A recent exclusive from Reuters revealed that the Trump administration is aiming to secure a 10% stake in Lithium Americas (NYSE: LAC). This move is part of ongoing negotiations to revise a $2.3 billion Department of Energy loan, which backs the Thacker Pass lithium project in Nevada—developed in partnership with General Motors.
The move shows Washington’s increasing readiness to take charge of key mineral projects. This aims to protect national security and lessen dependence on China.
Trump Targets Lithium Americas Equity
This proposed deal reflects a larger trend. Trump officials have pursued stakes in Intel, MP Materials, and other key tech firms. Washington’s push for direct equity in Lithium Americas shows that taxpayer-backed financing needs real returns. This is vital for sectors important to the clean energy transition.
The same Reuters report revealed what a White House official told the news agency. He said, “President Trump supports this project. He wants it to succeed and also be fair to taxpayers. But there’s no such thing as free money.”
Loan Backdrop: A $2.26 Billion Bet
In October 2024, the U.S. Department of Energy’s Loan Programs Office (LPO) approved a $2.26 billion loan for Lithium Nevada Corp., part of Lithium Americas. This loan includes $1.97 billion in principal and $289.7 million in capitalized interest. It’s one of the largest federal investments in U.S. lithium production.
The loan lasts for 24 years and has an interest rate tied to the U.S. Treasury rate. It will fund facilities to produce lithium carbonate for lithium-ion batteries.
Thacker Pass: America’s Lithium Powerhouse
Thacker Pass is in Humboldt County, Nevada, about 25 miles south of the Oregon border. It aims to be the largest lithium source in the Western Hemisphere. Construction has been underway for nearly a year, with over 600 contractors currently active on-site.
The project is massive in scale:
- Phase 1 output: 40,000 tonnes of battery-grade lithium carbonate annually.
- Enough material to power up to 800,000 electric vehicles (EVs) each year.
- Backed by the world’s largest measured lithium resource, enabling the development of a full lithium district in northern Nevada.
Slated to open in 2028, Thacker Pass is seen as a cornerstone of America’s clean energy strategy, promising to cut foreign dependence while fueling the EV boom.

Economic Impact for Nevada Communities
The Thacker Pass project also carries major local economic benefits. During construction, it is expected to create 1,800 jobs, with 360 permanent positions once operational. These jobs range from chemical processing specialists to management roles, providing new opportunities for rural Nevada.
The Biden administration earlier emphasized that the project aligns with its pledge to ensure the energy transition generates prosperity in communities that have historically been left out of economic growth.
- SEE ALSO: Live Lithium Prices Today
Why Trump Wants a Bigger Piece
Despite bipartisan support, the Trump administration has raised concerns about loan repayment amid a slump in lithium prices caused by Chinese overproduction. The fear: Lithium Americas might struggle to repay the DOE loan, potentially putting taxpayer dollars at risk.
Trump officials are demanding stronger safeguards, including:
- Equity Warrants: No-cost warrants that could give Washington 5%–10% ownership of Lithium Americas.
- GM Guarantees: A binding commitment that General Motors (GM) will purchase lithium from Thacker Pass for decades.
- Project Oversight: Pressure on GM to relinquish parts of its project control to the federal government.

GM’s $625 Million Bet on Lithium
GM invested $625 million in Thacker Pass in 2024, securing a 38% stake and long-term supply rights. The automaker locked in access to all lithium from the mine’s first phase and part of the second phase for 20 years, making the project essential to GM’s EV strategy.
A GM spokesperson stressed: “We’re confident in the project, which supports the administration’s goals. The loan is a necessary part of financing to commercialize this important national resource.”
For GM, Thacker Pass is a supply lifeline as it ramps up EV production under its electrification roadmap.
- SEE DETAILS: General Motors Invests $625M in Lithium Americas to Boost Nevada’s Thacker Pass Lithium Project
A Tightrope Over Loan Restructuring
Lithium Americas had sought a modification in the loan’s amortization schedule—shifting when certain payments are due, though not altering the overall repayment timeline or interest owed.
But as we understand, Trump officials want more. They see the deal as a chance to ensure taxpayers capture upside from any future rise in lithium prices and to cement federal influence over a strategic resource.
Even under the existing loan agreement, Washington holds protections. Reuter explained that clauses in the contract allow the government to seize control of the project if it faces significant delays or cost overruns. That safeguard reflects how seriously the U.S. views critical mineral projects in its broader economic and defense strategy.
