As tech giants race to build out AI and the sprawling infrastructure it depends on, climate concerns have tended to focus on one thing: power-hungry data centres.
Their electricity use is growing so fast that by 2030, it’s projected to be nearly three times more than the combined annual consumption of Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nigeria. With the explosion in the construction of data centres driving new investment in fossil fuels, especially in the US, greenhouse gas emissions generated by data centres – now standing at less than 1% of the global total – are set to soar.
But this narrow focus on electricity has let AI’s supporters and the International Energy Agency (IEA) make a convenient case: that rising emissions can be more than offset by the technology’s green applications, like optimising renewables or boosting efficiency. That story conceals how AI’s real climate danger lies elsewhere: in the oil fields, where it’s helping fossil fuel companies extract planet-heating oil and gas faster and more cheaply.
As a senior manager at Microsoft, Holly Alpine was shocked by this blind spot. In 2024, she and her husband Will – also a Microsoft manager – quit their jobs and launched a campaign to hold Big Tech accountable for the emissions its technology enables.
Over the past two years, they have teamed up with two researchers to quantify just how deep the fossil fuel industry’s embrace of AI tools runs.
Their peer-reviewed study, published last week, found that when AI is adopted at similar rates across the fossil fuel and renewable energy sectors, the net effect is a rise in emissions of 0.47–1.8 gigatonnes of CO2 annually. That’s equivalent to Mexico’s annual emissions at the low end, and to Russia’s – the world’s fourth-largest emitter – at the high end. It is also 3.3 to 13.3 times higher than the emissions currently generated by powering AI data centres.
We spoke with Alpine about the risks of overlooking this side of the AI climate story and what can be done to shift the focus.
Q: Why has the climate conversation focused so heavily on data-centre power use when your modelling suggests that’s the smaller part of the AI emissions story?
A: It’s been quite unfortunate that it has been framed that way and that it has stuck so much because that framing is wholly incomplete, very misleading and is leading to very dangerous consequences.
It’s in the fossil fuel industry and the technology companies’ favour to frame the equation in this way because it leaves out any responsibility and accountability of the tech’s use by fossil fuel companies, which is a large part of their business. They’re some of their largest customers and they have teams of engineers and sales folks who are dedicated to the fossil fuel industry.
Simply comparing the power needed to run the technology and its [clean energy] applications is also kind of apples to oranges. On the one hand, you have real-world actual emissions and, on the other, hypothetical future avoidance of emissions as a result of potential future use cases for renewables.
What we are saying is that we need to look at both sides of the ledger for AI applications, renewables versus fossil fuels, and then also add the emissions generated by running data centers on top of it.
Q: How do AI applications help fossil fuel companies in a way that drives up emissions?
A: It’s everything from finding more oil and gas underground by processing hundreds of terabytes of seismic and well data that would otherwise have to be done manually. These AI models can process this data extremely quickly and create high-resolution images of what is underground. It helps companies pinpoint the oil and gas reserves that are most likely to be commercially recoverable.
Fossil fuel companies can identify and develop fossil fuel deposits with a lot more certainty, allowing them to move forward with projects that would otherwise have been too risky or too slow to pursue. AI makes them viable.
We’ve seen that rig counts [number of active drilling rigs] have dropped dramatically, so they need fewer resources to get out even more fossil fuels. Their costs are decreasing, while their production is increasing.
Q: How deep do these relationships run between Big Tech and fossil fuel companies? How do they compare with equivalent relationships with renewable energy companies?
A: I have to caveat that I have not worked for Microsoft for about two years. But what we saw at the time was that the fossil fuel-dedicated teams were much larger in terms of the number of employees, the size of the contracts, and the long-standing relationships.
This is not new. Microsoft has worked with the fossil fuel industry for many years and has deep partnerships, starting with the humble machine-learning going back many years. AI is just the latest wave of technology being applied in this way.
There are also relationships between the tech companies and renewables companies [and] battery storage developers. There are definitely sustainability-related applications of the technology.
One of the recommendations that we had given the company [Microsoft] was to shift the ratio of engineering resources from fossil to low and no-carbon energy sectors within the company. When they came out with their principles for engagement with the fossil fuel industry in 2023, they committed to shifting engineering resources. But then we did not see any actual change in business practices.


