China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are investing in low-carbon sources and helping push the country’s energy transition towards a “critical turning point” where coal power starts to decline, a new report finds.
The report, by thinktank Ember, finds that, in the decade to 2020, central government-controlled power companies (central SOEs) had increased their wind and solar capacity nearly five-fold, surpassing 200 gigawatts (GW).
By 2022 – the most recent data available in the report – central SOEs accounted for about 40% of China’s installed solar capacity and 70% of its wind capacity.
Together with local government-controlled energy firms (local SOEs), these companies have made a “significant contribution” to shrinking coal’s share of China’s electricity mix, which has dropped from more than 70% in 2000 to less than 60% in 2023.
Moreover, coal is contributing less to meeting China’s rising electricity demand, the report says. From 1991-2000, 85% of the incremental electricity demand was met by coal, while in 2011-2020 this figure dropped to only 47%.
The report adds that, if current trends continue, coal power in China “will being to decline in absolute terms”, a turning point that could trigger a reduction in carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from the country’s electricity sector – and its emissions overall.
While SOEs’ diversification strategies have reduced their reliance on coal, however, the report says that these entities remain closely bound up in the “coal-electricity ecosystem”.
As such, the turning point away from coal power could trigger “potential tensions and conflicts” – particularly in coal-reliant regions of the country – that will need to be addressed in order for China’s energy transition to continue.
The transition journey of SOEs
SOEs are organisations set up to carry out commercial activities on behalf of the government.
They play a “crucial role” in China’s economy, particularly in key sectors, such as energy. According to the World Bank, SOEs accounted for 23-28% of China’s GDP in 2017.The leading nine power-sector SOEs are dubbed as “five bigs and four smalls” (五大四小). Collectively, these firms control more than half of China’s electricity generation capacity, as shown in the figure below.

Power-sector SOEs are particularly dominant in terms of the “coal power market (煤电市场)”, Ember notes, with private capital only accounting for a 5% share.
This gives power-sector SOEs a key role in China’s energy transition.
In addition, as a hybrid of corporate organisation and government ministry, SOEs’ development plans closely follow the central government’s overall blueprint.
Their governing body, the state-owned assets supervision and administration commission (SASAC), issued a “guiding opinion” mandate for SOE’s energy transition in 2021, after president Xi Jinping declared the “dual carbon” goal in 2020.
(The “dual carbon” goal is to peak emissions before 2030 and become “carbon neutral” before 2060. Read Carbon Brief’s China country profile for more detail.)
The mandate says that in order to “lay a solid foundation for achieving carbon peak” by 2030, SOEs should “incorporate over 50% of renewable energy in their generation capacity mix by 2025”.
Another recent report, by thinktank Climate Energy Finance (CEF), finds that the “five big” SOEs have poured tens of billions of yuan (billions of dollars) into the buildout of renewable energy, since this document was issued.
With capital expenditure being aligned with energy diversification goals, CEF says all “five bigs” already met the SASAC target in 2023.
Ember’s study on central SOEs finds their wind and solar capacity increased nearly five-folds since 2011, surpassing 200GW in 2020, roughly equivalent to the total installed capacity of Germany.
In 2022, central SOEs accounted for about 40% of China’s solar capacity and 70% of the wind capacity, adds Ember, leading China to approach “a critical turning point in its transition towards a clean electricity future”.
The Ember report says if current trends in energy transition continue, coal power will “begin to decline in absolute terms” – a similar conclusion to recent Carbon Brief analysis.
Pushing down coal’s share
Coal’s share of China’s electricity generation is declining. As shown in the figure below, coal’s share (black) dropped from nearly 80% in 2000 to about 60% in 2023.
(It fell further still, to a record-low 53% in May 2024, according to Carbon Brief analysis.)
Meanwhile, the combined share of wind (dark green) and solar (light green) grew from about 4% in 2015 to almost 16% in 2023, says Ember.

In addition, the role of coal in meeting the growing electricity demand is diminishing, as shown in the figure below.
Ember finds about 85% of the incremental electricity demand from 1991-2000 was met by coal (black), falling to 76% in the decade to 2010 and only 47% in the decade to 2020.
The contribution of renewable energy (green), including wind, solar, hydro, bioenergy and other sources, steadily increased over the same time period.

In 2023, China’s demand for electricity grew 6.7% compared to the previous year – higher than the average annual demand growth of about 6% between 2013 and 2022.