Lithium Supply: America’s Weak Spot
Currently, the U.S. produces less than 5000 tonnes of lithium per year, less than 1% of global supply. By contrast, Australia, Chile, and China dominate mining, while China refines over 75% of the world’s battery-grade lithium.
Latest lithium data from USGS shows:
- U.S. reserves: ~1.8 million tonnes.
- Geological resources: ~19 million tonnes.
- Global production (2024): 240,000 tonnes.
That imbalance leaves the U.S. heavily exposed. Overreliance on foreign supply chains poses risks to defense capabilities, infrastructure, and technology development. With minerals traveling an average of 50,000 miles before being assembled into batteries, the carbon footprint of global lithium supply is also a concern.

Thacker Pass promises to change the equation by establishing a domestic EV battery supply chain, reducing emissions, and enhancing economic security.
China’s Grip on Lithium
China may not be the top miner of lithium, but its control of refining capacity is unrivaled. The country processes 60–75% of the global supply, turning raw ore into the high-purity lithium carbonate and hydroxide required for EV batteries.
That dominance has raised concerns in the U.S., which views domestic lithium production as crucial for both the energy transition and national security. Direct U.S. ownership in Thacker Pass would send a clear message: America is ready to compete.
Lithium Americas Stock (NYSE: LAC) Jumps
This announcement fueled a dramatic rally in Lithium Americas’ stock. Shares closed at $3.07, then soared pre-market to $5.23 – a remarkable jump of nearly 71%. After markets opened, the price surged even higher, reaching $6.30 intraday. The rally sent the company’s market capitalization above $1.39 billion, highlighting how direct government involvement can rapidly transform investor confidence and reshape valuation.
Other U.S. lithium developers—including ioneer (ASX: INR), Standard Lithium (TSX-V: SLI), and even Exxon Mobil (NYSE: XOM), which has entered lithium projects—are closely watching. If Washington pursues direct ownership across the sector, project financing and timelines could shift overnight.
By seeking a stake in Lithium Americas, the Trump administration is reshaping how the U.S. approaches critical mineral projects. It’s now about equity and control.
A Turning Point for U.S. Lithium
Thacker Pass is becoming the test case for America’s resource nationalism. With Trump pushing for equity, and GM relying on its output for EV production, the project sits at the intersection of energy security, industrial policy, and the clean energy future.
Additionally, analysts are also considering a reduction in the volatility of lithium prices with this deal. Notably, SMM data shows battery-grade lithium carbonate prices are approximately $9,165 per metric tonne (USD) and battery-grade lithium hydroxide around $9,200 to $9,800 per metric tonne.
If successful, Thacker Pass could anchor a new domestic lithium district and accelerate the U.S. energy transition. But with Washington demanding a slice of ownership, the deal could redefine how America funds and controls its most critical resources. However, it’s marking a new era in the race for clean energy minerals.
The post Lithium Americas (LAC) Stock Rockets 95% as Trump Seeks Government Equity in Nation’s Largest Lithium Mine appeared first on Carbon Credits.
Carbon Footprint
Climate-Linked Supply Chain Risk Is Already in Your P&L
The earnings calls that quietly reframed climate from sustainability question to operating risk.
Three earnings calls in the last 18 months tell the story without any help from a press release.
Hershey, May 2024: cocoa price exposure compresses margin, and the company attributes part of the cost shock to West African weather. Olam, July 2024: coffee climate exposure quantified in the annual report. JBS, January 2025: supply chain climate disclosures expanded materially in response to investor pressure and regulatory expectation. None of these companies issued the announcement as climate news. They issued it as financial news. The climate-linked supply chain risk did not arrive with a sustainability framing; it arrived as a P&L line.
You are probably reading this article because you suspect the same thing is happening to your business. This piece walks through what is showing up on which earnings calls, how procurement and finance leaders are quantifying the exposure, and what serious corporates are doing about it before the regulator asks.
Where climate risk has already appeared in earnings
The pattern is consistent across resource-intensive sectors. A weather event compresses supply, the price spikes, the cost flows through the income statement, and the analyst on the call asks whether the event is anomalous or structural. Increasingly, the honest answer is the second one.
Cocoa is the cleanest example. The 2023 to 2024 West African harvest fell sharply on the back of erratic rainfall and disease. Cocoa futures more than tripled. Companies with concentrated West African sourcing absorbed the cost; companies with diversified sourcing absorbed less. The exposure was not climate as ESG topic. It was climate as cost of goods.
