During the 2024 UK general election campaign, politicians and newspapers have used a series of “scary-sounding numbers” to mislead voters about net-zero.
While some of the numbers are accurate in isolation, they have been used in false or misleading ways, shaved of context and typically designed to exaggerate the cost of cutting emissions.
Current prime minister Rishi Sunak, his energy secretary Claire Coutinho and a string of right-leaning newspapers have all been guilty of this approach.
The most common tactics for misleading voters about net-zero include: focusing on the cost of action without mentioning the cost of business-as-usual; mentioning the costs of cutting emissions but not the benefits; and omitting the costs of failing to tackle dangerous climate change.
Below, Carbon Brief factchecks a series of claims made around the election campaign, each of which involves a big number about “costs”. The article explains who made each claim, where the relevant number came from – and the missing context that makes the claim false or misleading.
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MISLEADING
Hundreds of billions
“We’ve just found a recording that they have put out there from the deputy chancellor from the Labour Party admitting that their [climate] plans will cost hundreds of billions of pounds.”
– Rishi Sunak during BBC leaders’ debate – 26 June 2024
Where it comes from
In what appears to have been a coordinated move, Sunak attacked Labour’s net-zero plans during the final leaders’ debate hosted by BBC News, by citing an article published online the same evening in the Daily Telegraph. The article, which appeared on the newspaper’s frontpage the following morning, is based on public comments by Labour’s Darren Jones in March 2024 about the cost of reaching net-zero emissions by 2050, which is also government policy. The target was legislated in 2019 under Conservative former prime minister Theresa May.
What it excludes
Sunak misleads voters by omitting the fact that his own government – as well as the Conservative manifesto – also support the net-zero by 2050 target. He also ignores the costs of inaction on climate change and the evidence that accelerated action would yield significant economic benefits.
In 2019, the Climate Change Committee estimated that the net cost to the whole economy of reaching net-zero by 2050 would amount to £1.4tn, offset by savings from lower fossil fuel bills of £1.1tn. As set out by the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) in 2021, this amounted to a net cost of £321bn over nearly 30 years – consistent with the “hundreds of billions” cited by Labour’s Darren Jones. Furthermore, the OBR estimated that only a quarter of the costs of reaching net-zero would come from public spending and that delaying action towards the target could double the overall cost to the UK. It added that failing to act on climate change would have far greater impacts on the economy and public finances, concluding: “Unmitigated climate change would ultimately have catastrophic economic and fiscal consequences.”
In a 2023 report, the OBR found that continued reliance on gas could be more than twice as costly for the exchequer as reaching net-zero. Separate analysis for trade group Energy UK concluded: “[A]n accelerated transition [to net-zero] could boost the UK’s economy by £240bn in 2050 more than current trajectories…Under the most ambitious scenario, the GDP of each area of the UK would be 5.4%-7.5% greater in 2050 than under the current trajectory.”
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FALSE
£116bn
“Labour are still not being honest about the costs of their energy policy. Independent energy experts have warned that Labour’s 2030 target would need an extra £116bn of investment, which means one thing…higher taxes for millions of Brits.”
– Claire Coutinho tweet – 25 June 2024
Where it comes from
The figure is based on analysis by consultancy Aurora, which said a total of £116bn would need to be invested during 2025-2035 to reach Labour’s 2030 clean power target. This works at an average of £10.6bn per year, according to Aurora.
What it excludes
The current secretary of state’s phrasing is false. The same Aurora analysis said a total of £105bn would need to be invested during 2025-2035 to meet the government’s own target of clean power by 2035, averaging £9.5bn per year. As such, the “extra” investment is only £11bn over 11 years, or £1bn a year.
Coutinho’s claim that higher investment would mean higher taxes is also false, as electricity sector investment is predominantly from the private sector and paid for via bills. Moreover, Aurora has said, based on the same analysis, that consumer energy bills would be lower under Labour’s 2030 target than under a 2035 clean power goal – or under the current, less ambitious trajectory. Aurora said: “Either scenario will be highly challenging to implement, stretching the limits of deliverability. However, if delivered, increased investment could lead to lower total system costs once the long-term savings from lower gas consumption are included.”
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FALSE
£30bn
“Ditching Net Zero could save the public sector over £30bn per year for the next 25 years.”
