Human-caused emissions of aerosols – tiny, light‑scattering particles produced mainly by burning fossil fuels – have long acted as an invisible brake on global warming.
This is largely because they absorb or reflect incoming sunlight and influence the formation and brightness of clouds.
These combined effects act to lower regional and global temperatures.
Aerosols also have a substantial impact on human health, with poor outdoor air quality from particulate matter contributing to millions of premature deaths per year.
Efforts to improve air quality around the world in recent decades have reduced aerosol emissions, bringing widespread benefits for health.
However, while cutting aerosols clears the air, it also unmasks the warming caused by carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases (GHGs).
In this explainer, Carbon Brief unpacks the climate effects of aerosols, how their emissions have changed over time and how they could impact the pace of future warming.
Key points include:
- Clean air rules are driving a rapid decline in sulphur emissions around the world. Global sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions have fallen by around 40% since the mid‑2000s.
- There is around half a degree of warming today that is “hidden” by aerosols. Without the cooling from sulphate and other aerosols, today’s global temperature would already be close to 2C above pre‑industrial levels, rather than the approximately 1.4C the world is currently experiencing.
- Chinese SO2 emissions have fallen by more than 70% between 2006 and 2017 as the national government has brought in a series of air-pollution measures. These declines have added around 0.06C to global warming since 2006.
- Shipping’s low‑sulphur fuel rules have added to recent warming. The International Maritime Organization’s (IMO’s) 2020 cap on marine‑fuel sulphur has already warmed the planet by an estimated 0.04C, albeit with a wide range of estimates across published studies.
- Roughly one‑quarter of the increase in global temperature over the past two decades stems from this unmasking of human-caused heat. Altogether, recent aerosol cuts may have contributed ~0.14C of the ~0.5C of warming the world has experienced since 2007.
- By unmasking warming from CO2 and other GHGs, aerosols have flipped from reducing the rate of decadal warming (as emissions increased) to increasing the rate of warming (as emissions decreased) after 2005.
- Sulphate and other aerosols are a major component of PM2.5 air pollution, which has been linked to millions of premature deaths each year.
- Most future‑emissions pathways project continued aerosol declines. Unless methane and other short-lived GHGs fall at the same time, the rate of warming could accelerate in the coming decades even if CO2 emissions plateau.
Aerosol emissions
The term “aerosols” can be a source of confusion as it often evokes images of spray cans and concerns over depletion of the ozone layer. However, aerosols are a broad category that refer to solid or liquid particles that are fine enough to remain suspended in the atmosphere for extended periods of time.
The major climate-relevant aerosols include SO2, nitrate (NO3), ammonia (NH4), mineral dust, sea spray and carbonaceous aerosols, such as black carbon and organic aerosols.
They vary in size – from nanometres to tens of micrometres – and generally have a short residence time in the lower atmosphere, lasting days to weeks before drifting back to the surface or being washed out in rain.
This means that unlike long-lived GHGs, such as CO2 or nitrous oxide (N2O), aerosols only continue to impact the climate while they are being released. If emissions stop, their climate impacts quickly dissipate.
Aerosols affect the climate by absorbing or reflecting incoming sunlight, or by influencing the formation and brightness of clouds. Most aerosols have a cooling impact because they scatter sunlight away from the Earth and back to space. However, others, including black carbon, cause warming by absorbing incoming sunlight and heating the lower atmosphere.
The figure below shows climate model output looking at the global temperature impact of each different driver of climate change (referred to as “climate forcings” or “radiative forcings”) individually. It includes GHGs, aerosols and other human-caused drivers (such as land albedo changes or tropospheric ozone), as well as natural factors (such as volcanoes and variations in solar output).
Lines above zero show forcings that have an overall warming impact, while those below zero have a cooling effect.
Global average surface temperature changes between 1850 and 2024 caused by each category of climate forcing. Calculated based on the FaIR climate model by comparing all-forcing model simulations to those with an individual forcing removed, following an approach developed by Dr Chris Smith. Observed surface temperatures (using the WMO average of six groups) are shown by the dashed black line.
The warming associated with GHG emissions and cooling associated with aerosol emissions are the largest factors driving the global temperature changes, particularly over the past 70 years.
In the absence of aerosol emissions, the best estimate of current warming would be approximately 0.5C higher, with the world approaching 2C rather than the 1.4C that the world is experiencing today.
Cooling from aerosols has likely masked a substantial portion of the warming that the world would otherwise have experienced.
Different aerosols and their climate effects
There are a number of different types of aerosols, whose climate impacts vary based on both the properties of the particles and the magnitude of human emissions. Of these, SO2 – often referred to as just “sulphur” – has the largest climate impact and is responsible for the bulk of aerosol masking (around -0.5C) that is occurring today.
Black carbon has a modest warming effect on the climate globally (~0.1C), but a much larger impact on Arctic temperatures where it can darken snow and ice, increasing the sunlight they absorb from the sun.
Organic carbon emissions have a modest cooling effect (around -0.1C), while emissions of ammonia and nitrate have an even-smaller cooling effect (around -0.02C). Others, such as dust and sea salt, are primarily natural and changes have had negligible effects on global temperatures.
The table below, adapted from the IPCC AR6 climate science report, provides details on the major aerosols, including their primary sources, effective radiative forcing and temperature impacts over the 1750-2019 period.
| Aerosol type | Primary sources | Effective radiative forcing in watts per metre squared (w/m2), 1750-2019 | Temperature impact, 1750-2019 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sulphur / Sulphate (SO4) | Fossil fuel and biomass SO2 | -0.9 (-1.6 to -0.3) | Strong cooling with -0.5C (-0.1C to -0.9C) of offset warming globally. Dominant aerosol cooling component. |
| Black carbon (BC) | Incomplete combustion (diesel, coal, biomass) | 0.1 (-0.2 to 0.4) | Warming of 0.1C globally (-0.1C to 0.3C). Offsets some cooling; major regional Arctic impact. |
| Organic carbon (OC) | Biomass burning, biofuel and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) | -0.2 (-0.4 to 0.0) | Cooling of -0.1C globally (-0.2C to 0C). |
| Nitrate (NO3) and ammonia (NH3) | Nitrous oxide (NOX) from vehicles and industry and ammonia (NH3) from agriculture | -0.03 (-0.07 to 0.00) | Small global cooling effect of -0.02C (-0.05C to 0.01C). Regionally important where ammonia is abundant. |
| Dust (mineral) | Natural (deserts); some land-use change | ~0 (uncertain, ±0.1) | Small globally with an uncertain sign, but potentially larger regional effects. Anthropogenic fraction of dust forcing is small. |
| Sea salt | Ocean spray (natural) | 0 (natural baseline) | No trend or forcing attributable to human activity. |
Aerosol cooling was relatively modest until around 1950, after which SO2 emissions substantially increased worldwide, driven by a rapid increase in coal combustion and industrial activity.
The cooling effect of aerosols peaked around the year 2000 and has been declining over the past two decades. The figure below highlights the impact of aerosols on global temperature change over time.
Global average surface temperature changes over 1850-2024 caused by aerosols, based on the FaIR climate model.
However, the cooling effects of aerosols remain uncertain due both to their regional nature and the complex nature of interactions between aerosols and clouds.
There is also a relationship between aerosol forcing and climate sensitivity, which is a measure of how much warming is expected from a doubling of atmospheric CO2. In general, climate models with a higher sensitivity tend to have higher aerosol cooling that counterbalances the larger GHG-driven warming. The reduction of uncertainty in aerosol cooling – particularly the effects of aerosols on cloud formation – is a major focus of scientists in their attempts to reduce the uncertainty in climate sensitivity estimates.
