Connect with us

Published

on

Electric vehicles (EVs) significantly cut lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions in almost all circumstances and are the key technology for decarbonising road transport.

While not having a car has even larger climate benefits, many peoples’ ability to go car-free is limited by their circumstances and the availability of alternatives.

This means EVs are “likely crucial” for tackling transport emissions, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

EV sales are growing fast, accounting for one in every seven cars sold globally in 2022 – up from one-in-70 just five years earlier.

Yet EVs are also being subjected to relentless hostile reporting across mainstream media in many major economies, including the UK.

Here, Carbon Brief factchecks 21 of the most common – and persistent – myths about EVs.

FALSE: ‘An EV has to travel 50,000+ miles to break even’

One of the most common false claims made against EVs is that they offer little or no climate benefit over conventional cars, due to the emissions associated with making their battery.

In a Twitter post promoting his anti-EV comment article for the Daily Mail, for example, the climate-sceptic former Conservative peer Matt Ridley claimed:

“An EV has to travel 50,000+ miles to break even with an ICE [internal combustion engine] car. That number is growing, not shrinking.”

This is doubly false. As Carbon Brief showed in its 2019 factcheck, it takes less than two years for a typical EV to pay off the “carbon debt” from its battery. Over the full vehicle lifecycle, carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from an EV are around three times lower than an average petrol car.

In reality, therefore, an EV in Europe will pay off its carbon debt after around 11,000 miles (18,000km), according to the International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT).

Moreover, the lifecycle benefits of EVs are increasing over time as electricity grids get cleaner.

In a 2021 lifecycle analysis, the ICCT found that an EV bought in Europe would cut emissions by 66-69%, relative to a conventional car. By 2030, this emissions saving would rise to 74-77%, the ICCT said, “as the electricity mix continues to decarbonise”.

New Carbon Brief analysis shows that a Tesla Model Y, the world’s best-selling EV, would pay off its “carbon debt” after around 13,000 miles in the UK (21,000km), as shown in the figure below.

This would take less than two years for the average UK driver.

A Tesla Model Y would pay off its 'carbon debt' after 13,000 miles
Lifecycle tonnes of CO2 (y-axis) per thousand miles of driving in the UK (x-axis) for a new Tesla Model Y (red) versus a new combustion-engine petrol car with EU-average fuel efficiency (grey). Source: Carbon Brief analysis. Chart by Carbon Brief using Datawrapper.

Typically, claims to the contrary argue that the higher emissions created during production of an EV are only very slowly paid off, or perhaps not at all, during the vehicles’ full lifecycle.

Yet these claims almost always make the same three key mistakes, which serve to underplay the emissions from combustion-engine cars and overestimate those from EVs.

First, these claims routinely overstate the emissions associated with manufacturing EV batteries, often cherrypicking older studies with the highest estimates.

Second, they usually take fuel-efficiency figures at face value, ignoring the long-standing issue that vehicle test cycles are unrealistic – with real-world efficiency around 40% worse than stated.

(Combustion-engine car test cycles were the subject of deliberate manipulation exposed by the “dieselgate” scandal. While real-world EV mileage is also lower than in test cycles and some electricity is lost during charging, this only adds around 19% to energy use, according to the ICCT.)

Third, they generally ignore the significant amount of CO2 associated with fuel production, including refining, which adds at least 20% – or more – to that emitted from the car’s tailpipe.

Taking these together, the ICCT concludes that combustion-engine cars have lifecycle emissions that are “twice as high as official tailpipe CO2 values”.

Back to top

FALSE: ‘VW’s e-Golf becomes more environmentally friendly only after 77,000 miles’

In order to support their false claims about the climate benefits of EVs, many articles refer to figures published several years ago by carmaker VW.

These studies have an air of credibility – after all, surely the manufacturers know best about their own supply chains? Yet both have been comprehensively – and repeatedly – corrected.

A few days before publishing Ridley’s false claims in July 2023 (see above), the Daily Mail published a news article including almost identical inaccuracies about the emissions benefits of EVs:

“The environmental benefit of electric cars may never be felt – with their production creating up to 70% more emissions than their petrol equivalent. Electric cars need to be used for tens of thousands of miles before they offset the higher releases, with VW’s e-Golf becoming more environmentally friendly only after 77,000 miles, according to the manufacturer’s own figures.”

There are several issues with these figures, including the fact that the e-Golf was discontinued three years ago. More substantively, the figures behind the VW analysis – shared with Carbon Brief in 2020 – show that the company makes the same key errors identified above. (See: FALSE: ‘An EV has to travel 50,000+ miles to break even’.)

Specifically: VW overestimates the emissions associated with making batteries; VW fails to account for the real-world fuel economy of its diesel Golf; VW underestimates the emissions associated with diesel fuel production; and VW overestimates the emissions in EU electricity.

Correcting for these errors shows that the e-Golf – if it were still being produced – would pay off its carbon debt after closer to 14,000 miles, or less than two years of UK average mileage.

The discontinued e-Golf would be better for the climate than a diesel_br_within 14,000 miles – not 77,000 miles as claimed by VW (1)
Lifecycle tonnes of CO2 (y-axis) per thousand miles of driving in the EU (x-axis) for an e-Golf (red) versus a Golf diesel (black). Dotted lines show VW’s original uncorrected analysis. Solid lines show corrected estimates. Source: Carbon Brief analysis. Chart by Carbon Brief using Datawrapper.

Carbon Brief and others corrected these figures from VW at the time – and they no longer appear on the VW website – yet they continue to be repeated in media attacks on EVs.

Back to top

FALSE: ‘The electric Volvo C40 needs to be driven around 68,400 miles to cut carbon’

Newspapers have also continued to reuse estimates of the climate impact of Volvo’s EVs, published in 2021, which, as with those from VW, have been repeatedly corrected.

For example, a July 2023 article in the Daily Mail wrote:

“Volvo revealed in 2021 that the emissions from the production of electric cars can be up to 70% higher than petrol models and said it would require between 30,000 and 68,400 miles for an EV to become greener overall.”

This is recycled wording from the newspaper’s 2021 article, which had said:

“Volvo estimated that an electric Volvo C40 needs to be driven around 68,400 miles to have a lower total carbon footprint than its petrol equivalent, if the former is powered by the current global electricity mix.”

The Daily Mail’s repetition ignores a 2021 correction from Auke Hoekstra, a researcher at Eindhoven University of Technology (TU Eindhoven).

Hoekstra said Volvo overestimated the emissions in electricity generation, overestimated the fuel efficiency of its petrol car and underestimated the emissions associated with fuel production.

Overall, Hoekstra estimated that the Volvo C40 EV would pay off its “carbon debt” relative to a petrol XC40 after 16,000 miles, rather than the top-end 68,400 miles quoted by the Daily Mail.

@AukeHoekstra on X: British media and @VolvoCarUK are resuscitating an erroneous study I corrected before in #Astongate.

Interestingly, Volvo itself says in its 2021 report that – even with its disputed figures – its C40 EV shows a “great reduction” in emissions compared with a petrol equivalent:

“The carbon footprint [of an electric C40 Recharge] shows a great reduction in greenhouse gas emissions compared to that of an internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicle.”

Elsewhere in the report, Volvo notes that its assumptions are “conservative” and that, for example, it is “highly probable” that the carbon intensity of electricity generation will improve rapidly during the lifetime of an EV, meaning its results are “likely to overestimate the total carbon footprint”.

The manufacturer also says: “Volvo Cars has committed to only sell fully electric cars by 2030.”

Back to top

FALSE: ‘Electric vehicles have little or no CO2 advantage over the car you already drive’

Some newspapers have gone a step further in their attacks on EVs, falsely suggesting that they may not benefit the climate at all compared with combustion-engine cars.

The Daily Express gave climate-sceptic motoring lobbyist Howard Cox a July 2023 comment slot to argue: “Electric vehicles have little or no CO2 advantage over the car you already drive.”

As explained above, EVs cut lifecycle emissions relative to combustion-engine cars by around two-thirds in Europe – and this figure is expected to climb.

After an average petrol car has been driven for 14 years – the UK-average age at scrappage – its carbon footprint would be 45 tonnes of CO2 (tCO2), illustrated by the black line in the chart below.

In contrast, an electric Tesla Model Y would emit 14tCO2 – a saving of 30tCO2 or 68%. This is shown by the curved red line, with the Tesla’s annual impact falling as the grid is decarbonised.

Lifecycle tonnes of CO2 (y-axis) per year of driving in the UK (x-axis) for a Tesla Model Y (red) versus an average conventional car (grey).
Lifecycle tonnes of CO2 (y-axis) per year of driving in the UK (x-axis) for a Tesla Model Y (red) versus an average conventional car (grey). Source: Carbon Brief analysis. Chart by Carbon Brief using Datawrapper.

Indeed, a petrol car driven a UK annual-average of 7,400 miles emits nearly 3tCO2 every year thanks to the emissions from burning its fuel. (This is based on 2019 average mileage, as driving distances have yet to recover to pre-Covid levels.)

For comparison, global CO2 emissions are an average of 4.7t per person per year, 5.1tCO2 in the UK and 14.9tCO2 in the US. The average for Africa is 1.0tCO2 per person per year.

In support of his false claim that EVs do not have an emissions advantage over combustion-engine cars, Cox cites a self-published report that his organisation, FairFuel UK, funded with the Alliance of British Drivers and the Motorcycle Action Group. No authors are listed.

The report’s references include the notorious climate-sceptic blogs Watts Up With That? and JunkScience, an article in the Jaguar Drivers’ Club in-house magazine, and the climate-sceptic lobby group the Global Warming Policy Foundation and its campaigning arm Net Zero Watch.

The report’s false assertions are at odds with analysis published by the IPCC, the ICCT, the British and US governments and many others.

Back to top

FALSE: ‘Climate change is accelerating because of the ban on combustion-engines’

German magazine Der Spiegel has published even more outlandish claims about EVs.

In an August 2023 article, it quotes the former head of the ifo institute Hans-Werner Sinn saying that “climate change is accelerating because of the ban on combustion-engines”.

The quote comes from an interview Sinn gave to German tabloid Bild. He argued that while EVs might reduce oil demand and emissions in one country, this is simply displaced elsewhere.

Notably, Sinn is contradicted not only by the expected climate benefits of EVs in the future, but also by the evidence of their emissions impact in the recent past.

@DrSimEvans on X: Global CO2 emissions will grow by less than 1% (300MtCO2) this year, according to new @IEA analysis

In an October 2022 analysis, the International Energy Agency (IEA) said that EVs and renewable energy sources had prevented some 600m tonnes of CO2 (MtCO2) emissions last year. It said:

“The rise in global CO2 emissions this year [2022] would be much larger – more than tripling to reach close to 1bn tonnes – were it not for the major deployments of renewable energy technologies and electric vehicles (EVs) around the world.”

In separate analysis published in April 2023 and covered by Carbon Brief, the IEA said that the EVs sold in 2022 alone had cut global emissions by 80MtCO2.

The IEA added that, by the end of the decade, EV sales were on track to displace 5m barrels of oil demand per day – some 5% of the current total – and to cut annual global emissions by 700MtCO2, roughly the current yearly output of Germany or Saudi Arabia.

Back to top

FALSE: ‘Old bangers are the green motorist’s choice’

Another common argument against the adoption of EVs is that keeping older cars – colloquially known in the UK as “bangers” – would be more environmentally friendly than buying a new model.

Writing in the Guardian in June 2023, for example, comedian Rowan Atkinson said that “keeping your old petrol car may be better than buying an EV”.

(The Guardian subsequently published a factcheck of Atkinson’s claims, including this one.)

Atkinson’s argument was supported by letter-writers to the Sunday Times, which published their missives under the headline: “Old bangers are the green motorist’s choice.”

A 2021 comment for the Daily Telegraph by assistant editor Jeremy Warner was more definitive:

“If you want to do your bit for the planet, forget Tesla and other super expensive electric vehicles; just carry on driving the same old gas-guzzling banger you’ve always had. As much if not more carbon tends to be expended producing a new car as actually driving it.”

Avoiding the premature scrapping of functioning vehicles makes financial sense. Indeed, this is embedded in government plans to ban the sale of new combustion-engine cars by 2035 or before.

(The UK government had pledged to ban new combustion-engine car sales from 2030, with hybrid vehicle sales allowed to continue until 2035. It has since pushed back the ban to 2035.)

Given a lifetime of around 15 years, a 2035 ban would ensure that combustion-engine cars are off the road by 2050, when CO2 emissions need to reach net-zero to limit warming to 1.5C.

Yet, perhaps counterintuitively, it would still be a net benefit for the atmosphere to retire an “old banger” early in favour of an EV, Carbon Brief analysis shows.

Despite the bump in CO2 from manufacturing an electric car and its battery, a new EV would start cutting emissions after 20,000-32,000 miles in the UK (32,000-50,000km), per the chart below.

Buying a new EV to replace an 'old banger' would benefit the climate_br_after driving 20,000-32,0000 miles (32,000-51,000km)
Lifecycle tonnes of CO2 (y-axis) per thousand miles of driving in the UK (x-axis) for an old pre-2015 petrol Ford Focus (grey), old pre-2000 petrol Mercedes (black), a new Tesla Model Y (red) or new Nissan Leaf (pink). Source: Carbon Brief analysis. Chart by Carbon Brief using Datawrapper.