Ember says that, although hydropower decreased by about 59 terawatt hours (TWh) in 2023, wind and solar met 46% of the increased demand, followed by bioenergy and nuclear.
“If hydro had remained at 2022 levels, non-fossil fuel generation would have met more than half of the demand increase in 2023, further pushing coal power out of the generation mix,” adds the report.
(Carbon Brief’s previous analysis shows the decline of hydropower was due to a series of droughts in 2022/23.)
Muyi Yang, author of the Ember report, tells Carbon Brief that the surge in low-carbon energy means an “absolute decline” in coal power is “very likely to soon begin”.
Yang also thinks “the recent announcement of the ‘coal power low-carbon retrofitting action plan’ signifies that China has started to prepare for the new era of coal generation”.
The action plan, released by China’s top planner National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), is allocated to a number of SOEs, including the “five bigs”.
However, the Shuang Tan newsletter says the action plan is designed “to test the selected technologies at a few carefully chosen [SOE] coal power units”. Moreover, since the action plan did not set a “performance target”, it is “unlikely to drive industry-wide transformation”, adds the newsletter.
‘Crossing the river by touching the stones’
Despite the progress to date in diversifying China’s electricity supply – and the business models of the country’s power sector SOEs – major challenges lie ahead, Ember says.
A number of central SOEs also have major interests in other parts of the coal ecosystem.
Central SOE China Shenhua, for example, spent 8bn yuan (about $1bn) on coal mining development and exploration, and only 824m yuan (about $113m) in hydropower in the first half of 2023, according to a report by CEF.
Nevertheless, Shenhua parent company CHN Energy’s overall portfolio still complies with SASAC’s general energy diversification goal, CEF says. This is largely due to another subsidiary – Longyuan Power – being one of the largest wind power companies in China.
The Ember report explains:
“This [coal-electricity] ecosystem is characterised by extensive cross-industry and cross-ownership linkages encompassing coal production and supply, logistics, the coal chemical industry, power generation and the manufacturing of related equipment and facilities. Consequently, an absolute decline in coal generation will inevitably impact other interconnected and interdependent segments of this system, with far-reaching ramifications, particularly within the broader socio-economic assemblages that have evolved around it.”
“Reduced coal generation presents substantial challenges”, says Yang, “economic restructuring, including switching to ‘green industry’, will require comprehensive support”.
The challenges are more significant in major coal-producing provinces, such as Shanxi. In 2022, coal and its related industry contributed 80% of tax revenues and provided 55% local jobs for the province, according to Chinese financial media outlet Caixin.
Ember says that this illustrates why diversification of power-sector SOEs is, on its own, insufficient. It explains:
“Diversification strategy by large generation SOEs is useful, as it weakens the incumbent utilities’ commitment to the existing coal-dominated power system, making deeper transition…possible. However, its effectiveness begins to wane when considering its inability to adequately address the tensions and conflicts that may arise from the absolute decline in coal power and the wider impacts associated with it.”
The report continues by suggesting that coal-dependent regions will also need to develop tailored diversification strategies to address the “unique challenges” they face. It says:
“By diversifying the economic base of these areas, a smoother transition can be facilitated, mitigating the adverse effects on local communities and workers who have long relied on the coal-electricity sectors.”
Yet challenges remain, Ember says, because clean-energy industries may not bring benefits to the same regions that have long relied on coal.
Yang says “the key issue here is not about the magnitude of the benefits [of renewable energy], but their distribution”. He adds:
“Many modelling studies have confirmed that the clean energy transition is beneficial and can create growth and jobs, more than sufficient to offset reduced economic activities from conventional fossil fuel supply chains.
“By leveraging their substantial resources and infrastructure, SOEs can lead the development and integration of renewable energy projects, enhance grid stability, and ensure a reliable energy supply.”
Finally, the report suggests that China takes the path of “gradualism and experimentation” to navigate the challenges inherent in the transition away from coal. It says:
“Often likened to ‘crossing the river by touching the stones’, these approaches are widely recognised as pivotal to China’s economic success. They allow for careful testing and adjustment of strategies and policies, facilitating the adaptation of broader policy directives into pragmatic, localised actions tailored to specific circumstances. Additionally, they help promote consensus-building among a diverse range of stakeholders by incorporating iterative improvements based on practical experience and feedback.”
The post ‘Critical turning point’ for coal poses risks for China’s state power firms, says report appeared first on Carbon Brief.
