Two weeks of tense UN climate talks in Bonn, Germany, have produced few tangible outcomes as diplomats faced “gridlock”.
Negotiators failed to find agreement in numerous areas, such as scaling up global emissions cuts and funding for climate adaptation.
In the closing plenary, many diplomats lamented weakened trust in the UN climate process, as it struggled to find its footing in a new geopolitical landscape.
As ever, climate finance was one of the greatest sources of tension between developed and developing countries, influencing the debate around adaptation and trade in the Bonn talks.
Many countries criticised “coordinated attacks” on science by those with “fossil-fuel interests”.
Some delegates saw progress on a “just transition mechanism” to support communities through decarbonisation as a positive outcome, with a package of texts agreed for the COP31 climate summit in Antalya, Turkey.
Reporting from the talks in Bonn, Carbon Brief covers the key outcomes and disputes at the 64th biannual sessions of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) subsidiary bodies (SB64).
- Adaptation
- Just transition
- Climate finance
- Global stocktake
- Mitigation work programme
- Action agenda and new initiatives
- Climate science
- Fossil fuels
- Trade dialogues
- COP reform
- Ocean dialogue
- Road to COP31
Adaptation
Climate adaptation proved one of the most contentious areas of negotiation in Bonn. In particular, parties were unable to agree on text relating to the “global goal on adaptation” (GGA).
Across the two weeks, progress was “stuck, stalled or deferred”, even in the rooms of technical adaptation items, Jeffrey Qi, policy advisor with International Institute for Sustainable Development’s (IISD) resilience program, told Carbon Brief.
In many of the rooms, this was due to a “fault line” over finance, Ana Mulio Alvarez, policy advisor at thinktank E3G told Carbon Brief, as developing countries sought support to help protect themselves from escalating climate hazards.
Last year at COP30, parties had agreed on a new adaptation finance target within the “global mutirão”.
The text “calls for efforts to at least triple adaptation finance” for developing countries by 2035. This is largely expected to come from developed countries, which are obliged to provide climate finance under the Paris Agreement.
While this tripling target agreed in Brazil was broadly welcomed by developing countries, it lacked key details. For example, it did not specify the baseline for tripling, the parties which have to contribute or the types of finance that will be counted under the goal.
(Earlier drafts of the text in Belém had included reference to 2025 as the baseline, the deadline for a $40bn adaptation finance goal set at COP26. This led some parties and civil society organisations to state that the 2035 level ought to be $120bn.)
In Bonn, various parties said that the tripling target should also be included within the text on the GGA. This included the African group, small-island states (AOSIS), least developed countries (LDCs), some Latin American countries (AILAC), as well as the G77 and China.
They said that they would need finance to implement the GGA, especially as adaptation projects often rely on public, grant-based funding rather than private investment.
Canada, Norway and Japan were among those opposing a reference to the tripling target.
A first draft text on the GGA did not include a reference to the finance goal. Many parties again expressed their concern over this omission.
A second draft only included a reference to the tripling of adaptation finance within a bracketed opening paragraph. (Passages of text that are not yet agreed are shown in square brackets.)
A reference to tripling finance remained in the final draft, shown below. The entire text is surrounded by square brackets and is subject to negotiation and agreement at COP31.
Speaking to Carbon Brief, Teresa Anderson, global lead on climate justice for ActionAid International, said:
“It’s been a huge fight to even get a soft acknowledgement of the Belém promise to triple adaptation finance, let alone a proper plan to meet that promise. It seems rich countries want to be able to quietly forget they ever said anything at all.”
Beyond the question of finance, a number of other GGA elements were discussed in Bonn. This included work on the “indicators”, a set of 59 ways to measure progress towards the GGA, which were agreed by parties at COP30.
The adoption of these indicators in Belém had proven difficult, despite experts having worked on them for two years. They were pushed through at the close of COP30 to mixed reactions.
Parties entered negotiations in Bonn amid the uncertainty this created. Alongside the indicators, the final text last year contained plans for a two-year “Belém-Addis vision” to further refine the indicator process.
As part of this, at SB64 parties worked towards creating a taskforce that would establish underlying data and methodologies for the indicators. However, the make-up of this taskforce became fraught, as parties disagreed on whether it should be technical or political.
Speaking to Carbon Brief, Bethan Laughlin, senior policy specialist at the Zoological Society of London, said the negotiators were in “a very Groundhog Day’ situation”, where they were once again looking to experts to refine the indicator package, while struggling with the idea of ceding control of the process.
During negotiations in the second week, Brazil and the EU called for the taskforce to be expert-driven, while Grupo Sur, the like-minded developing countries (LMDCs) and the Arab group supported a party-driven taskforce.
As the talks moved into the final days of negotiations in Bonn, this remained a sticking point.
A final element of the GGA is the Baku adaptation roadmap (BAR), which was launched at COP29 in Azerbaijan. It is designed to help bring coherence across the multiple different adaptation efforts and advance progress towards the GGA.
At workshops during the first week in Bonn, parties focused on how the current adaptation framework supports the GGA and climate finance for adaptation.
In negotiations, the G77 and China called for the BAR to ensure access to finance in accordance with Article 9.1. This is the part of the Paris Agreement that refers to developed countries “providing” climate finance. (See: Climate finance.)
Canada, Japan, the UK and the EU all disagreed with this inclusion, arguing that finance should be addressed under other agenda items.
Ultimately, no agreement could be reached on the GGA. The issue was therefore subject to “rule 16” and passed to COP31 without any agreed text.
In the closing plenary, parties expressed their disappointment with the situation, with AOSIS noting the outcome was “completely unacceptable”.
In a statement, E3G’s Mulio Alvarez said that amid worsening climate impacts, the “rule 16 is more than a procedural outcome: it is a warning sign”.
Beyond the GGA, the adaptation space also includes numerous other negotiations.
Those around the adaptation fund drew particular focus this year, as it is in the process of transitioning to exclusively serve the Paris Agreement. This will allow it to access 5% of the revenues generated by the agreement’s new carbon market under Article 6.4.