The climate impacts of aerosols are broadly divided into two groups, shown in the chart below. The first is a direct effect (blue line), where they scatter and absorb incoming radiation from the sun, preventing it reaching the Earth’s surface. The second is an indirect effect (dark blue line) on cloud formation, where aerosols serve as “condensation nuclei” around which clouds form.
For example, aerosols can enhance the coverage, reflectance and lifetime of low-level clouds, causing a strong cooling effect.
Global average surface temperature changes between 1850 and 2024 caused by direct and indirect aerosol effects, based on the FaIR climate model.
Of the two, direct aerosol effects generally have the smaller effect, with less uncertainty around their impact. They cool the planet by around -0.13C (-0.31C to 0C) today.
Indirect aerosol effects have a larger magnitude and uncertainty, with a -0.42C (-1C to -0.11) cooling impact globally today.
The recent sixth assessment report (AR6) report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) increased the estimated magnitude of indirect aerosol forcing, compared to the fifth assessment report (AR5). This increase was based on an improved understanding and modelling of aerosol-cloud adjustments.
While global average temperature is the focus here, it is important to note that – unlike CO2 and other GHGs – aerosols in the lower atmosphere are not “well mixed”. That is, they are not spread evenly through the atmosphere.
Rather, their short lifetime results in strong regional variation in aerosol concentrations and associated climate effects, which can have a large impact on local temperature and rainfall extremes. Regions such as east or south-east Asia, which have high sulphur emissions, have experienced larger aerosol cooling than regions with lower emissions.
The one exception is when aerosols are injected higher up in the atmosphere in the stratosphere. There, they tend to have a much longer lifetime – measured in years rather than days – and are much more well-mixed.
(Today, meaningful increases in stratospheric aerosols only occur as a result of particularly explosive eruptions of sulphur-rich volcanoes, which cool the Earth for a few years after a major eruption. However, intentionally introducing sulphate aerosols into the stratosphere has been proposed as a potential “geoengineering” strategy to temporarily mask the effects of warming. These ideas have been controversial in the scientific community.)
Aerosol emissions have a huge impact on public health. The substances are generally considered to be conventional air pollutants and are precursors of fine particulate matter air pollution (PM2.5).
Outdoor air pollution associated with sulphur and other aerosol emissions contributes to millions of premature deaths annually. As a result, much of the impetus to rapidly cut aerosols arises from public health concerns. Despite the contribution to more rapid warming, a reduction in aerosols represents a massive improvement in health and welfare for people worldwide.
Rapid declines in global sulphur emissions
Global emissions of the most climatically important aerosol – SO2 – have declined precipitously since peaking around 50 years ago.
SO2 cuts were initially driven by clean air regulations adopted by the US, UK and EU in the 1970s and 1980s in response to the growing effects of SO2 on both air pollution and acid rain.
As the figure below illustrates, SO2 emissions across the US, UK and EU have subsequently fallen from 68m tonnes per year in 1973 to just 3.3m tonnes per year today.
Annual SO2 emissions by country and by international shipping and aviation, 1850-2022. Data from the Community Earth atmospheric Data System (CEDS).
In the first decade of the 21st century, SO2 cuts in the UK, US and EU were counterbalanced by growing SO2 emissions in China, driven by a rapid expansion of coal use and industrial activity.
Between 2000 and 2007, global SO2 emissions saw a renewed increase, as China’s SO2 emissions reached 38m tonnes per year by 2006.
However, following an international and domestic focus on air pollution in the aftermath of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, China embarked on an ambitious programme to clean up air pollution. The nation has since cut its SO2 emissions by more than 70% to around 10m tonnes of SO2 today.
Meanwhile, SO2 emissions from global shipping recently dropped by around 65%, after the IMO instituted regulations requiring the use of low-sulphur marine fuels from 2020.
Many other countries have also broadly seen aerosol declines since 1990, although there are exceptions. For example, India’s expansion of coal generation has driven increasing SO2 emissions.
Annual SO2 emissions from China, international shipping and the rest of the world. Data from the Community Earth atmospheric Data System (CEDS).
While global SO2 emissions started decreasing in the 1980s, these declines were relatively modest until around 2008, after which they have dropped precipitously.
Global SO2 emissions today are 48% lower than they were in 1979 and 40% lower than in 2006.
It is this recent rapid decline in global SO2 emissions that has driven the reduction in overall global aerosol cooling – and a subsequent decline in the associated masking of GHG warming – discussed earlier.
Effects of low-sulphur shipping fuel
The climate effects of the IMO’s 2020 phase-out of most of the sulphur content in shipping fuel has received a lot of attention over the past two years (see Carbon Brief’s earlier coverage of the topic).
This has been explored by researchers as a potential explanation for the record levels of warming the world has experienced in recent years.
Determining the climate effects of low-sulphur shipping fuel is less straightforward than simply assessing the reduction in global SO2 emissions.
The impact of additional SO2 emissions on cloud formation diminishes as emissions increase, meaning that reductions in SO2 over areas with low background sulphate concentrations, such as the ocean, could result in a proportionately larger warming effect than in highly polluted areas, such as south Asia.
This is somewhat countered by the concentration of shipping in specific “lanes” and by natural emissions of dimethyl sulphide produced by algae that are not present on land. Assessing the radiative forcing impact of the IMO’s 2020 regulations in greater detail requires the use of sophisticated climate models that can simulate these regional effects.
Carbon Brief conducted a survey of the literature on the climate impacts of the 2020 low-sulphur marine fuel regulations. Of eight studies published in peer-reviewed journals over the past two years, shown in the chart below, most determined a radiative forcing change of around 0.11 to 0.14 watts per meter squared (w/m2).
One estimate from Skeie et al. (2024) was a bit lower at around 0.08 w/m2 and another from Hansen et al. (2025) was substantially higher than all the others at 0.5 w/m2.
Estimates of global average radiative forcing changes from the IMO 2020 regulations published in the last two years. See the Methodology section for links to individual studies.
To account for these differing studies, Carbon Brief used the FaIR climate model emulator to simulate the effects of the radiative forcing estimated in each study on global average surface temperatures between 2020 and 2030. This includes 841 different simulations for each study to account for uncertainties in the climate response to aerosol forcing. (See: Methodology for further details.)
These estimates were then all combined to provide a central estimate (50th percentile) that gives each study equal weight, as well as a 5th to 95th percentile range across all the simulations for each different forcing estimate, as shown in the figure below.
Range (5th to 95th percentile) and central estimate (50th percentile) of simulated global average surface temperature responses to the IMO 2020 regulations across the radiative forcing estimates in the literature. Analysis by Carbon Brief using the FaIR model.
Overall, this approach provides a best estimate of 0.04C (0.02C to 0.16C) additional warming from the IMO’s 2020 regulations as of 2025, increasing to 0.05C (0.03C to 0.2C) by 2030.
These large uncertainty ranges are due to the inclusion of the Hansen et al. (2025) estimate, which represents something of an outlier relative to other published studies. Note that the warming of the climate system associated with the IMO 2020 regulations increases over time in the plot due to the ocean’s slow rate of warming buffering the climate response to forcing changes.
Declines in Chinese SO2 are unmasking warming
China’s reduction of SO2 emissions by more than 70% since 2007 represents a remarkable public health success story. It is estimated to have prevented hundreds of thousands of premature deaths from air pollution annually.