– Reform manifesto – 17 June 2024
Where it comes from
Reform, a climate-sceptic party led and majority owned by Nigel Farage, offers almost no information on how it arrived at this figure. According to the OBR, public-sector spending on net-zero is estimated at around £8bn per year. The only other number mentioned by Reform is for renewable energy subsidies, which it puts at £10bn per year. These are paid by consumers, not the government, such that scrapping them would not save the public sector any money. Instead, Reform proposes to tax renewables by an equivalent amount, which would likely end investor confidence in the UK across the board.
What it excludes
Reform is claiming, implausibly, that the government could save more than it currently spends. It also focuses on the costs of reaching net-zero while ignoring benefits, as well as the cost of business-as-usual. The CCC has estimated that reaching net-zero will entail net investment costs of £44bn per year out to 2050, offset by operational cost savings of £29bn per year, with the annual cost in total averaging £15bn. This excludes wider GDP impacts: the CCC said that the size of the economy, the number of jobs and real disposable incomes would all grow under a net-zero pathway. The CCC’s monetary estimates also exclude the cost of climate impacts, the sizeable health benefits of improved air quality and other externalities. The IEA recently concluded that accelerating climate action towards net-zero “could lead to major reductions in household energy bills”, again purely looking at economic costs and benefits. According to the OBR, the UK government spent £51bn on energy bill support during 2022-23, after gas prices rocketed.
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FALSE
£2tn
“The UK cost of net-zero has been estimated by the National Grid and others at some £2tn or more. It is so big that no one really knows.”
– Draft Reform manifesto – 19 March 2024
Where it comes from
In 2020, National Grid Electricity System Operator (ESO) estimated the cost of building and operating a net-zero energy system at a cumulative total of £2.8-3tn by 2050. This is the total cost of building and operating the country’s energy system for 30 years.
What it excludes
The Reform statement is false. The same National Grid ESO report said: “Scenarios where we hit net-zero in 2050…incur broadly the same costs as the scenario where we miss our net-zero target.” As such, based on the National Grid ESO analysis, there would not be any additional cost to hitting net-zero relative to running an energy system that does not meet the target. Moreover, in 2021, the Treasury stated: “The costs of global [climate] inaction significantly outweigh the costs of action.”
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FALSE
£2.8-3tn
“National Grid ESO, the company which manages our electricity supply, has estimated decarbonising Britain’s entire energy system will cost between £2.8tn and £3tn between now and 2050, working out at between £108bn and £115bn a year.”
– Sun comment by Ross Clark – 23 June 2024
Where it comes from
In 2020, National Grid Electricity System Operator (ESO) estimated the cost of the country’s energy system at a cumulative total of £2.8-3tn by 2050. This is the total cost of building and operating the energy system for 30 years.
What it excludes
The climate-sceptic columnist’s statement is false. The same National Grid report said: “Scenarios where we hit net-zero in 2050…incur broadly the same costs as the scenario where we miss our net-zero target.” As such, based on the National Grid ESO analysis, there would not be any additional cost to hitting net-zero, relative to running an energy system that does not meet the target. Furthermore, the £108-115bn annual cost cited by Clark can be compared with the £265bn spent by UK consumers on energy in 2022 – when fossil fuel costs spiked due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – including more than £100bn on imported oil and gas alone. These 2022 figures did not include investment in new infrastructure.
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FALSE
£1,000
“[R]estoring the 2030 ban on the sale of new petrol and diesel cars will cost an estimated extra £1,000 per household per year from 2022 until 2050.”
– Sunday Telegraph article and editorial – 15 June 2024
Where it comes from
The Sunday Telegraph article and accompanying editorial are based on a dossier compiled by free-market thinktank the Institute of Economic Affairs, which, in turn, cites a 2022 report published by consultancy the Centre for Economic and Business Research (CEBR). The CEBR work was funded by Fair Fuel UK, the motoring lobby group run by climate-sceptic Reform candidate for London mayor Howard Cox. The newspaper omits this detail from its article.
What it excludes
The Sunday Telegraph claim is false, because the underlying report from CEBR makes the “simply perverse” assumption that the relative cost of petrol and electric vehicles (EVs) is unchanged for the next 30 years. The assumption that EVs will continue to face a purchase price premium over petrol cars is directly contradicted by the evidence of falling costs, including recent data showing that EVs are now close to up-front price parity in the UK. The Climate Change Committee (CCC) concluded that an earlier combustion-engine car ban would deliver £6bn in cost savings, because EVs have much lower running costs than petrol cars, again directly contradicting the CEBR and Sunday Telegraph claims. When Sunak delayed the combustion-car ban from 2030 to 2035, the CCC said this was “likely to increase…motoring costs for households”, adding that EVs were “significantly cheaper than petrol or diesel vehicles to own and operate”.