This means that an average UK driver replacing an “old banger” would pay off the carbon debt from buying a new EV within around four years, with the exact timelines depending on the fuel efficiency of the car being scrapped, annual mileage and the battery size of the new EV.

(The Sunday Times letter-writer driving a 36-year old Mercedes only 5,000 miles a year would start cutting emissions with a new Tesla Model Y after five years.)

Back to top

FALSE: ‘EVs simply displace carbon emissions from roads to distant power stations’

A common refrain from those arguing that EVs are “nowhere near as green as you think”, in the words of climate-sceptic columnist Ross Clark in the Daily Mail, is that “driving an electric car simply displaces carbon emissions from roads to distant power stations”.

This argument is often misleadingly used to suggest that EVs are powered wholly or mainly on fossil fuels – with the implication that they are, therefore, unlikely to cut emissions. Clark says:

“If all the electricity used to power a car comes from coal – China and Poland, for example, have large numbers of coal power stations – you would need to drive 78,700 miles before your electric car’s carbon ‘budget’ broke even.”

First, there are no countries in the world that generate all of their electricity from coal. In China, the share of coal power was 61% in 2022, down 14 percentage points in a decade, with the equivalent figures in Poland being 69% and a reduction of 15 points.

Second, Carbon Brief analysis shows EVs would pay off their carbon debt in China and Poland after 22,000 miles (35,000km) and 18,000 miles (28,000km), respectively.

An academic analysis of EVs in China found they already cut carbon emissions by 40% relative to combustion-engine cars in 2020, with a further 43% reduction possible by 2030.

In general, EVs cut carbon emissions significantly, even if they mainly run on coal- or gas-fired electricity, as the chart below shows. In coal-heavy Poland, an EV would cut lifecycle emissions by two-fifths, Carbon Brief analysis shows, rising to two-thirds in the UK and four-fifths in Norway.

EVs cut carbon significantly, even when they mainly run on coal power
Lifecycle emissions, grams of CO2 per km, for an average EU petrol car and a Tesla Model Y running on the average electricity mix in a range of countries. Source: Carbon Brief analysis. Chart by Carbon Brief using Datawrapper.

In its latest assessment report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) spelled this out, but added that EVs already cut emissions in almost all cases. It said:

“The extent to which EV deployment can decrease emissions by replacing internal combustion engine-based vehicles depends on the generation mix of the electric grid although, even with current grids, EVs reduce emissions in almost all cases.”

The IPCC went on to note that investments in EVs are “convertible” into low-carbon assets, even in countries with very carbon-intensive electricity:

“Today’s investments in electric vehicles in settings where electricity is produced with fossil fuels is an example of convertible investments – they will be decarbonised once electricity production has switched to renewable energies.”

The reason that EVs can cut emissions, even when running on fossil-heavy electricity, is that they are roughly four times more energy efficient than combustion-engine cars.

Back to top

MOSTLY FALSE: ‘Electric cars are not green machines’

As noted above, many attacks on the climate benefits of EVs are completely false. Yet it is also the case that there is a non-trivial carbon footprint associated with the production and use of EVs.

For some commentators, this is an opportunity to make the perfect the enemy of the good, with a recent Daily Mail headline stating: “Electric cars are NOT green machines.”

When an EV bought in the UK today would cut emissions by two-thirds, relative to a combustion-engine car, it is obvious which is the “greener” choice.

Yet with a lifecycle carbon footprint of 20 or even 30tCO2, depending on lifetime mileage, location and the size of the EV battery, there is clearly scope for EVs to become lower-carbon in the future.

Ragout_Daily mail – why electric cars are not green machines

This is already expected to happen to some extent – as already noted – as electricity grids are decarbonised around the world. But mining, battery manufacturing and the production of steel, aluminium and other components all add to EVs’ footprint overall.

The IPCC says, with high confidence, that EVs running on low-carbon electricity “offer the largest decarbonisation potential for land-based transport, on a lifecycle basis”. But it also notes:

“Further efforts to reduce the GHG footprint of battery production…are essential for maximising the mitigation potential of BEVs [battery EVs].”

In other words, EVs are central to decarbonising road transport, but more needs to be done to ensure their production and use has the lowest-possible emissions.

The Daily Mail draws a different conclusion, continuing its headline by stating falsely:

“The environmental benefit of EVs may never be felt as their production creates up to 70% more emissions than petrol equivalents.”

While it is true that the production of EVs creates more CO2 than petrol equivalents – the US Argonne National Laboratory puts manufacturing-phase emissions at some 30-100% higher, depending on battery size – this carbon debt is paid off quickly. (See: FALSE: ‘An EV has to travel 50,000+ miles to break even.’) As a result, EVs still cut carbon significantly overall.

Moreover, the Argonne analysis says EVs’ production-phase disadvantage will shrink significantly by 2030-2035, falling to 5-50%, as supply chains become lower-carbon and more efficient.

It also notes the potential for steel decarbonisation to be a “major source of opportunity for emissions reduction” in the future – for example, using “green steel” produced without burning coal.

Back to top

INCOMPLETE: ‘Electric vehicles alone can’t solve climate change’

Among all the myths about EVs, it can be easy to lose sight of one important point, summarised in the headline of a recent Bloomberg editorial: “Electric vehicles alone can’t solve climate change.”

On the one hand, this statement is trivially true, in the sense that it could equally be applied to any individual climate solution. On the other hand, this statement is also incomplete.

No serious strategy for decarbonising road transport – let alone the entire global economy – could rely on EVs alone. But this is hardly a reason to push back on the adoption of EVs.

Aerial photo of electric buses in east China.
Aerial photo of electric buses in east China. Credit: Imago / Alamy Stock Photo

On the contrary, the IPCC concludes that EVs are “likely crucial”. Its latest report says:

“Widespread electrification of the transport sector is likely crucial for reducing transport emissions.”

Indeed, the IPCC finds that EVs – along with other zero-carbon fuels – likely have the single-largest potential to cut transport emissions. Moreover, it puts the carbon-cutting potential of these technologies ahead of changes to urban infrastructure and behaviour.

The IPCC says EVs and other technological changes can contribute an estimated 50% of emissions cuts in the land transport sector by 2050, with a range of 30-70%. It says:

“Technology adoption, particularly banning combustion and diesel engines and 100% EV targets (and other zero-carbon fuels, especially in freight) and efficient lightweight cars, can contribute to between 30% and 70% of GHG emissions reduction from land transport in 2050, with 50% as our central estimate.”

This is well ahead of the potential from changes in urban infrastructure (30%, range 20-50%), behavioural change (5%, range up to 15%) and active travel (2-10%), according to the IPCC.

As a result, the IPCC concludes with high confidence that:

“Several end uses, such as passenger transportation (light-duty electric vehicles, two and three wheelers, buses, rail)…are likely to be electrified in net-zero energy systems.”

Nevertheless, the IPCC makes clear that other options for cutting transport emissions are an important part of the solution for reaching net-zero emissions globally.

On urban infrastructure, the IPCC says:

“Infrastructure use (specifically urban planning and shared pooled mobility) has about 20-50% (on average) potential in land transport GHG emissions reduction, especially via redirecting the ongoing design of existing infrastructures in developing countries, and with 30% as our central estimate.”

On behaviour change, the IPCC says:

“[S]ocio-cultural factors can contribute up to 15% to land transport GHG emissions reduction by 2050, with 5% as our central estimate. Active mobility, such as walking and cycling, has 2-10% potential in GHG emissions reduction.”

(At a household level, the IPCC cites findings showing that “liv[ing] car-free” is the single-most effective individual action, with the potential to cut emissions by around 2tCO2 per person per year. Shifting from a combustion-engine car to an EV would have a similar impact, it notes.)

Overall, it is clear from the IPCC report that EVs are “crucial” to decarbonising transport, but also that they cannot do the job alone. In addition, EVs will only reach their full carbon-cutting potential if electricity systems and manufacturing supply chains are also decarbonised.

Back to top

FALSE: ‘EVs are [low-mileage] runabouts…[that] take a long time to pay off their carbon debt’

In a July 2023 article for the Daily Mail, climate-sceptic columnist Ross Clark falsely claims that EVs will take a long time to pay off their “carbon debt” of manufacturing, because they are mostly “used as runabouts in towns and cities”.

He asserts, without evidence, that the mileage of EVs is low due to “their limited range”. A cursory glance at real-world data shows these claims to be false.

New EVs in the UK drive an average of 9,435 miles per year in the first three years of their life, according to analysis of MOT data from the RAC Foundation. This is well above the average for UK cars overall and 26% further than the average new petrol car, the analysis finds.

(The figures also show new diesels covering 12,496 miles per year. However, diesel cars are rapidly becoming less popular, accounting for less than 4% of sales in 2023 to date.)

Figures from Norway paint a similar picture. EVs now drive more miles each year, on average, than petrol or diesel cars, according to the latest official figures discussed by BloombergNEF head of transport Colin McKerracher in an article for Bloomberg. He writes:

“This effect shouldn’t be surprising; people like to use more of things that are cheaper. But it wasn’t always received wisdom in the market. A few years ago, some oil energy outlooks assumed not only that EV adoption would be muted, but that each EV would on average travel less than a comparable internal combustion vehicle. This now looks like a very shaky assumption…at BNEF, we’re expecting this same effect to start showing up in the data of more countries in the years ahead.”

Back to top

FALSE: ‘Synthetic petrol could displace electric vehicles’

In early 2023, an EU rule banning the sale of new combustion-engine cars from 2035 was delayed by several weeks after Germany insisted on an exemption for cars running on “e-fuels”.

Sometimes referred to as “synthetic fuels”, they are made by combining CO2 with hydrogen and can be used in existing combustion-engines. If they are made with low-carbon hydrogen, synthetic fuels can have a low carbon footprint overall.

These apparent advantages have persuaded some politicians and commentators to argue for their widespread use, with some going so far as to suggest they could “stop electric cars in their tracks”.

For example, in a since-corrected comment for the Guardian, comedian Rowan Atkinson argued that “a sensible thing to do would be to speed up the development of synthetic fuel”.

In March 2023, the UK parliamentary select committee on transport also argued in favour of using synthetic fuels, in a report that received positive media coverage, stating:

“[D]rop-in sustainable fuels enables us to address the existing fleet and minimise cost (and carbon emissions) through the use of existing infrastructure. It would also enable more socially equitable access to carbon reduction technologies for everyday transport as it would not be necessary to buy a new electric car and have access to charging infrastructure.”

The recent interest in synthetic fuels has been co-opted by those seeking to delay the UK government’s pledged ban on sales of new combustion-engine cars.

Such calls, including lobbying from the UK’s fuel producers, were rejected by the government on the basis that synthetic fuels are “expensive”, “not proven” and contribute to air pollution.

Synthetic fuels are indeed costly. They are ”up to three times more expensive than conventional fossil fuels”, according to the IPCC, and “expensive…even in the long run”, says the IEA.

They are also very inefficient to produce. Carbon Brief analysis shows it would take at least five times as much electricity to run cars on e-fuels as for EVs.

@DrSimEvans on X: Running all of the UK's cars on synthetic 'e-fuels' would take FIVE TIMES as much electricity as for EVS.

EVs running on renewables also have significantly lower CO2 emissions than cars burning e-fuels made from the same source of power, according to lifecycle analysis for the UK government.

(According to NGO Transport & Environment, lifecycle emissions from an EV in 2030 would be 53% lower than for a combustion-engine car running on e-fuels.)

These issues make it vanishingly unlikely that synthetic fuels will “displace” EVs, let alone “stop electric cars in their tracks”. The IPCC explains that synthetic fuels will be relatively scarce and expensive, with their use focused on harder-to-abate sectors such as aviation. It says:

“Given these high costs and limited scales, the adoption of synthetic fuels will likely focus on the aviation, shipping and long-distance road transport segments, where decarbonisation by electrification is more challenging.”

Indeed, the head of German airline Lufthansa recently pushed back against the use of synthetic fuels for cars. Referring to moves by luxury carmaker Porsche to get exemptions from combustion engine bans based on e-fuels, he said:

“With no technology in sight to replace fuels, we really need all the sustainable aviation fuel in the world…[Porsche chief executive] Oliver [Blume] can maybe have some for his 911, but we really need the volumes.”

Mercedes-Benz chief executive Ola Källenius, at least, has acknowledged this reality, stating: “As for carbon-reduced fuels…aviation will need them.”

A 2021 briefing from Transport and Environment concluded bluntly: “E-fools: why e-fuels in cars make no economic or environmental sense.”

A June 2023 article for the Evening Standard was titled, “Synthetic petrol could displace electric vehicles” – but went on to undermine its own headline. The piece asked: “Could e-fuels completely derail attempts to phase out the internal combustion engine?” It then answered: “[T]here’s no suggestion e-fuels are a credible like-for-like replacement for today’s petrol use.”

Back to top

FALSE: ‘Hydrogen cars are more sustainable than EVs’

Hydrogen cars are another favourite of those disputing the benefits of EVs. In his Guardian article criticising EVs, for example, Rowan Atkinson said hydrogen was an “interesting alternative fuel”.

Elsewhere, a recent feature in the Times is titled: “Hydrogen cars were the future once – might they be again?” Going a step further is an article from “sustainable living” website the Ethos, which claims falsely that “hydrogen cars are more sustainable than EVs”

In a since-deleted article for the Daily Express, the founder of a firm hoping to make hydrogen from waste plastic writes glowingly of its potential and says that EVs are “destined to go the way of the dodo”.