A key challenge was the makeup of the fund’s board, which currently includes members from “Annex I” and “non-Annex I” countries. This refers to the division of countries based on their development status in 1992, when the UNFCCC was established.
The Paris Agreement refers instead simply to “developed” and “developing” countries. The concern, observers told Carbon Brief, is that this could open the door for wealthier developing countries to be defined as “developed” – something that some parties oppose.
Speaking to Carbon Brief, Qi said that the issue would require a head of delegation or higher to push through an agreement. He added:
“This is such a politically charged issue that concerns the fundamental question of the relationship between the convention and the Paris Agreement.”
Parties failed to come to an agreement on this point, instead deciding to continue discussions at COP31.
Just transition
The agreement to create a “just transition mechanism” was one of the most substantial outcomes of COP30. In Bonn, it took a further step forward.
Dubbed the “Belém-Antalya mechanism for global just transitions” (BAM) by civil society, it is intended to provide a centralised hub to support “just transitions” for workers and communities around the world.
Speaking during a press conference in the second week of SB64, COP30 president André Corrêa do Lago pointed to the mechanism as a key “legacy” of the conference.
However, as work got underway on the just transition work programme (JTWP), where the BAM sits, the focus of negotiations was instead on the “terms of reference” for an upcoming review.
Speaking to Carbon Brief, Anabella Rosemberg, senior advisor on just transition at NGO umbrella group Climate Action Network (CAN) International, said that while negotiations got off to a good start, negotiators got “distracted very fast”. She added:
“Basically, over the 10 days of negotiations, a week was just [spent] on an extremely procedural and technical discussion, instead of a conversation on the mechanism.”
Over the first week, parties diverged on the review’s mandate, objective and scope. This latter point includes how the JTWP relates to processes under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Paris Agreement and UN entities.
Observers told Carbon Brief that they did not think the delay in the discussion of the mechanism had been orchestrated by parties to hamper progress, although they did suggest the BAM was not a priority for certain groups.
Going into the second week, with so much time focused on the terms of reference, Chadli Sadorra, senior program staff at the Asian Peoples’ Movement on Debt and Development, told Carbon Brief that whether or not there was enough time to come up with meaningful outcomes on the mechanism was a concern.
However, on 16 June, the co-chairs introduced a draft text with a “non-exhaustive” list on how to take the mechanism forward.
This was divided into sections on context, purpose, functions integration, coordination and coherence, barriers and opportunities, international cooperation, modalities and governance, timelines and links to the JTWP.
Parties, including Latin American countries under AILAC, Brazil, Norway, AOSIS, the African group and others, welcomed the note as the basis of further negotiations. The Arab group pushed back, saying the text did not reflect its priorities.
There were further discussions on key elements, such as AILAC suggesting a review of the timelines. Brazil and others said that the way the BAM operates and is governed should be considered separately, while the African group urged a strengthened focus on international cooperation.
Ultimately, talks were able to move forward substantially.
Civil society representatives also broadly welcomed the draft text. Rosemberg told Carbon Brief that “there’s a whole chunk that is really good”, adding:
“It points to functions that make sense; it’s not rehashing stuff that we have seen forever in the UNFCCC. It’s new, it’s fresh, it’s crisp, it has potential.”
On the penultimate day of the SB64 negotiations, the co-facilitators asked parties to agree on a package of outcomes, including a summary of the fifth JTWP “dialogue”, a placeholder for its next meeting and the terms of reference for the review of the process. It also included a list of items that would need to be agreed as part of developing the BAM.
Several parties said they could agree to the package in the spirit of compromise. This included an invitation to the chairs of the process to continue working on the matter before COP31, in order to try to find agreement on the BAM.
Speaking to Carbon Brief, Dr Leon Sealey-Huggins, a senior campaigner at the charity War on Want, said that lots of important elements remained in the text, albeit in “skeleton form”, including links to financial architecture.
But key questions remain around the details of the BAM, including on the role of non-party stakeholder participants, Huggins added. As such, civil society groups see further meetings on the mechanism, ahead of COP31, as key to allowing it to be adopted in November.
Ultimately, this package of texts was agreed without intervention in the closing plenary of SB64 on 18 June.
Speaking during a press conference that day, attended by Carbon Brief, Rosemberg concluded:
“Watch out, the BAM is coming”.
Climate finance
Delegates spent much of the first week in Bonn debating climate finance outside of formal negotiations, in a series of “workshops” and “dialogues”. Much of their focus was on how to fulfil financial commitments made during previous climate negotiations.
Finance is a core issue at UN climate talks and one that has frequently led to “agenda fights” and delays in recent years.
The major divide is between developing countries that receive climate finance and developed countries that are obliged, under the Paris Agreement, to provide or “mobilise” it.
There was no agenda fight as SB64 kicked off in Bonn. However, finance remained a source of friction across many workstreams, against a difficult global backdrop.
Recent official figures show that climate finance from developed countries reached a record $136.7bn in 2024. Developed countries, therefore, argue that they are raising climate finance in line with their obligations, despite other fiscal strains.
Since 2024, however, aid cuts by major donors – particularly the US – mean public climate spending by developed countries is likely to have fallen substantially. There have also been drops in support for UN climate funds, such as the Green Climate Fund.
Moreover, hardly any developed countries have pledged new finance for 2026 and beyond.
This is in spite of parties agreeing in 2024 on a “new collective quantified goal” (NCQG) of $300bn a year for developing countries by 2035 – largely from developed countries.
Given this, developing countries argue that developed countries are, in fact, shirking their responsibility to scale up their public-finance provision. They say this is vital, especially considering the $300bn goal is already far below the scale needed to tackle climate change.
Isatou Camara, lead climate finance coordinator for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), told Carbon Brief that their adaptation needs depended on securing such funding:
“[Public finance is] oxygen for us, because when we talk about what we need as vulnerable countries, it’s basically enhancing resilience and adaptation.”
