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The UK’s Climate Change Act is a landmark piece of legislation that guides the nation’s response to global warming and has proved highly influential around the world.

Increasingly, the law has come under attack from right-wing politicians, who want to scrap the UK’s net-zero target and the policies supporting it.

Conservative leader Kemi Badenoch has announced that her party would “repeal” the Climate Change Act entirely, if her party is able to form the next government.

The opposition leader said she still believed that “climate change is real”, but offered no replacement for the legislation that the Conservatives have backed since its inception.

Her proposal drew intense criticism from scientists, business leaders and even senior Conservatives, who argued that abandoning the act would harm the UK economy and drive more climate extremes.

Meanwhile, the hard-right populist Reform UK party – which is currently leading in the polls – has also rejected climate action and promised to “ditch net-zero”.

Below, Carbon Brief explains what the Climate Change Act does – and does not – mean for the UK, correcting inaccurate comments as the UK’s political right veers further away from the previous consensus on climate action.

Why does the UK have the Climate Change Act?

It is well-known that the Climate Change Act was voted through the UK parliament with near-unanimous cross-party support. In October 2008, some 465 MPs voted in favour, including 263 Labour members, 131 Conservatives, 52 Liberal Democrats. Just five Conservatives voted against.

Less widely appreciated is the fact that the Labour government only agreed to legislate in the face of huge public and political pressure, including from then-Conservative leader David Cameron.

Jill Rutter, senior fellow at thinktank the Institute for Government (IfG), tells Carbon Brief that the Conservatives “can also claim significant credit for the Climate Change Act”.

This is at odds with comments made by Badenoch, who described it as “Labour’s law”, when pledging to repeal it if she were ever elected as prime minister.

In early 2005, two Friends of the Earth campaigners – Bryony Worthington and Martyn Williams – had drafted a Climate Change Bill, inspired by the “worsening problem of climate change and the inadequacy of the government’s policy response”, according to a 2018 academic paper.

Worthington tells Carbon Brief they had “decided [the government’s plan] was rubbish and we needed a different approach”, based on five-yearly carbon budgets rather than single-year goals.

Their draft was introduced into parliament that July, as a private members’ bill, by high-profile backbench MPs from the three main political parties: Labour’s Michael Meacher; the Conservatives’ John Gummer (now Lord Deben); and Norman Baker for the Liberal Democrats.

This was the centrepiece of Friends of the Earth’s “Big Ask” campaign, gaining huge public support and backing from more than 100 other NGOs, 412 MPs and celebrities such as Radiohead frontman Thom Yorke.

Then, in December 2005, Cameron was elected Conservative leader, using support for climate action as part of his efforts to “‘decontaminate’ the Tory brand”, according to an IfG retrospective.

With the Labour government still resisting the idea of new climate change legislation, Cameron made what the IfG called a “really significant political intervention” on 1 September 2006, throwing his weight behind the “Big Ask” and publishing his own draft bill, on green recycled paper.

Former UK conservative leader David Cameron and his wife Samantha at Friends of the Earth's "Big Ask" Benefit Concert, 2006.
Former UK conservative leader David Cameron and his wife Samantha at Friends of the Earth’s “Big Ask” Benefit Concert, 2006.
Credit: PA Images / Alamy Stock Photo

As the Guardian reported at the time, a letter from Cameron and others “call[ed] on the government to enshrine annual targets for carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions into a bill, to be introduced in the next Queen’s speech…the government believes a bill is unnecessary”.

At prime minister’s questions on 25 October 2006, Cameron continued to press Labour prime minister Tony Blair, who was still not committed to legislation.

Cameron went beyond the “Big Ask” draft by calling for an independent commission with executive powers, able to adjust the UK’s climate goals. Cameron asked Blair:

“Are we getting a bill: yes or no?…Will it include the two things that really matter: annual targets and an independent body that can measure and adjust them in the light of circumstances?”

The IfG says a former aide to David Miliband, who was then environment secretary, “remembers him commenting that Labour could not get into the position of being the only major party not in favour of the proposed bill”.

Finally, in November 2006, the Labour government confirmed in the Queen’s speech that it would introduce a new climate change bill.

Emphasising the cross-party consensus, Lord Deben tells Carbon Brief: “It was the Tories who wrote it and it was the Labour Party who accepted it – and all parties supported it.” He adds:

“It’s not just that every Tory leader since [then] has supported climate change, the Climate Change Act [and the] Climate Change Committee, but it’s simply that, actually, they ought to, because they invented it.”

The Labour government published its own draft climate change bill in March 2007 and this, after lengthy negotiation, went on to become the 2008 act.

Cameron continued to campaign for “independent experts, not partisan…ministers” to set the UK’s statutory climate targets, but this responsibility was, ultimately, left to the government.

Rutter tells Carbon Brief that, in pledging to repeal the 2008 act, Badenoch is “rejecting” a Conservative “inheritance” on climate change that runs back to Margaret Thatcher. She says:

“One of the defining features of climate policy to date in the UK has been the political consensus that has underpinned it. That may have been because Margaret Thatcher was the first leading world politician to draw attention to climate change in 1989 [via a speech at the UN in New York].”

