Governments are still at loggerheads over the timeline for publishing the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) next three-part report, after countries doubled down on existing positions at a meeting in Bangkok.
Last week, around 330 delegates from more than 100 countries met in Thailand for the 64th session (IPCC-64) of the UN’s climate science body.
The meeting, set against the backdrop of a global energy shock triggered by war in the Middle East, comes more than two-and-a-half years into the IPCC’s seventh assessment cycle (AR7).
There was disagreement on a range of issues, including the workplan for the cycle’s “working group” reports.
For five consecutive meetings, countries have failed to agree on whether the reports should be completed before, or after, the second “global stocktake” process under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), due to culminate in 2028.
IPCC chair Prof Jim Skea tells Carbon Brief the “frustrating and disappointing” meeting delivered “minimal outcomes”.
“We made some formal decisions by consensus, but I would say they were more to postpone the decision making than they were to take decisions,” he says.
AR7 report timeline
As is typical for an IPCC assessment report cycle, AR7 will include three “working group” reports – on the physical science of climate change, impacts and adaptation, and mitigation. These will be summarised in a synthesis report.
Work is already underway on the three headline reports, as well as a special report on cities and climate change and methodology reports on carbon dioxide removal technologies and inventories for short-lived climate forcers.
However, countries are yet to reach an agreement as to when the three headline reports will be published, after deadlocked negotiations at meetings at Lima, Hangzhou, Sofia and Istanbul.
A coalition of developing and developed countries have backed a plan – proposed by the IPCC’s co-chairs – that would see the three reports published in 2028. This would enable their findings to feed into the second global stocktake, due to conclude that year at the COP33 conference.
The global stocktake is a five-yearly appraisal of global progress on tackling climate change that is designed to inform the national climate goals countries must submit to the UN under the Paris Agreement.
A separate group of countries, including China, India, Kenya, Russia and Saudi Arabia, have argued for a longer timeline on the grounds that developing nations need more time to review and approve the reports, according to reports from inside the meeting. This would mean some of the working group reports would be published after the second global stocktake is completed.
Dr Bill Hare, CEO and senior scientist at Climate Analytics, tells Carbon Brief that “the majority of countries, across geographies and levels of development, including least developed countries and small island developing states” support a timeline where the AR7 reports align with the stocktake.
Speaking during the opening session of IPCC-64, UNFCCC executive secretary Simon Steill said that 194 nations who attended COP30 in Belem last year had “emphasised the critical importance of the IPCC’s work in ensuring that the best available science feeds into the global stocktake”.
The timeline of the AR7 reports was not on a provisional agenda released ahead of the meeting.
However, the contentious issue was belatedly added to the agenda on the meeting’s first day, according to the Earth Negotiation Bulletin (ENB) reporting from inside the meeting.
This came after objections about the omission from a raft of countries, including Algeria, China, Egypt, Kenya, India, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Venezuela.
According to the ENB, Saudi Arabia “insisted” the issue be included on the agenda and warned that deferring it to the next meeting “risked a scenario in which the budget would not be approved and further work would be delayed”.
In response to calls for clarification on why there was no formal agenda item on report timelines, IPCC AR7 chair Prof Jim Skea said the secretariat had “not detected the flexibility” among governments that could lead to its resolution, according to the ENB.
Skea thus proposed that “informal consultations” would be held in order to “identify the basis for any flexibility”. He also suggested the subject be discussed in a session earmarked for “any other business”.
This proposal was rejected by some delegations, who argued the issue required more formal treatment and said informal consultations might not be inclusive, the ENB says.
In the end, the IPCC agreed to add the item to the agenda and establish a contact group, co-chaired by Brazil and Canada, tasked with advising the IPCC on how to make progress.
Speaking to Carbon Brief, Skea explains that the secretariat did not put the issue on the agenda because it had “very low expectations about the success of such a discussion” and felt that more preparation was needed “to build the foundations for a decision” at a future meeting.
The last-minute addition of AR7 timelines to the agenda prompted some delegations to question the inclusivity of discussions. They noted that some countries had come without permission from their governments to discuss the issue, the ENB reports, whereas others with “limited resources” had decided to skip the meeting altogether.
This position was articulated at different stages of negotiations by Antigua and Barbuda, the Netherlands and Singapore in interventions supported by Canada, China, Cuba, Mexico, South Korea and Tanzania.
Climate Analytics’ Hare explains:
“The agenda item ‘progress with the timeline of AR7’ was added at the last minute upon pressure by countries including India and Saudi Arabia, in an attempt to introduce their own timelines into the process, which would push both WG2 and WG3 to 2029.
“As the AR7 timeline was not on the provisional agenda, many developing countries with resource and capacity constraints across the continent did not attend the session.”
One observer to the talks tells Carbon Brief that logistical issues prompted by the war in Iran had contributed to some countries’ decision not to attend.
‘Heated and polarised’
Discussions about the AR7 report timeline were focused on how to reach agreement by the IPCC’s next session.
A number of solutions were proposed, including for the IPCC secretariat to hold “informal conversations” between sessions to the creation of an “options paper” based on country submissions that would be presented at IPCC-65. Ultimately, all options ultimately failed to get the consensus required to be officially ratified by the IPCC.
On Thursday, the co-chairs of a contact group tasked with advising on how to progress with the timeline issue reported that “no consensus had been reached” and said there was a need for a “further exchange of views”, according to ENB.
Singapore subsequently suggested a plan for countries to formally submit views on the topic to the IPCC secretariat, which would then summarise submissions and present an “options report” for discussion at IPCC-65, says ENB. This would allow countries that were not prepared or not present at IPCC-64 to contribute, the country delegation said.
On the other hand, the Cook Islands said that “time is of the essence and further submissions from members should not be invited”, reports ENB. The country delegation also said the report timeline presented by co-chairs in Lima provided “sufficient time” for report reviews. This intervention was supported by Australia, Belize, Chile, Dominican Republic, Finland, Italy, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Panama, Samoa and Vanuatu.
