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China Briefing handpicks and explains the most important climate and energy stories from China over the past fortnight. Subscribe for free here.
Key developments
China’s equipment ‘trade-in’ act could reduce emissions
EQUIPMENT UPGRADE: On 13 March, the State Council, China’s top administrative authority, released an action plan to “promote the large-scale renewal of equipment and the trading-in of consumer goods”, reported state news agency Xinhua. According to the official document, “the scale of equipment investment, in areas including industry, agriculture, construction, transportation, education, culture, tourism and medical care, is planned to increase by more than 25% by 2027 compared with last year”. The upgrade in “key industries” will also help “reduce emissions” and “increase efficiency”, the document said. Chinese financial outlet Yicai said that, under the plan, the government also aims to double the volume of scrapped cars being recycled and increase the recycling of household appliances by 30%.
DOMESTIC DEMAND: Bloomberg said that the equipment upgrade action plan was a “pillar” of the government’s plan for economic expansion: “The programme will get support from the central government budget alongside tax breaks and targeted lending from banks…The statements didn’t specify the amount of government funding for the programme, which was first mentioned by President Xi Jinping in February as a way of boosting demand for goods.” The outlet quoted one economist saying the plan would add 0.7 percentage points to GDP growth each year until 2027, with most of the boost coming from support for car purchases. It reported an economist that advises the Chinese government saying that “China needs to boost domestic demand and adjust its industrial policy to counter rising criticism from the US and Europe”.
New rules to boost renewables
GUARANTEED PURCHASE: China’s top economic planner the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) released measures to provide “fully-guaranteed purchase of renewable energy electricity” from 1 April, industry news outlet BJX News reported. The rules update an existing policy from 2007, according to an analysis published by Jiemian, to clarify the scope of the “fully guaranteed purchase” programme. The report added that the purchase mechanism was designed to allocate “purchase responsibilities” based on “market behaviour (need)”. An analysis republished on WeChat by BJX News said that the rules also clarify there might be legal “consequences” for both the renewable energy producer and grids that purchase the power, if they failed to meet their targets of production and purchase. For power purchasers, it is their “responsibility” to purchase a certain amount of renewable power under the purchase mechanism, added the outlet.
CURTAILMENT TOLERATED: Elsewhere, local media in China suggested that the country may soon “end its policy of limiting [renewable power] installations when power curtailments rise above 5% of installed capacity for a given source”, Bloomberg reported, adding that “solar manufacturers have seen their shares rebound in recent days as speculation mounts”. It noted that the local outlets did not provide a source for this information. However, Yu Qing, chief executive of an electricity company in Hangzhou, wrote in an analysis on social media platform WeChat that he was sceptical about the benefit for solar. He said that while easing curtailment rules would allow some previously restricted projects to connect to the grid, it was only a “planning method” and that market signals and other constraints would still cause problems for solar developers.
Carbon market expands to aluminium industry
NEW JOINER: China’s national emissions trading scheme (ETS) is about to expand beyond the power sector to cover aluminium production, Chinese economic media outlet Caixin reported, but the details have not yet been finalised. Electrolytic aluminium production emits “the most carbon in the non-ferrous metals sector in China” and was responsible for 4.5% of the national total carbon emissions in 2020, added Caixin. (For more, see Carbon Brief’s Q&A on the ETS, China country profile and China Briefing of 8 February.)
WHAT TO EXPECT: Yan Qin, lead analyst at London Stock Exchange Group, told Carbon Brief that the consultation draft of the official document hinted the ETS will cover “indirect emissions from aluminium production”, related to the electricity used in the process. She added that, “as previously announced, industry sectors will only conduct ‘simulation trading’ at the beginning” of their entry into the ETS. The recently closed “two sessions” political gathering (see below) sent a signal that the ETS will involve more industries in the future, said an analysis published by the Chinese government-backed China clean development mechanism fund. Chinese media outlet Lintan-energy posted on its WeChat account that the cement industry is likely to be the third sector to join the ETS, after power and aluminium, and could enter the market by the end of this year.