Q: Tech companies are now quietly scaling back some of their climate commitments, but there was a point, not long ago, when they wanted to be seen as climate leaders. Was there ever a genuine commitment to do that, or was it just an image they were projecting?
A: It depends on how you evaluate a company for its climate impact. If all we are looking is its own operational emissions, then in that case, Microsoft was and, still is to some extent, a climate leader.
But if we evaluate a company based on what it is producing, then I would say it’s a very different story. Back in 2019, ExxonMobil said it was able to produce an extra 50,000 barrels [of oil] per day purely thanks to Microsoft technology. There was also another public and quantified deal with Chevron.
We calculated that those emissions alone from just two deals among dozens were 300% of Microsoft’s entire operational emissions, including data centres. So, how do you want to evaluate your company?
If you look at other sectors and, say, evaluate a weapons manufacturer on its violence footprint, you don’t just look at their supply chain and the violence within it to create the weapons. You look at the real-world impact of the weapons they’re manufacturing. Yet we completely left technology companies off the hook.
Q: You make some recommendations as well in the paper. They include the idea of putting some supply-side constraints on this AI-enabled productivity for fossil fuel companies. What would that look like in practice?
A: Ultimately, our goal would be to have disclosure and governance measures that limit AI’s role in increasing fossil fuel productivity. The first thing would be a recognition of “enabled emissions” even as a measurable category because, at the moment, they are not included in any emissions disclosure or accountability frameworks.
Then we should require transparency around these fossil fuel contracts and constrain some of these specific mechanisms that the research identifies.
We are not trying to have a blanket ban on AI or even a blanket ban on AI use in the fossil fuel industry. There are some great applications, like methane leak detection, for example. But we just want to align applications with climate science and ensure that any contracts that move forward have been evaluated against a 1.5C future.
AI governance debate silent on risks to nature, campaigners warn
The easy thing would be for companies to voluntarily put guardrails on how their tech can be used, which is not new. There just currently are none for climate. But we do think that… policy is what needs to be implemented.
We also think that if we can change the market structure and incentives, then this kind of restriction will follow. If we look at ESG investing and how sustainable investing is defined, if we include what these companies are doing into that evaluation, then that can move capital flows.
Q: What do you think are the most promising avenues where you can shift the AI narrative and drive the change you are seeking to achieve?
A: We are now building off the study and there are various governance frameworks that we are attempting to incorporate this sort of evaluation into like the Greenhouse Gas Protocol or the Science Based Targets initiative (SBTi)
Luckily, we have seen some very promising drafts for the future of those frameworks that do include evaluations and disclosures of this work, which is really exciting.
The vote that stopped a data center: US communities query resource-hungry AI
We also need to look at companies for impacts in order to evaluate their sustainability metrics, and there could be potential greenwashing concerns that we could address on the legal side of things.
And then [there are] different policy workstreams. In the EU, we were quite hopeful about the AI Act,and the various use cases that were classified as high risk and would go through additional scrutiny. Unfortunately, with the Omnibus passing [in July], that opportunity is a little restrained.
But now with the Cloud and AI Development Act (CADA) coming out with various European frameworks around evaluating tech’s impacts, we hope to inform those discussions with this research.
The post “Dangerous consequences” – how AI’s climate framing lets Big Tech off the hook appeared first on Climate Home News.
“Dangerous consequences” – how AI’s climate framing lets Big Tech off the hook
Climate Change
Brazil confident new rainforest fund will reach $10bn donor milestone
Brazil’s environment minister says he is “very optimistic” that the Tropical Forest Forever Facility (TFFF) – a new rainforest fund to channel private and public finance to developing nations – can meet a key $10 billion funding target this year, and is not at risk from his country’s elections next month.
The TFFF, launched by Brazil at COP30 in the Amazon last November and co-led by Norway, is intended as an alternative to traditional grant-based forest finance. The fund aims to raise $125bn in public and private capital, invest it in bond markets, and then pay countries that keep their forests standing from the annual returns. Donor contributions needed to get it going have tailed off after an initial burst.
Speaking to Climate Home News on the sidelines of Climate Week in New York, Brazilian environment minister João Paulo Capobianco pointed out that in less than a year since its official launch, the TFFF has already secured $7.3bn from governments.
“How many other initiatives can say that?” he asked. “Of course, if you have $7 billion, it’s easier for more countries to consider their own contribution. And not just countries – non-governmental organisations also. We are expecting even more support.”