At COP30, parties agreed to launch a new two-year “work programme” for countries to discuss these concerns, among others.
This came after a concerted effort, led by the LMDCs and the Arab group, to start a work programme focused exclusively on Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement. This is the part that says developed countries “shall provide” finance – generally taken to mean public spending.
However, developed countries note that the NCQG goal covers a “wide variety of sources”, including the private sector and wealthier developing countries, such as China.
In the end, parties at COP30 compromised on a programme to address Article 9.1 “in the context of Article 9…as a whole” – meaning it could cover all types of finance.
Nevertheless, in submissions ahead of SB64, many developing countries were clear that they wanted the programme to be a “dedicated space” to discuss Article 9.1.
The LMDCs and Arab group even erroneously referred to it simply as the “work programme on Article 9.1” and made it clear that they “do not see [it] as a way of consolidating other agenda items on finance”.
(Some developing-country groups, such as AOSIS, place a lot of emphasis on other aspects of finance, such as quality and accessibility, as well as the need for provision by developed countries.)
In contrast, developed countries, such as the EU, Norway and Canada, said they wanted a broad approach that focuses on “streamlining” the existing climate-finance agenda and “mobilising” finance from various sources.
There were three “engagement workshops” to discuss this new climate-finance work programme at SB64.
Parties remained entrenched in long-held positions, with developed countries happy to keep the focus on climate finance of all kinds, as opposed to public funding.
The G77 and China rejected the “work plan” prepared by the co-chairs and said its focus should be squarely on Article 9.1. Some developing countries argued for “burden sharing agreements” and an “action plan” to compel developed countries to provide more finance.
In order to elevate these issues into formal negotiations, developing countries and civil-society organisations stressed throughout SB64 that the Article 9 work programme should be placed on the agenda at COP31. (A draft version of the agenda for November’s summit did not include it.)
This argument was given more weight when COP30 president Corrêa do Lago used his “authority” to request such an item, in a letter published towards the end of SB64 week one.
When asked why he made this unconventional intervention, Corrêa do Lago told Carbon Brief that it reflected his understanding of what was agreed last year:
“If I believe that we agreed in Belém that this would happen, I think it is normal that, as president of the COP, I request that to the secretariat.”
Nevertheless, his action is not binding and will not, in itself, avert conflict over whether to include the issue on the COP31 agenda. Despite this, the move was celebrated by civil society, with Sehr Raheja, a climate change programme office at the Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) telling Carbon Brief:
“Developed countries have been resistant to it from the beginning…Drama is going to be there [at COP31], whether we like it or not.”
The SB64 talks also saw the first two-day meeting of the “Veredas dialogue”, another new finance-related process agreed at COP30.
This is a space for parties to discuss Article 2.1c of the Paris Agreement, which concerns making all global financial flows “consistent” with climate goals. Some developing countries, such as the Arab group, have resisted this aspect of negotiations, preferring to keep the focus exclusively on finance from developed countries.
The Veredas dialogue is essentially a continuation of the “Sharm el-Sheikh dialogue” – which ended last year – except with greater focus on real-world implementation.
These discussions saw presentations on various topics, including how Rwanda is aligning its public finance with climate resilience and Norway’s experience with carbon pricing. As part of the dialogue, high-level “Xingu finance talks” will take place later this year.
Finally, the COP30 presidency hosted sessions to discuss the implementation of the “Baku to Belém roadmap”.
As well as the $300bn goal, the NCQG contains a more aspirational target of reaching $1.3tn in annual climate finance by 2035, which parties at COP30 agreed to “urgently advance”. The roadmap is a presidency-led attempt to add substance to the $1.3tn pledge.
In Bonn, parties and experts discussed activities to “focus collective energies” and “gain quick wins”, as well as how to follow up on the roadmap in “mandated workstreams and through the action agenda”.
A summary of the discussion will be produced and used to inform the continued follow-up on the roadmap, over the coming year.
Global stocktake
Years of discussions culminated in the first “global stocktake” (GST) of the Paris Agreement in 2023, which assessed progress towards climate goals and what more needed to be done.
Since then, countries have been engaging in a process known as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) dialogue, which focuses on implementing the GST outcomes.
There were two sessions at SB64 for parties to share experiences and information about how to implement the GST – and barriers they faced – as agreed at COP30.
Interventions from parties such as the EU, Switzerland and Colombia focused on the GST’s “energy package”, contained in paragraph 28 of the text, including “transitioning away from fossil fuels” and “phasing out inefficient fossil-fuel subsidies”.
AOSIS highlighted the recent conference on transitioning away from fossil fuels in Santa Marta, Colombia, as a good example of cooperation to deliver on these outcomes.
Many developing-country parties stressed that they needed more climate finance and other forms of support to carry out GST outcomes. The Philippines, speaking on behalf of the G77 and China, highlighted:
“The persistent gap between the scale of action required to implement GST outcomes…and the scale, quality, accessibility and predictability of support provided.”
Among the groups preferring to keep the focus on finance were those representing major fossil-fuel producers. Saudi Arabia, speaking for the LMDCs, described the dialogue as a “non-prescriptive space with a focus on finance”.
The co-facilitators are now expected to prepare a report that summarises the discussions, without providing guidance.
As the talks came to a close and an overview was presented to attendees by the diplomats leading the discussions, Colombia noted that “transitioning away from fossil fuels” was missing:
“This topic featured prominently in several interventions and was identified by many parties as a key element of the GST outcomes that requires [finance].”
Following this, Saudi Arabia said “cherry-picking” of paragraphs from the GST should be avoided, given it was a “carefully negotiated” package:
“While some parties may choose specific pathways, roadmaps, initiatives, approaches, others are contributing through other alternative approaches – all of which are valid and contribute to the goal of the Paris Agreement.”
(The stocktake calls on all parties to contribute to the entire energy package, including the fossil-fuel transition. Yet Saudi Arabia has consistently argued the package is a menu of options, from which parties can pick and choose.)
Across various rooms in Bonn, talk also turned to the next GST, a two-year process that will begin at COP31 later this year and end in 2028.