The evidence, however, paints a very different picture, both in terms of the prospects for hydrogen versus electrified transport and when it comes to their relative sustainability.

There were only 72,000 hydrogen fuel-cell vehicles on the planet at the end of 2022, against 26m EVs, according to the IEA. This means there were already 360 times more EVs than hydrogen vehicles at the end of 2022, as shown in the figure below.

With EV sales set to climb by 40% to 14m units in 2023 and hydrogen vehicle sales falling, this chasm is set to widen even further.

Hydrogen vehicles are a 'rounding error' compared with EV sales
Global stock of hydrogen fuel cell and battery electric vehicles at the end of 2022. Source: IEA global EV outlook 2023. Chart by Carbon Brief using Datawrapper.

According to Colin McKerracher, head of advanced transport for BloombergNEF, fuel-cell vehicle sales are “a rounding error” relative to sales of EVs, despite the fact that governments have “bent over backwards to make their support as technology-neutral as possible”. He writes:

“A dearth of government support isn’t the issue for alternatives to battery EVs – the problem is the product. Fuel cell vehicles are failing because they’re not proving compelling enough.”

As to the false idea that hydrogen cars are more sustainable than EVs, this is at odds with the findings of a lifecycle analysis for the UK government.

This analysis found that EVs are “much more efficient” than hydrogen cars, using only a third of the energy. It also said lifecycle emissions from hydrogen cars would be 60-70% higher than EVs, even assuming that the hydrogen was from low-carbon sources.

The latest IPCC report concluded that EVs are “the most attractive” option for cars, whereas hydrogen vehicles could “complement” EVs in heavy-duty transport.

Back to top

FALSE: ‘Sales of electric vehicles appear to be slowing’

One bizarrely persistent myth is that consumer appetites are turning away from EVs. An October 2022 article in the Times, for example, said that “sales of electric vehicles appear to be slowing”.

This is false: indeed, EVs sales are surging in the UK and globally. Yet a September 2023 Times article said the “popularity of electric cars (EVs) continues to wane”.

The Daily Telegraph’s climate-sceptic columnist Matthew Lynn may have marked the apogee of this trend with a comment headlined: “Nobody wants an electric car”. (Lynn also wrote in a 2007 article for the New Zealand Herald that the iPhone “won’t make a long-term mark on the industry”.)

It is easy to see why some newspapers and columnists have been blindsided by the pace of change. In 2017, only one in every 70 new cars sold was an EV (1.4%). Just five years later, in 2022, this had risen to one in seven (14.4%), according to figures from the IEA.

In April 2023, the IEA said “explosive” growth would see EVs making up 18% of global car sales in 2023, just two years after saying that threshold would not be crossed until after 2030.

@DrSimEvans on X: 'Explosive' growth means 1-in-3 new cars will be electric by 2030, new @IEA report says

A slow initial phase followed by increasingly rapid growth is characteristic of the “S-curve” of technology adoption, which has been followed by mobile phones and now EVs.

In the UK, EV sales grew 88% in July 2023 compared with the same month a year earlier and 72% in August. Some 16.4% of sales in the first eight months of 2023 were “pure” EVs with no combustion engine, up from 14.0% in the same period of 2022.

The UK has also seen rapid expansion in the second-hand market for EVs, which grew by 81% in the second quarter of 2023, albeit from a low base.

Forecasts from industry group the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT) show pure electric cars and vans roughly doubling and tripling their shares of sales, to 22.6% and 11.2%, respectively, between 2021 and 2024. This would put them on track to meet the requirements of the UK’s recently confirmed “zero emissions vehicle” (ZEV) mandate, which enters force in 2024.

The world’s top 10 markets for EVs all saw double-digit growth in sales during the second quarter of 2023, Bloomberg reports, including China, the US, Germany and France.

@tsrandall on X: If anyone tries to tell you EV sales are plateauing, just look at the latest growth rates of the 10 biggest markets.

While there is a wide range of views over how quickly the shift to EVs will happen, even oil producers’ cartel OPEC agrees that their sales and market share will grow rapidly.

The IEA says EVs will make up a third of global car sales by 2030, with BloombergNEF saying 45%. The most aggressive recent forecasts for EVs come from the Rocky Mountain Institute (RMI) and use S-curves to predict a global EV share of 60-80% by 2030.

For context, some 37% of car sales in China in August 2023 were EVs or “plug-in” hybrids, BloombergNEF says.

Back to top

FALSE: ‘Electric cars could soon be more expensive to drive than their petrol equivalents’

One of the most obvious advantages of electric cars is their much lower running costs, relative to combustion-engine equivalents. This is largely a result of their far greater efficiency.

In an October 2023 article, the UK’s Climate Change Committee (CCC) says EVs “will be significantly cheaper than petrol and diesel vehicles to own and operate over their lifetimes”.

Indeed, Carbon Brief analysis shows that EV drivers would make significant savings over using a petrol car in all countries considered, from Australia to Argentina and from China to India, the US, or the UK. Annual EV savings, for a selection of these countries, are shown in the figure below.

Yet a number of newspaper articles have sought to paint a different picture.

In August 2022, for example, the Daily Telegraph reported: “Electric cars could soon be more expensive to drive than their petrol equivalents amid soaring energy prices.”

This supposed future – when EVs “could soon be more expensive to drive” – never came to pass.

The chart below illustrates the lower fuel costs of EVs in a varied range of countries, including COP28 host the UAE, as well as the US, China, India, UK and EV frontrunner Norway.

For each country, the chart shows annual fuel costs for an EV in red, based on standard domestic electricity prices as of mid- to late-2023, depending on data availability. This is compared with the equivalent annual cost for a petrol car in grey, based on pump prices in October 2023.

EVs are significantly cheaper to drive than petrol cars
Annual fuel costs for an EV versus a petrol car in selected countries, based on standard domestic electricity prices in mid- to late-2023 and October 2023 pump prices. For the purposes of comparison, annual mileage and fuel efficiency is the same for all countries, based on figures for the EU. Source: Carbon Brief analysis. Chart by Carbon Brief using Datawrapper.

More recently, in July 2023, the Daily Mail published a similar article questioning the cost savings of EVs. However, it made a narrower and much more carefully worded claim. It said: “Recharging electric cars at public points can now prove more expensive than a petrol refill.”
In the UK at least, this can be true, depending on the fuel efficiency of the petrol and electric cars, the prevailing price of fuel and the type of public charge point used, given fast chargers are more expensive than home charging. Nevertheless, the statement is incomplete – and, therefore, potentially misleading.

@KatyDuke on X: Latest BEV V ICE fuel costs. ICE = 19.8p per mile, diesel 17.2p pm.

Crucially, the majority of UK homes have access to off-street parking and owners usually charge their EVs overnight, using off-peak tariffs that are cheaper than standard home electricity prices.

While EVs cost significantly less to drive than petrol cars, they generally remain more expensive to buy. This is despite rapid declines in the cost of batteries over the past decade.

The IPCC’s latest report said that EV costs “are decreasing”. In its latest 2023 EV outlook, research firm BloombergNEF said price parity with combustion-engine cars “is getting closer”.

The outlook explained:

“EV price parity is getting closer, but progress varies by segment and country. Prices for lithium-ion batteries increased for the first time in 2022 and are likely to remain elevated in 2023. This delays the upfront price parity of battery electric vehicles with combustion cars. Despite the near-term increase, EVs still reach up-front price parity with comparable combustion vehicles, without subsidies, by the end of the decade in most segments.”

The outlook shows EVs reaching up-front price parity with combustion vehicles in the SUV and large car segments in Europe by 2025, with small and medium cars following by 2028.

(According to data firm Benchmark Mineral Intelligence, lithium-ion battery prices dipped below $100 per kilowatt hour in August 2023 for the first time since two years earlier.)

While they have yet to reach up-front price parity, the total cost of ownership of EVs reached parity with combustion-engine cars “in leading markets outside the US in the early 2020s”, according to RMI, thanks to lower running costs. Similarly, a recent analysis for the German government found “clear advantages for electric cars”, when looking at the total cost of ownership.

More recently, Bloomberg published a chart, below, showing that Tesla’s Model 3 and Model Y are now cheaper than the average selling price of a new car in the US.

@tsrandall on X: At the start of the year Tesla's base Model Y cost $20,000 more than the average selling price of a new car in the US.

(In October 2022, the Sun was among newspapers giving coverage to a woefully wrong analysis of the costs of the shift to EVs, commissioned from motoring campaign group Fair Fuel UK from economic consultancy the Centre for Economics and Business Research. In order to reach its paid-for conclusions, the consultancy incorrectly claimed that EVs cost more to run than petrol cars and makes the “simply perverse” assumption that the upfront cost of EVs would never change.)

Back to top

FALSE: ‘There are insufficient raw materials…for all vehicles to be EVs’

Another common line of attack against the widespread adoption of EVs relates to the metals needed to make lithium-ion batteries.

In a March 2023 report, for example, the transport select committee of MPs in the UK parliament claimed – falsely – that “there are insufficient raw materials…for all vehicles to be EVs”.

This assertion does not appear to be supported by any evidence in the committee’s report. It also stands in stark contrast to the findings of the Energy Transitions Commission (ETC), which said in a July 2023 report that there was “no fundamental shortage” of any key materials. It said:

“There is no fundamental shortage of any of the raw materials to support a global transition to a net-zero economy: geological resources exceed the total projected cumulative demand from 2022-50 for all key materials, whether arising from the energy transition or other sectors.”

Writing in the Financial Times on the launch of the report, ETC chair Adair Turner said “myths” were “clouding the reality of our sustainable energy future”. He said it was important to separate those myths from genuine concerns and added:

“One thing we don’t need to worry about is long-term supply: for all the key minerals, known resources easily exceed total future requirements.”

It is clear that the shift to EVs will significantly increase demand for a number of “critical minerals”, including lithium, but also nickel, cobalt and others.

The IEA, for example, says that demand for critical minerals would grow by three-and-a-half times between 2023 and 2030 to reach 30m tonnes a year, if countries get on track to limit warming to 1.5C. It adds that EVs and batteries would be the main drivers of this demand growth.

In its July 2023 critical minerals market review, the IEA highlights the need to address mining environmental impacts, as the shift towards net-zero drives demand for minerals. It says:

“The mining industry has been associated with a host of negative environmental, social and governance (ESG) impacts, including human rights violations, contribution to armed conflict, environmental contamination, deforestation and other harms. Failure to manage these impacts could have profound implications for clean energy transitions as well as damage the environment and communities in the vicinity of mining deposits.”

These issues have prompted a torrent of media coverage, with headlines including one in the Daily Telegraph saying: “The green revolution is fuelling environmental destruction.” Elsewhere, the Washington Post ran a series of articles in early 2023 with the tagline “clean cars, hidden toll”.

Such coverage generally fails to offer perspective on the scale of resource extraction needed to support the world’s current fossil-fueled economy.

@DrSimEvans on X: Factcheck (true): Mining causes environmental problems

Some 15bn tonnes of fossil fuels are extracted and burnt each year. Under a 1.5C pathway, critical mineral needs would be 500 times lower, reaching 30m tonnes a year by 2030.

Making a similar point, Turner writes in his Financial Times article:

“Mineral supply challenges must be clearly faced and managed. But we must also welcome the sustainable nature of the new energy system. In today’s energy system, each year we burn 8bn tons of coal, 35bn barrels of oil, and 4tn cubic metres of gas, producing around 40bn tonnes of CO2 equivalent. In the new system, we extract far smaller quantities of key minerals and place them in structures that generate, store and use clean electrical energy; and the materials are then ready to do the same again next year or to be recycled over and over again. This is an inherently renewable system and the faster we build it the better.”

Turner also says that, setting aside the “myths”, there are “three key challenges” around critical minerals. These include scaling up supply fast enough to meet rising demand and diversifying supply chains, which are currently concentrated in a small number of countries.

His third challenge is the environmental impacts of mining:

“[N]ew developments can have adverse local environmental effects. In aggregate, the adverse effects will be more than offset by putting a stop to coal mining but that won’t be true for some local communities. Best mining and refining practices can dramatically reduce harm – and must be required by regulation imposed on mineral producers and users.”

Back to top

FALSE: The lifetime of EV batteries is ‘horribly uncertain’

Over the years, many newspaper articles have raised questions over the longevity of EV batteries. Back in 2010, a Daily Telegraph article said the lifetime of batteries was “horribly uncertain” and predicted that this would make EVs “financially disastrous”.

In fact, most manufacturers offer battery warranties of at least eight years – and EVs do not depreciate any faster than conventional cars.

Still, even carmakers acknowledge that – perhaps not surprisingly – consumers remain uncertain about battery life, with Chinese-owned UK brand MG stating on its website: “Electric car battery life is one of the main factors that makes drivers reluctant to switch to an electric vehicle.”

UK motoring website Autocar notes that there are many “rumours and anecdotes” circulating about EV batteries failing “after a relatively short space of time”. It points to peoples’ experience with mobile phone batteries as one reason why such ideas persist.

However, Autocar goes on to say that most batteries will last the lifetime of the car. (Tesla says its batteries are “designed to outlast the vehicle”.) Autocar says:

“[T]he more electric cars that are out there and the longer they are run for, the more evidence is produced to show that the power pack will often last the lifetime of the car.”