These rapid emissions cuts by China represent more than half the reduction in global SO2 emissions since 2007. They have been a major contributor to global temperature increases over the past two decades.
To determine the impact of Chinese SO2 reductions on global average surface temperatures, Carbon Brief used Chinese SO2 emissions data from the Community Emissions Data System (CEDS) combined with the FaIR climate model emulator.
The figure below shows the central estimate and 5th to 95th percentile across 841 different FaIR model simulations to account for uncertainties in the climate response to SO2 emissions.
Range (5th to 95th percentile) and median (50th percentile) of simulated global mean surface temperature responses to declines in Chinese SO2 emissions. Analysis by Carbon Brief using the FaIR model.
The figure above shows that Chinese SO2 declines were likely responsible for a global temperature increase of around 0.06C (0.02C to 0.13C) between 2007 and 2025, increasing to 0.7C (0.02C to 0.14C) by 2030.
Much of this increase occurred between 2007 and 2020, with a more modest contribution of Chinese aerosol changes to warming in recent years.
These results are nearly identical to those found in a study currently undergoing peer review by Dr Bjørn Samset and colleagues at CICERO, which finds a best estimate of 0.07C (0.02C to 0.12C) using a large set of simulations from eight different Earth system models.
This suggests that Chinese SO2 reductions are responsible for approximately 12% of the around 0.5C warming the world experienced between 2007 and 2024.
What aerosol cuts mean for current and future warming
It is clear that rapid reductions in global SO2 emissions have had a major impact on the global climate.
The combination of declines in emissions since 2007 in China and the rest of the world, along with declines in SO2 from shipping after 2020, have collectively unmasked a substantial amount of warming driven by GHGs.
While the reduction in SO2 emissions in other countries has been proportionately smaller than that seen in China, collectively it adds up to 0.03C (0.01C to 0.07C) of warming in 2025.
The figure below provides a best-estimate of all three factors: declines in SO2 emissions in shipping, China and the rest of the world.
Combined central (50th percentile) estimates of modeled global average surface temperature changes from IMO 2020, Chinese SO2 and rest-of-world SO2 declines between 2005 and 2030. Analysis by Carbon Brief using the FaIR model.
Taken together, these declines in SO2 emissions may represent around 0.14C additional warming today, or more than a quarter of the approximately 0.5C warming the world has experienced between 2007 and 2024.
However, the uncertainty in the climate response to changes in aerosol emissions remains large, particularly for changes in shipping emissions, so it is hard to rule out either a much smaller or much larger effect.
These results are in line with other recent analyses showing that changes in aerosol emissions are contributing to an increase in the rate of human-caused global warming in recent years.
The figure below uses a similar FaIR-based climate modeling approach to assess how different factors contributing to human-caused warming have changed over time.
Drivers of decadal warming rates between 1970-1979 and 2015-2024, excluding natural factors like volcanoes and solar cycle variation. From an analysis using the FaIR model at The Climate Brink, adapted from earlier work by Dr Chris Smith.
This shows that the rate of human-caused warming remained relatively flat at around 0.18C per decade from 1980 to 2005, before accelerating to around 0.27C over the past decade.
The primary driver of this recent acceleration in warming has been declining aerosol emissions.
Aerosols have flipped from reducing the rate of decadal warming (as emissions increased) to increasing the rate of warming (as emissions decreased) after 2005 by unmasking warming from CO2 and other GHGs.
The rate of warming from CO2 has increased over time as emissions have increased, though it has plateaued over the past decade as increases in global emissions have slowed.
However, the rate of warming from all GHG emissions – CO2, methane and others – has been relatively consistent since 1970. This is primarily due to the declining contribution of other GHGs to additional warming, likely associated with the phaseout of halocarbons after the Montreal Protocol.
Future declines in aerosols are expected in most of the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) used to simulate potential levels of future warming for the IPCC AR6 report, as shown in the figure below.
Modelled future SO2 emissions are generally dependent on broader mitigation trends – worlds with less fossil-fuel use result in less sulphur emissions – but are also highly variable across different models.
Observed SO2 emissions (black line) are broadly at the same level as (though slightly below) the SSP2-4.5 scenario (yellow line), which is the pathway that most closely matches current climate policies.
Observed SO2 emissions are also similar to those in the very-high emissions SSP5-8.5 scenario (lower grey line), while being higher than emissions in the most ambitious mitigation scenario (SSP1-1.9, green line) and below those in the SSP1-2.6 scenario (navy blue line).
Given differences across modeling groups, it is hard to infer too much about which SSP scenario is most in line with real-world SO2 emissions. However, it is worth noting that the current SSPs do not include a scenario where SO2 emissions continue to rapidly decline while emissions of CO2 and other GHGs increase.
Interestingly, the best-estimate cooling effect from sulphur dioxide is more or less counterbalanced by the warming effect of methane emissions today. As a result, scenarios where all GHG emissions are brought to zero do not result in sustained additional warming due to unmasking from declining aerosols.
However, if CO2 emissions alone were reduced to zero, while non-CO2 emissions were held constant, cutting global aerosol emissions to zero would result in between 0.2C and 1.2C of additional warming.
This means that aerosol emissions represent something of a wildcard for future warming over the 21st century. Continued rapid reductions in SO2 emissions will contribute to an acceleration in the rate of global warming in the coming years.
Methodology
Carbon Brief used the FaIR climate model to determine the effects of aerosol emissions on the climate, building on the work of Dr Chris Smith. Runs were done using the constrained ensemble approach using “fair-calibrate v1.4.”1 to be consistent with the IPCC AR6 parameter range. More details on the constrained ensemble approach can be found in Smith et al. (2024).
Figures showing the global mean surface temperature impact of different climate forcings in isolation were performed by calculating the difference between all-forcing runs and runs where a single forcing (e.g. from GHG emissions) was removed, following the approach used to generate Figure 7.8 in the IPCC AR6 climate science report.
IMO 2020 forcing estimates were taken from the following studies published in the peer-reviewed literature over the past two years:
- Yuan et al. (2024)
- Yoshika et al. (2024)
- Quaglia and Visioni (2024)
- Skeie et al. (2024)
- Gettelman et al. (2024)
- Jordan and Henry (2024)
- Watson-Parris et al. (2024)
- Hansen et al. (2025)
IMO 2020 global average surface temperature changes were calculated by running 841 different FaIR simulations for each of the different forcing estimates identified in the literature, which is the default setting for the FaiR constrained ensemble to provide a range of results consistent with the IPCC AR6 parameter range.
This produced 6,728 total simulations, from which a central (50th percentile) estimate and uncertainty range (5th to 95th percentile) were calculated.
These results were further validated by comparing them to the Earth system model-based estimates in individual studies where near-term global average surface temperature change estimates were provided (Yoshika et al. (2024); Quaglia and Visioni (2024); Gettelman et al. (2024); Jordan and Henry (2024); Watson-Parris et al. (2024); and Hansen et al. (2025).
The results of each of these studies were within the range of FaIR based estimates for the respective study’s radiative forcing – and generally quite close to FaIR’s median estimate for that study, as shown in the table below.
| Study | Carbon Brief’s Estimate (2025) | Published Estimate |
|---|---|---|
| Yoshika et al., 2024 | 0.041C (0.032C to 0.053C) | 0.04C |
| Quaglia and Visioni, 2024 | 0.044C (0.034C to 0.057C) | 0.08C (0.05C to 0.11C) |
| Gettelman et al., 2024 | 0.038C (0.029C to 0.049C) | 0.04C |
| Jordan and Henry 2024 | 0.044C (0.034C to 0.057C) | 0.046C (0.036C to 0.056C) |
| Watson-Parris et al., 2024 | 0.035C (0.027C to 0.045C) | 0.03C (-0.09C, 0.19C) |
| Hansen et al., 2025 | 0.157C (0.123C to 0.205C) | 0.2C |
It is worth noting that the uncertainties associated with converting SO2 forcing estimates to warming outcomes are generally much smaller than converting SO2 emissions into warming outcomes.