‘Critical turning point’ for coal poses risks for China’s state power firms, says report
Greenhouse Gases
The Senate makes some improvements, but our defense work continues
The Senate makes some improvements, but our defense work continues
By Flannery Winchester
On Monday, the Senate Finance Committee released its portion of the big budget bill that’s working its way through Congress.
After the House passed a version of this bill that drastically cuts America’s clean energy tax credits, we’ve been pushing hard on the Senate — and the Senate Finance Committee in particular — to do a better job protecting these important measures.
So, how did this Senate committee do? Indeed, a bit better than the House!
As Heatmap reported, “Senate Republicans widened the aperture slightly compared to the House version of the bill, extending tax credits for geothermal energy, batteries, and hydropower, and preserving ‘transferability’ — a crucial rule that allows companies to sell their tax credits for cash — for years to come.”
These shifts are worth acknowledging and appreciating. These shifts mean that our advocacy work to defend these tax credits is making a meaningful difference in what members of Congress are willing to support. Our engagement is leading to better outcomes for climate and clean energy than there would be if we weren’t engaging on this.
We’re grateful to all of our volunteers who sent emails, made calls, and published local media over the last few weeks as we pushed hard to show Senators the value of these tax credits.
‘Better’ still isn’t ‘best’
Now, that said — even with these improvements from the House version of the bill, the Senate’s bill “would still slash many of the signature programs of the Inflation Reduction Act,” Heatmap reports.
We still prefer the clean energy tax credits to be left intact. CCL doesn’t endorse this bill and won’t encourage members of Congress to vote for it.
But we’re proud of all the ways we’ve helped push for a better outcome than full repeal of these clean energy tax credits, which many Republican lawmakers campaigned on last fall.
And, crucially, our defense work is not over yet. The chair of the Senate Finance Committee, Sen. Mike Crapo (R-ID), recently told Politico that Republicans are “not done writing the bill” and there are “all kinds of issues that are still being evaluated.”
That means we have another window to continue to advocate for better protection of the clean energy tax credits as negotiations continue. That’s why today we launched a new action for CCLers to email their Republican Senators with a message tailored to this moment, using data that we know makes an impact on these lawmakers. If you’re represented by at least one Republican Senator, send them a message today.
After you’ve contacted your Republican Senators, the next best opportunity to make a difference on this issue is to plan to join us in D.C. for our Summer Conference and Lobby Day next month. Negotiations are ongoing, and we’ll be pushing for the best results possible for climate and clean energy every step of the way. Learn more and register now to secure your lobby spot and bring the discussion from your hometown right to Capitol Hill.
The post The Senate makes some improvements, but our defense work continues appeared first on Citizens' Climate Lobby.
The Senate makes some improvements, but our defense work continues
Greenhouse Gases
Guest post: How the world’s rivers are releasing billions of tonnes of ‘ancient’ carbon
The perception of how the land surface releases carbon dioxide (CO2) typically conjures up images of large-scale deforestation or farmers churning up the soil.
However, there is an intriguing – and underappreciated – role played by the world’s rivers.
Right now, plants and soils absorb about one-third of the CO2 released by human activity, similar to how much the oceans take up.
Over thousands to millions of years, some of this land-fixed carbon can end up being buried in sediments, where it eventually forms rocks.
The waters that feed rivers flow through plants, soils and rocks in landscapes, picking up and releasing carbon as they go.
This process is generally considered to be a sideways “leakage” of the carbon that is being taken up by recent plant growth.
However, the age of this carbon – how long it resided in plants and soils before it made it into rivers and then to the atmosphere – has remained a mystery.
If the carbon being released by rivers is young, then it can be considered a component of relatively quick carbon cycling.
However, if the carbon is old, then it is coming from landscape carbon stores that we thought were stable – and, therefore, represents a way these old carbon stores can be destabilised.
In our new study, published in Nature, we show that almost 60% of the carbon being released to the atmosphere by rivers is from these older sources.
In total, this means the world’s rivers emit more than 7bn tonnes of CO2 to the atmosphere each year – more than the annual fossil-fuel emissions from North America.
This means that there is a significant leak of carbon from old stores that we thought were safely locked away.
Previous work has shown that local land-use change, such as deforestation and climate-driven permafrost thaw, will directly release old carbon into rivers. Whether this is happening at the global scale remains a significant unknown for now.
Who are you calling old?
How do you tell how old carbon is? We employ the same technique that is used to determine the age of an archaeological relic or to verify the age of a vintage wine – that is, radiocarbon dating.