A study of 15,000 EVs by Seattle-based battery analysis firm Recurrent Motors found that only 1.5% of batteries had been replaced. According to coverage of the study in the Globe and Mail, 90% of the cars that had covered over 100,000 miles still had at least 90% of their original range.

In a 2022 interview with Forbes, Nissan UK marketing director Nic Thomas is quoted saying:

“Almost all of the [electric car] batteries we’ve ever made are still in cars…And we’ve been selling electric cars for 12 years…It’s the complete opposite of what people feared when we first launched EVs – that the batteries would only last a short time”

UK roadside assistance firm RAC says: “For all intents and purposes, the lifespan of EV batteries…is broadly comparable to that of a traditional combustion car.”

Back to top

FALSE: ‘Electric vehicles can explode – petrol ones only do it in movies’

In a July 2023 article for the Sun, climate-sceptic motoring journalist Jeremy Clarkson wrote that EVs were “bloody dangerous”, as part of a lengthy and familiar list of their supposed issues.

His comment piece ran under the false and – presumably – tongue-in-cheek headline: “Electric vehicles can explode – petrol ones only do it in movies.”

If this was meant as a joke, it fell flat. It was also flat-out wrong. Indeed, the evidence does not support Clarkson’s viewpoint at all – quite the opposite.

Figures from Norway, where more than a fifth of cars on the road are electric, show that standard combustion engine vehicles catch fire around five or six times more often than EVs.

Emergency services were called to around 30 fires per 100,000 standard cars on the road per year during 2018-2022, compared with around five EV fires per 100,000 vehicles, according to the data compiled by Robbie Andrew of the Cicero climate research institute in Oslo, using figures from the Norwegian Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning (DSB) and Statistics Norway.

@robbie andrew on X: Norway is known for having a large share of electric cars on its roads, currently over 21%.

In a Twitter thread, Andrew translates reporting from Norway saying that EV fires rarely involve the battery and that, asked by a journalist how much people should “fear” fires in electric cars, the senior engineer at DSB says: “To a very, very small extent.”

(Andrew notes that the discrepancy could be partly down to the EV fleet being relatively new on average. He has previously pointed to major flaws in a widely shared study, from price comparison website AutoinsuranceEZ, which claimed to show that EVs suffer fewer fires than other cars.)

Several other sources confirm that EVs are much less likely to catch fire than combustion-engine vehicles. For example, Australian EV news site the Driven cited figures from the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency: “Petrol and diesel cars 20 times more likely to catch fire than EVs.”

Such is the interest in supposedly widespread EV fires, however, that certain media outlets have ended up falsely blaming the vehicles for fires they did not cause.

For example, the Daily Telegraph was one of several publications reporting a cargo ship fire in July 2023 as being “linked” to electric cars on board. On the day of the fire, on the Fremantle Highway car transporter ship in the North Sea, website electrek spoke to the Dutch coastguard and reported that – in contrast to widespread finger-pointing at EVs – the cause of the fire was unknown.

One month later, German trade publication Automobilwoche went further and reported that the fire had not been caused by exploding electric cars, “contrary to much media speculation”.

In a post on LinkedIn summarising its reporting, the outlet says: “The investigations indicate that the electric cars on board were not the cause of the fire, contrary to much media speculation.”

In July 2023, an EU-funded research programme on reducing the risk of fires on ships, known as LASH FIRE, released information on “facts and myths about fires in battery electric vehicles”.

There are fewer fires in EVs than in combustion engine cars, it says, adding that those fires that do occur in EVs do not burn more intensely or at higher temperatures than for combustion engines.

In summary, EVs are “not more hazardous” than conventional cars, the document says, but the risks they present are different. It explains:

“New technologies naturally raise a large interest in the public and as new energy carriers make their way into the market, some misconceptions will naturally also make their way to the public. BEVs are not more hazardous than internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEVs), but the risks of Li-ion batteries differ to those of conventional fuels.”

An August 2023 press release from the International Union of Marine Insurers comments on the Fremantle Highway fire and says: “to date, no fire onboard a ‘roro’ or pure car and truck carrier (PCTC) has been proven to have been caused by a factory-new EV”.

It reiterates the LASH FIRE findings and notes that while batteries exposed to fire can result in “thermal runaway”, which can be harder to put out, the resulting risks can be managed. It adds:

“Traditional fuels such as petrol and diesel are potentially extremely dangerous but we, as a maritime industry, have learnt to understand and mitigate the associated risks. Lithium-ion batteries are still relatively new but have already become a major part of everyday life. The maritime industry is still learning and needs to adapt to these new sets of risks and mitigate them accordingly.”

In another recent incident, social media users – and some media outlets – pointed the finger at EVs after a huge fire broke out in a car park at Luton airport in the UK.

Even after the local fire service “confirm[ed] the initial vehicle involved in the fire was a diesel car” and CCTV footage emerged of the car itself, showing it to be a 2014 diesel Range Rover, many social media users continued to insist that EVs must have been to blame.

Armchair experts argued that it is hard to get diesel to burn and that it must have been an electric hybrid, even though Range Rover did not sell hybrids in 2014. (An error-strewn 18 October comment by Daily Telegraph columnist Allison Pearson repeated this false claim.)

Meanwhile, the Daily Mail reported that there had been previous fires involving Range Rovers and Land Rovers. It said:

“The Range Rover fire which sparked last night’s Luton airport car park inferno comes six years after a Land Rover went up in flames at Liverpool’s Echo Arena’s car park. The blaze at Luton airport yesterday also comes six months after Land Rover recalled several models of the Range Rover and Range Rover Sport to address issues that could potentially lead to fires.”

Back to top

FALSE: ‘Under Biden’s electric vehicle mandate, 40% of US auto jobs will disappear’

Another angle of attack on EVs is that the transition towards electrified transport will cause problems for the manufacturing industry in general and for its workers in particular.

In remarks reported by the Economist, for example, former US president Donald Trump said the shift to electric cars is a “transition to hell” that will destroy “your beautiful way of life”.

Yet, as a September 2023 article from CNN notes, the US car industry has announced more than $100bn of investment in the transition to EVs, creating “more than 100,000 American jobs”.

In further recent remarks, Trump falsely claimed that “under Biden’s electric vehicle mandate, 40% of US auto jobs will disappear”. FactCheck.org “found no support” for this claim.

Former US President Donald J. Trump speaks at the 2023 Republican Party of Iowa Lincoln Dinner in Des Moines, Iowa.
Former US President Donald J. Trump speaks at the 2023 Republican Party of Iowa Lincoln Dinner in Des Moines, Iowa. Credit: UPI / Alamy Stock Photo

A New York Times factcheck also says Trump’s claim “lacks evidence” – but it repeats the idea that “electric vehicles can be made with fewer workers than gasoline vehicles”.

An article for Heatmap challenges this argument, saying that, while it seems to be “conventional wisdom”, research uncovered for the article “suggested the opposite”. It says:

“Trump may be exaggerating, but the underlying idea, that electric vehicles require less labour to manufacture than internal combustion engine cars, is the conventional wisdom. It has been circulated for years by automakers, autoworkers, politicians, and journalists. EVs contain fewer parts, the thinking goes, so naturally they will require fewer workers.

“That logic seems obvious, which might be why it hasn’t received much scrutiny. But when I tried to find any research supporting it, what I found instead suggested the opposite. A number of analyses showed that electric vehicles could actually require more labour to build than gas-powered cars in the US, at least for the foreseeable future.”

A 2020 report from the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) supports Heatmap, stating:

“The common wisdom that BEVs are less labour intensive in assembly stages than traditional vehicles is inaccurate. In fact, the labour requirements for ­assembling BEVs and ICEVs are comparable.”

In its latest report on how to limit global warming to 1.5C, the International Energy Agency (IEA) says that a shift towards net-zero emissions would see 30m new clean energy jobs created by 2030 in industries including low-carbon power and electric vehicles.

These new jobs would outweigh losses in coal, oil and gas extraction, as well as in the production of combustion-engine vehicles, by two to one overall, the IEA says. In the car industry specifically, the IEA suggests new jobs making EVs and batteries would roughly balance losses elsewhere.

Evidence from the UK suggests the shift to EVs could create 80,000-100,000 new jobs. However, these jobs are contingent on attracting manufacturers to make EVs and their batteries in the UK.

In a May 2023 report, government advisory body the CCC highlights the conditionality on these jobs:

“The UK has taken steps to capture market shares and some car manufacturers are investing in electric vehicle manufacturing in the UK. However, there have been challenges and there is a risk manufacturing will find more favourable conditions elsewhere. Subsidies in places such as the US and the EU are likely to attract investment and secure jobs outside of the UK.”

What is not in doubt is that the transition to electrified transport will be disruptive. The rise of Chinese manufacturers of EVs – and the batteries that power them – is a case in point.

Another BCG report, looking at the car industry in Europe out to 2030, notes that it expects the shift to EVs to have a “minor net impact” on job numbers overall. However, it adds that this “obscures massive changes” in the type and distribution of jobs in the sector.

In the US, the argument over EV jobs has coincided with – and is partially tied up in – a dispute between carmakers and unionised labour. In October 2023, the Financial Times reported:

“General Motors has agreed to include battery manufacturing plants in its overarching contract with the United Auto Workers [UAW], the union said, meeting a crucial demand for employees anxious over the industry’s shift to electric vehicles…The UAW has been pushing for higher wages and other concessions in a new contract…It has also sought to extend contract protections at the plants that will provide many of the batteries for a wave of EVs hitting the market in the next several years.”

Back to top

FALSE: ‘Electric car revolution at crisis point’ due to ‘charging point shortage’

In early 2023, the Daily Mail reported that the “electric car revolution [is] at crisis point” in the UK due to a “charging point shortage”. Around the same time, the Times said a “lack of [charging] infrastructure” was “threatening the EV revolution”.

Since then, UK EV sales have continued to surge, growing 36% year-on-year in the first nine months of 2023. Global EV sales grew 40% in the first half of the year.

While the headlines are clearly false, it is clear that a rapid transition to EVs will require a similarly fast rollout of charging infrastructure – and there are bound to be teething troubles along the way.

In its sixth assessment report, the IPCC emphasises the need for investment in charging infrastructure and the electricity networks it connects too. It says with high confidence:

“The continued growth of electromobility for land transport would require investments in electric charging and related grid infrastructure.”

Returning to the case of the UK, the number of public charging points reached the milestone of 50,000 in early October 2023, according to charging services provider Zapmap. It said this represented year-on-year growth of 43%, with the number of “ultra-rapid” chargers up 68%.

Zapmap says the number of public chargers will reach 100,000 in 2025, if current rates of installation continue, against a government target of 300,000 by 2030.

@zap map on X: We're very pleased to confirm that the UK has hit a major milestone of 50,000 charge points.

While the number of chargers remains highest in London, recent growth has largely been outside the capital city, according to figures released in July 2023 by the Department for Transport.

In August 2023, the Association for Renewable Energy and Clean Technology (REA) and several other groups wrote to UK transport minister Jesse Norman, calling for charge points to be given priority in the queue for connections to the electricity grid, among other changes. They wrote:

“By adopting the recommendations in this report, the government can achieve its target of reaching 300,000 charge points by 2030, creating new jobs and driving economic growth.”

Nevertheless, a July 2023 editorial in the Times said: “The rollout of charging infrastructure is going too slowly.”

That month, the Financial Times reported industry fears the shift to EVs was being “held up” by the “painfully slow” process for connecting new chargers to the grid.

Looking at the global picture, some $1tn of investment in the charging network is needed over the next three decades, according to BloombergNEF. It explains:

“Over $1tn in cumulative investment in EV charging infrastructure is required globally over this period [to 2050]…The required charger investment is still small compared to overall auto sales. For example, China requires $453bn of cumulative investment in charging infrastructure to 2040, compared to automotive sales revenue from domestic car sales and exports of $750bn in 2022 alone.”

The number of public charge points more than doubled in several European countries over the past year, according to figures assembled by consultancy Cornwall Insight. Growth in the UK was in the middle of the pack, at 57%, ahead of Germany (35%) but behind Poland (81%).

In its 2023 global EV outlook, the IEA notes that most charging is done at home, but that public infrastructure remains important. It says:

“While most of the charging demand is currently met by home-charging, publicly accessible chargers are increasingly needed in order to provide the same level of convenience and accessibility as for refuelling conventional vehicles.”

In a launch presentation for the report, the agency says that charging infrastructure “kept pace” with the growth of EVs in 2022, with the stock of charging stations rising by 55%.

ragout-4_iea

There were 2.7m public charging points worldwide at the end of 2022, the IEA says. It adds that 60% of slow charging points were added in 2022 – and almost 90% of fast chargers – were in China.

Back to top

FALSE: ‘Britain’s creaking power grid cannot cope with charging electric cars’

During the summer of 2023, the Sun newspaper made a series of false arguments against EVs as part of its “give us a brake” campaign “to protect drivers from a rush to net-zero”.

In one August 2023 article, for example, the Sun claimed falsely that “Britain’s creaking power grid cannot cope with charging electric cars”. This is described as a “myth” by National Grid, the company that owns and operates the UK’s electricity network.