Saudi Arabia repeated objections raised at previous meetings and said there was a need to address issues relating to overlaps in report scheduling, back-to-back reviews, inclusivity and capacity, as well as how the IPCC aligns with the UNFCCC processes, reports the ENB.
Instead, Saudi Arabia suggested that a later publication of working group reports in 2028 and 2029 would “provide sufficient intervals between IPCC sessions, time for developing countries to undertake their reviews and inclusive engagement”. This intervention was backed by Bahrain, Belarus, Kenya, Russia and Yemen, according to ENB.
As in previous IPCC sessions, there were diverging opinions around whether the IPCC needed to align report production with the global stocktake.
Some countries – including Bangladesh, Panama and South Korea, emphasised the need for the reports to align with the UNFCCC process.
The Netherlands, backing the plan for countries to submit their views ahead of IPCC-65, said delivery of AR7 reports after the global stocktake would “significantly lower” their policy relevance. The delegation noted that “never before” had the timeline given rise to such “heated and polarised debate”, according to the ENB.
Others – including Saudi Arabia, China and Russia – minimised the role of IPCC reports as an input into the stocktake, reports ENB.
A selection of interventions by country delegations at the IPCC’s Bangkok meeting, as reported in the ENB’s meeting summary. ENB (2026).
A number of countries, including France, Haiti and Panama, stressed that the absence of several delegations from the Bangkok meeting, including many small-island states, made the discussions about the timeline less inclusive, according to ENB.
Skea tells Carbon Brief that none of the talking points raised by countries around AR7 reports were new:
“I didn’t hear any new arguments offered at this meeting.”
No decision
By close of play on Thursday, Skea presented a draft decision text which proposed that governments entrust the IPCC secretariat to develop an “options paper” that would be circulated ahead of IPCC-65, with a view to making a decision at the meeting.
India, Russia and Saudi Arabia said that they would prefer the creation of a “task group” that would produce a “compilation of views and proposals” on options for the timeline, according to the ENB. This would provide the “basis for further discussion” at IPCC-65.
Skea subsequently advised IPCC vice-chair Ladislaus Chang’a to form a huddle to find a middle ground between these two approaches.
On Friday, Chang’a presented a compromise solution where the IPCC chair and secretariat would “facilitate an exchange on the timeline with a view to reaching a decision at IPCC-65”, according to ENB. This would include overseeing a “task group” that would work between now and the next session.
This “draft decision” was backed by Brazil, China, India, Kenya, Russia and Saudi Arabia.
However, Belgium, Chile, Colombia, the Cook Islands, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Sweden and Switzerland said they could not support it, ENB says.
Antigua and Barbuda, the Cook Islands and a coalition of European nations instead suggested the chair hold “informal conversations” with governments over the coming months, with a view to coming to a timeline agreement at IPCC-65, says the ENB.
Skea subsequently proposed eliminating the reference to the task group in the decision text and to postpone all further deliberations on the timeline to IPCC-65.
This proposal faced opposition from a swathe of developing and emerging-economy countries, including Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Botswana, Burundi, Cuba, Guinea, India, Iraq, Kenya, Libya, Libya, Russia, Tanzania, Tunisia, Turkmenistan and Venezuela.
At this juncture, a growing number of countries supported pressing ahead without a decision text, citing lack of consensus as the meeting clock was running down, notes ENB.
Among these countries was Canada. Its delegation noted there was little time left in the session – and that countries had heard “basically nothing” about the scientific work of the IPCC at the meeting, reports ENB.
Despite some last-hour calls from India and South Africa for previous proposals to be revisited, no agreement was reached and no decision issued.
Review of IPCC principles and procedures
Another issue discussed in Bangkok was a review of the IPCC’s principles and procedures, which inform how the panel goes about putting together its reports.
The principles and procedures came into force in 1998 and are meant to be reviewed every five years. However, the last review was delayed due to the Covid pandemic.
Opening the agenda item on the IPCC’s principles and procedures towards the beginning of the talks on Tuesday, IPCC officials laid out 12 topics that the IPCC bureau had prioritised for review, according to the ENB. These included:
- Author selection criteria
- Responsibility for author selection
- Chapter scientists
- Scope of literature/Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge. (See Carbon Brief’s recent report on considering Indigenous knowledge within the IPCC.)
- Selection criteria and responsibilities for review editors
- Terms of reference for the chair, vice chairs and working group co-chairs
- Terms of reference for technical support units
- Developing country engagement and broader finance concerns
- Carbon footprint and inclusivity
- Artificial intelligence
- Copyright
- Timing and guidance on conflict of interest
Skea told countries that, while the bureau’s input was meant to inform discussions, it was for them to decide if a review of the principles and procedures was needed and what topics should be covered.
In discussions that followed, some countries called for the review to focus on the inclusivity of global south countries, while others said the review should be “targeted”, “focused” and “completed within a set time frame” to allow the IPCC to make swift progress.
Noting countries’ differing views, Skea proposed a huddle to discuss whether a task force on the review should be created.
On Wednesday, countries once again set out their priorities for the review.
According to the ENB, many countries “prioritised copyright, conflict of interest procedures, AI, and ensuring inclusivity by supporting the participation of developing and least developed countries and incorporating Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge”.
Many also said the “principles and procedures are working well and supported a limited review that could be completed by IPCC-65, ahead of the report approval sessions starting in 2027”, the ENB says.
A small number of countries, including Saudi Arabia, India and Russia, called for the procedures to dictate that the timing of IPCC reports should be unaffected by “external factors”.
This could be interpreted as a reference to the push for the next IPCC assessment report to coincide with the next global stocktake – something that Saudi Arabia, India and Russia oppose.
Skea proposed the establishment of a contact group to try to take discussions forward, appointing Egypt and Ireland as co-chairs.
On Friday, the contact group co-chairs told the talks that they had found no agreement on whether to complete a review of the principles and procedures at these talks or at a future session.