The most contentious issue regarding the second GST was whether or not the next Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report will feed directly into it. See: Climate science.
Mitigation work programme
Bonn closed with the mitigation work programme (MWP) – the only formal agenda item specifically about cutting greenhouse gas emissions – failing to reach an agreement. As a result, it was subject to “rule 16”, meaning it was simply pushed to COP31.
The main challenge within negotiations was a divergence between parties wanting the MWP to actively drive more urgent emissions cuts and those who want it to be merely a space for communication.
Speaking to Carbon Brief, Kaveh Guilanpour, vice president for international strategies at the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions (C2ES), explained:
“Tensions in the MWP go back to when it was adopted at COP27, where some parties wanted it to be a non-negotiated space to exchange ideas and views on how to accelerate mitigation action, while others hope the space could be used for more normative signals on what needs to be done going forward.
“At the heart of this is the fact that NDCs are nationally determined, while the goals of the Paris Agreement are collective in nature.”
One of the main areas of focus in Bonn was the future of the MWP, including its duration, its relationship with other UNFCCC processes and how it should be carried out.
For example, during discussions in the first week, parties disagreed on whether the mandate for the MWP’s work – which refers to “this critical decade” – meant it should continue operation until 2030, or whether this simply related to the urgency of action.
Speaking during a press conference in the second week attended by Carbon Brief, Anne Rasmussen, lead climate negotiator for AOSIS, said that on mitigation:
“We need to move beyond simply exchanging views and focus on how the work programme can support the implementation of GST outcomes, particularly those related to mitigation. These [include] accelerating renewable energy deployment and strengthening dedicated mitigation space beyond 2027.”
Questions of finance also became contentious, as they had across a range of negotiating rooms in Bonn.
During negotiations, some parties highlighted the need to engage with financiers, investors or other avenues, in order to turn MWP discussions into action.
In the second week, the diplomats leading negotiations put together three separate documents to represent the divided discussions: a draft legal text; a note capturing the key parts of the debate; and a “non-exhaustive reflection of the exchange of views”.
Further documents released the day after, with few substantial changes, faced a similar response.
In the afternoon of the final day in Bonn, brief draft conclusions were published. This contained just five points, predominantly focused on the need for continued work on the MWP.
Ultimately, however, parties could not even agree on this minimal document and the MWP was pushed to COP31.
In the closing plenary, a range of parties expressed their “profound disappointment” and reaffirmed their commitment to the MWP process.
Action agenda and new initiatives
COP30 saw an effort by the Brazilian presidency to raise the profile of the “action agenda” – a long-running initiative to mobilise climate action outside the formal UN process.
Hundreds of voluntary climate initiatives have been launched by businesses, local governments and many other actors over the years at COP summits and other international events.
In a bid to turn this into real-world action, the COP30 presidency marshalled these initiatives into six broad themes and compiled them into a five-year plan for “accelerating implementation”.
These plans were intentionally aligned with the goals of the global stocktake, negotiated in 2023, which includes everything from “transitioning away from fossil fuels” to “halting and reversing deforestation”. (See: Global stocktake.)
This work continued at SB64, with UN Climate Change executive secretary Simon Stiell telling participants in his opening speech:
“We hear calls from many to elevate the global climate action agenda – complementing negotiations, bringing together governments, companies, innovators, investors, cities and regions and civil society.”
The Turkish COP31 presidency launched its own “priorities” for the action agenda during the first week of SB64. The most high-profile of these was a goal – yet to be endorsed by national governments – to increase the global share of final energy demand met by electricity from just over 20% today to 35% by 2035.
(Amid soaring fuel prices linked to the Iran war, some governments have already identified electrification as a way to curb their reliance on expensive fossil-fuel imports.)
The Turkish presidency also announced targets to halve the growth in global waste, reduce “energy consumption intensity in the building sector” by 25%, increase the global use of “circular materials” by 15% and “build awareness of the climate crisis” among young people and farmers, all by 2035.
Alongside these goals, the presidency has also announced a “climate implementation bridge”. This was described as an initiative to help developing countries access support and capacity building – but it is not a new climate fund.
(The COP31 action agenda is set to be formally launched at London Climate Action Week, the week after SB64.)
In a press conference announcing these new goals, the Australian “president of negotiations” for COP31, Chris Bowen, made it clear that the negotiations and the action agenda are “separate things” and that the latter could proceed without universal buy-in from every country. He said:
“The action agenda is set by the presidency, the negotiations are steered but are a party-driven process and require consensus.”
COP30 also had also seen the launch of more new presidency-led initiatives that were intended to drive climate action beyond the UN negotiating halls. SB64 provided an opportunity to flesh these out and for parties to provide their views.
One of these initiatives was the “global implementation accelerator”, which was the focus of an event in the first week of the conference.
COP30 and COP31 presidency representatives explained that this would involve providing additional support to three or four “high-impact” climate “solutions” from the action agenda. The goal would be to help parties – on a voluntary basis – as they implement nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and national adaptation plans (NAPs).
Another new presidency initiative was the “Belém mission to 1.5C”, which held a consultation event in Bonn. This has similar objectives to the global implementation accelerator – namely, driving ambition, implementation and investment in nations’ NDCs and NAPs.
The “mission” is gathering inputs from various actors and will use these, alongside various meetings and consultations, to produce a report ahead of COP31.
Some parties used these sessions to make their priorities clear. For example, Saudi Arabia, on behalf of the Arab Group, made statements during both consultations about the importance of carbon-capture technologies. They told the “mission to 1.5C” session:
“International cooperation currently disproportionately emphasises particular solutions, while technologies such as CCUS [carbon capture, utilisation and storage] and CDR [carbon dioxide removal], despite their critical role in IPCC-assessed pathways, remain disproportionately underrepresented.”
This is notable, given the predominance of major oil-and-gas producers in this negotiating bloc and the group’s resistance to efforts to move away from fossil fuels. Saudi Arabia also stressed that these initiatives are voluntary and not connected to UNFCCC processes.