Booming EV industry faces export difficulties
‘INTENSIFYING’ MARKET: The number of newly registered companies selling electric vehicles (EVs) in 2023 was six times higher than in 2019, said Chinese outlet Science and Technology Daily, citing a report on trends in the country’s manufacturing industry. China’s technology giant Xiaomi will start EV sales this month, according to BBC News, which said the move “comes as a price war in China’s EV market has been intensifying”. Meanwhile, the Financial Times reported on a “zombie” combustion-engine car factory in China – referring to unused production lines due to lack of demand – and said analysts were predicting hundreds more over the next decade “as buyers opt for EVs”. The head of Chinese EV giant BYD said “new energy vehicles” – including EVs and plug-in hybrids – made up 48% of new cars sales in China last week, Australian outlet the Driven reported, which quoted him saying that, “if it continues at this rate, I estimate that the penetration could cross 50% in the next three months”.
ROAD BUMPS: Despite the phenomenon of combustion car “zombie” factories, Volkswagen said it still believed the market for petrol-powered cars remains “lucrative” in smaller Chinese cities, said the Financial Times. The report added that poorer cities’ “lack of charging infrastructure” has frustrated EV industry growth. In related news Caixin, citing data from consultancy firm McKinsey China, reported that there was significant “disillusionment” among Chinese EV owners in 2023, with 22% stating they would not consider an EV for their next car, a sharp rise from 3% in 2022. It said the number of EV owners in small cities and rural areas regretting their purchase was at a “striking” 54%, due to inconvenient charging infrastructure.
EXPORT CONUNDRUM: Following investigations in the EU and US over the growth of Chinese EV exports, the UK is expected to launch its own probe, reported the Daily Telegraph, adding that transport secretary Mark Harper warned of “robust” trade sanctions to prevent what the newspaper called a “flood” of cheap Chinese EVs. Responding to the moves, He Yadong, spokesperson of China’s Ministry of Commerce, expressed “concerns” and added that China’s exports will not “damage” the EU market, reported BJX. Italy has already approached Chinese EV firms and setting up manufacturing in Italy would be “a big win for China’s auto industry”, which sees Italy as a “strategically positioned bridgehead” to get into European, African and Middle Eastern markets, reported Quartz.
Spotlight
What does the economic signal from China’s ‘two sessions’ mean for global emissions, geopolitics and trade?
Every spring, China’s top leaders use the annual political event lianghui (两会), which is also known as “two sessions”, to send signals to the world about how they would like to lead the country in the coming year.
As the “two sessions” drew to a close, experts, academics and foreign investors moved on to interpreting those signals and drafting strategies in response to them. In the previous issue of China Briefing, Carbon Brief analysed the “two sessions” domestic impact.
But, as the world’s second-largest economy and largest emitter, China’s influence does not stop there. This week, Carbon Brief looks into the bigger picture and asks leading experts to interpret how geopolitics, international trade and global emissions could be impacted. Their responses have been edited for clarity and length.
Dr Li Fang, China country director at World Resources Institute:
The most impressive takeaways from this year’s “two sessions”, for me, are the emphasis on how to vitalise development through internal-driven forces, how to improve its market allocation, and how to establish a more low-carbon, ecological and equitable business environment.
The discussion surrounding high-standard international economic and trade rules integrating considerations for climate, ecology and human welfare signals that China is exploring how to achieve a better combination of “effective government” and “efficient market”.
It is speeding up efforts to incorporate new production elements like carbon into its considerations. I believe there’s a growing inclination among China’s decision-makers to propose proactive strategies aligning economic development with addressing sustainability challenges like climate change and biodiversity loss. I believe there are emerging opportunities for markets and businesses to play more significant roles in China’s future transition.
Nis Grünberg, lead analyst at MERICS:
The “two sessions” did not offer anything surprising or substantively new, but confirmed the approach of the past months, prioritising energy security and economic stability before an accelerated, potentially disruptive, exit of fossil fuel. No new ambitions on emission cuts or coal consumption were announced.
On the positive side, officials plan to continue the massive buildup of renewable energy capacity and systematic support of clean-tech industries. In the short run, this means no quick departure from fossil fuel and large emissions, but, in the long run, the added renewables and China’s rapidly growing clean-tech sector will displace fossil fuel and bring down emissions.