Skea then presented a draft decision produced by the contact group co-chairs, which stated that the “IPCC’s principles and procedures are robust and have worked well” and expressed thanks to the bureau “for their work in preparing for a review of the principles and procedures”.
In response, Saudi Arabia said the draft “lacked a clear process and could be misleading”, with India adding that the “group had not reached agreement”, according to the ENB.
Colombia suggested “specifying that the review of principles and procedures had ended and would be considered again in 2031”, it continues.
This idea was opposed by Saudi Arabia, who said the “review has just begun”.
India, Kenya and Saudi Arabia also opposed language indicating the principles and procedures “have worked well and are robust”.
Norway “observed that lack of consensus could be interpreted to mean that no amendments of the principles and procedures were appropriate and the panel could consider the review complete”, according to the ENB.
Skea presented a slightly revised text for adoption, which was adopted without further discussion.
The text notes the “diversity of views expressed at the session” and “decides to consider the review of the IPCC principles and procedures at future sessions, as appropriate”.
The ENB notes that this outcome left countries confused, saying:
“Some countries saw lack of consensus as an indication that discussions on the issue are now complete, while others believe the review process has just begun.”
Approval of meeting summaries
In what could be viewed as a signifier of the high levels of disagreement between countries, the talks failed to approve the meeting reports from its past three sessions in Peru, China and Bulgaria.
(The approval of the reports from China and Bulgaria had already been shifted to this meeting after countries failed to agree to them at previous sessions.)
During discussions on Wednesday, many European countries, along with Panama, complained about a “lack of transparency” in the reports, according to the ENB.
They suggested that countries making interventions should be named in the reports and that the number of speakers showing their support or opposition to an issue should be included.
This idea was opposed by Saudi Arabia.
In response, Skea called for a huddle to convene to discuss the matter further.
On Friday, Skea noted that some countries had suggested that the “quality” of the report from the most recent meeting in Peru was higher than those from China and Bulgaria and suggested that countries adopt it.
Germany opposed this, expressing “openness” to further revisions of the report, in light of “diverging views” and a “lack of consensus in the room”, according to the ENB.
France requested that “past and future reports include everything that has been said by all delegates”, a view that was described as “unacceptable” by Saudi Arabia.
Skea said the lack of consensus from countries meant the issue would be deferred to the next IPCC meeting. This was reflected in a text adopted at the meeting.
Funding crunch
The IPCC receives funding from its parent organisations, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and UN Environment Programme (UNEP), in addition to voluntary contributions from its member governments and the UNFCCC. This money is held in a “trust fund”.
According to the IPCC, the trust fund “supports IPCC activities, in particular the participation of developing country experts in the IPCC, the organisation of meetings as well as publication and translation of IPCC reports”.
However, in her opening remarks at last week’s meeting, UNEP executive director Inger Andersen warned that “expenditures from the IPCC trust fund have exceeded contributions over the last few years”, according to the ENB. She added:
“If this continues, the trust fund’s cash balance will be depleted before the end of the seventh cycle, impacting both this cycle and the transition to the next.”
The IPCC secretariat presented nine different IPCC funding scenarios for 2026-29 to the delegates. These scenarios include three different future expenditure levels, ranging from a “business as usual” scenario to a “severe spending cuts” scenario, which would see “fully virtual operations with suspension of multiple activities”.
They combine these expenditure scenarios with three different contribution scenarios, including a scenario in which annual contributions match annual expenditure and another that is equivalent to 2025 expenditure.
These scenarios highlighted that the IPCC trust fund is “likely to be depleted soon without new and larger financial contributions, expenditure cuts, or both,, the ENB says. It continues:
“The message was clear: if contributions do not increase, significant cuts in operations and more efficient meeting formats will need to be implemented. Possible ways forward include reduced activities and the greater use of virtual meetings, which run counter to the needs voiced by many countries for inclusivity, equity and capacity.”
The ENB adds that “the timing of this situation is particularly difficult”, because the IPCC is moving into its “busiest and most difficult part” of the assessment cycle, when the initial draft of reports are being written and reviewed.
According to the ENB, “the pattern of contentious meetings may also increase costs, especially if the panel requires late night sessions or extended days to conclude its work”.
Skea tells Carbon Brief that he is “more confident” about the budget than the “mood music that came out of some of the reporting”. He notes:
“It is really only in the worst-case scenarios where you combine low levels of contributions with high levels of spend that you run into real difficulties during the [AR7] cycle.
“During the first Trump administration, other countries stepped in [with funds] and we are now seeing these signs as well.”
The ENB reports that “Sweden has committed to increasing its contribution by 150% and encouraged all countries to contribute financially or host plenary sessions”.
The IPCC did not publish an updated budget in the documents for the IPCC-64 meeting.
Working group updates
The co-chairs of the three AR7 working group reports (WG1, WG2 and WG3) also presented updates on progress.
All three working group reports highlight the first joint lead author meeting, which was held in Paris in December. The meeting brought together lead authors from all three working groups and saw a total of 650 attendees.
All working groups have also submitted “zero order drafts” – an initial draft text – of their reports to their respective technical support units.
Meanwhile, the World Climate Research Programme and IPCC co-sponsored a workshop on high-impact events and Earth system tipping points in Paris in November 2025.
Separately, the IPCC undertook an expert review of the first order draft of the “special report on climate change and cities” between October and December 2025.
The agenda for the Bangkok meeting also included a range of other items.
IPCC legal officer Jennifer Lew Schneider reported that there are currently 263 organisations with “observer status” to the IPCC, alongside 20 new applications.
IPCC vice-chair Diana Ürge-Vorsatz presented a progress report on an expert meeting on “gender, diversity, equity and Inclusivity”, which was held in September 2025.
The UNFCCC’s Annett Möhner presented a review of collaborations between the IPCC and UNFCCC. In its summary of the meeting, the ENB says:
“She described activities and outcomes from UNFCCC COP30 including decisions on the global mutirão, procedural and logistical elements of the global stocktake process, and the Belém gender action plan, as well as conclusions on research and systematic observation.”