A January 2023 comment for the Sun by the climate-sceptic motoring lobbyist Howard Cox also claimed that the UK’s grid would have problems meeting demand for EVs. He wrote:

“Unless the capacity of the national grid is expanded by tens of gigawatts, there will be insufficient power to meet the proposed growth in battery-powered electric vehicle ownership and maintain anything like our current treasured freedom of motoring movement.”

While the specifics have shifted, the spirit of the Sun’s false claims recall a series of 2017 articles – which Carbon Brief factchecked at the time – that incorrectly and implausibly said the UK would need 20 new nuclear plants to meet the demand for electricity from EVs.

Electricity pylons from Dungeness nuclear power station in Kent.
Electricity pylons from Dungeness nuclear power station in Kent. Credit: PA Images / Alamy Stock Photo

(The Sunday Times later removed this wildly overstated figure, issuing a print correction that acknowledged a “significant miscalculation based on a confusion of energy and power”. The false claim remains, more than six years later, in the article’s web address.)

Of course, there is no question that the transition from combustion engine cars to EVs will dramatically reconfigure global energy demand – as well as cutting emissions. It will cut demand for oil, reducing imports and energy security in countries such as the UK and China.

At the same time, EVs will become a significant new source of electricity demand. In its latest report, the IPCC states: “Decarbonising the transport sector will require significant growth in low-carbon electricity to power EVs.”

(The IPCC notes that decarbonising transport with “energy-intensive fuels, such as hydrogen, ammonia and synthetic fuels” would require even larger increases in electricity generation.)

EVs already used an estimated 110 terawatt hours (TWh) of electricity in 2022, according to the IEA, equivalent to the entire annual consumption of the Netherlands – or 0.5% of global demand.

This could rise tenfold, to 1,150TWh in 2030, if countries meet their climate pledges, the IEA estimates, equivalent to nearly 4% of global electricity demand. These EVs would cut global oil use by nearly 6m barrels per day, around 6% of current demand.

According to BloombergNEF, EVs will add 12-14% to global electricity demand in 2050.

In the UK, EVs would increase electricity demand by up to 38TWh in 2030 and 88TWh in 2035, according to the latest scenarios from the National Grid Electricity System Operator (ESO). This would cut cars’ demand for petrol and diesel in 2030 to 27-45% below current levels.

In addition to raising annual demand for electricity, there have also been fears that uncontrolled EV charging could increase the peak load on electricity grids.

UK newspapers such as the Daily Telegraph were once again quick to highlight these supposedly insurmountable problems, with a 2017 article saying plans to ban petrol and diesel car sales by 2040 were “unravel[ling] as 10 new power stations needed to cope with electric revolution”.

Once again, however, the company that actually runs the UK’s electricity network sees things differently. National Grid ESO says EVs could, in fact, support the network by storing excess generation from renewable sources and “giv[ing] [it] back to the grid in times of high demand”.

It says the country’s grid could “capably handle” an overnight switch to EVs, thanks to reductions in peak demand over the past two decade:

“Do the electricity grid’s wires have enough capacity for charging EVs? The simple answer is yes. The highest peak electricity demand in the UK in recent years was 62GW [gigawatts] in 2002. Since then, the nation’s peak demand has fallen by roughly 16% due to improvements in energy efficiency. Even if we all switched to EVs overnight, we estimate demand would only increase by around 10%. So we’d still be using less power as a nation than we did in 2002, and this is well within the range the grid can capably handle.”

The firm adds that it is, nevertheless, working with electricity distribution companies, government and others to ensure that “the wires, the connections to charge points” are in place to support EVs.

The IPCC says EVs “provide several opportunities for supporting electricity grids if appropriately integrated”, whereas they could “negatively affect the grid” if there is a lack of integration. It points to the use of “smart-charging” – where EVs are mostly charged during periods of low demand – which it says can cut the impact on peak electricity demand by 60%.

Back to top

FALSE: ‘How your super heavy EV produces MORE pollution than petrol and diesel cars’

A July 2023 article from the Sun claimed falsely that EVs “actually end up producing MORE pollution than petrol and diesel motors”.

The article’s headline statement is false because it is framed very broadly, implying that EVs produce more “pollution” in general than combustion engine cars.

In fact, although it mistakenly refers to “milligrammes of carbon dioxide per kilometre from [an EV’s] four new tyres”, the article focuses more specifically on fine particulates (PM2.5) from tyre wear.

Even on this narrower point, the article is at best incomplete. Tyre wear is only one source of particulate matter from vehicles, along with exhaust emissions, brake wear and road abrasion.

In contrast to the impression created by the Sun article, the UK government stated unequivocally that the shift to EVs would have the co-benefit of “cleaner air”.

ragout-3_air_quality_benefits

The government document, published in early 2023, contradicts earlier statements from then-UK environment secretary George Eustice. Giving evidence to MPs in 2022, he raised questions over the air quality impact of shifting to EVs, saying:

“The unknown thing at the moment is how far switching from diesel and petrol to electric vehicles will get us. There is scepticism. Some say that just wear and tear on the roads and the fact that these vehicles are heavier means that the gains may be less than some people hope, but it is slightly unknown at the moment.”

The 2023 document notes that EVs have “no exhaust emissions of particulate matter (PM) or NOx [nitrogen oxides, which are emitted by petrol and diesel engines and which contribute to poor air quality”. It puts the net economic benefits of cleaner air from EVs at £1bn in present value terms.

The document refers to a report from the government’s air quality expert group and says that the non-exhaust emissions of EVs compared with conventional cars are assumed to be equal.

The expert group says that EVs “should” have lower brake wear emissions due to using “regenerative braking” rather than brake pads, but adds that tyre and road wear emissions increase with vehicle weight. The “net balance” between these effects “remains unquantified”.

The Sun article reports findings from independent testing firm Emissions Analytics that EVs are, on average, heavier than their combustion-engine equivalents, resulting in “20% more pollution”.

Motoring organisation RAC moved to quickly “set the record straight” over Eustice’s remarks, commissioning a brief report from Dr Euan McTurk, a consultant battery electrochemist.

McTurk also notes reduced brake wear in EVs, pointing to the experience of a taxi firm in Dundee, among others. Summarising McTurk’s conclusions on tyre wear, the RAC states: “[EV] tyre wear is similar for the non-driven wheels and only slightly worse for driven wheels.”

While the Sun article presented a false and misleading picture of the pollution impacts of EVs, it is the case that they currently tend to be heavier than equivalent combustion-engine cars.

Along with the much broader shift in consumer preferences towards larger, heavier SUVs, this does present problems for transport infrastructure.

An August 2023 article in the Guardian reported on SUVs being too large to fit in car parking spaces, a phenomenon it referred to as “autobesity”:

“More than 150 car models are now too big to fit in average car parking spaces, according to analysis conducted by Which?. While the size of the standard parking bay has remained static for decades, cars have been growing longer and wider in a phenomenon known as ‘autobesity’…All three of the widest cars are sports utility vehicles (SUVs).”

Other newspapers have chosen to focus their reporting on EVs, with an April 2023 article in the Daily Telegraph saying: “Car parks could collapse under the weight of electric cars.” Another Daily Telegraph  article was titled: “Sheer weight of electric vehicles could sink our bridges.”

ragout-2_the_Sunday_Telegraph

In June 2023, US factchecking site Politifact faulted claims by Republican presidential hopeful Nikki Haley, who had said: “Electric vehicles are so heavy that our roads and bridges aren’t capable of handling that.” The site concluded:

“Electric vehicles generally weigh more than gasoline-powered cars…But infrastructure experts said that by far, more damage to roads and bridges is caused by weightier vehicles such as semitrucks [articulated lorries].”

Similarly, the claim in a frontpage Daily Telegraph story that EVs cause “double” the pothole damage of petrol cars, was branded “rubbish” by TU Eindhoven’s Auke Hoekstra.

Hoekstra also points to the “disproportionate impact” of the heaviest vehicles, such as trucks and vans. He goes on to argue that batteries are getting twice as light per unit of capacity per decade, meaning that: “By the time most vehicles sold will be EVs…they will NOT be heavier.”

(The Daily Telegraph article cites “analysis led by the University of Leeds”, however, the university’s press office notes that its research does not say anything about potholes.)

The post Factcheck: 21 misleading myths about electric vehicles appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Factcheck: 21 misleading myths about electric vehicles

Continue Reading

Climate Change

World falling short on 22 of 23 nature targets for 2030, says draft UN report

Published

on

The global goal to halt and reverse nature loss by 2030 “will not be achieved” unless action by countries “accelerates rapidly”, says a draft UN report.

Countries are falling short on 22 of the 23 targets for 2030 they set under the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF), the “Paris Agreement for nature”.

That is according to a draft version of a global report prepared by the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), published on 26 July.

The report will be finalised ahead of the next nature summit, COP17, taking place in Armenia in October of this year.

The second draft of the global report has undergone “peer review”, but will still be subject to “technical edits” before being formally published ahead of COP17.

The final version will inform a global review of countries’ progress towards meeting the world’s 2030 nature goals, which will take place in Armenia.

Below, Carbon Brief explains why the report has been produced and what it says about countries’ progress in areas such as restoring ecosystems and raising funds for biodiversity.

Article Contents

Global report

In Montreal, Canada, in 2022, nearly every country in the world agreed to the GBF. The overall “mission” of the framework is to halt and reverse biodiversity loss by 2030. Its “vision” is to bring the world into “harmony with nature” by 2050.

The GBF includes a list of 23 targets for 2030. They cover an expansive range of topics, from restoring ecosystems, to addressing pollution and providing developing nations with finance to help cover the costs of protecting nature.

As part of the GBF and its underlying documents, countries agreed to a schedule for monitoring their progress towards achieving the 2030 targets.

This included the preparation of a “global report” of progress coordinated by the CBD, which will inform a “global review” undertaken by countries at COP17.

The global report draws on countries’ national reports, which were due to be submitted to the UN in February of this year. It also draws on countries’ national nature plans, known as “national biodiversity strategies and action plans” (NBSAPS) and national targets, which were both due in 2024.

Not all countries have met the call to publish these documents and targets. According to the UN, 45% of countries published NBSAPs in time to be considered for the report, 83% had submitted at least one national target and 66% had produced their new national report.

The first draft of the global report was published on 29 June 2026. This draft was subject to a “peer review process”, which invited countries and observers, such as NGOs and businesses, to submit comments on all aspects of the report.

The second draft, which has been revised based on the peer review, was published on Sunday 26 July. (This was just ahead of COP17 preparatory talks being held in Nairobi from 27 July to 1 August.)

A final version of the global report will be formally published ahead of COP17, which will take place from 19-30 October.

Overall findings

The second draft of the global report says that the GBF has led to “unprecedented” interest in tackling biodiversity loss, but adds:

“However, unless collective implementation accelerates rapidly, the 2030 targets and mission will not be achieved.”

It says that countries have taken some action to address all 23 targets, but that “no target presents a fully positive picture”.

(The first draft has slightly softer language. It “concludes that the world is not yet on track to collectively meet the global ambitions that the parties to the convention set when they adopted the framework”.)

The report identifies “two distinct gaps in progress”, relating to ambition and implementation.

First, that the national targets and plans submitted by countries “do not yet fully reflect the scope and level of ambition” of the global targets in the GBF.

Second, countries are not taking sufficient action to achieve their targets, according to the report.

It adds that progress is “particularly lagging” for addressing the “indirect drivers of biodiversity loss”, such as harmful business practices and government subsidies promoting them.

In addition, countries are showing “consistent gaps” in making progress on taking action to protect “marine, coastal and inland water ecosystems”.

The report produces a “scorecard” assessing countries’ progress towards meeting each of the 23 targets of the GBF.

The scorecard includes an “overall score” of between 0 and 1 for each target. This is calculated by considering countries’ self-reported progress in their plans and targets, as well as an assessment of progress based on a set of agreed indicators.

The results are split into four categories: 0-0.25 is red, 0.25-0.5 is orange, 0.5-0.75 is yellow and 0.75-1 is green.

The report gives a “green” score for just one target, indicating overall positive progress. This is target 8, on “minimising” the impact of climate change on biodiversity, including through mitigation and adaptation.

Elsewhere, the draft says that countries have “reported gaps in the scale and timely provision” of “financial resources, capacity-building and development, technical and scientific cooperation, access to and transfer of technology, and knowledge sharing”. It adds:

“These barriers can result in uneven capacities and cause specific technical and financial constraints for all parties, but particularly for developing-country parties. It is likely these constraints are even more pressing for least developed countries and small island developing states.”

Protecting and restoring nature

Target 3 of the GBF is for countries to protect “30% of Earth’s land and sea for nature” by the end of the decade.

This commitment – referred to as “30 by 30” – is widely considered the flagship target of the agreement.

Target 3 of the Global Biodiversity Framework. Credit: UN CBD

The report says that countries are making “progress in expanding and managing protected areas, especially for marine and coastal areas”. But it adds that “current ambition and implementation remain insufficient to fully achieve all aspects of the target”.

It continues that, according to countries’ available national targets, “monitoring and reporting of some elements of the target remains low”. This includes “those relating to equitable governance of protected areas” and “recognition of Indigenous and local territories”.

The report adds that countries “face significant challenges in implementation, particularly related to lack of finance and capacity”.

(An investigation by Carbon Brief and the Guardian in 2025 revealed that more than half of nations that have submitted UN biodiversity plans do not commit to “30 by 30” within their borders.)