The effect of Chinese SO2 reductions were based on a comparison of two scenarios. The first is where Chinese SO2 emissions remained constant at their peak (2007) levels and did not decline. The second is where Chinese emissions followed observational estimates from CEDS between 2005 and 2022 and then remained constant at 2022 levels thereafter (which represents a conservative assumption that likely underestimates future effects of SO2 emissions declines on global temperatures given the strong downward trend). Global average surface temperature changes were calculated by running 841 different FaIR simulations in emissions mode for two scenarios and analysing the difference between the two.
The resulting estimate of 0.06C (0.02C to 0.13C) warming by 2025 was validated by comparing it to the Samset et al. (2025) preprint, which finds a nearly identical best estimate of 0.07C (0.02C to 0.12C) using a large set of simulations from eight different Earth system models.
The effects of the rest of the world’s SO2 declines were estimated using the same approach used for Chinese SO2 emissions, using CEDS emissions data. International shipping and aviation aerosols were excluded from the rest of the world estimate as to not double count IMO 2020 effects.
The post Explainer: How human-caused aerosols are ‘masking’ global warming appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Explainer: How human-caused aerosols are ‘masking’ global warming
Drought and heatwaves occurring together – known as “compound” events – have “surged” across the world since the early 2000s, a new study shows.
Compound drought and heat events (CDHEs) can have devastating effects, creating the ideal conditions for intense wildfires, such as Australia’s “Black Summer” of 2019-20 where bushfires burned 24m hectares and killed 33 people.
The research, published in Science Advances, finds that the increase in CDHEs is predominantly being driven by events that start with a heatwave.
The global area affected by such “heatwave-led” compound events has more than doubled between 1980-2001 and 2002-23, the study says.
The rapid increase in these events over the last 23 years cannot be explained solely by global warming, the authors note.
Since the late 1990s, feedbacks between the land and the atmosphere have become stronger, making heatwaves more likely to trigger drought conditions, they explain.
One of the study authors tells Carbon Brief that societies must pay greater attention to compound events, which can “cause severe impacts on ecosystems, agriculture and society”.
Compound events
CDHEs are extreme weather events where drought and heatwave conditions occur simultaneously – or shortly after each other – in the same region.
These events are often triggered by large-scale weather patterns, such as “blocking” highs, which can produce “prolonged” hot and dry conditions, according to the study.
Prof Sang-Wook Yeh is one of the study authors and a professor at the Ewha Womans University in South Korea. He tells Carbon Brief:
“When heatwaves and droughts occur together, the two hazards reinforce each other through land-atmosphere interactions. This amplifies surface heating and soil moisture deficits, making compound events more intense and damaging than single hazards.”
CDHEs can begin with either a heatwave or a drought.
The sequence of these extremes is important, the study says, as they have different drivers and impacts.
For example, in a CDHE where the heatwave was the precursor, increased direct sunshine causes more moisture loss from soils and plants, leading to a drought.
Conversely, in an event where the drought was the precursor, the lack of soil moisture means that less of the sun’s energy goes into evaporation and more goes into warming the Earth’s surface. This produces favourable conditions for heatwaves.
The study shows that the majority of CDHEs globally start out as a drought.
In recent years, there has been increasing focus on these events due to the devastating impact they have on agriculture, ecosystems and public health.
In Russia in the summer of 2010, a compound drought-heatwave event – and the associated wildfires – caused the death of nearly 55,000 people, the study notes.
The record-breaking Pacific north-west “heat dome” in 2021 triggered extreme drought conditions that caused “significant declines” in wheat yields, as well as in barley, canola and fruit production in British Columbia and Alberta, Canada, says the study.
Increasing events
To assess how CDHEs are changing, the researchers use daily reanalysis data to identify droughts and heatwaves events. (Reanalysis data combines past observations with climate models to create a historical climate record.) Then, using an algorithm, they analyse how these events overlap in both time and space.
The study covers the period from 1980 to 2023 and the world’s land surface, excluding polar regions where CDHEs are rare.
The research finds that the area of land affected by CDHEs has “increased substantially” since the early 2000s.
Heatwave-led events have been the main contributor to this increase, the study says, with their spatial extent rising 110% between 1980-2001 and 2002-23, compared to a 59% increase for drought-led events.
The map below shows the global distribution of CDHEs over 1980-2023. The charts show the percentage of the land surface affected by a heatwave-led CDHE (red) or a drought-led CDHE (yellow) in a given year (left) and relative increase in each CDHE type (right).
The study finds that CDHEs have occurred most frequently in northern South America, the southern US, eastern Europe, central Africa and south Asia.
Threshold passed
The authors explain that the increase in heatwave-led CDHEs is related to rising global temperatures, but that this does not tell the whole story.
In the earlier 22-year period of 1980-2001, the study finds that the spatial extent of heatwave-led CDHEs rises by 1.6% per 1C of global temperature rise. For the more-recent period of 2022-23, this increases “nearly eightfold” to 13.1%.
The change suggests that the rapid increase in the heatwave-led CDHEs occurred after the global average temperature “surpasse[d] a certain temperature threshold”, the paper says.
This threshold is an absolute global average temperature of 14.3C, the authors estimate (based on an 11-year average), which the world passed around the year 2000.
Investigating the recent surge in heatwave-leading CDHEs further, the researchers find a “regime shift” in land-atmosphere dynamics “toward a persistently intensified state after the late 1990s”.
In other words, the way that drier soils drive higher surface temperatures, and vice versa, is becoming stronger, resulting in more heatwave-led compound events.
Daily data
The research has some advantages over other previous studies, Yeh says. For instance, the new work uses daily estimations of CDHEs, compared to monthly data used in past research. This is “important for capturing the detailed occurrence” of these events, says Yeh.
He adds that another advantage of their study is that it distinguishes the sequence of droughts and heatwaves, which allows them to “better understand the differences” in the characteristics of CDHEs.
Dr Meryem Tanarhte is a climate scientist at the University Hassan II in Morocco, and Dr Ruth Cerezo Mota is a climatologist and a researcher at the National Autonomous University of Mexico. Both scientists, who were not involved in the study, agree that the daily estimations give a clearer picture of how CDHEs are changing.
Cerezo-Mota adds that another major contribution of the study is its global focus. She tells Carbon Brief that in some regions, such as Mexico and Africa, there is a lack of studies on CDHEs:
“Not because the events do not occur, but perhaps because [these regions] do not have all the data or the expertise to do so.”
However, she notes that the reanalysis data used by the study does have limitations with how it represents rainfall in some parts of the world.
Compound impacts
The study notes that if CDHEs continue to intensify – particularly events where heatwaves are the precursors – they could drive declining crop productivity, increased wildfire frequency and severe public health crises.
These impacts could be “much more rapid and severe as global warming continues”, Yeh tells Carbon Brief.
Tanarhte notes that these events can be forecasted up to 10 days ahead in many regions. Furthermore, she says, the strongest impacts can be prevented “through preparedness and adaptation”, including through “water management for agriculture, heatwave mitigation measures and wildfire mitigation”.