The strong focus on technology apparent throughout the government work report means continuing the substantial political and economic investment in clean tech, which has become a key sector for growth. This also means there is no end in sight to trade conflicts over Chinese exports of electric vehicles (EVs), solar and batteries, which were singled out as success stories. China is signalling that it is not building its clean-tech industry for domestic consumption only, but seeks to double down and expand its export capacities.
Yao Zhe, policy analyst at Greenpeace East Asia:
At a time when China’s economy is in dire need of confidence, clean-energy industries offered a rare success story. At this year’s “two sessions”, renewable energy and EVs received the highest recognition for their contributions to economic growth and industrial upgrading. Where the low-carbon economy was once a catchy concept seeking political buy-in, it has now established itself. That signal is clear: China will not waste this potential. The global race for net-zero economies will only accelerate.
But while Chinese policymakers are eager to embrace the future, the past has proven tricky to discard. Coal power continues to receive special treatment, slotted as a safety net for China’s energy consumption, fueling concerns that China will miss its key 2025 climate targets. China’s carbon emissions may soon reach a tipping point. But this year’s “two sessions” did not reveal how or on what near-term timetable policymakers will navigate this historic change.
Ali Wyne, senior research and advocacy advisor on US-China relationship, International Crisis Group:
Chinese leaders emphasised cultivating “new productive forces“. [“Productive forces” is a central idea in Marxist theory referring to the combination of human labour with technology and infrastructure, explained a recent article in the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post. It added that Chinese president Xi Jinping coined the phrase “new productive forces” last year and quoted him saying it means “advanced productivity freed from traditional economic growth models’, feature “high technology, high efficiency and high quality” and “align with the country’s new development philosophy”.]
With [leaders] emphasising the concept, the “two sessions” underscored China’s hope that investing in leading-edge industries including advanced manufacturing, artificial intelligence and renewable energy will sustain its growth more reliably than investing in traditional drivers, such as real estate.
Domestic demand is unlikely to keep pace with the new capacity that this push generates, however, so economic frictions between China and advanced industrial democracies, especially in the West, are poised to intensify further.
Watch, read, listen
WOMEN AND CLIMATE CHANGE: Chinese climate and investment consultancy firm 2060 Advisory produced a podcast on International Women’s Day about female entrepreneurship in the climate industry.
CLIMATE COOPERATION: The Legal Planet, a climate policy and environmental law blog, released a video recording of Joanna Lewis, writer of the book “Cooperating for the Climate”, giving a lecture on how to cooperate with China at UCLA’s Emmett Institute.
‘TWO SESSIONS’ AND JAPAN: UK thinkthank Chatham House recorded a podcast discussing China’s National People’s Congress – the legislative body that hosted the recent “two sessions” – and China’s relationship with its close neighbour Japan.
STEEL EMISSIONS: Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post published an article based on data from US thinktank Global Energy Monitor (GEM), which found China’s steel sector could cut carbon emissions by more than 10% in 2025 with a “faster shift to clean production”.
New science
Health cost impacts of extreme temperature on older adults based on city-level data from 28 provinces in China
Environmental Research Letters
New research into the impact of extreme temperatures on medical costs for “older adults” found that in western Chinese provinces, costs will more than triple by 2030, compared to a 2016-20 baseline. The authors found that under the very high emissions RCP8.5 scenario, older adults could cost 2.7tn Chinese yuan by 2050. However, costs can be reduced by 4.6% and 7.4% by limiting emissions in line with the medium-emissions RCP4.5 and low-emissions RCP2.6 scenarios, respectively.
Assessing the supply risks of critical metals in China’s low-carbon energy transition
Global Environmental Change
China has “grown increasingly susceptible to disruptions” in critical metal supplies as it transitions to low-carbon technologies, according to a new study. The nation is the largest consumer and importer of these metals, leaving it vulnerable to geopolitical shifts and volatile prices, the researchers say. They model supply risks for 30 metals and conclude that the risk facing China for nine metals – including copper and chromium – “exceeds that of other countries that consume large amounts of critical metals”.