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TRUE
£265bn
“The UK spent a staggering £265bn on energy in 2022 – the most recent data available – including more than £100bn on imported oil and gas alone”
– Tweet by Carbon Brief’s Simon Evans – 8 February 2024
Where it comes from
This is the cost of energy – the majority of it being fossil fuels – bought in the UK in 2022 at market prices, reflecting the cost to consumers of heat, power and transport fuel. The data was the most recently available at time of publication and covers the first year of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when Russia restricted gas supplies to Europe and sent fossil fuel prices rocketing. In the pre-crisis year of 2021, the UK spent £184bn on energy.
What it excludes
These figures do not include investment in energy-related infrastructure, such as power plants, pylons, boilers, cars or heat pumps. Many conversations about the cost of reaching net-zero ignore the substantial costs of the status quo, which is heavily reliant on volatile fossil fuels.
The post Factcheck: How ‘scary-sounding numbers’ are being used to mislead the UK about net-zero appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Factcheck: How ‘scary-sounding numbers’ are being used to mislead the UK about net-zero
June Rubis is a steering group committee member for the Cali Fund, from Sarawak in Malaysian Borneo.
At COP16 in Cali, governments made a significant commitment: at least half of the funding from the new Cali Fund should support the self-identified needs of Indigenous Peoples and local communities, including women and youth. It was a watershed moment for multilateral benefit-sharing.
The challenge now is to translate that commitment into access arrangements that recognise the different institutions, priorities and decision-making processes of Indigenous Peoples and local communities.
For generations, biodiversity and traditional Indigenous knowledge have provided significant value to companies who depend on nature’s genetic diversity to discover new drugs that fight diseases, create products that improve health, and grow crops resilient to extreme heat and flooding events. While some compounds are sampled directly from the source country, increasingly the digital blueprints are held in online public databases which are freely accessible to use for innovation and research.
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The Cali Fund was established at COP16 to encourage commercial users of Digital Sequence Information, or DSI, to share benefits arising from its use. Estimates suggest it could generate over $3.5 billion a year – a stark contrast to the modest $10,656 currently committed to the fund from just five SMEs, underlining how much progress must be made at COP17 over the next two weeks.
The COP16 decision that set up the fund offers two routes for money to reach Indigenous Peoples and local communities: through government authorities, and through direct payments to institutions identified by Indigenous Peoples and local communities themselves.
Varied ways of organising
Indigenous Peoples and local communities organise through a wide range of institutions. Some have national or regional organisations experienced in managing international grants. Others work through territorial organisations, customary institutions, community associations, cooperatives or networks. Some have professional finance teams and audited accounts; others have extensive experience governing territories, collective resources or conservation work without having been organised around international funding requirements.
For direct access, some questions are already apparent. Which institutions should be able to receive funds? How should they be identified? What fiduciary standards should apply? How should safeguards and accountability work where institutional capacities differ? What support may be needed where institutions have strong community mandates but less experience with international finance?
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If access is designed mainly around institutions that already meet the expectations of large international finance mechanisms, early funding will tend to favour those already familiar to funders. They will gain further experience and become better positioned for future funding, while institutions with less administrative capacity may remain outside the system despite strong community mandates and long histories of stewardship.
These first decisions matter most, because they set the terms for everyone who follows.
The role of intermediaries requires care. Some Indigenous organisations may want a fiscal host to hold and manage funds on their behalf. Communities may choose to work through an NGO they trust. Government-facilitated arrangements may work well in particular national contexts.
What matters is the function an intermediary performs and the authority that comes with it. Providing administrative support is different from deciding which Indigenous organisations qualify, which priorities can receive support, or how success will be assessed. Direct access means communities keep that decision-making authority.
Decision-making power
The COP16 decision refers to institutions that Indigenous Peoples and local communities identify. But authority among Indigenous Peoples does not sit in one kind of body. It may sit with territorial organisations, customary institutions, community associations or combinations of these. Legal recognition and customary authority do not always align neatly.