The study recommends reassessing current risk management strategies for these compound events. It also suggests incorporating the sequences of drought and heatwaves into compound event analysis frameworks “to enhance climate risk management”.
Cerezo-Mota says that it is clear that the world needs to be prepared for the increased occurrence of these events. She tells Carbon Brief:
“These [risk assessments and strategies] need to be carried out at the local level to understand the complexities of each region.”
The post Heatwaves driving recent ‘surge’ in compound drought and heat extremes appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Heatwaves driving recent ‘surge’ in compound drought and heat extremes
Greenhouse Gases
DeBriefed 6 March 2026: Iran energy crisis | China climate plan | Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ wind turbine
Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed.
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.
This week
Energy crisis
ENERGY SPIKE: US-Israeli attacks on Iran and subsequent counterattacks across the Middle East have sent energy prices “soaring”, according to Reuters. The newswire reported that the region “accounts for just under a third of global oil production and almost a fifth of gas”. The Guardian noted that shipping traffic through the strait of Hormuz, which normally ferries 20% of the world’s oil, “all but ground to a halt”. The Financial Times reported that attacks by Iran on Middle East energy facilities – notably in Qatar – triggered the “biggest rise in gas prices since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine”.
‘RISK’ AND ‘BENEFITS’: Bloomberg reported on increases in diesel prices in Europe and the US, speculating that rising fuel costs could be “a risk for president Donald Trump”. US gas producers are “poised to benefit from the big disruption in global supply”, according to CNBC. Indian government sources told the Economic Times that Russia is prepared to “fulfil India’s energy demands”. China Daily quoted experts who said “China’s energy security remains fundamentally unshaken”, thanks to “emergency stockpiles and a wide array of import channels”.
‘ESSENTIAL’ RENEWABLES: Energy analysts said governments should cut their fossil-fuel reliance by investing in renewables, “rather than just seeking non-Gulf oil and gas suppliers”, reported Climate Home News. This message was echoed by UK business secretary Peter Kyle, who said “doubling down on renewables” was “essential” amid “regional instability”, according to the Daily Telegraph.
China’s climate plan
PEAK COAL?: China has set out its next “five-year plan” at the annual “two sessions” meeting of the National People’s Congress, including its climate strategy out to 2030, according to the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post. The plan called for China to cut its carbon emissions per unit of gross domestic product (GDP) by 17% from 2026 to 2030, which “may allow for continued increase in emissions given the rate of GDP growth”, reported Reuters. The newswire added that the plan also had targets to reach peak coal in the next five years and replace 30m tonnes per year of coal with renewables.
ACTIVE YET PRUDENT: Bloomberg described the new plan as “cautious”, stating that it “frustrat[es] hopes for tighter policy that would drive the nation to peak carbon emissions well before president Xi Jinping’s 2030 deadline”. Carbon Brief has just published an in-depth analysis of the plan. China Daily reported that the strategy “highlights measures to promote the climate targets of peaking carbon dioxide emissions before 2030”, which China said it would work towards “actively yet prudently”.
Around the world
- EU RULES: The European Commission has proposed new “made in Europe” rules to support domestic low-carbon industries, “against fierce competition from China”, reported Agence France-Presse. Carbon Brief examined what it means for climate efforts.
- RECORD HEAT: The US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has said there is a 50-60% chance that the El Niño weather pattern could return this year, amplifying the effect of global warming and potentially driving temperatures to “record highs”, according to Euronews.
- FLAGSHIP FUND: The African Development Bank’s “flagship clean energy fund” plans to more than double its financing to $2.5bn for African renewables over the next two years, reported the Associated Press.
- NO WITHDRAWAL: Vanuatu has defied US efforts to force the Pacific-island nation to drop a UN draft resolution calling on the world to implement a landmark International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling on climate, according to the Guardian.
98
The number of nations that submitted their national reports on tackling nature loss to the UN on time – just half of the 196 countries that are part of the UN biodiversity treaty – according to analysis by Carbon Brief.
Latest climate research
- Sea levels are already “much higher than assumed” in most assessments of the threat posed by sea-level rise, due to “inadequate” modelling assumptions | Nature
- Accelerating human-caused global warming could see the Paris Agreement’s 1.5C limit crossed before 2030 | Geophysical Research Letters covered by Carbon Brief
- Future “super El Niño events” could “significantly lower” solar power generation due to a reduction in solar irradiance in key regions, such as California and east China | Communications Earth & Environment
(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)
Captured
UK greenhouse gas emissions in 2025 fell to 54% below 1990 levels, the baseline year for its legally binding climate goals, according to new Carbon Brief analysis. Over the same period, data from the World Bank shows that the UK’s economy has expanded by 95%, meaning that emissions have been decoupling from growth.
Spotlight
Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ community wind turbine
Following the recent launch of the UK government’s local power plan, Carbon Brief visits one of the country’s community-energy success stories.
The Lawrence Weston housing estate is set apart from the main city of Bristol, wedged between the tree-lined grounds of a stately home and a sprawl of warehouses and waste incinerators. It is one of the most deprived areas in the city.
Yet, just across the M5 motorway stands a structure that has brought the spoils of the energy transition directly to this historically forgotten estate – a 4.2 megawatt (MW) wind turbine.
The turbine is owned by local charity Ambition Lawrence Weston and all the profits from its electricity sales – around £100,000 a year – go to the community. In the UK’s local power plan, it was singled out by energy secretary Ed Miliband as a “pioneering” project.
‘Sustainable income’
On a recent visit to the estate by Carbon Brief, Ambition Lawrence Weston’s development manager, Mark Pepper, rattled off the story behind the wind turbine.
In 2012, Pepper and his team were approached by the Bristol Energy Cooperative with a chance to get a slice of the income from a new solar farm. They jumped at the opportunity.
“Austerity measures were kicking in at the time,” Pepper told Carbon Brief. “We needed to generate an income. Our own, sustainable income.”
With the solar farm proving to be a success, the team started to explore other opportunities. This began a decade-long process that saw them navigate the Conservative government’s “ban” on onshore wind, raise £5.5m in funding and, ultimately, erect the turbine in 2023.
Today, the turbine generates electricity equivalent to Lawrence Weston’s 3,000 households and will save 87,600 tonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2) over its lifetime.
‘Climate by stealth’
Ambition Lawrence Weston’s hub is at the heart of the estate and the list of activities on offer is seemingly endless: birthday parties, kickboxing, a library, woodworking, help with employment and even a pop-up veterinary clinic. All supported, Pepper said, with the help of a steady income from community-owned energy.
The centre itself is kitted out with solar panels, heat pumps and electric-vehicle charging points, making it a living advertisement for the net-zero transition. Pepper noted that the organisation has also helped people with energy costs amid surging global gas prices.
Gesturing to the England flags dangling limply on lamp posts visible from the kitchen window, he said:
“There’s a bit of resentment around immigration and scarcity of materials and provision, so we’re trying to do our bit around community cohesion.”
This includes supper clubs and an interfaith grand iftar during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.
Anti-immigration sentiment in the UK has often gone hand-in-hand with opposition to climate action. Right-wing politicians and media outlets promote the idea that net-zero policies will cost people a lot of money – and these ideas have cut through with the public.
Pepper told Carbon Brief he is sympathetic to people’s worries about costs and stressed that community energy is the perfect way to win people over:
“I think the only way you can change that is if, instead of being passive consumers…communities are like us and they’re generating an income to offset that.”
From the outset, Pepper stressed that “we weren’t that concerned about climate because we had other, bigger pressures”, adding:
“But, in time, we’ve delivered climate by stealth.”