Another conservation measure included in the GBF is target 2, which aims to ensure that at least 30% of land and sea areas are under restoration by 2030.

Target 2 of the Global Biodiversity Framework. Credit: UN CBD
Target 2 of the Global Biodiversity Framework. Credit: UN CBD

The report says that “restoration efforts are expanding”. However, it says that “current commitments to restore areas and implementation of those commitments remain below the level required” to achieve target 2.

It adds that countries’ national targets are “generally well aligned with target 2”, but that “addressing the effectiveness of restoration efforts is often absent”.

Moreover, the report adds that monitoring of progress is “constrained by inconsistent definitions and monitoring approaches for ecosystem degradation and restoration”.

Another “major barrier” is a lack of available finance for developing countries looking to restore ecosystems, it says.

Target 8 of the GBF is the only one to specifically address climate change, one of the major drivers of biodiversity loss.

It says countries should “minimise the impact of climate change” on biodiversity through mitigation and adaptation, including “nature-based solutions” and “ecosystem-based approaches”.

Target 8 of the Global Biodiversity Framework. Credit: UN CBD
Target 8 of the Global Biodiversity Framework. Credit: UN CBD

Target 8 was the only one to achieve a “green” marking in the report’s scorecard of progress (see: Overall findings).

The report says that actions to make biodiversity more resilient against climate change are “progressing”. Yet “implementation remains constrained by data gaps, limited means of implementation and the need for stronger coherence between biodiversity, climate and disaster risk reduction planning”.

It continues that countries’ national targets “generally” show “good alignment” with target 8, across “all elements apart from efforts to minimise the impacts of ocean acidification”.

It adds that the deployment of nature-based solutions and ecosystem restoration is not yet at a “sufficient scale”.

Subsidies

Overall progress is “insufficient” on target 18, which calls on countries to identify subsidies and other incentives that are harmful for biodiversity by 2025, says the GBF report.

It also outlines that nations should “eliminate, phase out or reform” these subsidies in a “proportionate” way, reducing them by at least $500bn per year by 2030.

Countries should first target the “most harmful” incentives, while simultaneously scaling up positive incentives for nature, it adds.

Target 18 of the Global Biodiversity Framework. Credit: UN CBD (2022)
Target 18 of the Global Biodiversity Framework. Credit: UN CBD (2022)

The report finds that countries have made some progress in assessing, compiling inventories and commissioning studies on harmful subsidies.

But issues remain, such as incomplete data and the lack of agreed definitions on which subsidies are deemed “harmful”.

Several national reports also note “entrenched interests and political barriers to subsidy reform”, says the report.

Only one-quarter of countries’ national targets that are “highly aligned” with target 18 are “on track” to be met, it finds. Most show “insufficient progress”.

It notes that 38% of countries have addressed the 2025 aim to identify harmful subsidies in their national targets “to some extent”.

Countries’ national reports do not “provide a sufficient basis to determine” whether this goal was met, says the report, but available evidence “suggests” that it was not.

Recent analysis by Carbon Brief found that just 16% of the 134 national reports submitted so far appear to meet the aim.

The report outlines that half of countries have set national targets addressing plans to eliminate, phase out or reform harmful incentives. Almost 60% mention scaling up positive incentives, it adds.

Just 27%, however, address the issue of reducing subsidies by at least $500bn annually by 2030. Also, only 5% set quantitative national targets to reduce subsidies.

There are two headline “indicators” to measure progress on target 18. The first shows that 30% of countries have outlined information on their nature-positive incentives.

The second indicator shows that 22 countries submitted the value of their biodiversity-harmful subsidies, which amounted to a total of $268bn spent on harmful subsidies over 2022 to 2025 – averaging $67bn each year.

Carbon Brief’s analysis had identified an estimated $270bn each year, based on a wider list of submissions from 32 countries. (More countries submitted national reports since the CBD’s deadline to be included in the global report in February.)

All of these figures remain well below the estimated trillions of US dollars spent annually.

The report notes that different methodologies could lead to global subsidy estimate “inconsistencies”, meaning that reported values are likely “underestimates”.

The amount of positive incentives in place is also likely underestimated, it adds.

The report says that harmful subsidies may have declined by around 20% in recent years, based on figures consistently reported by a minority of countries over 2022-24.

Despite this, the total value of subsidies “remains higher than the resources that parties reported mobilising for biodiversity”. (See: Mobilising finance.) 

Mobilising finance

Overall progress on raising biodiversity finance has been “insufficient”, according to the report.

Goal D of the GBF, shown below, states that countries must close a $700bn biodiversity gap by 2030 through ending harmful subsidies ($500bn per year) and mobilising resources from the global north to south ($200bn per year).

Goal D of the Global Biodiversity Framework refers to a $700bn biodiversity finance gap. Credit: UN CBD (2022)
Goal D of the Global Biodiversity Framework refers to a $700bn biodiversity finance gap. Credit: UN CBD (2022)

This target aims to raise “at least $200bn per year” by 2030 from “all sources”, including domestic, international, public and private funding.

In all, countries reported raising a cumulative total of $186.4bn over four years, according to the report.

While it adds that it “is still too early to conclude”, the report states that the total finance mobilised so far “falls far short” of what is needed to close the biodiversity finance gap.

Target 19, shown below, states that developed countries and others should boost finance for nature to “at least $20bn” per year by 2025 and “at least $30bn” by 2030. This falls to developed countries and others that “voluntarily assume” the obligation of contributing.

However, the report suggests that the milestone of raising “at least $20bn per year by 2025” was “likely not achieved”.

Target 19 of the Global Biodiversity Framework. Credit: UN CBD (2022)
Target 19 of the Global Biodiversity Framework. Credit: UN CBD (2022)

Between 2020 and 2023, reporting countries cumulatively raised just $17.7bn in international public funding for biodiversity, according to the report.

This amounts to an average of $4.4bn per year between 2020-23, with the total touching its highest at $5.2bn in 2023.

The report cautions that this figure “should be read as a minimum”, as it does not account for all potential flows of biodiversity finance.

Both estimates “fall below the $20bn milestone”, although the report adds that a “definitive assessment will only be possible” once data for 2024 and 2025 are included.

An earlier draft of the report included language noting that biodiversity-related “official development assistance” remains “well below the agreed 2025 milestone”. This was cut from the summary in this latest iteration of the report.

References to the OECD reporting a “shortfall in funding” and projecting “a decrease for 2024 and 2025” – suggesting the $20bn target was “unlikely to be met” – were also removed from the latest draft.

The chart below shows how international public funding for biodiversity has varied from 2020 to 2023, according to the report.

Bar chart showing that between 2020-23, countries provided $17.7bn in biodiversity finance, well below a "$20bn by 2025" target
The yearly sum of official development assistance provided by donor countries (blue) for biodiversity conservation (in billions) and the average share of national GDP (in %) represented by their national value (red). Source: UN CBD 2026

By comparison, domestic spending makes the largest cumulative contribution to biodiversity finance, at ($135.9bn) over the four years. However, spending has “declined” as a share of GDP. It also notes that spending varies “greatly”, from 0.1% to 2.7% of GDP.

According to the report, many countries highlighted that national budget allocations for biodiversity are “far too low” and that biodiversity “frequently loses out to competing development priorities”, including “defence, food security and infrastructure”.

At COP15 in Montreal, the EU and several other countries pushed for the inclusion of “all sources” of finance in the final text – including private finance and “innovative” schemes.

Private and “innovative” biodiversity finance – which spans a plethora of sources such biodiversity offsets and debt-for-nature swaps – was eventually included in target 19.

The report, however, notes that private finance “peaked in 2021 and fell afterwards” and “remains particularly undeveloped”, with a cumulative total of $32.7bn between 2020-23.

At the same time, the report notes that only 26% of all countries had reported data on private biodiversity finance, making it harder to assess funding declines in 2022 and 2023.

Genetic resources

The report finds there has been limited progress on sharing genetic biodiversity data.

”Digital sequence information” (DSI) refers to genetic data derived from biodiversity, which is often sourced from species in biodiversity-rich developing countries.

These countries have long called for an international mechanism to ensure that the benefits of DSI are shared fairly with the people living where the resources were “discovered”, including Indigenous communities.

At COP16, countries agreed to the first-ever global fund, called the Cali Fund, for companies profiting from genetic data to contribute to conservation goals on a voluntary basis.

However, experts have cautioned that much rests on whether countries develop strong national laws to support the COP16 agreement. This could include incentivising companies in their regions to contribute to the fund.

In the GBF, target 13 and goal C address elements of DSI, including the sharing of benefits from genetic resources and their digital derivatives.

Target 13 of the Global Biodiversity Framework. Credit: UN CBD (2022)
Target 13 of the Global Biodiversity Framework. Credit: UN CBD (2022)

According to the report, 79% of countries submitted national targets that address legal, policy and administrative measures to enable benefit-sharing from DSI. Some 71% included measures to facilitate access to genetic resources.

The report finds that the “strongest progress” has been in developing laws and policies, which are now at an intermediate stage.

The “most fundamental regulatory barrier”, according to many countries cited, is the lack of a “dedicated” national framework to enable access to genetic resources and share benefits with communities.

This would involve enacting laws compatible with the GBF, setting up digital registries to catalogue and trace genetic resources, as well as implementing tracking systems to monitor how they are used. It would also include a financial mechanism to pay communities for the use of their traditional knowledge.

Goal C of the Global Biodiversity Framework covers benefit-sharing from genetic resources and DSI, as well as protection of traditional knowledge. Source: UN CBD, 2022
Goal C of the Global Biodiversity Framework covers benefit-sharing from genetic resources and DSI, as well as protection of traditional knowledge. Source: UN CBD (2022)

Progress in monitoring monetary and non-monetary benefits from DSI is “much weaker” and is “particularly limited” for measures related to the Cali fund.

According to the report, most parties have “no monitoring systems [for evaluating benefits from genetic resources] in place, or [are] still developing them”. It says they add that the benefits from genetic resources are hard to track “across borders and along value chains through to the final product”.

For those that have tracked benefits, it says that countries reported a cumulative $6.9m in receipts from the use of genetic resources between 2022 and 2025. It adds that “several parties reported that they had received no monetary benefits” to date.

Countries also reported more than 960 non-monetary benefits, ranging from technical training to research participation. The report cautions that these “fluctuated over time rather than increasing consistently, and cannot be seen as indicative of global benefit-sharing”.

In December 2025, Carbon Brief reported that the Cali fund had received only one contribution of $1,000 as an “icebreaker”. No other major companies have stepped up to fill the fund.

Meanwhile, the report states that the formal protection of traditional knowledge held by Indigenous peoples and local communities remained “underdeveloped”.

It says that a “significant number” of countries raised concerns about gaps in recognition of Indigenous peoples’ rights and dedicated registries to document their traditional knowledge.

The report says it is not yet possible to assess progress towards goal C:

“To date it is not possible to comment on whether benefits are being shared fairly and equitably nor on the role played by traditional knowledge and Indigenous peoples and local communities. Therefore, progress towards goal C cannot yet be assessed.”

Pollution

Target 7 of the GBF focuses on tackling pollution from pesticides, chemicals, plastic and other sources.

It calls for countries to reduce pollution risks and negative impacts “from all sources” to “levels that are not harmful” to biodiversity and ecosystems by 2030.

It also aims to reduce excess nutrients in the environment and overall risks from pesticides and hazardous chemicals by “at least half”.

The draft report finds that there is no significant change or insufficient progress on 60% of national targets categorised as being highly aligned with target 7. Only one-third of these national targets (35%) are on track to be achieved by 2030.

On average, it says countries have addressed around half of the various elements of target 7 “to some extent” in their national targets.

The most frequently-mentioned aspect of the target – addressed by 72% of countries – refers to reducing pollution from all sources by 2030.

One headline indicator related to target 7 focuses on the concentration of pesticides in the environment.

Just five countries out of 125 submitted estimates on this, according to the report. It says only one country has met the aim of halving the overall risk from pesticides on a national basis so far.

Measures to address plastic pollution are the most frequently reported actions by countries in relation to this target, including bans on single-use bags and straws.

A number of countries in Europe and Asia have also implemented measures to reduce nutrient losses from fertilisers and slurry.

A “major challenge” for countries in advancing pollution aims is “effectively and fairly considering and managing impacts on food security and livelihoods”, according to the report.

Several countries point to a lack of national funding to implement measures towards achieving this target.

Some developing countries also list poor wastewater-treatment infrastructure as a “persistent challenge” on this issue.

Invasive species

Invasive alien species refers to those that have moved to and become established in a region outside their natural habitat, as a result of human activities. This has negative impacts for local biodiversity and ecosystems.

Target 6 of the GBF calls for countries to, among other things, reduce the rates of introduction and establishment of invasive alien species by 50% by 2030.

The draft report says countries are “taking action” on this target, but progress is “difficult to assess”.

Two-thirds of national targets aligned with target 6 show “no significant progress or insufficient progress”, it finds. Fewer than one-third are on track to be achieved by 2030 and just 1% of these national targets have already been achieved.

But most countries have made progress in putting in place measures to manage invasive species – mostly focusing on reducing the introduction rate and impact of species.

Countries have addressed around half of the different elements of the invasive species target “to some extent” in their national targets, finds the report.

But fewer than one-third (30%) have set national targets that put a numeric goal on reducing invasive species.