Rutter adds that David Miliband had only been able to convince then-chancellor Gordon Brown to accept legally binding targets as a result of Cameron’s enthusiasm for the cause. She says:

“Although it was Labour legislation, brought forward by David Miliband (though implemented by brother Ed), the reason Miliband was…able to convince a sceptical Gordon Brown at the Treasury that the UK should set legally binding targets, was the enthusiasm with which new Conservative leader David Cameron embraced the Friends of the Earth ‘Big Ask’ campaign as part of his moves to detoxify the Conservative party after its 2005 defeat. Theresa May then increased the target [in 2019] from 80% to net-zero as part of her legacy. It is that long Conservative inheritance on climate action that Badenoch is now rejecting.”

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What does the Climate Change Act require?

The Climate Change Act sets out an overall “framework” for both cutting the UK’s emissions and preparing the country for the impacts of climate change.

At its heart is a legally binding goal for reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. Originally envisaged as a 60% reduction on 1990 levels, this was quickly increased to 80%.

In 2019, amid a surge in concern about climate change, the then-Conservative government strengthened the target again to a reduction to “at least 100%” below 1990 levels, more commonly referred to as net-zero.

The target for 2050: (1) It is the duty of the Secretary of State to ensure that the net UK carbon account for the year 2050 is at least [F1100%] lower than the 1990 baseline. (2)“The 1990 baseline” means the aggregate amount of— (a)net UK emissions of carbon dioxide for that year, and (b)net UK emissions of each of the other targeted greenhouse gases for the year that is the base year for that gas.
Section 1 of the Climate Change Act. Source: UK government.

On the pathway to this long-term goal, the act also requires the government to set legally binding interim targets known as ”carbon budgets”. These must be set 12 years in advance, to allow time for the government and the rest of the economy to plan ahead.

The carbon budgets set limits on emissions over five-year periods, providing greater flexibility than annual goals, while tackling the cumulative emissions that determine global warming.

Section 13 of the act specifies that the government has a “duty to prepare proposals and policies for meeting carbon budgets”. There is also a requirement for the government to explain how its actions will achieve its climate goals.

(In addition, the act requires the government to set out a programme of measures for climate adaptation and how it intends to meet them.)

The final key pillar of the act is the creation of the Climate Change Committee (CCC), an independent advisory body. The CCC advises – but does not decide – on the level at which carbon budgets should be set and the climate-related risks facing the UK.

The committee also produces annual assessments of “progress” and recommendations for going further, which the government is obliged to respond to, but not to accept.

Each time the secretary of state sets out their plan for a new carbon budget – taking the CCC’s advice into account – or responds to a progress report from the committee, parliament scrutinises the government’s activities.

Contrary to recent criticisms from the opposition Conservatives and the hard-right populist Reform UK, however, the act says nothing at all about how the government should meet its targets.

The only requirement is that the government’s plan should be capable of meeting its targets.

Moreover, it was the Conservatives under Cameron that had wanted to give the CCC executive and target-setting powers. This was opposed at the time by the then-Labour government.

Rachel Solomon Williams, executive director of the Aldersgate Group, notes on LinkedIn that this was a “closely debated” issue, but that, ultimately, the act puts the government “in control”:

“A closely debated aspect of the bill at the time was whether the CCC should have an executive or an advisory function. In the end, it was appointed as an expert advisory committee and the government remains entirely in control of delivery choices.”

The Conservative press release announcing Badenoch’s plan to “repeal” the act is, therefore, incorrect to state that the legislation “force[s]” governments to introduce specific policies.

(Speaking at the 2025 Conservative party conference, shadow energy secretary Claire Coutinho caricatured what she called “Ed Miliband’s…act” as requiring “1970s”-style “central planning” that “dictate[s] what products people must buy, and when”.

Just 18 months earlier, she, as energy secretary, had written of her “government’s unwavering commitment to meeting our ambitious emissions targets, including the legislated carbon budgets and the net-zero by 2050 target”.)

The press release also falsely describes the targets set under the act as “arbitrary” and falsely suggests they were set without consideration for the impact on jobs, households and the economy.

(In 2021, Badenoch herself, then a government minister, told parliament: “We will put affordability and fairness at the heart of our reforms to reach net-zero.”)

Specifically, section 10 of the act lists “matters to be taken into account” when setting carbon budgets, including the latest climate science, available technologies, “economic circumstances”, “fiscal circumstances” and the impact of any decisions on fuel poverty.

As for the net-zero target, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has concluded that reducing emissions to net-zero is the only way to stop global warming. The target was set on this basis, following detailed advice from the CCC that took climate science, economic and social factors into account.

The Conservatives have also taken aim at the CCC itself as part of their rejection of the Climate Change Act, highlighting the committee’s advice on meat consumption and flying.

In an echo of widely circulated conspiracy theories, Badenoch even told the Spectator that the CCC “wants us to eat insects”. This is not true.

Despite the framing by right-leaning media and politicians, the CCC’s recommendations for contentious topics such as meat consumption and reductions in flight numbers are modest.

The committee notes that “meat consumption has been falling” without policy interventions and says this will help to free up land for tree-planting. It says “demand management measures” to curb flight numbers “may” be needed, but only if other efforts to decarbonise aviation fail.

More importantly, the government decides how to meet the carbon budgets. It can – and often does – ignore recommendations from the CCC, including those on diets and airport expansion.

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The costs and benefits of the Climate Change Act

The debate over whether to tackle climate change, how quickly and to what extent has almost invariably centred on the costs and benefits of doing so.

Those opposed to climate action have, in general, sought to exaggerate the supposed costs, while playing down the losses and damages already being caused by global warming.