Similarly, Simone Schiele – programme officer at the IPBES secretariat – noted outcomes of the IPBES-12 meeting held in February 2026, as well as ongoing IPBES work.
‘Frustrating and disappointing’
IPCC chair Skea tells Carbon Brief that, overall, the meeting delivered “minimal outcomes”. He says:
“It was a frustrating and disappointing meeting. It was only a business meeting – there was no science involved in it. The lack of progress was a frustration to me, sitting there, chairing it.”
The next meeting – IPCC-65 – will take place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, during the second week of October 2026.
During this session, delegates hope to finalise the timeline for the AR7 reports and approve the draft reports of the IPCC’s 61st, 62nd and 63rd sessions.
As such, the ENB notes that “intersessional work” will play an important role in preparing panel members for meetings at IPCC-65. This, it says, includes the “submission of proposals on the AR7 timeline and informal consultations with the chair to identify points of convergence and possible flexibility”.
Skea says the secretariat will be working between sessions “to figure out the process that will move [things] in the right direction”. He continues:
“One of the issues that we have to consider is that there has been, in my view, quite a loss of trust between different groups of countries. We do need to address the trust issue, as well as the technicalities of how the timeline is constructed.”
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IPCC: ‘Frustrating and disappointing’ meeting leaves AR7 timeline in deadlock
Nations are “back on track” to adopt a framework for curbing global shipping emissions, following the latest International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) meeting in London, UK.
The proposed “net-zero framework” had been expected to be approved by countries at the IMO towards the end of 2025.
Instead, the Trump administration was accused of “bully-boy” tactics as the US led a concerted effort to reject the framework, leading to its approval being delayed.
Since then, the US, other fossil-fuel producers and some industry groups have called for the framework to be stripped of its carbon-pricing mechanism, or abandoned entirely.
At the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC84) meeting in London, UK, last week, nations tried once again to reach an agreement on the framework.
Opponents said they were trying to seek consensus, but supporters, such as Brazil, the EU and Pacific islands, pointed out the framework was already a “careful balance of interests”.
Liberia and Panama – “flag states” for a third of the world’s commercial shipping – led a counter-proposal, alongside Argentina, which effectively cut carbon pricing from the framework.
Ultimately, however, the meeting ended with a reconfirmation that delegations are committed to rebuilding consensus on global shipping emissions.
The framework survived the negotiations and the committee will now try to adopt it at its December 2026 meeting.
Below, Carbon Brief explains why the framework has proved so contentious, who the major players have been and what the final outcome was at the latest IMO meeting.
- Why was the net-zero framework delayed last year?
- Why do some countries oppose the net-zero framework?
- What ‘alternative frameworks’ were discussed?
- What do supporters of the net-zero framework want?
- What was the final outcome from the IMO meeting?
Why was the net-zero framework delayed last year?
In April 2025, nations at the IMO had agreed on a “net-zero framework” at their MEPC83 meeting in London, despite the US withdrawing halfway through.
Later that year, in October 2025, they failed to formally adopt the framework after a fraught meeting that saw US negotiators accused of “bully-boy tactics”.
The framework was meant to be a practical set of measures to achieve the global net-zero target for shipping, agreed at the IMO in 2023. The target is significant, as international shipping is responsible for more than 2% of emissions and is not covered by the Paris Agreement.
Following a week of negotiations at the April 2025 meeting, the remaining nations had voted on approving a compromise proposal for an emissions levy – effectively a carbon tax on global shipping – and a credit-trading system.
A majority of nations had agreed to this framework that would have set a lower emissions-intensity reduction target of 4% in 2028, rising to 30% in 2035. It had also included an upper target that would have increased from 17% in 2028 to 43% in 2035.
Ships that failed to lower their emissions intensity in line with these limits would have needed to purchase “remedial units” for $380 per “tier two” unit. This would have fed into a new IMO “net-zero fund”.
Those who met the lower target, but fell short of the more difficult upper target, would have had to pay into the IMO fund, but at the lower rate of $100 per “tier one” unit.
The number of compliant ships had been expected to grow under this framework, reducing the number of vessels reliant on buying units and helping to reduce emissions intensity by over 40%, as the chart below shows.
The purchase of units to comply with the rules had been expected to raise $10-15bn annually in the initial years of the fund, as well as help with the development of zero and near-zero (ZNZ) greenhouse gas fuels and energy sources, according to thinktank IDDRI.
In turn, the fund would have been used to support developing countries to decarbonise shipping.
A clear majority of 80% of the eligible voters – not including those who abstained or the US – approved the framework at the April 2025 meeting.
The 63 countries that voted in favour included the EU, China, India and Brazil, while those that voted against included major fossil-fuel producers, such as Saudi Arabia, Russia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
Following this “landmark” agreement, countries had then been expected to formally adopt the framework at the next MEPC session in October 2025.
However, the meeting proved challenging. The US “unequivocally rejected” the proposal and lobbied extensively against adoption, including by threatening governments, individual diplomats and shipping companies with sanctions, visa restrictions, tariffs and port fees.
During the October meeting, the US and its allies pushed for a shift from a “tacit” approval system for the net-zero framework to one that would require explicit acceptance by governments. This would mean it would only come into force if, six months later, two-thirds of nations actively accepted the deal, Climate Home News explained at the time.
Negotiations continued throughout the week before Saudi Arabia called to adjourn the meeting, a move that was passed after it was backed by 57 countries.
As such, the decision on the adoption of the net-zero framework was pushed back by a year.
Among the 63 countries that supported the IMO net-zero framework at MEPC83 in April 2025, 15 supported the adjournment and 10 abstained – showing that some nations that had previously supported the framework had softened on the deal, following lobbying by the US, Saudi Arabia and their allies.
Going into the April 2026 MEPC84 meeting, it was clear that agreement on the framework would not be straightforward. A report ahead of the meeting from University College London (UCL) noted:
“The level of support is noticeably weaker than in April [2025] and likely reflects the effectiveness and efforts made by sides supporting or opposing the net-zero framework over the intervening period.”