Island biosecurity programmes and measures to intercept invasive species at country borders are among the actions countries have put in place to tackle the issue.

The report lists some barriers countries say stand in the way of achieving the target. These include a lack of baseline data from which to measure a 50% reduction rate, poor early-detection systems and a lack of funding for long-term reduction efforts.

Some countries also cite capacity and technical challenges in monitoring invasive species, according to the report.

They say many of these species “go unnoticed for years before impacts become apparent”, it adds, with countries arguing that setting a specific reduction target is “challenging”.

The post World falling short on 22 of 23 nature targets for 2030, says draft UN report appeared first on Carbon Brief.

World falling short on 22 of 23 nature targets for 2030, says draft UN report

Continue Reading

Climate Change

Climate change is driving a ‘shift’ in childhood malaria risk across Africa

Published

on

Rising temperatures are redistributing the risk of childhood malaria in sub-Saharan Africa, resulting in areas of “new risk” in the east and south of the continent, but also “relief hotspots” in western Africa.

This is according to a new study, published in Nature, which provides the “most comprehensive look to date at the impact of climate change on any infectious disease”.

The research finds that since the year 1900, climate change has resulted in one extra case of malaria for every 1,000 children in sub-Saharan Africa on average.

Over the 21st century, climate change is expected to drive down malaria rates across the continent on average, as temperatures rise above the optimum range for mosquitoes.

However, the authors emphasise that continent-wide averages hide more detailed local trends.

They find that cooler parts of Africa face an increase in malaria risk, as rising temperatures have made the regions more suitable for malaria-carrying mosquitoes, while warmer regions see a suppression in malaria cases.

The lead author tells Carbon Brief that this is the first study to use “attribution” – a field of climate science which uses models to compare conditions in a world with global warming to one without – to assess the impact of climate change on malaria.

The study also reveals that climate change is not the main driver of shifting malaria risk in Africa, with public health measures and government policy making a more significant impact.

The “most important” message from the study, according to another expert, is that to eliminate malaria entirely, “effective surveillance, prevention and treatment remain substantially more influential – and more actionable – than climate change alone”.

Childhood malaria

Malaria kills hundreds of thousands of people every year. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that 610,000 people died due to the disease in 2024.

The disease is transmitted to humans by bites from mosquitoes infected with the malaria parasite. Malaria spreads most rapidly in warm, wet regions, where the parasite-carrying mosquitoes can live and breed.

However, malaria is preventable. A total of 42 countries – mainly in Europe and the Americas – have eliminated the disease entirely through a combination of measures including insecticide use, draining the swamplands that provide breeding habitats for mosquitoes and improving basic healthcare services .Global mortality from malaria declined by 90% over the 20th century.

Today, the vast majority of malaria cases are recorded in Africa, which was home to 95% of malaria cases and deaths in 2024. Children under the age of five make up three-quarters of all African malaria deaths.

The malaria-causing parasite can be detected using a blood test. Over the last century, scientists, government officials and healthcare professionals have collected thousands of blood samples from people across sub-Saharan Africa and tested for the presence of the malaria parasite.

In 2017, scientists brought together more than 50,000 samples collected from sub-Saharan Africa over 1900-2016. This data provides a “snapshot” of the amount of malaria in the population in any year in the last century the study explains.

Dr Colin Carlson is an assistant professor of epidemiology at the Yale school of public health and lead author of the study. He tells Carbon Brief that malaria in Africa is “extraordinarily well documented”, as a result of academic interest and colonial rule in the continent.

The size and quality of the malaria dataset are “exceptionally rare”, Carlson says. He explains that the dataset stretches back to before the impacts of human-caused climate change were strongly felt, making it “extraordinarily” valuable for this analysis.

The chart below shows the percentage of children between two and 10 years old who tested positive for the malaria parasite over 1900-2016. Each dot indicates one blood test result and the pink vertical bars indicate periods of “successful malaria prevention intervention”, such as the 1955-69 global malaria eradication programme.

The percentage of children between two to 10 years old who tested positive for the parasite that causes malaria between 1990 and 2016. Source: Carlson et al. (2026)
The percentage of children between two to 10 years old who tested positive for the parasite that causes malaria between 1990 and 2016. Source: Carlson et al. (2026)

Attribution

The authors use the blood test survey data to develop a statistical model separating out the climatic, social and economic factors that affect malaria, such as temperature, rainfall, economic development, healthcare and population changes. This allows the authors to isolate the effects of the climate on malaria.

They find that malaria prevalence in children peaks when average monthly temperatures reach 24.9C, dropping off in warmer and cooler climates.

Mosquitoes also need stagnant or slow-moving water in which to lay their eggs. The authors find that periods of drought tend to decrease malaria prevalence one-to-two months later, whereas floods increase prevalence two-to-three months later. However, they conclude that rainfall is “less important than temperature” in predicting malaria rates.

They then combine the statistical models with climate models, to simulate childhood malaria rates in a range of past and future climates.

First, the authors simulate malaria rates in the present day, by running the models using the climate of 2000-14. They then carry out the same analysis, using the climate of a hypothetical world without human-caused climate change.

By comparing the two, the authors were able to attribute the impact of climate change on malaria rates across Africa.

The link between climate change and malaria in Africa is complex and “surprisingly contentious”, according to the authors. For example, they write that “malaria resurgence in the east African highlands became a particular point of contention, with over a dozen studies arguing for or against climate change as a substantial driver”.

It adds:

“Today, malaria experts generally agree that climate change has contributed to elevational shifts in malaria epidemics and the geographical ranges of mosquito vectors. However, the cumulative effect of climate change on the burden of malaria is still an open question.”

Lead author Carlson says this paper is “one of the first impact attributions on infectious disease” and the first attribution study on climate change and malaria. He adds:

“I think it’s the most clarity we’ve had on the malaria question.”

Dr Teresa Yamana, an associate research scientist at Columbia University, who was not involved in the study, praises its “rigorous” methodology. She tells Carbon Brief that the work “demonstrates the potential of climate attribution methods to quantify the impacts of climate change on infectious diseases”.

Warming world

The findings show that “climate change isn’t just making malaria worse or better – it’s moving it, says study author Prof Tamma Carleton, an assistant professor at UC Berkeley:

“Whether a place sees elevated malaria risks or reduced burdens under climate change depends on how hot it is today. We see relief in the hotspots and new risk nearly everywhere else.”

For example, in the Ethiopian highlands, low temperatures – which are unsuitable for mosquitoes to live and breed – have historically limited the spread of malaria. However, the region has seen childhood malaria rates increase by more than eight cases per 1,000 children since the year 1900 as rising temperatures have allowed the insects to expand their habitat.

The authors also found a similar increase in malaria prevalence in cooler southern African countries.

In contrast, global warming is pushing average temperatures above the ideal range for mosquitoes in many hotter parts of Africa, driving down malaria rates. The authors find that in western Africa, climate change has caused a reduction of four malaria cases per 1,000 children per year by 2014, reducing prevalence by 1-2%.

Overall, climate change has resulted in one extra case of malaria for every 1,000 children in sub-Saharan Africa since the year 1900, the study says.

The authors also run their models for three future climate scenarios: low (SSP1-2.6), intermediate (SSP2-4.5) and very-high (SSP5-8.5) emissions pathways. Comparing these to the present-day model results shows how climate change could affect malaria cases over the coming century.

They find that the trends observed so far will largely continue into the future – meaning climate change will lower the prevalence of malaria in warm regions and increase the prevalence in cool regions.

The study concludes that under the intermediate scenario, which is broadly in line with current climate policies, warming will drive down childhood malaria cases by about three cases per 1,000 children in central Africa and 16 cases per 1,000 children in west Africa by the end of the century.

By contrast, cases could increase by around 20% over the same period in regions such as the Rift Valley and coastal southern Africa – a rise of 30 cases per 1,000 children.

The maps below show changes in childhood malaria prevalence due to climate change in today’s climate (left) and the climate of 2096-2100 under the intermediate scenario (right).

Red indicates an increase in malaria prevalence and blue indicates a decrease. Greyer colours indicate greater uncertainty in the model results. White indicates regions where no data was collected.

Carlson tells Carbon Brief that this is “the first study to really confidently answer the highland East Africa debate”.

Eradicating malaria

Healthcare workers, governments and scientists have been working to eliminate malaria for decades.

On average, the authors find that climate change will reduce the prevalence of malaria in sub-Saharan Africa, as temperatures rise above the optimum range for mosquitoes. This effect is more pronounced at higher warming levels.

Under the low emissions scenario, about 1 case per 1,000 children will be averted by the end of the century. Meanwhile under the highest emissions scenario, average prevalence falls by 20 cases per 1,000 children, marking a 9% reduction.

The graph below shows childhood malaria rates over 1990-2024 in the historical climate (blue) and in a world without climate change (grey). These estimates are shown relative to baseline prevalence across 1901-30.

After the year 2014, the plot shows projected future changes in malaria prevalence, relative to a 2015-20 baseline, in the low (purple), intermediate (pink) and high (green) scenarios.

Malaria prevalence in the historical climate (blue), historical climate without global warming (grey), low emissions scenario (purple), intermediate emissions scenario (pink) and very-high emissions scenario (green). Source: Carlson et al. (2026)
Malaria prevalence in the historical climate (blue), historical climate without global warming (grey), low emissions scenario (purple), intermediate emissions scenario (pink) and very-high emissions scenario (green). Source: Carlson et al. (2026)

Carlson emphasises that this does not mean that climate change is “good news” for healthcare in sub-Saharan Africa. He explains that climate change will bring a wide range of negative health impacts that will strain healthcare systems, adding:

“A world that is too hot for malaria is not a good world for the health of children.”

He also notes that climate change is “not the primary driving factor of malaria dynamics”. For example, he notes that malaria prevalence fell over 2000-15, by about 16 percentage points, after the disease was identified as a “critical global target of the Millennium Development Goals”.

This reduction is 200 times greater than the increase seen so far because of climate change, Carlson says. He adds:

“It would not be tremendously hard both to keep malaria out of new places and to eliminate it where it is maybe going to get a little bit of an assist from climate change.”

Dr Adugna Woyessa is a senior researcher at the Ethiopian Public Health Institute and was not involved in the study. He has previously carried out research on malaria in eastern Africa.

Woyessa praises the study, telling Carbon Brief that the research could bring about a “paradigm shift” in efforts to eliminate malaria. He argues that the study is a “tool for engaging giant development partners”, adding that “future work will be needed to situate these global trends in local contexts”.

Dr Janey Messina is an associate professor in the school of geography and the environment at the University of Oxford and was also not involved in the study. She praises the paper’s “strong” method.

However, she cautions that the findings “should not be interpreted as forecasts of total future malaria burden”, because they only model the impact of climate change on malaria, while excluding “social, demographic and public-health determinants”, such as inequality, migration, conflict and changing access to malaria interventions.

She adds:

“One of the paper’s most important messages is this: effective surveillance, prevention and treatment remain substantially more influential – and more actionable – than climate change alone.”

Carlson, C. et al. (2026) The past and future impact of climate change on childhood malaria in Africa, Nature, doi:10.1038/s41586-026-10840-w

The post Climate change is driving a ‘shift’ in childhood malaria risk across Africa appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Climate change is driving a ‘shift’ in childhood malaria risk across Africa

Continue Reading

Climate Change

Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ for renewables mean for climate change?

Published

on

China has released its “15th five-year plan for the development of renewable energy”, outlining key targets and policies for the sector in 2026-2030.

A key focus of the plan is boosting renewable generation and consumption as a share of China’s overall energy mix.

It calls for continued capacity additions of wind and solar – albeit at lower levels than previous years – as well as hydropower, biomass and other clean-energy sources.

Specifically, China will aim to install 3,500 gigawatts (GW) of renewables capacity by 2030, 2,800GW will be wind and solar.

The country had previously pledged to install 1,200GW of wind and solar by 2030, a goal that China met six years early.

Another major theme is the provision of wind and solar supply that is “dependable” and “grid-friendly”.

Setting a target for “dependable output” from wind and solar could help to entrench their role as a provider of “energy security”, according to analysts.

The government also aims to boost renewables consumption by developing non-power uses of renewable energy, in sectors such as steel and chemicals.

Below, Carbon Brief examines the key targets and policies outlined in the five-year plan and what they mean for China’s energy transition.

Article Contents

Why are China’s five-year plans important?

Five-year plans are key to China’s political system. An overarching plan, covering all socioeconomic issues of importance to policy leaders, is published at the beginning of each five-year cycle.

The plan for the 15th five-year period (2026-2030) was published in March 2026.

It includes what the government considers to be the most important targets and policy signals for climate and energy. For example, binding targets for carbon intensity, the share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption and total energy production capacity.

Following this overarching document, five-year plans focused on specific sectors or themes are then published over the course of the five-year plan period.

This year, the government has already published several five-year plans related to energy and climate change. One covers the development of the “new-type” energy sector more broadly. Another wraps climate goals together with other environmental targets under the “Beautiful China” programme.

By contrast, the renewables five-year plan focuses specifically on the development of hydropower, wind, solar, biomass, geothermal and wave energy.

It was published in late July by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the country’s top economic planning agency, and the National Energy Administration (NEA).