Coffee follows the same pattern. Brazilian and Vietnamese harvests have moved on weather more sharply across the last several seasons. Roasters with long-tenor supplier relationships and origin diversification have managed the volatility; roasters with spot-market exposure have not. Wheat, sugar, palm oil, beef: the same dynamic in different commodities, a pattern the IPCC AR6 Working Group II report projects will intensify across agricultural systems through mid-century.
What this means: climate risk is no longer a footnote in the 10-K. It is a line item the CFO has to explain on the call.
The three commodity exposures that hit margin first
For most companies with material Scope 3 exposure, three exposures dominate the near-term P&L risk.
- Concentrated single-origin sourcing in a climate-vulnerable region. If your tier-one supply for any material commodity sits in one geography, you have a concentration risk that climate amplifies. Diversification across origins is the obvious hedge, but it takes years to build and requires relationships you cannot acquire by tender.
- Supplier financial fragility under climate stress. Smallholder farmers, who supply a large share of the global cocoa, coffee, and palm oil market, do not carry the balance sheets to absorb yield shocks. When yields collapse, they exit. When they exit, your supply base shrinks, and the surviving suppliers raise prices. The risk is structural, not cyclical.
- Logistics and storage exposure to extreme weather. Hurricane disruptions to Gulf shipping, drought-driven Panama Canal restrictions, flooding in European inland waterways: each of these has moved input costs in the last three years, a pattern documented in Munich Re’s natural catastrophe data. The exposure shows up as a one-quarter event in the financial press but accumulates over time on the cost line.
TCFD and ISSB disclosure changes
The disclosure architecture has now caught up with the risk. The Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, whose recommendations are now embedded in the ISSB’s IFRS S2 climate standard, requires companies to disclose climate-related risks across physical and transition categories, with quantification where possible.
For physical risk specifically (the climate-linked supply chain risk you are reading about), the disclosure must address both acute exposures (extreme weather events) and chronic exposures (gradual changes in temperature, precipitation, and growing seasons). The disclosure must address the time horizon over which the risk is material, the parts of the value chain exposed, and the financial impact under different scenarios.
The CSRD imposes similar requirements under European law, with double materiality (both financial and impact materiality) embedded in the assessment. The practical effect: your auditors and your investor relations team now need a defensible answer to the climate-linked supply chain risk question, and the answer needs to be quantified.
What procurement and finance can do now
Three actions matter near-term.
Map your exposure. Most companies do not have a clear view of which tier-one and tier-two suppliers sit in which climate-vulnerable geographies. Without the map, you cannot quantify the risk, and without the quantification, you cannot disclose it credibly. The map is the foundation, and World Resources Institute climate risk research provides useful public tooling to start.
Diversify and deepen, in that order. Diversification across origins reduces concentration risk, but the deeper move is to invest in the resilience of the suppliers you already have. Regenerative practices, agroforestry, soil health interventions: these reduce yield volatility under climate stress and protect your input cost trajectory.
Embed the climate spend inside procurement, not outside it. Treating climate risk as a sustainability cost line subordinates it to the ESG budget. Treating it as a procurement and resilience investment puts it in the budget that matters, which is the cost-of-goods budget that the CFO defends quarterly.
Nature-based supply chain investments are the asset class designed for exactly this purpose. They sit inside the value chain, they reduce climate-linked supply risk, they generate verifiable Scope 3 reductions, and they produce the documentation an auditor and a regulator can both test.
If you are quantifying climate-linked supply chain risk in advance of the next earnings cycle or the next disclosure period, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you map your exposure and structure a Dual-Value Model response that addresses reduction, resilience, and disclosure-readiness in a single program. Schedule a consultation.
Carbon Footprint
Where should an SME start with a carbon action plan?
More and more small and medium-sized businesses are hearing the same question from their larger customers: What is your carbon footprint? That question now travels down entire supply chains, and it arrives next to tender requirements, certification criteria, and rising customer expectations.
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Carbon Footprint
Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets
The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.
The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.
This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.
The two definitions, in plain English
Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.
Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.
The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.
What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says
The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).
For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.
For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.
A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.
When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)
Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:
- The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
- The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
- The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
- It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.
The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.
When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.
The procurement and supplier engagement question
Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.
To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.
The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.
Choosing the right tool for the right target
A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.
The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.
If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.
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