In the week ahead of the MEPC84, US IMO delegation lead Wayne Arguin told a meeting that there was a “clear, strong and sizable bloc of countries opposed to the [net-zero framework]” and “no prospect of achieving consensus”, according to Politico.
As the meeting kicked off on 27 April 2026, IMO secretary-general Arsenio Dominguez called on parties to engage in “engage in constructive and pragmatic exchanges”.
Why do some countries oppose the net-zero framework?
A coalition of countries, including the US, Saudi Arabia and various fossil-fuel producers, strongly oppose the IMO net-zero framework that was agreed last year.
They were supported by a wider group of industry bodies and major flag states – countries where many ships are registered – which were instrumental in advancing “alternative frameworks” at the latest meeting. (See: What ‘alternative frameworks’ were discussed?)
Documents submitted ahead of the April 2026 meeting laid out the basis for this opposition, with the US criticising the net-zero framework’s “significant shortcomings”, concluding:
“The most appropriate path forward is to end consideration of the IMO net-zero framework entirely.”
More nuance came in a statement from a group of primarily large fossil-fuel producers, including Saudi Arabia, Russia and Algeria, which was also backed by the US.
It stressed the need for “alternative” frameworks, with an emphasis on achieving consensus, as well as “practicability, equity and trust”. In practice, this meant a system without any carbon pricing, “top-down restrictions” or “international penalties”.
Opposing countries said any outcome should be “technology-neutral”, meaning it should not disadvantage specific fuels, potentially including liquified natural gas (LNG) and other fossil fuels.
These nations also stressed what they claimed were the potential impact of additional net-zero costs on “food and energy security”.
Much of their criticism was based on supposed economic harm that the net-zero framework would cause, particularly in developing countries.
These arguments purported to be about fairness for these countries. Yet some opponents of the framework were also calling for the IMO fund to be abandoned.
If this IMO fund were lost, then developing countries could lose out on a potential source of support for their own maritime decarbonisation, as well as potentially their broader energy transitions.
As well as supporting the fossil-fuel producers’ call for “alternative frameworks”, the UAE filed its own submission questioning the legitimacy of the IMO in establishing a new fund.
The US submission to the IMO stated that the fund would provide “pennies on the dollar compared to the economic hardship” brought about by the framework overall.
US delegates distributed flyers at the IMO meeting, emphasising the financial burden they claimed the framework would place on developing countries. While low-carbon shipping will come with substantial costs, analysts said the US figures were “not credible”.
Campaigners accused the US of “pretending to care about other countries’ economies”, pointing out that the energy crisis – triggered by the US-led war on Iran – is costing the shipping industry billions.
Moreover, they stated that the Trump administration’s new port entry fees would be a far greater financial burden for the global shipping industry than the mooted net-zero rules.
Analysis by UCL shipping researchers ahead of MEPC84 concluded that the Trump administration would potentially be less able to exert “soft power and influence” at the talks than last year. Additionally, it pointed to a Supreme Court ruling that limited the US’s capacity to impose punitive tariffs.
In practice, the US was less vocal at the talks, choosing to support alternative framework ideas proposed by other IMO members.
What ‘alternative frameworks’ were discussed?
There were two main alternatives to the net-zero framework considered at MEPC84.
Japan suggested some ideas as a “possible basis for discussion”, which included removing the need for ships to pay into an IMO fund when they fail to meet emissions targets.
It also suggested simply relaxing the emissions targets, in order to make them easier for shipping companies to meet.
The second – and more significant – counter-proposal to the net-zero framework was not submitted by the US or its fossil-fuel producer allies.
Instead, it came from Liberia, Panama and Argentina, three countries that have strong political and historical ties with the US.
This was particularly notable given Liberia and Panama’s status as the top two “flags of convenience”, as shown in the chart below. A third of the world’s commercial shipping is registered in these small states, giving them disproportionate significance within the talks.
Their proposal, offered in the spirit of “consensus‑building”, said that only fuels already considered “commercially viable” should be included in the IMO’s carbon-intensity targets.
The Argentina-Liberia-Panama proposal was dismissed by observers as “business-as-usual”, as it removes incentives to develop clean fuels, any substantial means of enforcement and opportunities to raise funds to help developing countries.
Delaine McCullough, director of the shipping programme at the Ocean Conservancy, tells Carbon Brief:
“By removing the mandatory greenhouse gas price, you take away the ability to provide any kind of rewards or other incentives, and you also take away the regulatory incentive, so you just end up where we are today.”
This was the proposal that the net-zero framework’s most prominent opponents, including the US and the Gulf states, rallied around at MEPC84.
Among those also backing the idea during the talks were some developing countries, such as Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, that also said they wanted the IMO outcome to provide them with financial support.
This came in spite of the proposal stating there should be “no establishment of an IMO fund”. Speaking on condition of anonymity, a small-island state delegate tells Carbon Brief:
“Many countries that support the Liberia-Panama-Argentina submission also seek support for transition, capacity-building and mitigation of negative impacts. This support will not be available if [that] approach is taken.”
Some delegates questioned the decision by Liberia and Panama to lead this pushback against the net-zero framework. Both nations had previously supported an emissions levy on shipping, which would have been far more ambitious than the framework they now oppose.
Observers noted ties between nations that opposed the framework and parts of the shipping sector – including US-based interests and LNG assets.
Among the industry voices arguing strongly against the net-zero framework have been the American Bureau of Shipping and a group of international shipping companies and registries – including the national registries of Liberia and Panama.
The latter group voiced “significant concerns” and called for “alternative proposals”. Rather than a domestic entity, the Liberian registry that issued this statement is a privately owned US company.
Reflecting on these issues, Prof Tristan Smith, an energy and transport expert at UCL, wrote on LinkedIn:
“Privately owned registries have leverage over their host governments because one angry shipowner’s personal wealth is more than the flag state’s GDP and governments of low-income countries can’t easily take risks with even small volume revenues.”