China Briefing is researched and written by Wanyuan Song, Anika Patel and other contributors. Please send tips and feedback to china@carbonbrief.org
The post China Briefing 21 March: New ‘trade-in’ policy; China ETS expands; ‘Two sessions’ geopolitical impact appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Climate Change
“Next year is too late for regulations”: Beetaloo Energy’s 2GW gas-powered AI data centre a “disaster proposal” destined to cause climate chaos
SYDNEY, Wednesday 22 July 2026 — Beetaloo Energy has secured land from the NT Government for a massive $40 billion “hyperscale” AI data centre near Darwin, which would be powered by 2 gigawatts (GW) of gas power fracked directly from the Beetaloo basin, prompting calls from Greenpeace for urgent federal legislation.
The proposal marks a dangerous escalation in the AI data centre industry’s expansion, which threatens to entrench fossil fuel infrastructure for decades and put immense pressure on the region’s fragile water resources — while continuing to be unregulated.
Joe Rafalowicz, Head of Climate and Energy at Greenpeace Australia Pacific, said: “This disaster proposal for a 2GW gas-powered AI data centre in the NT is a shocking example of the unchecked expansion of hyperscale data centres in Australia. It is also, critically, more evidence for the urgent need for a moratorium on all new data centres until strong, binding regulations are put in place to protect our communities and climate.
“This proposal mirrors the frenzied, unchecked expansion currently wreaking havoc on communities in the US. We are seeing cowboy data centre operators treat Australia like a playground, steam-rolling ahead with projects that would lock down precious water resources and spike emissions, despite the overwhelming community opposition.
“Every day, more councils, communities and environmental groups are joining Greenpeace’s call for a moratorium on data centres, yet as of today there is still no system of safeguards or rules in place to regulate these companies.
“While Beetaloo Energy and the NT Government prepare to bulldoze ahead with this climate and water disaster, the Prime Minister is asleep at the wheel, promising to legislate a vague set of standards next year.
“Next year is too late, and anything less than mandating data centres cover their own energy demand, and then some, with new renewable energy is not enough.”
-ENDS-
Media contact
Lucy Keller on 0491 135 308 or lucy.keller@greenpeace.org
Climate Change
Allegations of harms at China-backed transition minerals projects rise
Reports of human rights and environmental abuses linked to Chinese companies’ overseas investments in the mining and refining of minerals needed for the clean energy transition are on the rise, research by a monitoring group has found.
The number of recorded allegations of harm at projects tied to Chinese firms have increased every year since 2021, rising to 148 in 2025, according to the Business and Human Rights Centre (BHRC). On Wednesday it released new data showing that a total of 434 allegations of abuse were made against Chinese-backed projects over the five-year period in projects across the world.
The world’s top cleantech manufacturer, China is also the leading financier of critical minerals projects worldwide. The country has committed more than $120 billion in foreign direct investment into mineral mining and processing since 2023, Australian think-tank Climate Energy Finance recently found.
“China plays a central role in global transition mineral supply chains, and as such has a unique opportunity to raise the bar on human rights and community engagement at every stage of mining,” said Michael Clements, BHRC’s executive director.
“While there have been encouraging developments, from stronger regulations to more company engagement, there remains a gap between human rights commitment and action,” he said.
The report comes as communities affected by Chinese-backed mineral projects have filed the first two cases to a Beijing-based mediation mechanism intended to bring willing Chinese companies to the discussion table with affected communities.
Allegations of harms on the rise
BHRC’s latest analysis – including data for the period 2023-2025 – covered mining, smelting and refining projects for 11 minerals considered key to manufacturing clean energy technologies such as batteries, EVs and solar panels needed to move away from climate-heating fossil fuels.
The highest number of abuses was recorded in Indonesia, the world’s largest producer of nickel, which is used to make EV batteries. After the Indonesian government banned exports of raw nickel, Chinese firms invested billions of dollars to develop a large-scale nickel smelting and processing industry in the Southeast Asian country, largely powered by coal.
Other countries with a high number of recorded harms include the Democratic Republic of Congo, where Chinese firms dominate cobalt and copper production; Myanmar, where unregulated rare earths mining has caused widespread environmental destruction; Serbia, where Chinese-backed mining of some of Europe’s most significant copper and gold deposits is swallowing land and homes, and Zimbabwe, where Chinese investments have turned the nation into Africa’s top lithium producer.