Yet serious efforts to weigh up the costs and the benefits have concluded – again and again and again – that it would be cheaper to cut emissions than to face the consequences of inaction.

Indeed, this was precisely the conclusion of the landmark 2006 Stern Review, to which the 2008 Climate Change Act partly owes its existence. The review said:

“[T]he evidence gathered by the review leads to a simple conclusion: the benefits of strong and early action far outweigh the economic costs of not acting.”

More specifically, it said that the cost of action “can be limited to around 1% of global GDP [gross domestic product]”, whereas the damages from climate change would cost 5% – and as much as 20% of GDP.

When the act was passed in 2008, it was again estimated that the UK would need to invest around 1% of GDP in meeting its target of cutting emissions to 80% below 1990 levels by 2050.

Since then, estimates of the cost of cutting emissions have fallen, as the decline in low-carbon technology costs has outperformed expectations. At the same time, estimates of the economic losses due to rising temperatures have tended to keep going up.

(Some years after the review’s publication, Stern said he had “got it wrong on climate change – it’s far, far worse…Looking back, I underestimated the risks.”)

When it recommended the target of net-zero by 2050, the CCC estimated that the UK would need to invest 1-2% of GDP to hit this goal. It later revised this down to less than 1% of GDP.

Most recently, the CCC revised its estimates down once again, putting the net cost of reaching net-zero at £116bn over 25 years – roughly £70 per person per year – or just 0.2% of GDP.

In July 2025, the independent Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) went on to estimate that the UK could take an 8% hit to its economy by the early 2070s, if the world warms by 3C.

It concluded that while there were potentially significant costs to the government from reaching net-zero, these would be far lower than the costs of failing to limit warming.

Despite all this, Conservative leader Badenoch has falsely argued that the UK’s net-zero target will be “impossible” to meet without “bankrupting” the country and that the the Climate Change Act has “loaded us with costs”.

Her party has also pledged to “axe the carbon tax” on electricity generation – a significant source of government revenue – claiming that this “just adds extra costs to our bills for no reason”.

Prof Jim Watson, director of the UCL Institute for Sustainable Resources, tells Carbon Brief that the costs of climate policies are “sometimes exaggerated” and are not the main reason for high bills:

“Policies that are in place to meet the UK’s carbon targets have costs, but these costs are sometimes exaggerated. These policies are not the primary cause of the energy price shock businesses and households have experienced over the past three years.”

Watson says that high gas prices were the “main driver” of high bills and adds that shifting away from fossil fuels “will also reduce the UK’s exposure to future fossil-fuel price shocks”.

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How nearly 70 countries followed the UK’s Climate Change Act

In the interview announcing her ambition to scrap the Climate Change Act, Badenoch falsely told the Spectator that the UK was “tackl[ing] climate change…alone”. She said:

“We need to do what we can sensibly to tackle climate change, but we cannot do it alone. If other countries aren’t doing it, then us being the goody-two-shoes of the world is not actually encouraging anyone to improve.”

This is a common claim among climate-sceptic politicians and commentators, who argue that the UK has gone further than other nations and that this is unfair. Badenoch’s predecessor, Rishi Sunak, used similar reasoning to justify net-zero policy rollbacks.

The UK has indeed been a leader in passing climate legislation, but it is far from the only country taking action to tackle climate change.

The Climate Change Act was among the first comprehensive national climate laws and the first to include legally binding emissions targets.

It has inspired legislation around the world, with laws in New Zealand, Canada and Nigeria among those explicitly based on the UK model.

Indeed, 69 countries have now passed “framework” climate laws similar to the UK’s Climate Change Act, as the chart below shows. This is up from just four when the act was legislated in 2008. Of these, 14 are explicitly titled the “climate change act”.

Chart showing that nearly 70 countries have passed comprehensive climate laws since 2008 – with some inspired directly by the UK
Cumulative number of countries with “climate change framework laws”, as defined by the Climate Change Laws of the World database. When countries have updated laws or introduced additional framework legislation, duplicates have been removed. Source: Climate Change Laws of the World.

The UK was also the first major economy to legislate a net-zero target in 2019, but since then virtually every major emitter in the world has announced the target. (Not all of these targets have been put into law, as the UK’s has.)

When the UK announced its target in June 2019, around 1% of global emissions were covered by net-zero targets. By the end of that year, France and Germany brought this up to nearly 4%.

Over the following years, major economies including China and India announced net-zero targets, meaning that around three-quarters of global emissions are now covered by such goals, as the chart below shows.

(This figure would be even higher if the Trump administration in the US, which accounts for around a tenth of annual global emissions, had not abandoned the nation’s net-zero target.)

Chart showing that three quarters of global emissions are now covered by national net-zero targets – up from 1% when the UK legislated its target
Global greenhouse gas emissions covered by national net-zero targets (dark blue) and those that remain uncovered (light blue). Shares of emissions are derived from a 2024 dataset that includes both fossil-fuel and land-use emissions. Source: Net Zero Tracker, Jones et al (2024).

While it is true that the UK is “only responsible for 1% of global emissions”, as Badenoch has also noted, this does not mean its actions are inconsequential. Around a third of global emissions come from countries that are each responsible for 1% of global emissions or less.

Moreover, as a relatively wealthy country that is responsible for a large share of historical emissions, many argue that the UK also has a moral responsibility to lead on climate action.

This historical responsibility is implicitly invoked by the Paris Agreement, which recognises countries’ “common but differentiated responsibilities” for current climate change.