Major Greek shipowners, including some with US-linked LNG interests, also opposed the net-zero framework, citing the “absence of support from major and influential states representing a significant share of global tonnage”.
Greece itself had reportedly pushed back against the framework behind the scenes, despite the EU’s public, unified position of support.
What do supporters of the net-zero framework want?
There were many vocal supporters of the net-zero framework at MEPC84, including a broad range of developed and developing countries.
Among them were the EU, Brazil, Mexico, Kenya, Pacific island states, Australia and the UK.
Having supported the net-zero framework last April, but voted to postpone its adoption in October, China expressed support for a carbon-pricing system and an IMO fund in a technical submission issued ahead of MEPC84.
The major shipping nation had remained quiet during the US-Saudi disruption in October last year, so its submission was viewed as a positive for backers of the framework.
Colombia, which was simultaneously hosting a global conference on “transitioning away” from fossil fuels, also emerged as a supporter of the net-zero framework.
There has also been support from some sections of the shipping industry, including a large coalition of ports, logistics companies and clean-fuel providers.
Supportive nations pointed out that the net-zero framework was the result of years of talks and already represented what Pacific island states called a “fragile compromise”. They framed it as the “only politically viable option” for hitting the IMO’s net-zero goal.
Pacific islands and around 50 other nations had originally called for a universal carbon levy on shipping. Ultimately, they were forced to accept the net-zero framework as a compromise, but Pacific islands said they would revert to their call for a levy if they felt the framework was being “watered down”.
The demand for a levy was strongly opposed by numerous countries, including some of the current framework’s supporters, such as Brazil and Australia.
In a bid to revive the net-zero framework, a submission by Brazil sought to “dispel any possible potential misunderstandings”, stressing that the approach is “flexible” and “should not be mistaken for a ‘global tax’”.
For example, Brazil notes that the framework “does not exclude any fuels” and that even existing “bunker” fuels and LNG could be used, as long as carbon intensity targets are met. (Ships could, for example, use carbon capture and storage to meet the goals.)
Michael Mbaru, a low-carbon shipping expert for the Kenya climate special envoy, told a briefing ahead of the conference that the net-zero framework was in developing countries’ interests:
“If the global package unravels, pressure grows for more regional and unilateral measures instead, and this is particularly difficult for African and other developing countries, because fragmented regulation raises compliance, complexity [and] transaction costs.”
In response to the Argentina-Liberia-Panama proposal that opponents of the framework had coalesced around, the Solomon Islands pointed out that, in seeking “consensus”, this group was ignoring the numerous parties that wanted more ambition, rather than less. It stated in a submission:
“There is no reason to expect that a new proposal, that differs from the IMO net-zero framework, would find a majority, much less a consensus.”
Nevertheless, supporters of the net-zero framework also acknowledged that there were some areas where greater clarity might help countries to finalise the details.
These areas include clarifying technical considerations such as: how fuel intensity is calculated; addressing the potential impacts of net-zero rules on food security; the governance of the IMO fund; and regulation of sustainable fuel certification schemes.
Given this, there was broad support for more discussions at an extra “intersessional” meeting later this year, in order to hash out these final details before attempting to approve the net-zero framework once more.
What was the final outcome from the IMO meeting?
Ultimately, the IMO’s net-zero framework was agreed and will now be negotiated further in the uutumn, ahead of the next MEPC meeting in December 2026.
The decision, as well as the general willingness to move forward noted by numerous observers, was broadly welcomed. IMO secretary-general Arsenio Dominguez said:
“We are back on track, but we have to rebuild trust. I encourage you to maintain this momentum through your intersessional work and to prepare submissions that can bring the membership together.”
Over the week of negotiations, nearly 100 delegations took to the floor to voice their opinions on the adoption of the net-zero framework.
Of these, over half were in favour of it, including countries like the EU, Brazil, Colombia, Kenya, Tuvalu and others.
Others pushed for reopening the framework for substantial changes, including the US, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Liberia and others.
On Friday 1 May, the discussion turned to the terms of reference for further negotiation and countries agreed to move the net-zero forward as the only option in the final outcome text.
Em Fenton, senior director of climate diplomacy at Opportunity Green, tells Carbon Brief:
“The framework has survived, but survival is not a victory and we cannot end up in a cycle of open-ended negotiations. Taking forward consideration of multiple proposals is only acceptable as a bridge, not a destination.
“We must now look forward to moving towards adoption of the framework later this year in a way that maintains urgency and ambition, and delivers justice and equity for countries on the frontlines of climate impacts.”
The IMO committee agreed to establish an intersessional working group to resolve a number of outstanding concerns and “drive broader convergence on a global measure” ahead of the next MEPC meeting.
Member states will be able to submit new amendments and adjustments to complement those already approved.
The two intersessional meetings will take place in September and November, ahead of MEPC85 in December.
Christiaan De Beukelaer, senior lecturer in culture and climate at the University of Melbourne, tells Carbon Brief:
“The ship is mostly built, though it’s obvious that more work needs doing on its interior. Right now, some are trying to finish the build while others are trying to scuttle it.”
The post Q&A: How countries got the global ‘net-zero’ shipping deal ‘back on track’ appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: How countries got the global ‘net-zero’ shipping deal ‘back on track’
Climate Change
Cropped 6 May 2026: Forest loss falls | Deforestation regulations | Saving ‘India’s Galapagos’
We handpick and explain the most important stories at the intersection of climate, land, food and nature over the past fortnight.
This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s fortnightly Cropped email newsletter.
Subscribe for free here.
Key developments
Forest loss falls
DRIVER DECLINE: Tropical primary forest loss fell by more than one-third from 2024-25, according to the latest edition of the Global Forest Review. (Primary forests are those that are intact or relatively undisturbed by humans.) The World Resources Institute, which co-produced the report, noted that the loss of these forests is “still 46% higher than [it was] a decade ago”. It attributed much of this year’s decline to a decrease from last year’s “record-breaking year of extreme fires”.