Growing risks for people and nature
Allegations tracked by BHRC included negative impacts on local livelihoods, health and land rights, workers’ health and safety and work-related deaths, as well as water pollution and environmental contamination. In addition, 18 people were attacked for raising concerns about Chinese transition mineral projects between 2023 and 2025.
The report shows that 10 Chinese companies, including Zijin Mining, Tsingshan Group and Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt, accounted for nearly two-thirds of all allegations recorded in the last five years. It found that some Chinese companies “still appear to turn a blind eye to these issues” but noted that several others have been more responsive to allegations of abuse. However, even among companies with human rights policies, implementation remains a challenge, BHRC warned.
Zijin Mining and Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt repeatedly responded to the allegations of harm by saying they take environmental and social risks seriously and adhere to international standards. Tsingshan Group never responded to BHRC’s requests for comment.
Platform for dialogue between communities and Chinese firms
At the same time, Chinese authorities have made “significant progress” on introducing a more specific framework for managing environmental and social risks in overseas investment, BHRC said.
This includes global consultation on a draft Sustainable Mining Code, adherence to UN guiding principles on business and human rights, and greater emphasis on oversight of companies operating overseas.
The China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals & Chemicals Importers & Exporters (CCCMC) set up a mediation and consultation mechanism intended to provide a platform for dialogue between affected communities or civil society groups that have raised concerns and Chinese companies.
More than three years since its launch, the mechanism has now received its first two complaints from local communities and many more are considering filing a case, Margaux Day, executive director at the nonprofit Accountability Counsel, told an event hosted by Climate Home News last month.
“This is incredibly exciting in that it fills a governance and accountability gap where often communities who are seeking to protect their rights and the environment can’t reach someone who will respond to them,” she told the panel discussion at London Climate Action Week.
Climate Home News understands that the complaints were filed by communities in Latin America and Southeast Asia over labour rights and resettlement issues. No information about the cases has yet been made public. The mechanism’s secretariat did not respond to Climate Home News’ questions.
The mechanism was set up after the Chinese regulator for banks and insurers called on investor-level institutions to establish complaints bodies to hear from communities outside of China. But whether the new initiative will prove effective in tackling grievances remains an open question.
“Real potential” for better mining practices
Participation in the mechanism is voluntary for Chinese firms and it doesn’t have a fact-finding function, nor can it impose provisions for compensation or compliance with human rights standards.
But Day told Climate Home News that, if successful, it could bring companies to negotiate an outcome that is better for people and the planet and leads to more sustainable mining practice.
Chen Yu, an independent China advisor for campaign group Global Witness, agreed that the mechanism holds “real potential”.
“There exists nothing else at a similar level to promote dialogue between communities and Chinese mining companies in particular,” she said.
For companies, the mechanism opens “a channel for problem-solving and dialogue with communities”, she added, as “Chinese companies often remain cautious of approaching affected communities directly, afraid of making the problem bigger”.
However, Chen said the mechanism remains at an early stage of development, faces resourcing challenges and is not yet sufficiently understood by communities in mining areas or Chinese firms.
To help it address some of these challenges, the secretariat is currently seeking technical support from a range of organisations, including civil society groups. But, Chen said, “it will take time for the mechanism to show its value”.
The post Allegations of harms at China-backed transition minerals projects rise appeared first on Climate Home News.
Allegations of harms at China-backed transition minerals projects rise
Climate Change
Energy transition policymaking must evolve to fit an age of rupture
Andreas Sieber is head of political strategy at 350.0g. Cat Abreu is director of the International Climate Politics Hub.
From the US abduction of Venezuela’s president at the start of this year to the Iran war which rumbles on, disruption is the new normal for global geopolitics, more often than not linked to conflict over supplies of oil and gas.
Events so far in 2026 – driven largely by the desire of the Trump administration to grab control of fossil fuels around the world – show that the climate community’s approach to energy diplomacy will have to evolve if we are to operate effectively and push for climate action in such a volatile landscape.