Climate science
Throughout the Bonn talks, there were major disagreements about how climate science should feed into the UN climate process.
Parties traded accusations of “misinformation” and oversimplifying science. There were also disputes about the Paris Agreement’s 1.5C temperature goal and the role of the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
This came to a head when a press briefing was assembled with representatives from the EU, Switzerland and various developing countries to denounce “coordinated attacks” on science by “fossil-fuel interests”.
When asked which parties were behind these “attacks”, Sivendra Michael, chief negotiator for Fiji, told Carbon Brief:
“It is the usual suspects that seek to block progress…We are seeing efforts to remove references to the IPCC and the 1.5C temperature limit.”
A negotiator from one of the countries in the press conference later elaborated, telling Carbon Brief that Saudi Arabia and India were among those “undermining” climate science.
They also told Carbon Brief that Saudi Arabia had started referencing a Paris Agreement target of limiting warming to 2C – failing to mention the 1.5C component altogether. Saudi Arabia, a major oil-and-gas producer, has long opposed the 1.5C goal.
(The Paris Agreement technically has a single temperature target of “well-below 2C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5C”.)
All economies face very steep emissions cuts if the world is to meet the 1.5C target and this could have major societal impacts, especially for emerging economies with fossil-fuel industries.
However, small islands and climate-vulnerable states frame warming beyond 1.5C as an existential threat.
Anne Rasmussen, lead negotiator of AOSIS, told Carbon Brief that they were concerned about the “attempt to delink any relevance of the 1.5C” across several tracks, including the JTWP and the MWP.
As at COP30, differences of opinion were most evident in negotiations on “research and systematic observation”, where parties discussed scientific inputs into UN climate talks.
The EU was among parties voicing concerns about “misinformation” and the importance of 1.5C. Saudi Arabia and India were among those arguing against references to “misinformation and disinformation”, as well as 1.5C.
(There was also some debate about the inclusion of references to El Niño and climate “tipping points”. Both were opposed by some large, developing countries, with India and Saudi Arabia arguing there were “varying perspectives” on tipping points science.)
Dr Kate Dooley, a senior research fellow at the University of Melbourne who followed the Bonn negotiations, told Carbon Brief that the accusations levelled by some parties in the press conference were oversimplified. She said:
“We’ve got both sides finger-pointing at each other – the EU and Switzerland pointing the finger at large, developing countries and saying: ‘What you’re doing is climate denial.’ And it’s not.”
There is growing acceptance that the world is likely to breach 1.5C. If that happens, the “overshoot” could be temporary if there is mass deployment of carbon removal technologies and tree-planting to suck carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere.
As ever, this raises questions as to who will be responsible for cutting emissions and for the mass deployment of CO2 removal – and when and where these actions should take place.
Dooley said that “1.5C is the temperature goal and we need all hands on deck to achieve that”, but there was nothing wrong with “interrogating the risks of mitigation pathways and trying to make sure those risks are minimised”.
Large, developing nations argue on the basis of “equity” that they should have more leeway, whereas developed countries bear significant historical responsibility for climate change and that, as a result, they should cut emissions further and faster in line with the 1.5C goal.
Moreover, they argue that developed countries have failed to provide sufficient climate finance and technological support to help developing countries cut emissions.
Responding to this idea, Fiji negotiator Michael told the press briefing there would be “no equity for the most vulnerable” if 1.5C is breached:
“There is this growing narrative that science and equity are in competition…We reject this notion.”
Saudi Arabia and India were also prominent in questioning the role of the IPCC – considered the world’s most authoritative voice on climate science – in the UN process.
Some Indian researchers have been vocal in arguing that the scenarios assessed by the IPCC place an unfair burden on developing countries.
There was also a wider conversation about IPCC timelines in Bonn. Many parties, including the EU, AOSIS and South Africa, argued that the panel’s “seventh assessment report” (AR7) should be brought forward so the “best available science” can feed into the second “global stocktake” in UN climate talks, which is set to conclude in 2028. (See: Global stocktake.)
A group of countries, including Saudi Arabia, India, China, Kenya and Russia, have pushed back against any effort to accelerate the report timing. As a result, for five consecutive IPCC meetings, countries have failed to agree on the AR7 timeline.
These debates spilled over into SB64 talks, with the same parties arguing against alignment with the second GST. Again, these countries often make arguments on the basis of equity, stating that accelerating the process would disadvantage developing-country scientists.
Fossil fuels
Fossil fuels were not an official part of the negotiating agenda in Bonn, but countries nevertheless discussed them throughout the talks.
At COP30, dozens of nations had backed a “roadmap” to “transition away” from fossil fuels, but ultimately strong opposition meant it did not end up in the formal text.
Instead, countries accepted COP30 president Corrêa do Lago’s compromise offer to develop “roadmaps” outside the formal UN regime, including one for fossil-fuel transition and another on ending deforestation.
So far, 21 countries and negotiating groups have submitted their views to help shape the informal fossil-fuel roadmap. With the exception of Russia, none of the countries that reportedly opposed a formal roadmap at COP30 have had their say.
(There has been a similar call for input from parties for the deforestation roadmap, with 22 submissions so far.)
In the first week of Bonn, the COP30 president hosted a 90-minute session to discuss the fossil-fuel issue in person.
Corrêa do Lago presented progress on developing the roadmap, placing it in the context of implementing the energy-related outcomes from the first global stocktake. (See: Global stocktake.)
Some parties, including small-island nations and Switzerland on behalf of the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG) , expressed interest in carrying the roadmap discussion into the formal process – so it ended up as more than just “a document”.
Meanwhile, groups representing big fossil-fuel producers, such as the Arab group and the LMDCs, did not speak up at all.
Fossil fuels were also discussed in other parts of SB64, notably in the GST dialogue. Numerous nations pointed to the success of the recent “transitioning away from fossil fuels” conference in Santa Marta, Colombia.
