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The rapid global rollout of artificial intelligence (AI) data centers is set to add new pressure to the already strained copper market. A recent BloombergNEF (BNEF) report warns that:

  • Copper supply gap could swell to 6 million tonnes by 2035 if demand keeps rising at this pace.
  • Copper demand from AI-powered facilities will average about 400,000 tonnes a year over the next decade, peaking at 572,000 tonnes in 2028.
  • By 2035, the cumulative copper locked into data centers could surpass 4.3 million tonnes.

Furthermore, this rise comes as other copper-hungry industries, like power transmission and wind energy, are also using more of the metal. BNEF expects their copper demand to almost double by 2035. Together, they are putting heavy pressure on a market already held back by years of low investment in new mines.

Why AI Data Centers Are So Copper-Intensive?

Copper may account for up to 6% of a data center’s capital costs, but its role is essential. The metal’s unmatched electrical conductivity ensures efficient power transmission, while its high thermal conductivity supports heat exchangers vital for cooling AI-intensive servers. That’s why cables, busbars, power distribution strips, connectors, transformers, and cooling systems all rely heavily on copper.

Its ductility and malleability also allow it to be shaped into compact connectors and other components critical to space-optimized server rooms. From high-capacity cabling to switchgear and transformers, copper is woven into every layer of a data center’s infrastructure.

copper demand AI data centers
Source: BHP

Mining giant BHP predicts:

  • Copper demand will rise 72% by 2050 — driven largely by AI infrastructure and the clean energy transition.
  • By 2050, it could hit 3 million tonnes per year. That would lift the sector’s share of total global copper consumption from about 1% today to as much as 7% by mid-century.

Case studies illustrate the scale: Microsoft’s $500 million Chicago data center, completed in 2009, used about 2,177 tonnes of copper — roughly 27 tonnes per megawatt of power capacity. With AI-ready racks increasing power needs, the copper footprint per site is growing.

Copper demand
Source: BHP

Growth Projections Paint a Steep Climb

Similarly, a Macquarie analysis estimates that by 2030, data centers could consume between 330,000 and 420,000 tonnes of copper annually, with a midpoint of 375,000 tonnes. This projection factors in recent mega-project announcements from Microsoft, Meta, and the $500 billion Stargate Project to build OpenAI infrastructure in the U.S.

It also accounts for a forecast jump in required data center power capacity from 77 gigawatts in 2023 to 334 GW in 2030.

  • Goldman Sachs says AI will drive a 165% increase in data center power demand by 2030.
  • This means this massive leap will require extensive copper use for both on-site systems and the wider electrical grid.
 Data center power required for AI

data center AI

The Grid Connection Factor

Moving on comes the grid connection factor. As Colin Hamilton of BMO Capital Markets notes, the copper demand story isn’t just about what’s inside the data center. He says, “Data centers themselves are becoming incrementally less copper-intensive, but getting the electricity to them, that is copper-intensive.”

That means transmission lines, substations, and grid upgrades, all of which use large volumes of copper. In the era of AI, hyperscale campuses will need multiple redundant grid connections to ensure an uninterrupted power supply, further boosting copper demand.

Additionally, the scale of investment is staggering. North American data center infrastructure spending is expected to rise from $33 billion in 2020 to $70 billion by 2030 and $185 billion by 2040. Each new AI-ready site locks in thousands of tonnes of copper for decades.

What’s Driving the Copper Market Now?

On August 1, the U.S. imposed a 50% tariff on copper imports to boost domestic production. This policy could benefit major U.S.-based miners like Freeport-McMoRan and Rio Tinto, but some industry players warn it could cause short-term disruptions. The news hit just as Goldman Sachs lowered its 2025 copper price forecast on weaker Chinese demand.

However, following the BNEF report on future shortages, copper stocks like Freeport-McMoRan and the Global X Copper Miners ETF fell as investors weighed the combined effect of tariffs and market forecasts.

Analysts still expect a long-term crunch, projecting a 6 million-tonne shortfall by 2035 as AI data centers and clean energy projects drive demand higher.

Copper Price Volatility and Shocks

Copper prices plunged more than 20% after the tariff announcement, partly due to speculative trading, arbitrage, and stockpiling. In short, the “tariff trade” quickly unraveled in the U.S. market.

BNEF believes this is temporary, forecasting a price peak of $13,500 per tonne in 2028 as demand outpaces supply. By 2035, global output could reach just 29 million tonnes, well below the 35 million tonnes needed.

J.P. Morgan takes a cautious view, predicting prices could dip toward $9,100 per tonne in Q3 before recovering slightly to around $9,350 in Q4.

Copper price
Source: KITCO

AI Turns Copper into a Bottleneck

AI-ready data centers are changing the copper demand story. Unlike electric vehicles, which add demand gradually, these facilities need massive amounts of copper all at once — from utility-scale wiring and high-voltage tie-ins to dense cabling inside the building.

As said before, the demand extends beyond data centers. Hyperscale campuses drive new substations, grid upgrades, and redundant networks—each packed with copper. Combined with renewable grid expansion, copper is becoming a key bottleneck for AI and the clean energy shift.

With mine development taking more than a decade, the AI-driven copper crunch could arrive sooner than expected. For miners, utilities, and tech giants, this collision of digital expansion and material scarcity is set to be one of the biggest industrial challenges of the next 20 years.

The post Data Centers’ Copper Hunger: How AI is Driving a Looming Supply Crunch? appeared first on Carbon Credits.

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Carbon Footprint

Insetting vs Offsetting: Which Actually Counts Toward Your Scope 3 Targets

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The accounting differences that decide whether your nature investment shows up in inventory, in BVCM, or nowhere at all.