Watch, read, listen
OIL WATCH: The Guardian has published a “visual guide” with charts and videos showing how the “escalating Iran conflict is driving up oil and gas prices”.
MURDER IN HONDURAS: Ten years on from the murder of Indigenous environmental justice advocate Berta Cáceres, Drilled asked why Honduras is still so dangerous for environmental activists.
TALKING WEATHER: A new film, narrated by actor Michael Sheen and titled You Told Us To Talk About the Weather, aimed to promote conversation about climate change with a blend of “poetry, folk horror and climate storytelling”.
Coming up
- 8 March: Colombia parliamentary election
- 9-19 March: 31st Annual Session of the International Seabed Authority, Kingston, Jamaica
- 11 March: UN Environment Programme state of finance for nature 2026 report launch
Pick of the jobs
- London School of Economics and Political Science, fellow in the social science of sustainability | Salary: £43,277-£51,714. Location: London
- NORCAP, innovative climate finance expert | Salary: Unknown. Location: Kyiv, Ukraine
- WBHM, environmental reporter | Salary: $50,050-$81,330. Location: Birmingham, Alabama, US
- Climate Cabinet, data engineer | Salary: hourly rate of $60-$120 per hour. Location: Remote anywhere in the US
DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.
This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s weekly DeBriefed email newsletter. Subscribe for free here.
The post DeBriefed 6 March 2026: Iran energy crisis | China climate plan | Bristol’s ‘pioneering’ wind turbine appeared first on Carbon Brief.
China’s leadership has published a draft of its 15th five-year plan setting the strategic direction for the nation out to 2030, including support for clean energy and energy security.
The plan sets a target to cut China’s “carbon intensity” by 17% over the five years from 2026-30, but also changes the basis for calculating this key climate metric.
The plan continues to signal support for China’s clean-energy buildout and, in general, contains no major departures from the country’s current approach to the energy transition.
The government reaffirms support for several clean-energy industries, ranging from solar and electric vehicles (EVs) through to hydrogen and “new-energy” storage.
The plan also emphasises China’s willingness to steer climate governance and be seen as a provider of “global public goods”, in the form of affordable clean-energy technologies.
However, while the document says it will “promote the peaking” of coal and oil use, it does not set out a timeline and continues to call for the “clean and efficient” use of coal.
This shows that tensions remain between China’s climate goals and its focus on energy security, leading some analysts to raise concerns about its carbon-cutting ambition.
Below, Carbon Brief outlines the key climate change and energy aspects of the plan, including targets for carbon intensity, non-fossil energy and forestry.
Note: this article is based on a draft published on 5 March and will be updated if any significant changes are made in the final version of the plan, due to be released at the close next week of the “two sessions” meeting taking place in Beijing.
- What is China’s 15th five-year plan?
- What does the plan say about China’s climate action?
- What is China’s new CO2 intensity target?
- Does the plan encourage further clean-energy additions?
- What does the plan signal about coal?
- How will China approach global climate governance in the next five years?
- What else does the plan cover?
What is China’s 15th five-year plan?
Five-year plans are one of the most important documents in China’s political system.
Addressing everything from economic strategy to climate policy, they outline the planned direction for China’s socio-economic development in a five-year period. The 15th five-year plan covers 2026-30.
These plans include several “main goals”. These are largely quantitative indicators that are seen as particularly important to achieve and which provide a foundation for subsequent policies during the five-year period.
The table below outlines some of the key “main goals” from the draft 15th five-year plan.
| Category | Indicator | Indicator in 2025 | Target by 2030 | Cumulative target over 2026-2030 | Characteristic |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Economic development | Gross domestic product (GDP) growth (%) | 5 | Maintained within a reasonable range and proposed annually as appropriate. | Anticipatory | |
| ‘Green and low-carbon | Reduction in CO2 emissions per unit of GDP (%) | 17.7 | 17 | Binding | |
| Share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption (%) | 21.7 | 25 | Binding | ||
| Security guarantee | Comprehensive energy production capacity (100m tonnes of standard coal equivalent) |
51.3 | 58 | Binding |
Select list of targets highlighted in the “main goals” section of the draft 15th five-year plan. Source: Draft 15th five-year plan.
Since the 12th five-year plan, covering 2011-2015, these “main goals” have included energy intensity and carbon intensity as two of five key indicators for “green ecology”.
The previous five-year plan, which ran from 2021-2025, introduced the idea of an absolute “cap” on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, although it did not provide an explicit figure in the document. This has been subsequently addressed by a policy on the “dual-control of carbon” issued in 2024.
The latest plan removes the energy-intensity goal and elevates the carbon-intensity goal, but does not set an absolute cap on emissions (see below).
It covers the years until 2030, before which China has pledged to peak its carbon emissions. (Analysis for Carbon Brief found that emissions have been “flat or falling” since March 2024.)
The plans are released at the two sessions, an annual gathering of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). This year, it runs from 4-12 March.
The plans are often relatively high-level, with subsequent topic-specific five-year plans providing more concrete policy guidance.
Policymakers at the National Energy Agency (NEA) have indicated that in the coming years they will release five sector-specific plans for 2026-2030, covering topics such as the “new energy system”, electricity and renewable energy.
There may also be specific five-year plans covering carbon emissions and environmental protection, as well as the coal and nuclear sectors, according to analysts.
Other documents published during the two sessions include an annual government work report, which outlines key targets and policies for the year ahead.
The gathering is attended by thousands of deputies – delegates from across central and local governments, as well as Chinese Communist party members, members of other political parties, academics, industry leaders and other prominent figures.
What does the plan say about China’s climate action?
Achieving China’s climate targets will remain a key driver of the country’s policies in the next five years, according to the draft 15th five-year plan.
It lists the “acceleration” of China’s energy transition as a “major achievement” in the 14th five-year plan period (2021-2025), noting especially how clean-power capacity had overtaken fossil fuels.
The draft says China will “actively and steadily advance and achieve carbon peaking”, with policymakers continuing to strike a balance between building a “green economy” and ensuring stability.
Climate and environment continues to receive its own chapter in the plan. However, the framing and content of this chapter has shifted subtly compared with previous editions, as shown in the table below. For example, unlike previous plans, the first section of this chapter focuses on China’s goal to peak emissions.
| 11th five-year plan (2006-2010) | 12th five-year plan (2011-2015) | 13th five-year plan (2016-2020) | 14th five-year plan (2021-2025) | 15th five-year plan (2026-2030) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chapter title | Part 6: Build a resource-efficient and environmentally-friendly society | Part 6: Green development, building a resource-efficient and environmentally friendly society | Part 10: Ecosystems and the environment | Part 11: Promote green development and facilitate the harmonious coexistence of people and nature | Part 13: Accelerating the comprehensive green transformation of economic and social development to build a beautiful China |
| Sections | Developing a circular economy | Actively respond to global climate change | Accelerate the development of functional zones | Improve the quality and stability of ecosystems | Actively and steadily advancing and achieving carbon peaking |
| Protecting and restoring natural ecosystems | Strengthen resource conservation and management | Promote economical and intensive resource use | Continue to improve environmental quality | Continuously improving environmental quality | |
| Strengthening environmental protection | Vigorously develop the circular economy | Step up comprehensive environmental governance | Accelerate the green transformation of the development model | Enhancing the diversity, stability, and sustainability of ecosystems | |
| Enhancing resource management | Strengthen environmental protection efforts | Intensify ecological conservation and restoration | Accelerating the formation of green production and lifestyles | ||
| Rational utilisation of marine and climate resources | Promoting ecological conservation and restoration | Respond to global climate change | |||
| Strengthen the development of water conservancy and disaster prevention and mitigation systems | Improve mechanisms for ensuring ecological security | ||||
| Develop green and environmentally-friendly industries |
Title and main sections of the climate and environment-focused chapters in the last five five-year plans. Source: China’s 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th five-year plans.