Cosima Cassel, climate diplomacy lead at E3G, told a press conference on this topic that Santa Marta was an example of the climate regime “evolv[ing]”, with “coalitions of the willing” coming forward with solutions to move away from fossil fuels.
Trade dialogues
The first-ever dialogue on climate change and trade was held during the first week of negotiations. Parties approached it with a “pragmatic” tone, despite clear tensions, according to thinktank E3G.
Created as part of the “global mutirão” at COP30 in Brazil last year, this was the first of three dialogues that will be held at Bonn intersessional meetings between 2026 and 2028.
Opening the session, COP30 president André Corrêa do Lago highlighted the need to make trade work “as an engine of sustainable development”.
The session began with presentations from the World Trade Organization, the International Trade Centre and UN Trade and Development, which highlighted the potential for trade to contribute to countries’ climate objectives.
However, as parties moved into the discussion portion of the day, many developing nations drew attention to growing concerns that trade measures are creating burdens and barriers for them.
The discussion was organised around three questions: how trade can support climate action; how climate action can avoid adverse impacts on sustainable development; and how international cooperation can address the “trade-climate interface”.
Broadly, developing-country groups argued that the use of trade-related climate measures raises compliance costs, restricts market access and does not align with principles of “equity” and “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”.
For example, the Arab group pointed to research by the International Monetary Fund, which it said found that the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) could generate “welfare gains” for developed countries, while imposing “losses” on developing countries.
Meanwhile, the LMDCs described unilateral trade-related climate measures as:
“Effectively extraterritorial regulatory projection by those with dominant market power and greater historical responsibility [for global warming] onto those with fewer resources and less historical responsibility.”
Developed-country groups pushed back against these criticisms, arguing that they were legitimate approaches to climate “externalities”. The EU said:
“If we disregard sustainability considerations, negative environmental externalities can emerge and lead to dependencies that undermine efforts to protect the environment and the climate.”
Others, such as AILAC and South Korea, focused on improving fairness and transparency in climate-related trade measures.
In a statement, Jordan Dilworth, policy advisor for climate diplomacy and geopolitics at E3G, said that despite the tensions, parties did come prepared to engage:
“Many expected the first trade and climate dialogue to be a showdown, but parties resisted trading blows and instead engaged constructively despite entrenched differences. The test now is for the chairs to ensure that parties feel their positions are being adequately addressed in the next round of dialogues.”
The diplomats running the talks will now consider the interventions and submissions made by parties in the dialogue, before determining the next steps.
They said they would prepare an “informal note under their own authority and with no legal status”, as a record of the first dialogue.
Trade also raised its head in the just transition work programme, with groups such as G77 and China opposing “restrictive” trade measures, while others, such as the UK, argued that the topic of trade does not fall within the mandate of the workstream.
This mirrored divisions seen at COP30, SB62 and other UNFCCC meetings. (See: Just transition work programme.)
COP reform
Following on from COP30, there were continued discussions on the future of the UNFCCC process and potential for reform, although it was less of a hot-button topic.
Much of this fell within negotiations on “arrangements for intergovernmental meetings”, focused on the organisation of COP31, improving efficiency and observer engagement.
Negotiations over the course of the two weeks in Bonn saw parties disagree over issues such as imposing conditions on proposals for new agenda items, the opportunities for parties to engage in consultations, budgetary implications and more.
Ultimately, a final text was agreed on the penultimate day of Bonn.
Parties also negotiated on “cooperation between other international organisations”, which relates to coordinating the work of UN treaties on climate change, nature and desertification.
While this agenda item has existed for over 20 years, it has previously been limited to the publication of an annual report in Bonn.
At COP30, however, it was reinvigorated following a push at the Bonn sessions in June 2025, ultimately being included on the agenda at a COP for the first time in 19 years.
The workstream drew focus at COP30 amid the wider calls for reform of the COP process.
Its inclusion in the agenda at SB64 followed a report from UN scientific panel on nature research, IPBES, on the nexus between biodiversity and other workstreams, which found that countries are wasting $10-25tn annually by dealing with interconnected crises within silos, instead of taking advantage of synergies.
Speaking to Carbon Brief, Bethan Laughlin, senior policy specialist at the Zoological Society of London, highlighted that countries now have to produce dozens of reports across the three UN conventions. She added:
“The evidence is clear that siloed decision-making is costing countries trillions per year. To tackle the scale of the climate and ecological crisis, we can no longer act as if these issues are separate from one another.
“Already existing mechanisms, such as the Joint Liaison Group, need to be strengthened, but we also need innovative approaches that will aid countries in scaling up synergistic approaches.”
Ocean dialogue
During the first week at Bonn, stakeholders and delegates took part in the “ocean and climate change dialogue”.
This focused on ocean-based priorities in countries’ “nationally determined contributions” (NDCs), access to finance and aligning international climate and biodiversity efforts relating to oceans.
The dialogue built on the “blue NDC challenge” launched by Brazil and France in 2025, with the goal of as many countries as possible incorporating the ocean into their pledges.
Speaking to Carbon Brief, Micheline Khan, senior associate for ocean climate at thinktank the World Resources Institute (WRI), explained that since it was launched at COP25, the dialogue has “achieved important milestones” in the integration of the ocean across the work of the UNFCCC. This included helping to move from ad-hoc inclusion of the topic to a “growing political recognition of ocean language”.
Representatives for both sides of the joint COP31 presidency – Turkey and Australia – spoke during the first day of the ocean dialogue at SB64.
Khan added that the Turkish presidency has “defined the ocean as a key priority within their agenda”, providing political signalling that could help elevate the topic.
But more still needs to be done, Khan said:
“The central challenge is no longer whether ocean action belongs in climate plans – it does. But whether countries have the governance, data, technical capacity and investment pipelines to implement what they have already committed to.”
For more on the ocean dialogue, see the 19 June 2016 edition of Debriefed.
Road to COP31
Attention now turns to COP31, which will be held in the resort city of Antalya, Turkey.
Unusually, the COP presidency is being shared, with Turkey hosting the summit, but Australia serving as “president of negotiations”.