The question reaches a procurement team about three weeks before the next sustainability committee meeting. Someone has read about insetting. Someone else has just signed off on an offset purchase. The CSO wants to know if the two are interchangeable. The answer is no, and the GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard is the reason why.

This article walks through what each term means at audit-grade specificity, what the standards actually say about how each gets counted, and how to decide which tool fits which target. The insetting vs offsetting question is one of the most-searched in corporate climate strategy, and one of the most poorly answered. By the end of this piece, you should be able to brief a committee on the difference without notes.

The two definitions, in plain English

Offsetting means buying carbon credits generated outside your value chain and retiring them against your residual emissions. The reduction happens somewhere else, financed by you, and the credit is the receipt.

Insetting means investing in emission reductions or removals inside your own value chain, typically with suppliers, where the reduction is directly linked to the products and services you buy. The reduction happens inside the boundary of your Scope 3 inventory, and the accounting treatment is fundamentally different.

The shorthand from the University of Oxford’s Nature-based Insetting Initiative is useful: insetting is what you do with the supply chain you have; offsetting is what you do with the supply chain you do not have.

What the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard actually says

The GHG Protocol Land Sector and Removals Standard, finalised in 2024 after a multi-year pilot, sets the rules for how land-based emission reductions and removals enter corporate inventories. The Standard distinguishes between inventory accounting (Scope 1, 2, and 3) and project or intervention accounting (a separate methodology for crediting).

For insetting, the practical implication is that supplier-level interventions, when properly measured and attributed, can reduce your Scope 3 category 1 (purchased goods and services) emissions in your inventory. The reduction is not a credit retired against the inventory; it is a lower inventory number, period.

For offsetting, the credit is retired separately. It can be reported as a contribution toward a net-zero claim under the SBTi Beyond Value Chain Mitigation framework or as part of a VCMI Carbon Integrity claim, but it does not lower the inventory number.

A practical consequence: if your Science Based Target requires a 50% absolute reduction in Scope 3 emissions by 2030, insetting moves you toward the target. Offsetting does not. This single point of difference reshapes the procurement decision.

When insetting counts toward Scope 3 (and when it does not)

Insetting counts toward Scope 3 only when several conditions are met:

  • The intervention must occur with an entity in your value chain.
  • The emissions reduction or removal must be measured against a defensible baseline.
  • The reduction must be attributed to your share of that supplier’s output, not double-counted with other buyers.
  • It must follow the inventory accounting rules in the GHG Protocol Land Sector Standard, not the project accounting rules used to generate credits.

The most common failure mode is double counting. If your supplier sells the same reduction as a credit on the voluntary market and also reports it to you as a Scope 3 reduction, the math breaks. The Standard requires you to address this risk, typically by purchasing and retiring the supplier-issued credit as part of your inventory or by contractual provisions that prevent the supplier from selling the reduction twice.

When insetting does not count toward Scope 3: when the intervention sits with a supplier you do not buy from, when the baseline is not defensible, when the attribution is unclear, or when the documentation does not survive audit. Those cases default to Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, which is still useful but operates on a different ledger.

The procurement and supplier engagement question

Insetting is harder than offsetting. That is the unfashionable truth most buyers eventually confront. Offsetting is a transaction; insetting is a relationship.

To run an insetting program, you need supplier mapping precise enough to know which farms or facilities sit at which Scope 3 boundary. You need an engagement model that gets suppliers to participate, which usually requires multi-year commitments and shared economics. You need an MRV architecture that measures the right things and produces audit-ready documentation. And you need a contractual structure that prevents double counting and protects both sides.

The trade-off you receive in return is significant. Reductions count against your inventory rather than your residual. Supplier relationships deepen, which protects sourcing continuity. Yield and quality improvements often follow regenerative interventions, which reduces your input cost over time. And the regulatory file, under CSRD, CSDDD, EUDR, and the SBTi FLAG Guidance, is materially stronger.

Choosing the right tool for the right target

A practical decision rule. If your target is a science-based Scope 3 reduction and you operate in a FLAG sector or source FLAG commodities, insetting is the structurally correct tool. If your target is a net-zero claim that includes neutralising hard-to-abate residual emissions outside your value chain, BVCM via high-integrity offsets is the structurally correct tool. Most companies with material Scope 3 exposure need both, in different proportions, sequenced over time.

The sequencing matters. Insetting takes longer to stand up but produces a permanent reduction in the inventory. Offsetting can be transacted faster but does not change the inventory and now sits under tighter claim restrictions. Treat them as complementary tools with different jobs, not as substitutes. The Accountability Framework Initiative and the IUCN Global Standard for Nature-based Solutions both provide useful guardrails for the insetting side, with biodiversity, human rights, and benefit-sharing requirements that go beyond carbon math.

If you are mapping a Scope 3 reduction roadmap and need to scope which interventions count toward your inventory versus which sit in Beyond Value Chain Mitigation, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can help you structure a nature-based supply chain investment program that fits your FLAG exposure, your target architecture, and your audit horizon. Schedule a consultation.

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Carbon Footprint

Net zero needs nature: a carbon credit guide

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Net zero is often described as a balancing act: cut what you can, account for the rest, and reach zero on the ledger. That framing is useful, but it leaves something out. It treats every tonne of carbon as interchangeable and every route to zero as equally sound, while the science tells a more specific story.

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Carbon Footprint

Deforestation in Malawi: causes and solutions

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Malawi has lost a striking share of its forests over the past three decades. Woodlands that once covered well over a third of the country now cover less than a quarter, and the pressure on what remains is increasing. Behind those figures sit two practical questions: what is driving the loss, and what reverses it?

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