WIDESPREAD COLLABS: Although Brazil had the largest loss in terms of area, deforestation in the country fell by 42% compared to the previous year, reported Agência Brasil. It noted that this was made possible by a governmental task force, “with the participation of civil society, academia, local communities and the private sector”. In Indonesia, Malaysia and Colombia, progress “reflected improved governance, recognition of Indigenous land rights and corporate commitments to deforestation-free production”, said EnviroNews Nigeria.
EXCEEDING THE LIMIT: Despite the decline, the amount of deforestation “still remains ‘far above’ the level required to put the world on track to meet international targets to halt and reverse forest loss by 2030”, said BusinessGreen. It added that “fires present a growing threat that could reverse recent gains”, despite the declines from 2024. Reuters noted: “Agricultural expansion continued to be the biggest driver of forest loss around the world.”
EU deforestation law watered down
UNDER PRESSURE: Following industry pressure, the European Commission decided to “exclude imports of leather from its anti-deforestation law”, according to Reuters. The newswire said: “Leather industry groups have argued that as a by-product of the meat industry, with a relatively low value, leather’s production does not incentivise the cattle farming that drives deforestation.” It added that imported beef is still covered by the law.
‘LONG-OVERDUE’: Meanwhile, a group of UK Parliament members released an open letter calling for “long-overdue regulations to end UK imports linked to illegal deforestation”. Although the forest-risk regulation was introduced in 2021 as part of the Environment Act, “lawmakers have spent the last four years delaying the implementation” of the anti-deforestation rules, according to a Mongabay report from last year.
PROVISIONAL DEAL: The EU-Mercosur deal – a trade agreement between the European bloc and four South American countries – provisionally came into force on 1 May “after 25 years of negotiations”, said Euractiv. The application of the agreement is provisional because members of the European Parliament “referred the deal to the European Court of Justice for a legal review” in January, it added.
News and views
- PACKAGING PLANTATION: Asia Symbol, a China-based pulp and paper company, cleared “vast tracts of Indonesian rainforest home to endangered orangutans…for plantations supplying a maker of ‘carbon-neutral’ packaging”, according to an investigation by Agence France-Presse and the Gecko Project. The company told AFP that it is “committed to its no-deforestation policy”, while the newswire noted that the plantations supplying the paper mill have permits from the Indonesian government.
- SODA MOUNTAIN SOLAR: The California Energy Commission approved a proposed $700m solar power plant in the Mojave Desert after “nearly 20 years” of challenges, reported the San Bernardino Sun. Last month, climate journalist Sammy Roth dove into the history of – and current debate over – the Soda Mountain project on his Substack, Climate Colored Goggles.
- POSITIVE TIPPING POINTS: In a Nature Sustainability perspective piece, Prof Tim Lenton at the University of Exeter argued for the existence of “positive tipping points” – ecological, social or socio-ecological states where feedback loops that “suppor[t] self-propelling nature-positive change can help” achieve nature-recovery goals.
- ‘ACUTE HUNGER’: Nearly eight million people in South Sudan are at risk of “acute food insecurity” in coming months, “fuelled by ethnic conflict, climate change and the spillover of fighting from neighbouring Sudan”, according to Al Jazeera coverage of a new Integrated Food Security Phase Classification analysis. Meanwhile, a UN-produced global food crises report showed that “acute hunger” has doubled over the past decade, with two famines declared last year for the first time since the reports began a decade ago.
- SUMMERTIME SADNESS: Production of India’s prized Devgad Alphonso mango “has dropped by 70-90%” this summer, due to both “climate shock” and “ineffective pesticides”, reported the Print. Rich mango farmers in western India staged a “rare protest” demanding compensation for their losses, the outlet added, while a Print comment called for a “shift from compensation to climate-adaptation policies”.
- SEED SUIT: A judge at the Kenyan High Court “declared unconstitutional parts of a law that prohibited farmers from sharing and selling Indigenous seeds” – although the government has appealed the decision, reported Devex. The lawyer who represented the farmers in the suit “said that the ruling could have ripple effects worldwide”, it added.
Spotlight
Saving ‘India’s Galapagos’
This week, Carbon Brief follows the uproar around the Great Nicobar project, after India’s opposition leader visited the biodiversity hotspot, which is at imminent risk of deforestation.
On 30 April, Rahul Gandhi – the head of India’s opposition and grandson of former prime minister Indira Gandhi – posted an Instagram video from the evergreen rainforest on Great Nicobar island, the southernmost point of India’s territory.
The island is the site of a proposed $10bn infrastructure project called the Great Nicobar Island Project, which includes a transhipment port in Galathea Bay, an international airport, a township and a gas and solar-based power plant.
Completion of the project would require the felling of more than a million trees – nearly 130 square kilometres of forest.
Speaking to the camera and dwarfed by gigantic tree trunks, Gandhi said:
“I’m in the middle of what is easily the most beautiful forest I’ve seen in my life.”
As drone footage showed viewers the lush forest canopy, Gandhi told viewers that the primary forest here is so dense, there was simply no way through. He continued by claiming:
“Now I understand why the government did not want me to come…because this is the largest theft of Indian ecological property in history.”
(In February, India’s National Green Tribunal upheld environmental clearances for the project, stating that the government had “considered all possible damage to the ecology and had taken efforts to compensate it”, according to the Hindu. A challenge is pending in the Calcutta High Court. In March, India announced it was raising its forest carbon target in its 2035 climate pledge.)
The provocative video calling for a halt to large-scale deforestation on “India’s Galapagos” has garnered more than 1.4m views and has sparked media debate, smear campaigns and government pushback, defending its strategic importance.
Paradise almost lost?
Barely hours after Gandhi’s video was posted, the Indian government published a press release detailing how environmental and tribal welfare safeguards have been met, despite more evidence to the contrary emerging this week.