As its initial target, the TFFF aims to raise $10bn in seed capital from governments by the end of 2026, and still needs to fill a gap of $2.7bn. Its backers say that for each dollar in public funding, they can secure $4 from the private sector. Critics say the $10bn goal barely covers the fund’s expenses and would not allow it to make any significant payments to forest countries.
Because setting up its financial architecture, raising the starting capital and making the first investments will take time, experts say the TFFF is unlikely to generate any payments for developing countries before 2028.
Seeking new pledges
Capobianco told Climate Home News that Brazil is still in talks with potential new contributors to the fund, among them China, Korea and Japan, and said he hoped to see more pledges announced at the upcoming biodiversity and climate COPs in October and November. The Netherlands is expected to up its first small contribution and Canada may also come in, according to other sources close to the TFFF.
Because the fund was not created as part of the UN climate talks and is hosted by the World Bank, developing countries can contribute without taking on wider donor responsibilities for climate finance. Brazil and Indonesia – both large emerging rainforest nations – have each pledged $1bn to the TFFF.
Earlier in September, the UK became the latest country to pledge funding – promising a loan of £400 million (about $540 million). Capobianco welcomed the contribution and noted that Britain has also said it will keep “under review” the possibility of putting in more.
Currently the largest donor is Norway, which announced a $3bn pledge last year at COP30 in Belém. However, that pledge came with conditions, among them that the fund must reach $10bn in sponsor capital by 2026, and that Norway’s contribution can’t make up more than 20% of that total. Over the longer term, this means the fund must raise $15bn from governments to unlock Norway’s full investment.
Comment: UK’s budget juggling trick with rainforest loan for bus-fare cap needs transparency
Speaking at a forest finance event in New York, Norway’s environment minister Sigrun Aasland said the country’s pledge was made not “only out of solidarity but because of shared interests”, adding that protecting rainforests is critical for climate and biodiversity goals as well as for national security.
“Tropical deforestation matters to people in the Amazon and in the Congo. But let’s not forget that it also matters to global food production and to the cost of living in Oslo or in London,” she said.
At the event, Guyana’s minister of natural resources Vickram Bharrat said the TFFF is “one in a menu of options” to finance forest protection in developing countries. He added that to boost its capital “maybe we should put some amount of pressure on oil companies to contribute to the fund”.
Upcoming election “not a risk”
Brazil, which has been pivotal to getting the fund off the ground, is now heading into a national election that could see the country swing back to an anti-climate stance if right-wing candidate Flávio Bolsonaro beats current left-wing President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva. Capobianco, however, said the election result does not pose a risk to the TFFF.
“It’s a global initiative, not a Brazilian initiative. We proposed the first idea, but nowadays it’s a global initiative,” he said. “We believe the investor countries and the tropical countries together have the possibility to continue this process.”
In Brazil, the first round of voting is scheduled for Sunday, October 4. If no candidate wins more than 50% of valid votes, a run-off ballot will take place on October 25.
COP30 roadmap to end deforestation will invite countries to draft domestic plans
In July, the TFFF board adopted a charter, which outlines the instrument’s objectives and values, including that 20% of the payments made to tropical countries will go directly to Indigenous people and local communities.
The charter also says the TFFF board may comprise up to 12 member countries during the initial phase. Currently, seven seats are filled by the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Germany, Brazil, France, the Netherlands, Norway and Indonesia.
The board has also formally incorporated the Tropical Forest Investment Fund (TFIF) – the TFFF’s investment arm that will trade bonds in financial markets – hosted in Luxembourg.
The post Brazil confident new rainforest fund will reach $10bn donor milestone appeared first on Climate Home News.
Brazil confident new rainforest fund will reach $10bn donor milestone
Climate Change
COP31 must aim higher to cut emissions from the use of materials
Patrick Schröder is a senior research fellow at Chatham House’s Environment and Society Centre.
A climate summit serious about implementation cannot afford to leave major emissions reductions off the table. Yet, that is the risk COP31 faces unless it makes reducing raw material use central to the way countries decarbonise their economies.
On the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York last week, COP31 host Türkiye laid out proposals to accelerate emissions cuts in the next decade. Its plans include global goals to increase the share of recycled products in material use to at least 15% (up from 6.9% in 2025) and halve waste generation by 2035.