Radiocarbon is the radioactive isotope of carbon, which decays at a known rate. This enables us to determine the age of carbon-based materials dating back to a maximum age of about 60,000 years old.
We know that some of the carbon that rivers release is very young, a product of recent CO2 uptake by plants.
We also know that rivers can receive carbon from much older sources, such as the decomposition of deep soils by microbes and soil organisms or the weathering and erosion of ancient carbon in rocks.
Soil decomposition can release carbon ranging from a few years to tens of thousands of years. An example of very old soil carbon release is from thawing permafrost.
Rock weathering and erosion releases carbon that is millions of years old. This is sometimes referred to as “radiocarbon-dead” because it is so old all the radiocarbon has decayed.
Rivers are emitting old carbon
In our new study, we compile new and existing radiocarbon dates of the CO2 emissions from around 700 stretches of river around the world.
We find that almost 60% of the carbon being released to the atmosphere by rivers is from older sources (hundreds to thousands of years old, or older), such as old soil and ancient rock carbon.
In the figure below, we suggest how different processes taking place within a landscape can release carbon of different ages into rivers, driving its direct emission to the atmosphere.

So, while rivers are leaking some modern carbon from plants and soils as part of the landscape processes that remove CO2 from the atmosphere, rivers are also leaking carbon from much older landscape carbon stores.
One major implication of this finding is that modern plants and soils are leaking less carbon back to the atmosphere than previously thought, making them more important for mitigating human-caused climate change.
We find that the proportion of old carbon contributing to river emissions varies across different ecosystems and the underlying geology of the landscapes they drain.
In the figure below, we show that landscapes underlain by sedimentary rocks, which are the most likely to contain substantial ancient (or “petrogenic”) carbon, also had the oldest river emissions. We also show that the type of ecosystem (biome) was also important, although the patterns were less clear.

What is obvious is that at least some old carbon was common across most of the rivers we observed, regardless of size and location.
We provide evidence that there is a geological control on river emissions. And the variability in the ecosystem also indicates important controlling factors, such as soil characteristics, vegetation type and climate – especially rainfall patterns and temperature which are known to impact the rate of carbon release from soils and rock weathering.
Are old carbon stores stable?
Long-term carbon storage in soils and rocks is an important process regulating global climate.
For example, the UK’s peatlands are important for regulating climate because they can store carbon for thousands of years. That is why restoring peatlands is such a great climate solution.
Rivers emit more than 7bn tonnes of CO2 to the atmosphere each year – that’s equivalent to about 10-20% of the global emissions from fossil fuel burning annually.
If 60% of river carbon emissions are coming from old carbon stores, then this constitutes a significant leak of carbon from old stores we thought were safely locked away.
Another major implication of our study is that these old carbon stores can be mobilised and routed directly to the atmosphere by rivers, which would exacerbate climate change if these stores are further destabilised.
As can be seen in the figure below, we found that river carbon emissions appeared to be getting older since measurements first began in the 1990s (lower F14Catm means older radiocarbon ages).
We found that river carbon emissions appeared to be getting older since measurements first began in the 1990s.
While there are several caveats to interpreting this trend, it is a warning sign that human activities, especially climate change, could intensify the release of carbon to the atmosphere via rivers.
Given the strong link between soil carbon and river emissions, if this trend is a sign of human activity disturbing the global carbon cycle, it is likely due to landscape disturbance mobilising soil carbon.

Using rivers to monitor global soil carbon storage
Rivers collect waters from across the landscapes they flow through and therefore provide a tool to track processes happening out of sight.
A drop of water landing in a landscape travels through soils and rock before reaching the river, and its chemistry, including its radiocarbon age, reflects the processes occurring within the landscape.
Monitoring the age of carbon in rivers can therefore tell you a lot about whether their landscapes are storing or releasing carbon.
This has been shown to help identify carbon loss in degraded tropical peatlands, thawing Arctic permafrost and due to deforestation.
River radiocarbon is sensitive to environmental change and could therefore be a powerful monitoring tool for detecting the onset of climate tipping points or the success of landscape restoration projects, for example.
While we present data spread out across the world, there are quite a few gaps for important regions, notably where glacier change is happening and others where droughts and flood frequencies are changing.
These include areas with low amounts of data in Greenland, the African continent, the Arctic and Boreal zones, the Middle East, eastern Europe, western Russia, Central Asia, Australasia and South America outside of the Amazon.