Finally, Badenoch’s position diverges from that of recent Conservative leaders.

Theresa May and Boris Johnson spoke positively of the UK “leading the world” in low-carbon technology and expressed pride about the nation’s climate record.

They framed the UK’s success in tackling climate change as a good reason to do more, rather than less. “Green” Conservatives also argue that the UK should race to gain a competitive advantage in producing low-carbon technologies domestically.

Responding to Badenoch’s plan to scrap the act, May issued a statement criticising the “retrograde step” following nearly two decades of the UK “[leading] the way in tackling climate change”.

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What comes next under the Climate Change Act?

The debate over the future of the Climate Change Act, triggered by the Conservative pledge to repeal it, comes ahead of two key moments for the legislation.

First, the government has until the end of October 2025 to publish a new plan for meeting the sixth carbon budget (CB6), covering the five-year period from 2033-2037.

In 2021, the then-Conservative government passed legislation to cut emissions to 78% below 1990 levels during the sixth carbon budget period, centred on 2035. The government set out its “carbon budget delivery plan” for CB6 in October 2021, as part of a wider net-zero strategy.

In July 2022, however, this plan was ruled unlawful by the High Court for failing to publish sufficient details on exactly how the target would be met. The revised plan, published in March 2023, was once again found unlawful by the High Court in May 2024.

The High Court then gave the government a deadline of May 2025 to publish another version, later extended to October 2025 as a result of last year’s general election.

Second, the government has until June 2026 to legislate for the seventh carbon budget, covering the period 2037 to 2042. This legislation will be subject to a vote in parliament.

In February 2025, the CCC advised the government to set this budget at 87% below 1990 levels, in order to stay on track for the goal of net-zero by 2050, as shown in the chart below.

Chart showing that the CCC has recommended an 87% emissions cut by 2040 as the UK's next climate target
UK greenhouse gas emissions, including international aviation and shipping (IAS), MtCO2e. Lines show historical emissions (black) and the CCC’s “balanced pathway” to reaching net-zero. Legislated carbon budgets levels are shown as grey steps. The first five budgets did not include IAS, but “headroom” was left to allow for these emissions (darker grey wedges). Source: CCC.

Both the CB6 delivery plan this October and the parliamentary vote over CB7 next June are likely to be hotly contested, with the Conservatives and Reform having come out against climate action.

After publishing two unlawful carbon budget delivery plans and ahead of a widely anticipated election loss, the Conservatives began calling for greater scrutiny around carbon budgets in 2023.

Then-prime minister Rishi Sunak said in September of that year that parliament should be able to debate plans to meet the next carbon budget, before voting on the target. He said:

“So, when parliament votes on carbon budgets in the future, I want to see it consider the plans to meet that budget, at the same time.”

Then-secretary of state Coutinho subsequently wrote that a draft delivery plan for CB7 should be published alongside draft legislation setting the level of the carbon budget. She also argued that CB7 be debated on the floor of the House, rather than in the “delegated legislation committee”.

In response, the current government has pledged to provide “further information” to parliament, ahead of the vote on CB7. In a July 2025 letter to the chair of the House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee (EAC), energy secretary Ed Miliband wrote:

“Prior to parliament’s vote, we will publish an impact assessment which will clearly articulate the full range of benefits and costs of the government’s chosen CB7 target and the cross-economy pathway to deliver it.”

However, Miliband said the government would not publish a CB7 delivery plan until “as soon as reasonably practicable after” the parliamentary vote on the level of the budget.

The EAC itself is holding an inquiry on the seventh carbon budget and how the “costs of delivering it will filter through to households and businesses”. It is likely to report back in February 2026.

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What would happen if the Climate Change Act was repealed?

If any future government wanted to repeal the Climate Change Act and its legally binding net-zero goal, it would not be a straightforward process.

The government would need to introduce a new bill in parliament just to repeal the act.

This process would involve seeking approval from both the House of Commons and the House of Lords before receiving Royal Assent to become law. Within the make-up of the current UK parliament, it is likely that such a bill would face significant challenges.

Any new law repealing the Climate Change Act would need to introduce new climate commitments of a similar nature – or else the UK would be in breach of several international laws and treaties, explains Estelle Dehon KC, a barrister specialising in climate change. She tells Carbon Brief:

“In short, repeal of the Climate Change Act without any replacement commitments of a similar type would be in breach of the UK’s international obligations under: the climate change treaties (so UNFCCC, Kyoto and Paris); international human rights law and customary international law, as well as specific sources like UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.”

Under the Paris Agreement, the UK has made pledges to cut its emissions by 2030 and 2035, known as “nationally determined contributions” (NDCs).

The UK’s NDCs are directly informed by its domestic emissions-cutting targets, known as carbon budgets. The act specifies that the government has a “duty to prepare proposals and policies for meeting carbon budgets”.

Any move in breach of international laws and treaties could be vulnerable to legal challenges, particularly in light of a recent opinion on climate change by the International Court of Justice.

Repealing the Climate Change Act could also put the UK in opposition with its international trade agreements.

The most recent trade agreement between the UK and the EU states that each party “reaffirms its ambition of achieving economy-wide climate neutrality by 2050”.

It also contains rules on “non-regression” in relation to climate protection.

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Factcheck: What the Climate Change Act does – and does not – mean for the UK

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Loss and damage fund urged to hold crisis meeting on Nepal

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After last week’s catastrophic flash flooding caused hundreds of deaths and an estimated $5 billion of destruction in Nepal, some board members of the UN’s new loss and damage fund board have called for an extraordinary meeting to allocate money to help the Himalayan country.