Several media outlets – particularly print and independent outlets – have gone to Great Nicobar since 2024 to investigate the project’s impacts on biodiversity, assess its economic viability and corroborate the government’s claims of receiving Indigenous consent.
However, many of the project’s details have been shrouded in secrecy and restrictive conditions, including “gag orders” on scientists, rebuffed right to information requests and missing maps of tribal lands and coral colonies, media investigations have alleged.
For many mainland Indians, Gandhi’s video was a first glimpse of the Great Nicobar Biosphere Reserve and its 1,800 species, many of them endemic to the islands.
Turtle walker
Among the most charismatic and vulnerable are Great Nicobar’s sea turtles: leatherbacks, hawksbills and Olive Ridleys.
In an era before Instagram, biologist Satish Bhaskar surveyed over 4,000km of India’s coastline on foot from 1977-96 to document sea turtle nesting sites. Bhaskar laid the groundwork – and established the baseline – for Great Nicobar’s biodiversity and turtle conservation in India.
With only a transistor radio for company, Bhaskar would “maroon himself” on these islands for months at a time to measure tracks in the sand, count eggs and nests and wait for sightings of leatherback sea turtles, which can grow up to 2.7 metres long and weigh up to half a tonne.
From 1991-92, Bhaskar recorded more than 800 leatherback turtle nests on Great Nicobar Island alone. He identified Port Campbell Bay – where Gandhi met Nicobarese leaders last week – as a critical, irreplaceable turtle-nesting beach during his surveys.
“I’m glad I did what I did,” said the soft-spoken biologist in the 2025 documentary Turtle Walker, which recreates his early years on the island. Sadly, this new footage of Nicobar’s coastal reefs, mangroves and evergreen forests – is still only accessible to film festival audiences in India.
Can more visual, vocal and felt evidence shift the debate on deforestation in India? Experts told Carbon Brief that remains to be seen, but Gandhi’s video has brought “tremendous attention” back to the project, and brought in unlikely allies asking important questions.
Watch, read, listen
GO FISH: BBC News explored how climate change is “threaten[ing] the economic backbone” of the Pacific island nation of Kiribati – its tuna fisheries.
LIFE AFTER COWS: The New York Times profiled Butter Ridge’s dairy farmers selling their generations-old Pennsylvania farm in the face of looming tariffs and “surging” input costs.
C FOR COMMODITY: On the Wilder podcast, Sue Pritchard – chief executive of the Food, Farming and Countryside Commission – explored the “invisible forces” shaping modern food systems.
WAR FALLOUT: From oil spills to contaminated soil, Wired took a closer look at how the war on Iran is impacting the environment in “unseen ways”.
New science
- Commercial bottom-trawling fishing costs Europe nearly €16bn per year, mainly due to the release of carbon from ocean sediments | Ocean & Coastal Management
- A combination of global warming of 1.5-1.9C and deforestation of 22-28% could drive the Amazon to “system-wide changes” | Nature
- By 2050, 74% of the current habitats of all land mammals, birds, reptiles and amphibians could be exposed to heatwaves under a high-emissions scenario | Nature Ecology & Evolution
In the diary
- 11-15 May: 21st session of the UN Forum on Forests | New York City
- 11 to 15 May: Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) regional conference for Europe | Dushanbe, Tajikistan
- 13 May: Webinar on the State of Forests report from the World Resources Institute | Online
- 22 May: International day for biological diversity
Cropped is researched and written by Dr Giuliana Viglione, Aruna Chandrasekhar, Daisy Dunne, Orla Dwyerand Yanine Quiroz. Please send tips and feedback to cropped@carbonbrief.org
The post Cropped 6 May 2026: Forest loss falls | Deforestation regulations | Saving ‘India’s Galapagos’ appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Cropped 6 May 2026: Forest loss falls | Deforestation regulations | Saving ‘India’s Galapagos’
Climate Change
Analysis: Wind and solar have saved UK from gas imports worth £1.7bn since Iran war began
The UK has avoided the need for gas imports worth £1.7bn since the start of the Iran war, as a result of record electricity generation from wind and solar, reveals Carbon Brief analysis.
The surge in wind and solar output is cutting the need for gas-fired generation, which has been nearly a third lower than last year and fell to record lows in both March and April 2026.
The figure below shows that wind and solar have generated a record 21 terawatt hours (TWh) on the island of Great Britain since the end of February 2026, when the US and Israel first attacked Iran.
Amid another fossil-fuel price crisis, the record wind and solar output since the start of the Iran war avoided the need to import 41TWh of gas – roughly 34 tankers of liquified natural gas (LNG).
Importing those 34 tankers of LNG would have cost around £1.7bn, given the high gas prices triggered by the conflict.
At the same time, record wind and solar helped to cut electricity generation from gas by around a third year-on-year to the lowest levels ever recorded for the months of March and April, as shown in the figure below.
Together, wind and solar have generated more than twice as much electricity as fossil fuels over the period since the Iran war began. The country’s electricity mix has now flipped: a decade ago, fossil fuels were generating more than four times as much electricity as wind and solar.
Indeed, wind and solar have generated more electricity than fossil fuels for a record 15 months in a row. As shown in the figure below, this included a full winter season for the first time in 2025-26.
This meant that gas was setting the price of electricity roughly 25% less often in both March 2026 and April 2026 than in the same month in 2022, when fossil-fuel prices spiked after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
April 2026 also marked a series of other records for the GB electricity system.
For half an hour between 15.30 and 16:00 on 22 April, a record 98.8% of the electricity feeding into the country’s main “transmission” grid came from zero-carbon sources, according to the National Energy System Operator (NESO).
In addition, solar generation hit a series of new record-highs, ultimately reaching 15.4 gigawatts (GW) on the afternoon of 23 April. Wind set a new record of 23.9GW on 25 March.
The post Analysis: Wind and solar have saved UK from gas imports worth £1.7bn since Iran war began appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: Wind and solar have saved UK from gas imports worth £1.7bn since Iran war began
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