All these regions have the potential to store carbon in the long-term and we do not yet know if these carbon stores are stable or not under present and future climate change.
River radiocarbon offers a powerful method to keep tabs on the health of global ecosystems both now and into the future.
The post Guest post: How the world’s rivers are releasing billions of tonnes of ‘ancient’ carbon appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Guest post: How the world’s rivers are releasing billions of tonnes of ‘ancient’ carbon
Greenhouse Gases
Guest post: Why 2024’s global temperatures were unprecedented, but not surprising
Human-caused greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in 2024 continued to drive global warming to record levels.
This is the stark picture that emerges in the third edition of the “Indicators of Global Climate Change” (IGCC) report, published in Earth System Science Data.
IGCC tracks changes in the climate system between Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) science reports.
In doing so, the IGCC fills the gap between the IPCC’s sixth assessment (AR6) in 2021 and the seventh assessment, expected in 2028.
Following IPCC methods, this year’s assessment brings together a team of over 60 international scientists, including former IPCC authors and curators of vital global datasets.
As in previous years, it is accompanied by a user-friendly data dashboard focusing on the main policy-relevant climate indicators, including GHG emissions, human-caused warming, the rate of temperature change and the remaining global carbon budget.
Below, we explain this year’s findings, highlighting the role that humans are playing in some of the fundamental changes the global climate has seen in recent years.
(For previous IGCC reports, see Carbon Brief’s detailed coverage in 2023 and 2024.)
An ‘unexceptional’ record high
Last year likely saw global average surface temperatures hit at least 1.5C above pre-industrial levels. This aligns with other major assessments of the Earth’s climate.
Our best estimate is a rise of 1.52C (with a range of 1.39-1.65C), of which human activity contributed around 1.36C. The rest is the result of natural variability in the climate system, which also plays a role in shaping global temperatures from one year to the next.
Our estimate of 1.52C differs slightly from the 1.55C given by the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) state of the global climate 2024 report, published earlier this year. This is because they make slightly different selections on which of the available global land and ocean temperature datasets to include. (The warming estimate has varied by similar amounts in past years and future work will aim to harmonise the approaches.)
The height of 2024’s temperatures, while unprecedented in at least the last 2,000 years, is not surprising. Given the high level of human-induced warming, we might currently expect to see annual temperatures above 1.5C on average one year in six.
However, with 2024 following an El Niño year, waters in the North Atlantic were warmer than average. These conditions raise this likelihood to an expectation that 1.5C is surpassed every other year.
From now on, we should regard 2024’s observed temperatures as unexceptional. Temperature records will continue to be broken as human-caused temperature rise also increases.
Longer-term temperature change
Despite observed global temperatures likely rising by more than 1.5C in 2024, this does not equate to a breach of the Paris Agreement’s temperature goal, which refers to long-term temperature change caused by human activity.
IGCC also looks at how temperatures are changing over the most recent decade, in line with IPCC assessments.
Over 2015-24, global average temperatures were 1.24C higher than pre-industrial levels. Of this, 1.22C was caused by human activity. So, essentially, all the global warming seen over the past decade was caused by humans.
Observed global average temperatures over 2015-24 were also 0.31C warmer than the previous decade (2005-14). This is unsurprising given the high rates of human-caused warming over the same period, reaching a best estimate of 0.27C per decade.
This rate of warming is large and unprecedented. Over land, where people live, temperatures are rising even faster than the global average, leading to record extreme temperatures.
But every fraction of a degree matters, increasing climate impacts and loss and damage that is already affecting billions of people.
Driven by emissions
Undoubtedly, these changes are being caused by GHG emissions remaining at an all-time high.
Over the last decade, human activities have released, on average, the equivalent of around 53bn tonnes of CO2 into the atmosphere each year. (The figure of 53bn tonnes expresses the total warming effect of CO2 and other greenhouse gases, such as methane and nitrous oxide, using CO2 as a reference point.)
Emissions have shown no sign of the peak by 2025 and rapid decline to net-zero required to limit global warming to 1.5C with no or limited “overshoot”.
Most of these emissions were from fossil fuels and industry. There are signs that energy use and emissions are rising due to air conditioning use during summer heatwaves. Last year also saw high levels of emissions from tropical deforestation due to forest fires, partly related to dry conditions caused by El Niño.
Notably, emissions from international aviation – the sector with the steepest drop in emissions during the Covid-19 pandemic – returned to pre-pandemic levels.