Following a direct appeal for funding from Nepal’s government on Monday, developing-country board members gathered online and eight signed a letter, seen by Climate Home News, asking the fund’s board to hold a meeting to respond to the request.

The letter, signed by eight African, Asian and Least Developed Country board members, said the debris-laden torrent – which scientists believe was unleashed by a glacial slope collapsing after unusually hot weather – constitutes “precisely the kind of climate-related extreme weather events the fund was established to address”.

“The scale of loss of life, displacement, and destruction of energy, transport, and economic infrastructure warrants the board’s urgent consideration of how the fund’s existing instruments should be mobilised to support Nepal’s government and affected communities,” the letter said.

    The rules of the fund’s initial phase, which it is now in, allow for it to support “rapid response”, the letter noted. The fund’s governing instrument says it can provide funds “complementary to humanitarian actions taken immediately after an extreme weather event” as well as funds for “immediate or long-term, reconstruction or rehabilitation”, the letter added.

    Governments agreed at UN climate talks to set up the fund in 2022 and it launched its first call for proposals at the end of last year. It received 180 submissions, mainly for long-term projects to help countries reduce the risks from climate threats, like improving water infrastructure in Jamaica or flood response in Bangladesh.

    After delaying decisions at its last board meeting as it continued to work out processes, it has yet to approve any funding requests. Despite being set up on the back of the 2022 floods in Pakistan, the board has not yet given out any money in response to climate disasters nor expressed a clear willingness to do so.

    The secretariat of the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD) had not responded to a request for comment at the time of publication. A few days ago, it expressed solidarity for those affected by the disaster in a social media post.

    Rapid response precedent

    The board members signing the letter on Nepal want to set a precedent, with the letter saying the board should consider “any procedural lessons” the response to the flooding “offer for strengthening the Fund’s rapid-response modalities and operational protocols for sudden-onset extreme weather events”.

    Harjeet Singh, global convenor of the Fill the Fund campaign, told Climate Home News civil society has pushed “really hard” for the FRLD to be a rapid response fund rather than just inviting requests for project funding and reviewing them at regular board meetings as other UN climate funds do.

    “Climate disasters like the one unfolding in Nepal cannot wait for scheduled committee cycles,” he said. “The Loss and Damage Fund was built for moments exactly like this.”

    Harjeet Singh speaks at a press conference at climate talks on June 6, 2024 in Bonn, Germany (Credit Image: © Bianca Otero/ZUMA Press Wire)

    Nepal has received multi-million dollar humanitarian pledges from several governments already and the United Nations’ Central Emergency Response Fund is designed to rapidly disburse aid cash for disasters.

    But Singh – also founding director of India’s Satat Sampada Climate Foundation – said that, with disasters becoming more frequent and severe, the humanitarian system cannot support all countries in their recovery efforts and the fund should bridge the gap.

    “The Board Co-Chairs must heed the call of developing nations, convene an emergency session immediately, and prove that this Fund is ready to deliver real support when frontline communities need it most,” he told Climate Home News.

    While the FRLD’s response to Nepal’s recent disaster could set an important precedent, it is only likely to be of limited practical help. The fund’s rules mean it can only give out a maximum of $20 million to each project in its current initial phase. With only $820 million pledged by rich countries and not all of that yet delivered, it has allocated a total of $350 million to spend so far and without further contributions could run of money next year.

    Nepalese climate negotiator Manjeet Dhakal, who visited the affected area just days before the flood, told The Nation magazine that while $20 million “may only be a symbolic gesture”, it “could set an important precedent for how the fund responds when such disasters strike vulnerable countries in the future”.

    The government’s preliminary estimate of the damage is $5 billion, with many homes and critical infrastructure destroyed, as well as over 1,000 people dead.

    A letter to the FRLD board from Nepal’s finance and environment ministers said that Nepal had only contributed “negligibly to global greenhouse gas emissions yet continues to bear disproportionate and escalating climate impacts”.

    Requesting the fund’s board take a special decision to allocate funding to Nepal, the ministers emphasised that “time is of the essence”. “A prompt response would help protect affected populations, restore essential services, prevent further suffering and demonstrate that the fund can translate international solidarity into timely support for vulnerable countries and communities when it is most urgently needed,” they wrote.

    Glaciers ‘melt like butter’

    Despite initial reports of an earthquake, the US Geological Survey has said the floods were caused by a glacier collapsing and the resulting landslide hitting the bottom of the valley causing “subsequent catastrophic impacts downstream”.

    Alton Byers, a scientist at the University of Colorado Boulder’s Institute of Arctic and Alpine Research, told journalists this week that global warming has seen glaciers recede, glacial lakes forming and glacial lake outburst floods increasing.

    Scientists ride their snowmobiles near Kronebreen glacier through the arctic landscape near Ny-Alesund, Svalbard, Norway, April 10, 2023. REUTERS/Lisi Niesner

    He said that a heating glacier is like butter taken out of the refrigerator. “It becomes mushy. It no longer has the ability to hold together. What that means is that masses of rock and glaciers no longer are as resistant to gravity as they once were,” he explained. “Add to that melting water at altitude, which lubricates the interface between the rock and the glacier and you get an increased likelihood of slippage.”

