 will end with one, she said.
Ministerial consultations held on October 15, 2025, during pre-COP30 in Brasilia. (Photo: Rafa Neddermeyer/COP30 Brasil Amazônia/PR)
Decision due on adaptation indicators
In Brasilia, there was widespread recognition of the need to complete the Global Goal on Adaptation – agreed in the Paris accord 10 years ago – at COP30 by defining the indicators that will guide and monitor adaptation policies in areas such as food production, water and health.
After a process that began with nearly 10,000 indicators, countries are now discussing a far shorter potential list of 100 that should be decided upon at COP30.
At the closing of the pre-COP, Ana Paula Chantre Luna de Carvalho Pereira, environment minister of Angola and one of the coordinators for the adaptation talks, said there was still work to be done by the end of the month to finalise the indicators, so they “are applicable globally, flexible, and reflective of implementation and progress in all countries”.
At the meetings in Brasilia, some governments expressed the need to quickly finalise the definition of the indicators during the first week of COP30 and leave the second week for talks on more political aspects and implementation.
In response, the COP30 president said this could be possible. Civil society representatives were more sceptical, however, because of the differences among countries regarding the indicators, including the total number listed and which are most important. Finance is another likely sticking point.
Lucas Di Pietro, policy consultant and former adaptation director at Argentina’s Ministry of Environment, said the indicators are key to translate the political progress into “measurable and comparable results”.
“Their development must reflect the diversity of contexts and capabilities, allowing each country to adopt those most relevant to its national reality,” said Di Pietro. “Rather than rushing to approve them, it is important that the final result is balanced and linked to the effective provision of means of implementation, such as finance, technology and capacity-building.”
Many countries – especially some developing ones – consider it essential to include indicators related to the financing provided by developed countries to developing ones, while others argue that all types of financing should be monitored — including private sector investments.
June Rubis is a steering group committee member for the Cali Fund, from Sarawak in Malaysian Borneo.
At COP16 in Cali, governments made a significant commitment: at least half of the funding from the new Cali Fund should support the self-identified needs of Indigenous Peoples and local communities, including women and youth. It was a watershed moment for multilateral benefit-sharing.
The challenge now is to translate that commitment into access arrangements that recognise the different institutions, priorities and decision-making processes of Indigenous Peoples and local communities.
For generations, biodiversity and traditional Indigenous knowledge have provided significant value to companies who depend on nature’s genetic diversity to discover new drugs that fight diseases, create products that improve health, and grow crops resilient to extreme heat and flooding events. While some compounds are sampled directly from the source country, increasingly the digital blueprints are held in online public databases which are freely accessible to use for innovation and research.
The Cali Fund was established at COP16 to encourage commercial users of Digital Sequence Information, or DSI, to share benefits arising from its use. Estimates suggest it could generate over $3.5 billion a year – a stark contrast to the modest $10,656 currently committed to the fund from just five SMEs, underlining how much progress must be made at COP17 over the next two weeks.
The COP16 decision that set up the fund offers two routes for money to reach Indigenous Peoples and local communities: through government authorities, and through direct payments to institutions identified by Indigenous Peoples and local communities themselves.
Varied ways of organising
Indigenous Peoples and local communities organise through a wide range of institutions. Some have national or regional organisations experienced in managing international grants. Others work through territorial organisations, customary institutions, community associations, cooperatives or networks. Some have professional finance teams and audited accounts; others have extensive experience governing territories, collective resources or conservation work without having been organised around international funding requirements.
For direct access, some questions are already apparent. Which institutions should be able to receive funds? How should they be identified? What fiduciary standards should apply? How should safeguards and accountability work where institutional capacities differ? What support may be needed where institutions have strong community mandates but less experience with international finance?
If access is designed mainly around institutions that already meet the expectations of large international finance mechanisms, early funding will tend to favour those already familiar to funders. They will gain further experience and become better positioned for future funding, while institutions with less administrative capacity may remain outside the system despite strong community mandates and long histories of stewardship.