COP31 offers an opportunity to connect efforts to improve material circularity with stronger national climate commitments and mitigation pathways. But these targets could be a lot more ambitious.
The case for circularity
The Paris Agreement cannot be delivered through cleaner electricity alone. We must also reduce the emissions that are embedded in the way we extract resources, manufacture products, build infrastructure and dispose of waste.
Circularity principles are pivotal to credible mitigation pathways: designing technologies and products to last, repairing and reusing them, and reducing demand for virgin resources.
The scale of the opportunity is striking. A recent European Environment Agency review found that adopting such principles could deliver average global emissions reductions potential of 52% in the waste sector against a business-as-usual scenario, 48% in construction and buildings, 28% in transport and mobility, 26% in industry and 24% in agriculture.
These figures make a compelling case for raising circularity ambitions across the economy, offering the promise of far more than better recycling bins.
In fact, recycling minerals used in cleantech equipment, for example, illustrate the extent of the emissions savings available. The carbon footprint of minerals and metals recovered from secondary sources is up to 80% lower than those produced from new mining and processing, according to the International Energy Agency.
A major EU-funded project estimates that recovered materials could substitute up to 56% of Europe’s primary critical raw material requirements by 2050, provided they achieve the necessary quality. The main takeaway goes beyond Europe: yesterday’s products can become tomorrow’s strategic resources while mitigating climate change.
In this light, a target to increase the share of recovered material use to 15% isn’t enough.
The evidence-based Circularity Gap Report found a 17% target by 2032 is possible and could unlock additional emissions reductions amounting to several gigatonnes of CO2.
Reducing material demand
A higher circularity metric is only part of the answer, however. An economy can increase its recycling rate at the same time as extracting more primary materials if total material demand keeps growing.
The tougher issue governments need to address is identifying what reductions in primary material use are needed.
The Circularity Gap Report uses an indicative benchmark of eight tonnes of virgin materials consumed per person annually. This is already being translated into policy: Germany’s 2024 circular economy strategy aims to reduce primary resource consumption, with the German Federal Environment Agency identifying six to eight tonnes per person as an ambitious target.

Reducing primary material demand will require a closer integration of energy and resource policies. Efficient EVs charged with solar power can complement better public transport and walkable cities, while batteries designed to be repaired and reused for stationary energy storage before being recycled will reduce the materials footprint of transport and clean energy services.
Coordinated infrastructure development and urban planning can prevent unnecessary overbuild, while renovating existing building stock reduces demand for new steel, cement and aluminium, which are emissions-intensive to produce. Connecting industrial waste heat to district heating networks can further reduce energy demand and emissions.
What governments should agree at COP31
COP31 can translate this approach into three concrete commitments.
First, governments should agree a stronger circularity ambition, supported by material-footprint indicators and milestones. The presidency should seek recognition of these priorities in negotiated outcomes, alongside concrete delivery partnerships under its COP31 Action Agenda.
Second, countries should include quantified circular economy measures in their updated nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and implementation plans. Such measures should include reuse, material efficiency and circularity targets, as well as transparent estimates of emissions savings that avoid double counting across sectors. By the end of 2025, countries had developed 101 national circular economy roadmaps and action plans, yet these often remained disconnected from their NDCs.
Third, climate finance should support the delivery of circular solutions such as material recovery at scale, investments into circular critical mineral value chains beyond mining, developing a circular plastics economy, and designing buildings and cities that support material reuse. Developing countries need technology, affordable finance and support to deliver these ambitions, including for the informal workers whose livelihoods depend on recovering and recycling materials.
The test for COP31 is to reach an agreement that can start the transformation of our production and consumption systems and how they are financed.
A headline circularity target will achieve little without policies that address absolute resource demand and deliver measurable emissions cuts. But COP31 offers an opportunity to make circularity a central element of climate policy, with targets strong enough to matter and institutions equipped to deliver them.
The post COP31 must aim higher to cut emissions from the use of materials appeared first on Climate Home News.
COP31 must aim higher to cut emissions from the use of materials
Climate Change
As El Niño intensifies, we should be investing more in the world’s farmers
An exceptional El Niño is building. The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) says it has intensified to very strong levels and is likely to last at least through February 2027. If its current trajectory holds, it could become stronger than anything seen since WMO monitoring began four decades ago.