    He added that a trigger – like gravity or an earth tremor – can then set off the sudden release of masses of bedrock and glacial ice, “which is what happened last week”.

    As well as reducing emissions to rein in climate change, Byers said that authorities can adapt to climate change by not building in flood plains. Many of the destroyed buildings in Nepal were located in places that have flooded before, he noted.

    Flood deaths in West African cities raise fraught issue of slum evictions

    The disaster took place on the Himalayan border of Nepal and Tibet, which is governed by China. Chinese state media are reporting at least 16 people dead and hundreds missing. China’s government has made no appeal to the loss and damage fund and the board’s letter does not mention China or Tibet.

    The FRLD board’s co-chairs are now expected to respond to the letter, with any extraordinary board meeting likely to be held online, so that members from around the world can attend at short notice.

    The post Loss and damage fund urged to hold crisis meeting on Nepal appeared first on Climate Home News.

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    From Belém to Antalya – gains, gaps and challenges for a new Just Transition Mechanism 

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    Could a new mechanism to help countries transition to a cleaner, safer and fairer world be one of the main deliverables from the COP31 climate summit in Türkiye this November? Civil society groups – which played a key role in winning last year’s agreement in Brazil to set up a mechanism – want to see it come to life in Antalya and take shape in 2027.

    The concept of a “just transition” has gained momentum and widespread support in recent years. It recognises that countries have varying levels of responsibility for planet-heating emissions and unequal resources to adapt to the impacts of global warming and move away from fossil fuels.

    In July, UN Secretary General António Guterres told the High-Level Political Forum in New York: “We need to support the countries, communities and workers that depend on fossil fuels throughout the transition.” While few would dispute that need, governments at the UN climate talks are still working out how to respond to it with concrete action.

    With discussions set to produce a decision making the mechanism a reality at COP31, observers want to ensure the new mechanism is more than just a talking shop.

    Here’s what’s at stake in the just transition negotiations before and at COP31:

    What has been agreed on the mechanism so far?

    At the mid-year climate negotiations in Bonn, just transition was one of the few key issues on which governments reached a consensus, including on how to review the progress of the Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP) – a process that led to agreement on a mechanism last year at COP30 in Belém, Brazil.

    Set up in 2022 and launched a year later, the aim of the JTWP is to discuss how to achieve a green economic and social shift that is fair, from the global down to the local level. Its accompanying mechanism will be tasked with strengthening international cooperation, technical support, capacity-building and knowledge-sharing to enable societies to become low-carbon and climate-resilient in a way that does not harm people and shares the benefits.

    To phase out fossil fuels, developing countries need exit route from “debt trap”

    Anabella Rosemberg, senior advisor on just transition with Climate Action Network (CAN) International, told Climate Home News that the most important outcome in Bonn was an informal document laying out various options for establishing the new mechanism.

    However, this leaves a lot still to be worked out and the preliminary discussions at Bonn were not enough on their own to ensure the operationalisation of the mechanism at COP31, as planned.

    “In the months ahead of COP31, this issue should be a priority for the COP31 presidencies – both Türkiye and Australia,” said Camila Mercure, climate policy coordinator at the Environment and Natural Resources Foundation (FARN), an Argentinian NGO, adding this would help secure more space for debate in the lead-up to and during the annual summit.

    So far, an informal workshop for governments and NGOs to exchange views on the JTWP and the mechanism, and to push things forward has been organised from September 30 to October 2 in Sydney.

    How will the review of the Just Transition Work Programme affect the mechanism?

    One task for COP31 is to review the efficiency and effectiveness of the JTWP so far and to decide whether and how it will continue.

    For Laura Restrepo Alameda, advocacy officer at Climate Action Network Latin America (CANLA), the main positive aspect is that it will include a mapping of instruments, initiatives and processes relevant to just transitions under the UN climate convention, the Paris Agreement and among other UN entities. “It’s a resource that will enable us to assess the complementarity and coherence of the various tools available to support the implementation of a [just transition] mechanism,” she told Climate Home News.

    Not everyone wants the JTWP review and the work to launch a mechanism to feed into one another. Russia, Arab nations and a group of large emerging nations pushed for them to be separate – which they believe would make it easier to limit the scope of the mechanism – while the African Group defended joint work between the two processes.

    According to Anthony Dane of Southern Transitions, a South Africa-based “think and do-tank”, governments also have varying concerns around the mapping exercise, which is being carried out by the UN climate change secretariat.

    He noted in a recent webinar that some want to use it as a basis to argue that a lot is already being done on just transition and so the new mechanism does not need to offer much more, while others are preparing to argue the opposite, highlighting a lack of international cooperation and support. 

    How Belém launched the Just Transition mechanism

    For Dane, the mapping exercise also raises the bigger question of how to define the scope of “just transition” within the UN climate talks.

    So far, richer countries have favoured a narrower view that focuses on phasing out fossil fuels, while developing countries have pushed for a broader “whole of economy, whole of society” approach that encompasses issues like green industrialisation and sustainable development.

    Russia and some other high-emitting nations do not want the JTWP or its mechanism to become a tool for imposing new green trade restrictions, while the European Union has rejected attempts to use it as a forum to dispute its new carbon levy on imports. These debates are set to rumble on.

    What will the mechanism do and when will it start?

    In Bonn, countries discussed the design features of the mechanism – that is, the elements, governance arrangements, structures and functions it should have. The outcome was an informal preliminary note compiling a range of views and possible options.