This was a compromise landed on at COP30, after parties failed to agree on a single presidency following more than three years of dispute.
(COP32 will be held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 2027. It will be the first-ever COP hosted by one of the least-developed countries.)
COP31 is being promoted as an “implementation COP”, helping to “close the gap between multilateral commitments and real-world delivery”, according to its website.
However, the fraught negotiations in Bonn, including the lack of progress on key elements, mean the future effectiveness of climate summits is increasingly under question.
In his closing statement at Bonn, UN Climate Change executive secretary Simon Stiell urged countries to bring ministers together as soon as possible, “particularly on the thorniest issues,” to allow compromise to be found ahead of Antalya. He added:
“In some negotiating rooms, we’ve heard a familiar tendency towards you-first-ism: Groups refusing to deliver commitments or allow the process to move forward unless others go first. This is a recipe for gridlock when we need all negotiating tracks to be moving in the fast lane.”
| Date | Milestone |
|---|---|
| 20-28 June 2026 | London climate action week, London, UK |
| September 2026 | Climate week, New York City, US |
| 8-22 September | UN general assembly (UNGA81), New York City, US |
| 19-30 October 2026 | UN biodiversity summit COP17,, Yerevan, Armenia |
| 9-20 November 2026 | Global implementation accelerator – second information session |
| During Katowice Committee meeting, 2026 | Dialogue on the impact of response measures |
| 9-20 November 2026 | COP31, Antalya, Turkey |
The post Bonn climate talks: Key outcomes from the June 2026 UN climate conference appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Bonn climate talks: Key outcomes from the June 2026 UN climate conference
The global goal to halt and reverse nature loss by 2030 “will not be achieved” unless action by countries “accelerates rapidly”, says a draft UN report.
Countries are falling short on 22 of the 23 targets for 2030 they set under the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF), the “Paris Agreement for nature”.
That is according to a draft version of a global report prepared by the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), published on 26 July.
The report will be finalised ahead of the next nature summit, COP17, taking place in Armenia in October of this year.
The second draft of the global report has undergone “peer review”, but will still be subject to “technical edits” before being formally published ahead of COP17.
The final version will inform a global review of countries’ progress towards meeting the world’s 2030 nature goals, which will take place in Armenia.
Below, Carbon Brief explains why the report has been produced and what it says about countries’ progress in areas such as restoring ecosystems and raising funds for biodiversity.
Global report
In Montreal, Canada, in 2022, nearly every country in the world agreed to the GBF. The overall “mission” of the framework is to halt and reverse biodiversity loss by 2030. Its “vision” is to bring the world into “harmony with nature” by 2050.
The GBF includes a list of 23 targets for 2030. They cover an expansive range of topics, from restoring ecosystems, to addressing pollution and providing developing nations with finance to help cover the costs of protecting nature.
As part of the GBF and its underlying documents, countries agreed to a schedule for monitoring their progress towards achieving the 2030 targets.
This included the preparation of a “global report” of progress coordinated by the CBD, which will inform a “global review” undertaken by countries at COP17.
The global report draws on countries’ national reports, which were due to be submitted to the UN in February of this year. It also draws on countries’ national nature plans, known as “national biodiversity strategies and action plans” (NBSAPS) and national targets, which were both due in 2024.
Not all countries have met the call to publish these documents and targets. According to the UN, 45% of countries published NBSAPs in time to be considered for the report, 83% had submitted at least one national target and 66% had produced their new national report.
The first draft of the global report was published on 29 June 2026. This draft was subject to a “peer review process”, which invited countries and observers, such as NGOs and businesses, to submit comments on all aspects of the report.
The second draft, which has been revised based on the peer review, was published on Sunday 26 July. (This was just ahead of COP17 preparatory talks being held in Nairobi from 27 July to 1 August.)
A final version of the global report will be formally published ahead of COP17, which will take place from 19-30 October.
Overall findings
The second draft of the global report says that the GBF has led to “unprecedented” interest in tackling biodiversity loss, but adds:
“However, unless collective implementation accelerates rapidly, the 2030 targets and mission will not be achieved.”
It says that countries have taken some action to address all 23 targets, but that “no target presents a fully positive picture”.
(The first draft has slightly softer language. It “concludes that the world is not yet on track to collectively meet the global ambitions that the parties to the convention set when they adopted the framework”.)
The report identifies “two distinct gaps in progress”, relating to ambition and implementation.
First, that the national targets and plans submitted by countries “do not yet fully reflect the scope and level of ambition” of the global targets in the GBF.
Second, countries are not taking sufficient action to achieve their targets, according to the report.
It adds that progress is “particularly lagging” for addressing the “indirect drivers of biodiversity loss”, such as harmful business practices and government subsidies promoting them.
In addition, countries are showing “consistent gaps” in making progress on taking action to protect “marine, coastal and inland water ecosystems”.
The report produces a “scorecard” assessing countries’ progress towards meeting each of the 23 targets of the GBF.
The scorecard includes an “overall score” of between 0 and 1 for each target. This is calculated by considering countries’ self-reported progress in their plans and targets, as well as an assessment of progress based on a set of agreed indicators.
The results are split into four categories: 0-0.25 is red, 0.25-0.5 is orange, 0.5-0.75 is yellow and 0.75-1 is green.
The report gives a “green” score for just one target, indicating overall positive progress. This is target 8, on “minimising” the impact of climate change on biodiversity, including through mitigation and adaptation.
Elsewhere, the draft says that countries have “reported gaps in the scale and timely provision” of “financial resources, capacity-building and development, technical and scientific cooperation, access to and transfer of technology, and knowledge sharing”. It adds:
“These barriers can result in uneven capacities and cause specific technical and financial constraints for all parties, but particularly for developing-country parties. It is likely these constraints are even more pressing for least developed countries and small island developing states.”
Protecting and restoring nature
Target 3 of the GBF is for countries to protect “30% of Earth’s land and sea for nature” by the end of the decade.