These first decisions matter most, because they set the terms for everyone who follows.
The role of intermediaries requires care. Some Indigenous organisations may want a fiscal host to hold and manage funds on their behalf. Communities may choose to work through an NGO they trust. Government-facilitated arrangements may work well in particular national contexts.
What matters is the function an intermediary performs and the authority that comes with it. Providing administrative support is different from deciding which Indigenous organisations qualify, which priorities can receive support, or how success will be assessed. Direct access means communities keep that decision-making authority.
Decision-making power
The COP16 decision refers to institutions that Indigenous Peoples and local communities identify. But authority among Indigenous Peoples does not sit in one kind of body. It may sit with territorial organisations, customary institutions, community associations or combinations of these. Legal recognition and customary authority do not always align neatly.
An important feature of the Cali Fund’s governance is that Indigenous Peoples and local communities participate as full members of the Steering Committee, rather than as observers. Seven Indigenous Peoples and local community representatives, one from each of the seven socio-cultural regions, participate in consensus-based decision-making alongside representatives of governments and UN entities. Six additional representatives from civil society, scientific institutions and the private sector participate as observers.
That representation carries responsibility. Institutional legitimacy, access and representation take different forms across the seven socio-cultural regions. Indigenous Peoples and local communities members therefore have an important role in bringing those differences into the Fund’s governance and in ensuring that arrangements developed for one context do not become the assumed model for everyone else.
Safeguards and clear responsibilities
COP17 can establish the core principles and direction, while allowing operational pathways to develop in ways that respond to different regional contexts. The decisions countries take in Yerevan will shape how that flexibility is realised in practice.
The choices made around access will influence which institutions are able to participate, which routes become established and which forms of authority are recognised within the funding architecture. The aim should be an architecture with enough structure to maintain confidence while allowing for different forms of Indigenous and community governance.
A credible direct-access pathway will need safeguards, financial oversight and clear responsibilities. This would give the 50% commitment a stronger institutional foundation.
The Cali Fund’s importance will ultimately depend not only on how much funding reaches Indigenous Peoples and local communities, but on whether they are able to determine how the money is accessed, governed and used. This requires access pathways that recognise their institutions, priorities and decision-making processes, rather than requiring them to conform to a single predetermined model.
The UK government has approved extraction at the Jackdaw gas field in the North Sea, despite acknowledging that this decision could make it harder for Britain to convince other countries to move away from fossil fuel production.
UK energy secretary Miatta Fahnbulleh approved the drilling on Wednesday after months of high-profile debate, fuelled in part by interventions from US President Donald Trump. She argued that the project would boost energy security in the wake of the Middle East fossil fuel crisis, protect hundreds of jobs and add £2.9 billion ($3.88bn) to the UK economy.
She said Jackdaw’s gas would be cleaner than imported gas and would not prevent the UK from meeting its legally-binding carbon targets and its goal of net zero by 2050. As the field is already licensed, she said extraction was consistent with the Labour Party’s 2024 manifesto promise not to issue any new oil and gas licenses.
The same morning, the government announced a new Energy Wealth Fund to reinvest oil and gas revenues in the climate transition. It will start with £2 billion ($2.67bn) from the government and be topped up over time with tax revenues from offshore oil and gas production.
Energy Secretary Miatta Fahnbulleh and Chancellor of the Exchequer John Healey leave 10 Downing Street following Prime Minister Andy Burnham’s first cabinet meeting, on July 21, 2026 in London, England. (Photo by Ben Montgomery/Getty Images)
Climate campaigners in the UK and abroad were quick to condemn the decision, while a leading legal expert told Climate Home News it goes against the advice of the International Court of Justice. Meanwhile, the government’s own documents reveal that it recognises the drilling could damage the UK’s reputation and its ability to push forward the global transition away from fossil fuels.
“Climate leadership” blow
The 92-page decision document says Fahnbulleh “acknowledges that international standing on climate is important and accepts that a decision to grant consent may not further the UK’s international climate leadership.”