    While most country negotiating groups welcomed the document as a basis for further talks, Arab countries said it did not reflect their priorities, with Saudi Arabia insisting it had no formal status.

    “The mechanism must contribute to international cooperation between countries, serve as a guide, support countries so that they can develop just transition strategies, and act as a channel for accessing funding to implement projects within their territories,” said Mercure of FARN.

    But exactly what the mechanism should cover, and what it should not, remain a contentious subject for governments.

    A just agricultural transition takes root in Brazil

    For example, the Like-Minded Developing Countries – a bloc of more than 20 low- and middle-income nations including China and India – and the Arab Group appear keen to avoid any targets, requirements or conditionalities being imposed on them with regard to transitioning away from fossil fuels (TAFF).

    That contrasts with some Latin American and small island states that would like to see the mechanism used as a way of furthering global commitments already made in 2023 on TAFF and tripling renewable energy by 2030.

    Developed countries, for their part, do not want the mechanism to put too much responsibility on them to provide finance and other forms of cooperation.

    Some experts Climate Home News spoke to, meanwhile, called for the mechanism to lay out actions for different sectors – not just energy but also others like agriculture and heavy industries.

    Sandeep Pai, senior lead for international energy transitions at Duke University, said the mechanism should focus on at least eight to ten high-emitting sectors, addressing how to support workers through the transition to cleaner ways of operating. But, he noted “talking about sectors was always an issue at the negotiations”.

    Another issue important to civil society groups is that justice should be embedded in the process to operationalise what they have informally dubbed the BAM (short for the Belém Action Mechanism or, more recently, the Belém Antalya Mechanism).

    A banner calling for the establishment of a Belem-Antalya Just Transition Mechanism at the Bonn climate talks, on June 15, 2026 (Photo: IISD/ENB – Kiara Worth)

    A banner calling for the establishment of a Belem-Antalya Just Transition Mechanism at the Bonn climate talks, on June 15, 2026 (Photo: IISD/ENB – Kiara Worth)

    “The key milestone between now and COP31 must be to define a structure for the BAM with clear governance, coordination and the inclusion of civil society,” said CANLA’s Restrepo Alameda. The network, which represents hundreds of NGOs, is calling for groups that are likely to be hit hard by the transition, such as workers and Indigenous peoples, to have a seat at the table.

    Given the short time-frame until a decision to operationalise the mechanism is due to be agreed and adopted at COP31, experts say all these thorny issues are unlikely to be ironed out by then and further discussions may be needed to refine the form and functions of the new body.

    CAN’s Rosemberg told Climate Home News that “an ambitious outcome” at COP31 would be to establish the mechanism with its key functions and modalities in Antalya, while setting up a transitional committee to speed up technical work and ensure the BAM is fully operational by COP32 in Ethiopia in 2027.

    What is needed on the ground for a just transition?

    The top-down nature of decisions taken at COPs generally do not reflect the specific situations of individual countries and communities on the ground – and this is particularly so when it comes to just transition.

    Pai of Duke University contrasted India – where much of the transition will be about moving away from coal mining and coal-fired power stations – with countries that use relatively few fossil fuels like Costa Rica and will need to implement a very different set of changes.

    He added that each country must define what a “just transition” means to them, according to their contexts and needs: is it about using less oil and gas, promoting green steel-making and lower-emitting buildings, or transforming some other high-carbon activity? The next step is to establish government bodies and policies to plan and drive the transition.

    COP30: Spain’s unions say just transition means renewing communities beyond jobs

    “Global and broad declarations on a [just transition] mechanism are a good signal,” said Pai. “But we would be fooling ourselves if we think that just because something is getting declared, it will be implemented.”

    When it comes to tackling dependence on coal, for example, Pai noted the difficulty of shutting down coal mines and replacing their role in local economies that tend to be heavily reliant on the industry for both jobs and revenues. According to the International Energy Agency, 3.1 million of the 7.8 million people working in coal-related activities in 2022 were employed in coal mining.

    Workers load coal on a truck near an open-cast mine, on the outskirts of Dhanbad. (Amarjeet Kumar Singh / SOPA Image via Reuters Connect)

    Workers load coal on a truck near an open-cast mine, on the outskirts of Dhanbad. (Amarjeet Kumar Singh / SOPA Image via Reuters Connect)

    Why is finance the elephant in the room?

    Finance – and finding more of it for climate action – has always been a bone of contention between developed and developing countries in the UN climate process, cropping up time and time again across negotiating streams, whether it’s the new goal for tripling resources for adaptation or filling the loss and damage fund.

    In the corridors at Bonn, observers told Climate Home News that, for just transition, the discussions on the topic did not centre on setting up a new dedicated fund, but rather touched on how the mechanism could better connect available financial resources with just transition initiatives in countries.

    The informal note on the new mechanism includes mobilising and facilitating “grant-based and non-debt-inducing finance” and channelling finance through North-South and other multilateral partnerships. It is unclear whether finance will be included in the final COP31 decision on the BAM. CAN’s Rosemberg has suggested a resource mobilisation taskforce could be set up to start identifying sources of funding.

    An analysis by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) shows that, during the first year after mass layoffs, workers losing their jobs in energy-intensive industries – such as power supply, heavy manufacturing and transport – lose an average of 58% of their income, compared with 52% experienced in other sectors.

    Pai flagged two challenges when it comes to funding just transitions: many large financial institutions don’t want to invest in low and middle-income countries because of their high-risk profile; and developing countries often lack a well-prepared pipeline of investable projects.