The climate and environment chapter in the latest plan calls for China to “balance [economic] development and emission reduction” and “ensure the timely achievement of carbon peak targets”.
Under the plan, China will “continue to pursue” its established direction and objectives on climate, Prof Li Zheng, dean of the Tsinghua University Institute of Climate Change and Sustainable Development (ICCSD), tells Carbon Brief.
What is China’s new CO2 intensity target?
In the lead-up to the release of the plan, analysts were keenly watching for signals around China’s adoption of a system for the “dual-control of carbon”.
This would combine the existing targets for carbon intensity – the CO2 emissions per unit of GDP – with a new cap on China’s total carbon emissions. This would mark a dramatic step for the country, which has never before set itself a binding cap on total emissions.
Policymakers had said last year that this framework would come into effect during the 15th five-year plan period, replacing the previous system for the “dual-control of energy”.
However, the draft 15th five-year plan does not offer further details on when or how both parts of the dual-control of carbon system will be implemented. Instead, it continues to focus on carbon intensity targets alone.
Looking back at the previous five-year plan period, the latest document says China had achieved a carbon-intensity reduction of 17.7%, just shy of its 18% goal.
This is in contrast with calculations by Lauri Myllyvirta, lead analyst at the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), which had suggested that China had only cut its carbon intensity by 12% over the past five years.
At the time it was set in 2021, the 18% target had been seen as achievable, with analysts telling Carbon Brief that they expected China to realise reductions of 20% or more.
However, the government had fallen behind on meeting the target.
Last year, ecology and environment minister Huang Runqiu attributed this to the Covid-19 pandemic, extreme weather and trade tensions. He said that China, nevertheless, remained “broadly” on track to meet its 2030 international climate pledge of reducing carbon intensity by more than 65% from 2005 levels.
Myllyvirta tells Carbon Brief that the newly reported figure showing a carbon-intensity reduction of 17.7% is likely due to an “opportunistic” methodological revision. The new methodology now includes industrial process emissions – such as cement and chemicals – as well as the energy sector.
(This is not the first time China has redefined a target, with regulators changing the methodology for energy intensity in 2023.)
For the next five years, the plan sets a target to reduce carbon intensity by 17%, slightly below the previous goal.
However, the change in methodology means that this leaves space for China’s overall emissions to rise by “3-6% over the next five years”, says Myllyvirta. In contrast, he adds that the original methodology would have required a 2% fall in absolute carbon emissions by 2030.
The dashed lines in the chart below show China’s targets for reducing carbon intensity during the 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th five-year periods, while the bars show what was achieved under the old (dark blue) and new (light blue) methodology.
The carbon-intensity target is the “clearest signal of Beijing’s climate ambition”, says Li Shuo, director at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s (ASPI) China climate hub.
It also links directly to China’s international pledge – made in 2021 – to cut its carbon intensity to more than 65% below 2005 levels by 2030.
To meet this pledge under the original carbon-intensity methodology, China would have needed to set a target of a 23% reduction within the 15th five-year plan period. However, the country’s more recent 2035 international climate pledge, released last year, did not include a carbon-intensity target.
As such, ASPI’s Li interprets the carbon-intensity target in the draft 15th five-year plan as a “quiet recalibration” that signals “how difficult the original 2030 goal has become”.
Furthermore, the 15th five-year plan does not set an absolute emissions cap.
This leaves “significant ambiguity” over China’s climate plans, says campaign group 350 in a press statement reacting to the draft plan. It explains:
“The plan was widely expected to mark a clearer transition from carbon-intensity targets toward absolute emissions reductions…[but instead] leaves significant ambiguity about how China will translate record renewable deployment into sustained emissions cuts.”
Myllyvirta tells Carbon Brief that this represents a “continuation” of the government’s focus on scaling up clean-energy supply while avoiding setting “strong measurable emission targets”.
He says that he would still expect to see absolute caps being set for power and industrial sectors covered by China’s emissions trading scheme (ETS). In addition, he thinks that an overall absolute emissions cap may still be published later in the five-year period.
Despite the fact that it has yet to be fully implemented, the switch from dual-control of energy to dual-control of carbon represents a “major policy evolution”, Ma Jun, director of the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs (IPE), tells Carbon Brief. He says that it will allow China to “provide more flexibility for renewable energy expansion while tightening the net on fossil-fuel reliance”.
Does the plan encourage further clean-energy additions?
“How quickly carbon intensity is reduced largely depends on how much renewable energy can be supplied,” says Yao Zhe, global policy advisor at Greenpeace East Asia, in a statement.
The five-year plan continues to call for China’s development of a “new energy system that is clean, low-carbon, safe and efficient” by 2030, with continued additions of “wind, solar, hydro and nuclear power”.
In line with China’s international pledge, it sets a target for raising the share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption to 25% by 2030, up from just under 21.7% in 2025.
The development of “green factories” and “zero-carbon [industrial] parks” has been central to many local governments’ strategies for meeting the non-fossil energy target, according to industry news outlet BJX News. A call to build more of these zero-carbon industrial parks is listed in the five-year plan.
Prof Pan Jiahua, dean of Beijing University of Technology’s Institute of Ecological Civilization, tells Carbon Brief that expanding demand for clean energy through mechanisms such as “green factories” represents an increasingly “bottom-up” and “market-oriented” approach to the energy transition, which will leave “no place for fossil fuels”.
He adds that he is “very much sure that China’s zero-carbon process is being accelerated and fossil fuels are being driven out of the market”, pointing to the rapid adoption of EVs.
The plan says that China will aim to double “non-fossil energy” in 10 years – although it does not clarify whether this means their installed capacity or electricity generation, or what the exact starting year would be.
Research has shown that doubling wind and solar capacity in China between 2025-2035 would be “consistent” with aims to limit global warming to 2C.
While the language “certainly” pushes for greater additions of renewable energy, Yao tells Carbon Brief, it is too “opaque” to be a “direct indication” of the government’s plans for renewable additions.
She adds that “grid stability and healthy, orderly competition” is a higher priority for policymakers than guaranteeing a certain level of capacity additions.
China continues to place emphasis on the need for large-scale clean-energy “bases” and cross-regional power transmission.
The plan says China must develop “clean-energy bases…in the three northern regions” and “integrated hydro-wind-solar complexes” in south-west China.
It specifically encourages construction of “large-scale wind and solar” power bases in desert regions “primarily” for cross-regional power transmission, as well as “major hydropower” projects, including the Yarlung Tsangpo dam in Tibet.
As such, the country should construct “power-transmission corridors” with the capacity to send 420 gigawatts (GW) of electricity from clean-energy bases in western provinces to energy-hungry eastern provinces by 2030, the plan says.
State Grid, China’s largest grid operator, plans to install “another 15 ultra-high voltage [UHV] transmission lines” by 2030, reports Reuters, up from the 45 UHV lines built by last year.
Below are two maps illustrating the interlinkages between clean-energy bases in China in the 15th (top) and 14th (bottom) five-year plan periods.
The yellow dotted areas represent clean energy bases, while the arrows represent cross-regional power transmission. The blue wind-turbine icons represent offshore windfarms and the red cooling tower icons represent coastal nuclear plants.