That is bad news for agriculture. El Niño – a naturally occurring weather phenomenon – can scramble rainfall patterns across the world, bringing drought to some regions and floods to others. And this time it is unfolding against the backdrop of a significantly hotter climate, with farmers already contending with unreliable growing seasons, extreme heat and less predictable rainfall because of global warming.
El Niño expected to bring next record-hot year as soon as 2027
We are seeing the consequences already. In Sri Lanka, drought linked to El Niño has dried wells and reservoirs and cut into crops and farmer incomes. Indonesia is experiencing its worst wildfire season in 11 years, with prolonged drought and extreme heat exacerbated by El Niño. And in Peru, authorities are preparing for the opposite extreme: intense rains, flooding and landslides which the national civil-defence agency says could affect around 1.2 million people.
These impacts will multiply as El Niño intensifies.
And yet, just as the risks to food production are rising, the money available to help farmers withstand them is shrinking.
10% funding decline in 2024
A forthcoming analysis from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) shows that climate-related development finance for agrifood systems is moving in the wrong direction. In 2024, the latest year for which data is available, it fell by 10 percent compared with a 2 percent overall decline. The sectors that put food on our tables — crops, livestock, forestry and fisheries — received just 5 percent.
Yet this is precisely the moment when climate investment in agriculture needs to grow, not shrink. It can help communities adapt, build resilience and protect food security, while unlocking larger flows of public and private finance. Agriculture feeds us, supports the livelihoods of well over a billion people, and is often the first sector hit by drought, floods and extreme heat. Cutting that investment now is a false economy.
One failed harvest can plant the seed for the next crisis, forcing farmers to eat the seed they have saved for planting, sell livestock or tools, or take on debt. It can also deepen food insecurity, disrupt supply chains and drive up prices, showing up months later in supermarket aisles far away.
The Central American Dry Corridor, stretching through much of the region, shows both how exposed farmers are, and what investment can do. Based on an analysis of 41 years of satellite observations, FAO finds that some crop and pasture areas there face more than a 50 percent chance of agricultural drought over the coming months.
About half of Central America’s 1.9 million producers of maize, beans and other basic grains live in the Dry Corridor. Many grow food both for sale and for their own families. When a harvest fails, they lose both income and dinner.
El Salvador project conserves water and soil
In El Salvador, which lies within the Dry Corridor, more than 50,000 farmers have adopted practices to better withstand drought and increasingly unreliable rainfall through RECLIMA, a project financed by the Green Climate Fund and implemented by FAO in partnership with the government of El Salvador. It has substantial national co-financing, including from the country’s Environmental Investment Fund.
El Niño can intensify El Salvador’s annual mid-season dry spell, known as the canícula, turning it into a longer, harsher drought just as maize needs water most.


For María Cristina Corvera de López, a second-generation farmer in rural Nahualapa, adapting means changing how every drop of rain is captured and used. She plants trees alongside her crops to provide shade and minimise evaporation and uses simple irrigation channels and a homemade drip system to conserve water. Instead of burning stalks, leaves and husks after harvest, as generations before her did, she turns them into mulch to hold moisture in the soil.
“The effects of climate change are a constant challenge,” she says. But the new techniques have made her farm more resilient to El Niño as well. Where she once harvested about 50 bags of maize per acre, she now gets around 80, even during droughts. It’s enough to feed her family and sell the surplus.
Managing risk now cuts future costs
Together, these adaptations can mean the difference between losing a crop and getting through a dry season with enough food, seed and income to plant again. They are also the result of climate finance invested before disaster strikes.
RECLIMA shows what that kind of adaptation investment can buy. Adaptation accounted for 45 percent of climate-related development finance to agrifood systems in 2024, and multilateral development banks are directing more agricultural finance towards resilience. That shift reflects a growing recognition that adaptation is a form of risk management, not just a development cost.
We need much more of it. The same investments that help farmers withstand El Niño also enable them to adapt to a hotter, more unpredictable future. Cutting investment in the people who produce our food just as climate risks intensify does not save money. It simply pushes a much larger bill into the next harvest, the next food crisis, and the next El Niño.
The post As El Niño intensifies, we should be investing more in the world’s farmers appeared first on Climate Home News.
As El Niño intensifies, we should be investing more in the world’s farmers
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