The amount of CO2 in the atmosphere, alongside the other major GHGs of methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O), is continuing to build up to record levels. Their concentrations have increased by 3.1, 3.4 and 1.7%, respectively, since the 2019 values reported in the last IPCC assessment.
At the same time, aerosol emissions, which have a cooling effect, are continuing to fall as a result of important efforts to tackle air pollution. This is currently adding to the rate of GHG warming.
Notably, cutting CH4 emissions, which are also short-lived in the atmosphere, could offset this rise. But, again, there is no real sign of a fall – despite major initiatives such as the Global Methane Pledge.
The effect of all human drivers of climate change on the Earth’s energy balance is measured as “radiative forcing”. Our estimate of this radiative forcing in 2024 is 2.97 Watts per square metre (W/m2), 9% above the value recorded in 2019 that was quoted in the last IPCC assessment.
This is shown in the figure below, which illustrates the percentage change in an array of climate indicators since the data update given in the last IPCC climate science report.

Continued emissions and rising temperatures are meanwhile rapidly eating into the remaining carbon budget, the total amount of CO2 that can be emitted if global warming is to be kept below 1.5C.
Our central estimate of the remaining carbon budget from the start of 2025 is 130bn tonnes of CO2.
This has fallen by almost three-quarters since the start of 2020. It would be exhausted in a little more than three years of global emissions, at current levels.
However, given the uncertainties involved in calculating the remaining carbon budget, the actual value could lie between 30 and 320bn tonnes, meaning that it could also be exhausted sooner – or later than expected.
Beyond global temperatures
Our assessment also shows how surplus heat is accumulating in the Earth’s system at an accelerating rate, becoming increasingly out of balance and driving changes around the world.
The data and their changes are displayed on a dedicated Climate Change Tracker platform, shown below.

The radiative forcing of 2.97 W/m2 adds heat to the climate system. As the world warms in response, much of this excess heat radiates to space, until a new balance is restored. The residual level of heating is termed the Earth’s “energy imbalance” and is an indication of how far out of balance the climate system is and the warming still to come.
This residual rate of heat entering the Earth system has now approximately doubled from levels seen in the 1970s and 1980s, to around 1W/m2 on average during the period 2012-24.
Although the ocean is storing an estimated 91% of this excess heat, mitigating some of the warming we would otherwise see at the Earth’s surface, it brings other impacts, including sea level rise and marine heatwaves.
Global average sea level rise, from both the melting of ice sheets and thermal expansion due to deep ocean warming, is included in the IGCC assessment for the first time.
We find that it has increased by around 26mm over the last six years (2019-24), more than double the long-term rate. This is the indicator that shows the clearest evidence of an acceleration.
Sea level rise is making storm surges more damaging and causing more coastal erosion, having the greatest impact on low-lying coastal areas. The 2019 IPCC special report on the oceans and cryosphere estimated that more than one billion people would be living in such low-lying coastal zones by 2050.
Multiple indicators
Overall, our indicators provide multiple lines of evidence all pointing in the same direction to provide a clear and consistent – but unsurprising and worsening – picture of the climate system.
It is also now inevitable that global temperatures will reach 1.5C of long-term warming in the next few years unless society takes drastic, transformative action – both in cutting GHG emissions and stopping deforestation.
Every year of delay brings reaching 1.5C – or even higher temperatures – closer.
This year, countries are unveiling new “nationally determined contributions” (NDCs), the national climate commitments aimed at collectively reducing GHG emissions and tackling climate change in line with the Paris Agreement.
While the plans put forward so far represent a step in the right direction, they still fall far short of what is needed to significantly reduce, let alone stop, the rate of warming.
At the same time, evidence-based decision-making relies on international expertise, collaboration and global datasets.
Our annual update relies on data from NASA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and input from many of their highly respected scientists. It is this type of collaboration that allows scientists to generate well-calibrated global datasets that can be used to produce trusted data on changes in the Earth system.
It would not be possible to maintain the consistent long-term datasets employed in our study if their work is interrupted.
At a time when the planet is changing at the fastest rate since records began, we are at risk of failing to track key indicators – such as greenhouse gas concentrations or deep ocean temperatures – and losing core expertise that is vital for understanding the data.
The post Guest post: Why 2024’s global temperatures were unprecedented, but not surprising appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Guest post: Why 2024’s global temperatures were unprecedented, but not surprising
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