It covers topics including capacity and generation targets, as well as efforts to increase integration and reliability of wind and solar. It also has policies to encourage “non-power use” of renewable energy and ways to strengthen innovation of clean-energy technologies.

What overarching renewables targets are in the plan?

China will aim to install 3,500 gigawatts (GW) of renewables capacity by 2030, according to the five-year plan.

Of this, 2,800GW will be wind and solar – a pledge reiterated from China’s action plan for peaking carbon emissions, which was released earlier this month.

The goal more than doubles a previous 2030 target for wind and solar to reach 1,200GW, which China met six years early.

As of June 2026, the country has installed just under 2,000GW of wind and solar capacity, as well as 454GW of hydropower. Biomass, geothermal and wave energy hold very small shares of the overall energy mix.

As such, China would need to build 160GW of wind and solar each year – and just under 220GW of renewable capacity in total – to meet the targets.

The country installed 277GW of new solar alone in 2024 – and 315GW in 2025.

Bar chart titled “China aims for 3,500GW of renewables by 2030”, with the subtitle “China’s total installed capacity of renewable energy from 2016-2025, and its target for 2030, gigawatts”. The chart illustrates the growth of China’s solar, wind and hydro from 2016 to 2025, as well as targets for solar and wind, as well as overall renewables capacity, for 2030. Installed capacity rose from approximately 500GW in 2016 to over 2,200GW in 2025. Solar energy shows the fastest growth, particularly between 2022 and 2025, where it becomes the largest single contributor at over 1,200GW. Wind capacity increases steadily to around 600GW, and hydro capacity reaches over 400GW by 2025. As shown in the right-most bar, or 2030, China targets 3,500GW of total renewables capacity, composed of at least 2,800GW from solar and wind and 700GW from hydropower and other renewables, such as wave energy and biomass. Source: National Energy Administration, 15th five-year plan for the development of renewable energy. This text was produced with support from AI.
China’s total installed capacity of renewable energy from 2016-2025, and its target for 2030. Source: National Energy Administration, Carbon Brief.

A key part of meeting the targets will be the development of large-scale clean-energy bases in China’s northern regions. These will generate power to be exported elsewhere via ultra-high voltage lines. The plan also encourages greater “local consumption” and installations of distributed energy (see below).

The plan says that further research will be directed at increasing the renewable share of electricity generated by these large-scale energy bases to 100%.

A recent report by the thinktank Global Energy Monitor (GEM) finds that output from these bases “continues to be paired with coal-fired generation in the name of balancing and system flexibility”. It says that currently, coal generates 42% of the power transmitted to the rest of the country from these bases.

China will also add more hydropower, says the plan, with capacity rising from 448GW in 2025 to 570GW in 2030. Some 160GW of this will be pumped-storage hydropower.

Meanwhile, the plan sets a target for renewable power generation to reach 6,000 terawatt-hours (TWh), 4,000TWh of which would come from wind and solar.

This would be a 50% increase in five years as renewables generated just under 4,000TWh of electricity in 2025, according to the National Energy Administration.

By 2030, the plan says that total consumption of renewable energy will stand at 1.8bn tonnes of coal equivalent (Gtce).

This would be up from 1.2Gtce in 2025, which represented about one-fifth of China’s total energy consumption of 6.2Gtce that year.

The renewable targets in the plan are lower than those suggested in a recent study by high-profile Chinese scholars.

The study, from the department of energy and power engineering and the Institute of Climate Change and Sustainable Development at Tsinghua University in Beijing, assessed the “likelihood of China attaining its carbon peak” under different pathways.

It found that, in order to meet its climate commitments, China would need to either install more than 4,000GW of “non-fossil energy capacity” before 2030, or to “maintain a total energy consumption” below 6.5Gtce.

The table below outlines some of the key renewables targets for 2030, as specified in the plan.

Key targets for 2030, adapted from 15th five-year plan for renewable energy
Type 2025 2030 Percentage change
Renewable energy use 1.2Gtce 1.8Gtce 53%
Total renewables capacity 2,340GW 3,500GW 50%
Wind and solar capacity 1,840GW More than 2,800GW 52%
Of which: Solar thermal 1.8GW 15GW 733%
Hydro capacity 450GW 570GW 27%
Of which: Pumped storage hydropower 66GW 160GW 142%
Wave energy 0.4GW
Renewable generation 4,000TWh 6,000TWh 50%
Of which: Wind and solar 2,300TWh 4,000TWh 74%
Non-electricity use 60Mtce 150Mtce 150%
Renewable hydrogen 0.25Mt 2Mt 700%

Why does the plan focus on ‘firm capacity’ for renewables?

As well as increasing the overall size of China’s renewable power supply, the country must also maintain an “uninterrupted and reliable power supply”, officials from the NDRC and NEA told state news agency Xinhua in coverage of the new plan.

To support this goal, the plan says that the development of renewables will “enter a new stage”. This will mean that “improving quality and serving as a reliable alternative” to fossil fuels will be as important as “expanding scale”.

The plan, therefore, proposes targets for the “firm capacity” from wind and solar (置信出力). This is the amount plants or grids can be relied on to produce during critical supply periods, in conjunction with on-site storage.

The target for wind is a firm capacity of at least 11% of total installed capacity by 2030, while the equivalent goal for solar is 6%.

Wind and solar will also be expected to supply more than 20% of total demand in peak periods during the summer and winter evenings, says the plan. It expects “reliable peak-shaving capacity from renewable sources” to reach more than 300GW.

The new targets are a “positive move”, says Yao Zhe, global policy advisor at Greenpeace East Asia, as it “only applies during peak load and critical supply periods, when coal power is typically used to stabilise the power supply”.

She adds that this could, theoretically, “prevent the construction of new coal-fired power projects that are proposed and approved for the reason of meeting peak demand”.

The new metrics mark a change in focus, says Lyu Wenbin, director general of the Energy Research Institute – a state thinktank under the NDRC – in an “explanatory reading” posted on BJX News. He says it “marks a shift in renewable energy development from the mere pursuit of installed capacity to…also taking into account system support capabilities”.

The plan pledges to “accelerate the construction of grid-friendly wind and solar power stations”. It says this will enhance “reliable peak-load generation” and strengthen renewables’ ability to ensure “safe and stable operation” of the grid.

It says this will particularly be a focus in the energy-hungry east, central and south areas of China.

It sets out a slightly different focus for areas that already have a high share of renewables in their power mix, such as north-west China. Here, the aim will be to develop wind and solar parks that are “capable of providing voltage, frequency and inertia support”.

“This is a real challenge”, says James Norman, research analyst at GEM. He says these challenges are particularly acute in some circumstances:

“[For example], when the share of wind and solar is very high, relatively few synchronous generators (like coal) are online or large volumes of electricity are being transferred through high voltage DC lines.”

The plan mentions many technological solutions to address the problem, he tells Carbon Brief. However, he adds, there are no quantitative details for the issue. For example, he notes there is no target for “how many gigawatts of wind and solar must gain grid-forming capability”. This is in contrast to the goals for overall renewables capacity or generation.

Norman was a co-author on the recent GEM report, which identified further barriers to renewable uptake. It said these include transmission bottlenecks, alongside systemic features such as dispatching and power-contract mechanisms.

As a result, said the report, renewable power – especially solar – is increasingly being “curtailed”, particularly in north-western and northern provinces.

Yao also notes that the plan does not “spell out specific measures to address systemic constraints” around the electricity grid and the role of coal in the power sector.

“I interpret this as evidence that the vested interests are still strong in the policy debate,” she adds.

What does the plan say about ‘distributed’ energy?

Alongside gigawatt-scale clean-energy megabases, China also aims to expand construction of “distributed” energy. This means smaller-scale installations, such as rooftop solar.

More than 300GW of “distributed new energy” is to be added over 2026-30, some 60GW per year.

The plan aims for distributed new energy to be adopted in sectors such as industry, transport, buildings and agriculture.

Applications include the use of distributed solar and wind in industrial parks, coal mines and oilfields, as well as encouraging residents to install solar panels on buildings and developing rural clean-energy grids.

In some regions, distributed solar and wind is “likely to meet a large proportion of local demand”, says Prof Pan Jiahua at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou). He tells Carbon Brief that micro- and mini-grids using such resources will be particularly important in central and coastal China.

The 60GW annual target for new distributed energy is not “overly ambitious”, says Isadora Wang, head of China at the thinktank Transition Asia. She tells Carbon Brief that distributed solar additions, alone, exceeded 100GW in both 2024 and 2025.

Cosimo Ries, analyst at the consultancy Trivium China, agrees that the target is reachable. The biggest question mark, he tells Carbon Brief, is whether it will continue to make sense for industry and utilities to build distributed power at the volumes seen during the 14th five-year plan period.

He adds that market conditions for distributed solar have deteriorated sharply over the past two years. He says a range of factors have hit investor confidence:

“[Distributed solar faces] growing exposure to market trading, worsening returns in spot markets, growing risks of curtailment and new policies limiting or forbidding the selling of power back to the grid.”

What does the plan say about non-electricity use of renewables?

The plan also sets goals for renewable energy’s role in “non-electricity use”.

This means using renewable energy for purposes other than generating electricity, through converting it to other forms, such as heat or mechanical energy.

The government is aiming for non-power use to nearly triple from 60m tonnes of coal equivalent (Mtce) in 2025 to 150Mtce in 2030.

Ries tells Carbon Brief that he thinks this target is “one of the main highlights” of the plan. However, he notes that limited available data means it is hard to assess the level of its ambition. He adds that, given the relative conservatism of China’s other recent clean-energy targets, this one may also be met relatively easily.

Key applications for non-power use of renewables include “green hydrogen, ammonia and methanol”, says the plan. It also points to using wind and solar for heat, as well as to biomass and geothermal for heating and cooling.

Green hydrogen, ammonia and methanol are the “centrepiece” of the non-power push, according to state-owned newspaper Economic Information Daily.

For hydrogen alone, China plans to scale up renewable hydrogen production to 2m tonnes in 2030, up from 250,000 tonnes in 2025.

Today, non-power use of renewables accounts for only around 1% of China’s total energy consumption, NEA and NDRC officials said in a Q&A. They added that there is “considerable room for growth” in sectors such as industry, transport and buildings.

Potential new applications include the use of wind and solar for heat. This could see the use of centralised wind and solar heating stations in the chemicals, textiles, pharmaceuticals, papermaking and food sectors.

New projects in the steel and cement sectors should use locally-generated wind and solar to power electric-arc furnaces and kilns, adds the plan.

Wang tells Carbon Brief that she believes the naming of individual sectors is a “clear indication” that they will be included in China’s renewable consumption quotas. These already cover aluminium and other heavy industry sectors.

She adds that power and heat demand from the named sectors may help absorb distributed renewable energy. It will also serve as a testing ground for matching demand with supply through increased grid flexibility and power price reforms.

To Ries, the growing focus on non-power use signals that China’s decarbonisation efforts are “now entering deeper waters”. That means regulators are turning from easier-to-abate sectors, such as aluminium, to more challenging industries, such as steel.

The plan could create a “second growth curve” for the new-energy industry, says He Zhao, in a commentary for China Power News Net. He, the vice-president of the China Electric Power Planning and Engineering Institute (EPPEI). says this might begin with non-power use, before shifting to fuel, feedstock and heat substitution.

What does the plan say about China’s cleantech dominance?

The next five years is a prime opportunity for China to “consolidate our leading position across the entire industrial chain” for clean-energy technologies, says the plan.

It adds that the government will “strengthen technological innovation” and accelerate the roll-out of new applications of artificial intelligence in China’s renewable-energy system.

A particular focus for new R&D will be “cutting-edge, original and disruptive technologies”. It also points to technologies that “enhance the reliability of renewable energy” as a substitute for fossil fuels.

The plan names technologies for further development. For wind power, these include “reliable and low-cost” blades, ultra-tall towers and new types of floating platforms. It also mentions the development of “high-altitude wind power”. For solar, it points to the development of perovskite and other “high efficiency” solar cells, as well as space-solar technologies.

The plan also pledges to develop a power market that supports the “full entry” of renewable-energy companies. It underscores that companies should plan for an increasingly market-based and competitive environment.

Meanwhile, the government will also deepen cooperation with other countries on clean energy and “advance” global climate cooperation, it says.

A priority will be “strengthening” international coordination on investment and development in “green energy projects”. Another is “actively promoting the free circulation of China’s high-quality green technologies and products in global markets”.

Chinese exports of clean-energy technologies have been surging, especially since the closure of the strait of Hormuz.

At the same time, Chinese investment in clean-energy projects in Belt and Road Initiative member states totalled $20bn in the first half of 2026. This is also driven by the crisis.

The US, EU and others have launched tariffs and pricing mechanisms to curb imports of Chinese cleantech. This has contributed to pushback from China, against what it and others refer to as “unilateral trade measures”.

China is transitioning from a “major energy nation” (能源大国) to an “energy powerhouse” (能源强国), writes the Energy Research Institute’s Lyu in his explanatory reading. He says this will enable China to increasingly shift to building “systemic” advantages in developing clean-energy technologies.

He continues that, from 2026-2030, China will “move to the very forefront of the global stage” on clean energy, “venturing into uncharted territory”. This will create both “major new challenges and significant opportunities” for the country, he adds.

The post Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ for renewables mean for climate change? appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ for renewables mean for climate change?

Continue Reading

Trending

Copyright © 2022 BreakingClimateChange.com