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An important feature of the Cali Fund’s governance is that Indigenous Peoples and local communities participate as full members of the Steering Committee, rather than as observers. Seven Indigenous Peoples and local community representatives, one from each of the seven socio-cultural regions, participate in consensus-based decision-making alongside representatives of governments and UN entities. Six additional representatives from civil society, scientific institutions and the private sector participate as observers.
That representation carries responsibility. Institutional legitimacy, access and representation take different forms across the seven socio-cultural regions. Indigenous Peoples and local communities members therefore have an important role in bringing those differences into the Fund’s governance and in ensuring that arrangements developed for one context do not become the assumed model for everyone else.
Safeguards and clear responsibilities
COP17 can establish the core principles and direction, while allowing operational pathways to develop in ways that respond to different regional contexts. The decisions countries take in Yerevan will shape how that flexibility is realised in practice.
The choices made around access will influence which institutions are able to participate, which routes become established and which forms of authority are recognised within the funding architecture. The aim should be an architecture with enough structure to maintain confidence while allowing for different forms of Indigenous and community governance.
A credible direct-access pathway will need safeguards, financial oversight and clear responsibilities. This would give the 50% commitment a stronger institutional foundation.
The Cali Fund’s importance will ultimately depend not only on how much funding reaches Indigenous Peoples and local communities, but on whether they are able to determine how the money is accessed, governed and used. This requires access pathways that recognise their institutions, priorities and decision-making processes, rather than requiring them to conform to a single predetermined model.
The post COP17 must settle who decides how Cali Fund money is disbursed appeared first on Climate Home News.
COP17 must settle who decides how Cali Fund money is disbursed
The UK government has approved extraction at the Jackdaw gas field in the North Sea, despite acknowledging that this decision could make it harder for Britain to convince other countries to move away from fossil fuel production.
UK energy secretary Miatta Fahnbulleh approved the drilling on Wednesday after months of high-profile debate, fuelled in part by interventions from US President Donald Trump. She argued that the project would boost energy security in the wake of the Middle East fossil fuel crisis, protect hundreds of jobs and add £2.9 billion ($3.88bn) to the UK economy.
She said Jackdaw’s gas would be cleaner than imported gas and would not prevent the UK from meeting its legally-binding carbon targets and its goal of net zero by 2050. As the field is already licensed, she said extraction was consistent with the Labour Party’s 2024 manifesto promise not to issue any new oil and gas licenses.
The same morning, the government announced a new Energy Wealth Fund to reinvest oil and gas revenues in the climate transition. It will start with £2 billion ($2.67bn) from the government and be topped up over time with tax revenues from offshore oil and gas production.
Climate campaigners in the UK and abroad were quick to condemn the decision, while a leading legal expert told Climate Home News it goes against the advice of the International Court of Justice. Meanwhile, the government’s own documents reveal that it recognises the drilling could damage the UK’s reputation and its ability to push forward the global transition away from fossil fuels.
“Climate leadership” blow
The 92-page decision document says Fahnbulleh “acknowledges that international standing on climate is important and accepts that a decision to grant consent may not further the UK’s international climate leadership.”
It adds: “She acknowledges concerns about the potential implications for the UK’s credibility and influence – including the difficulty inherent in encouraging other states to move away from fossil fuel production while the UK continues, in a limited and transitional way, to draw on its own domestic resources.”
While noting that Jackdaw has not been issued with a new license – just permission to extract gas – the document says Fahnbulleh “accepts this does not fully resolve the underlying tension in the UK’s position” but “considers this alongside the substance of the UK’s wider record [on emissions reduction], which remains significant”.
It continues that she accepts these concerns are “legitimate” and weigh against approving gas extraction, but only gives this argument a “moderate negative weight” set against the benefits of gas production.
“Huge” wrong signal
In international climate talks, the UK has long supported the transition away from fossil fuels and is one of very few major oil and gas producers to ban new licenses. Across the North Sea, the Norwegian government continues to make offshore areas available for oil and gas exploration through annual licensing rounds.
Climate experts and campaigners shared the concern, acknowledged in the decision document, that approving Jackdaw could set a precedent for fossil fuel production elsewhere. Sam Fankhauser, professor of climate change economics at Oxford University, said the direct climate impact of Jackdaw is “much smaller than the debate around it would suggest” but the “wrong signal it sends, however, is huge”.
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Carbon capture industry faces tough future, as UK raids green spending
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