    The Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs) launched earlier this decade were an effort to overcome these barriers. The donor-backed initiatives, outside the UN climate process, mobilised billions of dollars from the public and private sectors to help several emerging economies, including South Africa and Indonesia, finance the transition to clean energy in an economically and socially fair manner.

    But the JETPs have run up against some difficulties, such as Jakarta abandoning its plan to shut down a major coal plant early, which was a key part of the original deal.

    Indonesia’s failing Just Energy Transition Partnership is a cautionary tale

    With UN climate negotiations on finance seeing positions harden between developed and developing nations as donor governments struggle to meet existing targets, some observers believe talks on funding for just transition are unlikely to produce quick results in the form of hard dollars any time soon.

    “Many of those who are asking for money don’t know what they’re asking for, and those who have the money don’t want to give. You can write a paragraph about finance [in the negotiations] but this fundamental reality will not change,” said Pai.

    The post From Belém to Antalya – gains, gaps and challenges for a new Just Transition Mechanism  appeared first on Climate Home News.

    From Belém to Antalya – gains, gaps and challenges for a new Just Transition Mechanism 

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    ‘Bloody dangerous territory’: UN report an indictment of govt climate inaction

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    KOROR, PALAU, Wednesday 2 September 2026 — The new global heating projection by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has laid bare the dire realities of inevitable climate disaster, loss and damage for the Pacific and Australia in a 1.8°C world, with Greenpeace warning ‘we are now in bloody dangerous territory’, and must do everything possible to return warming to 1.5°C.

    The report, Limiting Overshoot – Navigating exceedance of 1.5°C and pathways towards return, released as world leaders meet at this year’s Pacific Islands Forum in Palau, highlights the urgency of the climate crisis, the greatest security threat facing the Pacific. It comes as fracked gas from the Beetaloo Basin, one of Australia’s biggest climate bombs, began flowing for the first time.

    Australia is the biggest polluter of all Pacific Islands Forum member states, far exceeding all other forum members combined. Greenpeace is calling on Prime Minister Anthony Albanese to centre Pacific priorities at the Forum, and walk the talk on climate solutions as a genuine family member of the Pacific.

    Speaking from Palau, Shiva Gounden, Head of Pacific at Greenpeace Australia Pacific, said: “The latest UNEP report has printed in black and white that fossil fuel-hungry nations have overstepped, overshot and overindulged at the expense of Pacific lives, livelihoods, cultures and communities. This year’s Pacific Islands Forum has made it more apparent than ever that climate change is the region’s greatest security threat, and we cannot waste time on geopolitical power games when our world is sinking beneath our feet.

    “As a person from the Pacific, I know our communities will not quietly accept these dire warnings of climate overshoot as our fate; we are already living and fiercely resisting this reality every single day. With every increment of warming, our lands, our livelihoods, and our island homes are threatened, but the Pacific’s resolve only grows stronger. We draw strength from our ocean and those who walked before us; our people are the protectors of the frontlines of climate change and the beacons of climate justice.

    “By harnessing the natural power of our sun, winds, and seas through a rapid transition to renewable energy, and uniting in true global collaboration, we can steer back to 1.5°C – this is our moral, legal, and scientific imperative. A Fossil Fuel Free Pacific can breathe life back into the lungs of our islands.”

    Also in Palau, Dr Simon Bradshaw, COP31 Lead and climate expert at Greenpeace Australia Pacific, said: “The UN report is warning that we are now in bloody dangerous territory. It lays bare the deadly consequences of reckless fossil fuel expansion, and a failure to listen to Pacific voices and to the decades of emphatic scientific warnings.

    “It is a damning indictment of government climate inaction and negligence, coming just days after fracked gas from the Beetaloo Basin started flowing and Woodside’s disastrous Browse gas mega project undergoes Federal decision — two carbon bombs that would lock in decades of dangerous climate pollution and push us past the point of no return.

    “Every new fossil fuel project pushes us closer to dangerous and irreversible tipping points in the climate system, with almost unimaginable consequences for the safety and security of communities in the Pacific, Australia and around the world.

    “The task now is to minimise the magnitude, duration and consequences of any temperature overshoot. A pathway back to 1.5°C is possible but this pathway cannot be paved by fossil fuels.

    “Accelerating the shift from fossil fuels to renewable energy, and working with our big energy partners across Asia to decarbonise together, is not only the path back from the climate brink, but also the key to our energy security and our future prosperity.”

    Also in Palau, Vishal Prasad, Director of Pacific Islands Students Fighting Climate Change, said: “This report is terrifying for the young people of the Pacific. We know what 1.5, and what anything beyond it, means for our future, our families, our culture and our environment. 1.5 to stay alive has never been just slogan. It is our reality.

    “The International Court of Justice has made it clear: keeping to 1.5 is not a choice, it is a legal obligation. Every new fossil fuel project drives us further from it. So we are not asking for your goodwill. We are not begging you. We are telling you what international law requires of you: end fossil fuel expansion. No new coal, no new oil, no new gas. Your corporate profits cannot be allowed to extinguish our future.”

    —ENDS—

    Greenpeace Australia Pacific has delegates from the Pacific and Australia at the PIFLM in Palau available for interview

    Headshots can be found here

    Media contact: Kimberley Bernard in Palau on +61407 581 404 or kbernard@greenpeace.org

    ‘Bloody dangerous territory’: UN report an indictment of govt climate inaction

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