It adds: “She acknowledges concerns about the potential implications for the UK’s credibility and influence – including the difficulty inherent in encouraging other states to move away from fossil fuel production while the UK continues, in a limited and transitional way, to draw on its own domestic resources.”
While noting that Jackdaw has not been issued with a new license – just permission to extract gas – the document says Fahnbulleh “accepts this does not fully resolve the underlying tension in the UK’s position” but “considers this alongside the substance of the UK’s wider record [on emissions reduction], which remains significant”.
It continues that she accepts these concerns are “legitimate” and weigh against approving gas extraction, but only gives this argument a “moderate negative weight” set against the benefits of gas production.
“Huge” wrong signal
In international climate talks, the UK has long supported the transition away from fossil fuels and is one of very few major oil and gas producers to ban new licenses. Across the North Sea, the Norwegian government continues to make offshore areas available for oil and gas exploration through annual licensing rounds.
Climate experts and campaigners shared the concern, acknowledged in the decision document, that approving Jackdaw could set a precedent for fossil fuel production elsewhere. Sam Fankhauser, professor of climate change economics at Oxford University, said the direct climate impact of Jackdaw is “much smaller than the debate around it would suggest” but the “wrong signal it sends, however, is huge”.
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Bob Ward, policy and communications director at the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change, said that while Jackdaw’s output will be very small, “it will signal to other fossil fuel producers that they too should carry on with business as usual, less than a month before the COP31”.
Kenyan campaigner Mohamed Adow, director of Power Shift Africa, called the decision “a serious blow to Britain’s international climate credibility” as “the UK cannot expect developing countries to move away from fossil fuels while giving the green light to new drilling in its own backyard”.
International Court of Justice
In July 2025, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) advised that government failure to take appropriate climate action “including through fossil fuel production” may amount to an internationally wrongful act.
The UK voted in favour of a United Nations resolution welcoming the advisory opinion. Yet, in its Jackdaw decision document, it notes that the ICJ opinion is not legally binding and says the UK does not accept the court’s opinion that the customary international law duty to prevent significant harm to the environment applies to climate change.
Fahnbulleh concludes that, although it will have “significant effect on the environment”, gas drilling in Jackdaw “would not lead to significant harm to the environment” – and so does not breach any duty to prevent such harm. Instead, the government document says the duty should be considered “as a matter of policy rather than legal obligation”.
Margaretha Wewerinke-Singh, who led Vanuatu’s legal team pushing for the ICJ’s advisory opinion, told Climate Home News that treating the duty as a matter of policy rather than legal obligation is “not how international law works”. “An advisory opinion is not a judgement,” she said, “but it states the law as it stands, and that law binds the UK whether or not it accepts it.”
“Even as a matter of policy,” she added, “the decision asks the wrong question: whether Jackdaw on its own would cause significant harm. The Court found that accumulated emissions are already causing significant harm. What matters is whether approving new production is consistent with the stringent due diligence the duty requires.”
Public support for decision
While the decision was criticised by climate campaigners and the opposition Green party, polling reported by Politico suggests that 55% of British adults support drilling at Jackdaw, with just 14% opposed. Even supporters of the UK’s net zero target back new drilling by more than two to one, the polling found.
Jackdaw is one of two North Sea oil and gas fields the government has been debating whether to extract more from for months. While Jackdaw is a small gas field, the other, Rosebank, is a much larger field that holds mostly oil.
Rosebank’s emissions are estimated to be around seven times higher than Jackdaw’s. Fahnbulleh told Sky News that Rosebank is “different” to Jackdaw because its oil would be exported, whereas Jackdaw’s gas will be used in the UK, adding that she will consider it “in its own right”.
The Guardian reported on Wednesday that UK officials say Fahnbulleh is minded to refuse approval for Rosebank. She has not yet taken a final decision on Rosebank, the newspaper said, but a ruling is expected later this year.