Today’s climate and energy governance must be able to cope with trade wars, genocide, fascism, spiralling inequality and challenges to multilateralism. The increasingly dominant paradigms of economic competitiveness, energy security and green industrialisation can help drive the transition but they also challenge our collective mission to deliver an equitable green shift.
US-China rivalry dominates
Longer-term geopolitical trends that are seeing power move from West to East and North to South have fuelled a US–China “superpower rivalry”, which is pulling the global economy apart and reining in trade.
A key question will be how the fracture “lines” are drawn: by the US and China, or also by other countries or blocs? Many governments will try to remain “in the middle” between the two giants to capture economic gains from both sides. Yet despite the language of “strategic autonomy”, Washington and Beijing may be in a position to force choices via market access, export controls and sanctions.
At first glance, this may not seem particularly relevant for climate and energy politics. But Huawei’s exclusion from 5G operations across the political West and India following the so-called Clean Network Campaign by the US government serves as a warning of what could happen to climate green tech.
And the recent debate to cut out Chinese inverters from European markets follows the same pattern – US security forces perceive a risk and start encouraging their allies to drop Chinese technology.
The new drivers: competition and security
Despite this fracturing geopolitical and economic context, energy transition is still happening. To ensure it is effective and equitable, we need to understand what is driving it and how to adapt climate politics so that it better responds to these drivers.
Put simply, China is supplying the world with low-cost renewables (roughly 60% of critical wind and 80% of solar components), batteries, EVs and other key elements. Other countries now also want their piece of the green tech pie and are forming industrial policies to get it.
It is this new competitiveness-driven logic that will shape the quest for decarbonisation, which has shifted from cooperating around the cost of tackling climate change to rivalry for the benefits of climate action.
Over 90% of new renewables projects are now cheaper than fossil alternatives. Gas-fired power is 3–4 times more expensive than solar and wind. In 2015, most decarbonisation policies were “traditional” emissions-cutting strategies like carbon pricing or net zero dates, whereas green industrial policies now underpin the majority.
Iran war could boost fossil fuel phase-out push, says Colombian minister
Meanwhile, security has become a central driver of energy politics. We are living through the second major fossil fuel crisis in just four years. Elevated oil and gas prices will impose up to $1 trillion in additional costs on the global economy by the end of the year if disruption continues in the Strait of Hormuz. Fossil fuel supply chains have exposed countries to conflict, coercion and brutal price shocks.
Fossil fuel volatility destabilises whole economies – higher fuel costs drive up food prices, increase political instability, and push millions into poverty and hunger. This incentivises governments to shield themselves from global shocks, especially in countries that are net fossil fuel importers and home to roughly three-quarters of the world’s population.
Yet security fears can cut both ways. The same instability that makes fossil fuel dependence untenable is also sharpening concern over China’s dominance of critical clean technologies and supply chains.
Equity, cooperation and the opportunity for change
Developing countries benefit from the rapid uptake of renewables enabled by low-cost Chinese technologies. But significant fiscal space and public investment is needed for the electricity grids and infrastructure required to fully unleash the energy transition, as well as for green industrialisation to diversify revenue streams.
Despite this, industrial-scale domestic production and ownership often remain out of reach for too many countries that lack the fiscal space to allow green supply chains to flourish and compete with their traditional industrial base. But more just and diversified green tech supply chains could be achieved with concomitant support.
Can giant batteries unlock Africa’s green industrial future?
For the first time in decades, the international order is being substantially reshaped. If within this context, decarbonisation is increasingly driven by green industrial policy, energy security and competitiveness, the climate policy community must better anticipate where these debates are moving. We must speak the same language, and enter the forums where decisions are made, including security, trade and bilateral or trilateral spaces.
We should build on an enlightened self interest recognising that cooperation remains essential and beneficial. This includes using the UN climate process differently: less as an ever-expanding negotiation machine, and more as a space for norm-setting, political alignment and deal-making. In an age of fragmentation, effective cooperation must not only be framed as necessary but thought of as a strategically compelling source of resilience and shared advantage.
The post Energy transition policymaking must evolve to fit an age of rupture appeared first on Climate Home News.
Energy transition policymaking must evolve to fit an age of rupture
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