The 15th five-year plan map shows a consistent approach to the 2021-2025 period. As well as power being transmitted from west to east, China plans for more power to be sent to southern provinces from clean-energy bases in the north-west, while clean-energy bases in the north-east supply China’s eastern coast.
It also maps out “mutual assistance” schemes for power grids in neighbouring provinces.
Offshore wind power should reach 100GW by 2030, while nuclear power should rise to 110GW, according to the plan.
What does the plan signal about coal?
The increased emphasis on grid infrastructure in the draft 15th five-year plan reflects growing concerns from energy planning officials around ensuring China’s energy supply.
Ren Yuzhi, director of the NEA’s development and planning department, wrote ahead of the plan’s release that the “continuous expansion” of China’s energy system has “dramatically increased its complexity”.
He said the NEA felt there was an “urgent need” to enhance the “secure and reliable” replacement of fossil-fuel power with new energy sources, as well as to ensure the system’s “ability to absorb them”.
Meanwhile, broader concerns around energy security have heightened calls for coal capacity to remain in the system as a “ballast stone”.
The plan continues to support the “clean and efficient utilisation of fossil fuels” and does not mention either a cap or peaking timeline for coal consumption.
Xi had previously told fellow world leaders that China would “strictly control” coal-fired power and phase down coal consumption in the 15th five-year plan period.
The “geopolitical situation is increasing energy security concerns” at all levels of government, said the Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress in a note responding to the draft plan, adding that this was creating “uncertainty over coal reduction”.
Ahead of its publication, there were questions around whether the plan would set a peaking deadline for oil and coal. An article posted by state news agency Xinhua last month, examining recommendations for the plan from top policymakers, stated that coal consumption would plateau from “around 2027”, while oil would peak “around 2026”.
However, the plan does not lay out exact years by which the two fossil fuels should peak, only saying that China will “promote the peaking of coal and oil consumption”.
There are similarly no mentions of phasing out coal in general, in line with existing policy.
Nevertheless, there is a heavy emphasis on retrofitting coal-fired power plants. The plan calls for the establishment of “demonstration projects” for coal-plant retrofitting, such as through co-firing with biomass or “green ammonia”.
Such retrofitting could incentivise lower utilisation of coal plants – and thus lower emissions – if they are used to flexibly meet peaks in demand and to cover gaps in clean-energy output, instead of providing a steady and significant share of generation.
The plan also calls for officials to “fully implement low-carbon retrofitting projects for coal-chemical industries”, which have been a notable source of emissions growth in the past year.
However, the coal-chemicals sector will likely remain a key source of demand for China’s coal mining industry, with coal-to-oil and coal-to-gas bases listed as a “key area” for enhancing the country’s “security capabilities”.
Meanwhile, coal-fired boilers and industrial kilns in the paper industry, food processing and textiles should be replaced with “clean” alternatives to the equivalent of 30m tonnes of coal consumption per year, it says.
“China continues to scale up clean energy at an extraordinary pace, but the plan still avoids committing to strong measurable constraints on emissions or fossil fuel use”, says Joseph Dellatte, head of energy and climate studies at the Institut Montaigne. He adds:
“The logic remains supply-driven: deploy massive amounts of clean energy and assume emissions will eventually decline.”
How will China approach global climate governance in the next five years?
Meanwhile, clean-energy technologies continue to play a role in upgrading China’s economy, with several “new energy” sectors listed as key to its industrial policy.
Named sectors include smart EVs, “new solar cells”, new-energy storage, hydrogen and nuclear fusion energy.
“China’s clean-technology development – rather than traditional administrative climate controls – is increasingly becoming the primary driver of emissions reduction,” says ASPI’s Li. He adds that strengthening China’s clean-energy sectors means “more closely aligning Beijing’s economic ambitions with its climate objectives”.
Analysis for Carbon Brief shows that clean energy drove more than a third of China’s GDP growth in 2025, representing around 11% of China’s whole economy.
The continued support for these sectors in the draft five-year plan comes as the EU outlined its own measures intended to limit China’s hold on clean-energy industries, driven by accusations of “unfair competition” from Chinese firms.
China is unlikely to crack down on clean-tech production capacity, Dr Rebecca Nadin, director of the Centre for Geopolitics of Change at ODI Global, tells Carbon Brief. She says:
“Beijing is treating overcapacity in solar and smart EVs as a strategic choice, not a policy error…and is prepared to pour investment into these sectors to cement global market share, jobs and technological leverage.”
Dellatte echoes these comments, noting that it is “striking” that the plan “barely addresses the issue of industrial overcapacity in clean technologies”, with the focus firmly on “scaling production and deployment”.
At the same time, China is actively positioning itself to be a prominent voice in climate diplomacy and a champion of proactive climate action.
This is clear from the first line in a section on providing “global public goods”. It says:
“As a responsible major country, China will play a more active role in addressing global challenges such as climate change.”
The plan notes that China will “actively participate in and steer [引领] global climate governance”, in line with the principle of “common,but differentiated responsibilities”.
This echoes similar language from last year’s government work report, Yao tells Carbon Brief, demonstrating a “clear willingness” to guide global negotiations. But she notes that this “remains an aspiration that’s yet to be made concrete”. She adds:
“China has always favored collective leadership, so its vision of leadership is never a lone one.”
The country will “deepen south-south cooperation on climate change”, the plan says. In an earlier section on “opening up”, it also notes that China will explore “new avenues for collaboration in green development” with global partners as part of its “Belt and Road Initiative”.
China is “doubling down” on a narrative that it is a “responsible major power” and “champion of south-south climate cooperation”, Nadin says, such as by “presenting its clean‑tech exports and finance as global public goods”. She says:
“China will arrive at future COPs casting itself as the indispensable climate leader for the global south…even though its new five‑year plan still puts growth, energy security and coal ahead of faster emissions cuts at home.”
What else does the plan cover?
The impact of extreme weather – particularly floods – remains a key concern in the plan.
China must “refine” its climate adaptation framework and “enhance its resilience to climate change, particularly extreme-weather events”, it says.
China also aims to “strengthen construction of a national water network” over the next five years in order to help prevent floods and droughts.
An article published a few days before the plan in the state-run newspaper China Daily noted that, “as global warming intensifies, extreme weather events – including torrential rains, severe convective storms, and typhoons – have become more frequent, widespread and severe”.
The plan also touches on critical minerals used for low-carbon technologies. These will likely remain a geopolitical flashpoint, with China saying it will focus during the next five years on “intensifying” exploration and “establishing” a reserve for critical minerals. This reserve will focus on “scarce” energy minerals and critical minerals, as well as other “advantageous mineral resources”.
Dellatte says that this could mean the “competition in the energy transition will increasingly be about control over mineral supply chains”.
Other low-carbon policies listed in the five-year plan include expanding coverage of China’s mandatory carbon market and further developing its voluntary carbon market.
China will “strengthen monitoring and control” of non-CO2 greenhouse gases, the plan says, as well as implementing projects “targeting methane, nitrous oxide and hydrofluorocarbons” in sectors such as coal mining, agriculture and chemicals.
This will create “capacity” for reducing emissions by 30m tonnes of CO2 equivalent, it adds.
Meanwhile, China will develop rules for carbon footprint accounting and push for internationally recognised accounting standards.
It will enhance reform of power markets over the next five years and improve the trading mechanism for green electricity certificates.
It will also “promote” adoption of low-carbon lifestyles and decarbonisation of transport, as well as working to advance electrification of freight and shipping.
The post Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ mean for climate change? appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ mean for climate change?
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