This commitment – referred to as “30 by 30” – is widely considered the flagship target of the agreement.
The report says that countries are making “progress in expanding and managing protected areas, especially for marine and coastal areas”. But it adds that “current ambition and implementation remain insufficient to fully achieve all aspects of the target”.
It continues that, according to countries’ available national targets, “monitoring and reporting of some elements of the target remains low”. This includes “those relating to equitable governance of protected areas” and “recognition of Indigenous and local territories”.
The report adds that countries “face significant challenges in implementation, particularly related to lack of finance and capacity”.
(An investigation by Carbon Brief and the Guardian in 2025 revealed that more than half of nations that have submitted UN biodiversity plans do not commit to “30 by 30” within their borders.)
Another conservation measure included in the GBF is target 2, which aims to ensure that at least 30% of land and sea areas are under restoration by 2030.
The report says that “restoration efforts are expanding”. However, it says that “current commitments to restore areas and implementation of those commitments remain below the level required” to achieve target 2.
It adds that countries’ national targets are “generally well aligned with target 2”, but that “addressing the effectiveness of restoration efforts is often absent”.
Moreover, the report adds that monitoring of progress is “constrained by inconsistent definitions and monitoring approaches for ecosystem degradation and restoration”.
Another “major barrier” is a lack of available finance for developing countries looking to restore ecosystems, it says.
Climate and biodiversity links
Target 8 of the GBF is the only one to specifically address climate change, one of the major drivers of biodiversity loss.
It says countries should “minimise the impact of climate change” on biodiversity through mitigation and adaptation, including “nature-based solutions” and “ecosystem-based approaches”.
Target 8 was the only one to achieve a “green” marking in the report’s scorecard of progress (see: Overall findings).
The report says that actions to make biodiversity more resilient against climate change are “progressing”. Yet “implementation remains constrained by data gaps, limited means of implementation and the need for stronger coherence between biodiversity, climate and disaster risk reduction planning”.
It continues that countries’ national targets “generally” show “good alignment” with target 8, across “all elements apart from efforts to minimise the impacts of ocean acidification”.
It adds that the deployment of nature-based solutions and ecosystem restoration is not yet at a “sufficient scale”.
Subsidies
Overall progress is “insufficient” on target 18, which calls on countries to identify subsidies and other incentives that are harmful for biodiversity by 2025, says the GBF report.
It also outlines that nations should “eliminate, phase out or reform” these subsidies in a “proportionate” way, reducing them by at least $500bn per year by 2030.
Countries should first target the “most harmful” incentives, while simultaneously scaling up positive incentives for nature, it adds.
The report finds that countries have made some progress in assessing, compiling inventories and commissioning studies on harmful subsidies.
But issues remain, such as incomplete data and the lack of agreed definitions on which subsidies are deemed “harmful”.
Several national reports also note “entrenched interests and political barriers to subsidy reform”, says the report.
Only one-quarter of countries’ national targets that are “highly aligned” with target 18 are “on track” to be met, it finds. Most show “insufficient progress”.
It notes that 38% of countries have addressed the 2025 aim to identify harmful subsidies in their national targets “to some extent”.
Countries’ national reports do not “provide a sufficient basis to determine” whether this goal was met, says the report, but available evidence “suggests” that it was not.
Recent analysis by Carbon Brief found that just 16% of the 134 national reports submitted so far appear to meet the aim.
The report outlines that half of countries have set national targets addressing plans to eliminate, phase out or reform harmful incentives. Almost 60% mention scaling up positive incentives, it adds.
Just 27%, however, address the issue of reducing subsidies by at least $500bn annually by 2030. Also, only 5% set quantitative national targets to reduce subsidies.
There are two headline “indicators” to measure progress on target 18. The first shows that 30% of countries have outlined information on their nature-positive incentives.
The second indicator shows that 22 countries submitted the value of their biodiversity-harmful subsidies, which amounted to a total of $268bn spent on harmful subsidies over 2022 to 2025 – averaging $67bn each year.
Carbon Brief’s analysis had identified an estimated $270bn each year, based on a wider list of submissions from 32 countries. (More countries submitted national reports since the CBD’s deadline to be included in the global report in February.)
All of these figures remain well below the estimated trillions of US dollars spent annually.
The report notes that different methodologies could lead to global subsidy estimate “inconsistencies”, meaning that reported values are likely “underestimates”.
The amount of positive incentives in place is also likely underestimated, it adds.
The report says that harmful subsidies may have declined by around 20% in recent years, based on figures consistently reported by a minority of countries over 2022-24.
Despite this, the total value of subsidies “remains higher than the resources that parties reported mobilising for biodiversity”. (See: Mobilising finance.)
Mobilising finance
Overall progress on raising biodiversity finance has been “insufficient”, according to the report.
Goal D of the GBF, shown below, states that countries must close a $700bn biodiversity gap by 2030 through ending harmful subsidies ($500bn per year) and mobilising resources from the global north to south ($200bn per year).
This target aims to raise “at least $200bn per year” by 2030 from “all sources”, including domestic, international, public and private funding.
In all, countries reported raising a cumulative total of $186.4bn over four years, according to the report.
While it adds that it “is still too early to conclude”, the report states that the total finance mobilised so far “falls far short” of what is needed to close the biodiversity finance gap.
Target 19, shown below, states that developed countries and others should boost finance for nature to “at least $20bn” per year by 2025 and “at least $30bn” by 2030. This falls to developed countries and others that “voluntarily assume” the obligation of contributing.
However, the report suggests that the milestone of raising “at least $20bn per year by 2025” was “likely not achieved”.
Between 2020 and 2023, reporting countries cumulatively raised just $17.7bn in international public funding for biodiversity, according to the report.
This amounts to an average of $4.4bn per year between 2020-23, with the total touching its highest at $5.2bn in 2023.
The report cautions that this figure “should be read as a minimum”, as it does not account for all potential flows of biodiversity finance.
Both estimates “fall below the $20bn milestone”, although the report adds that a “definitive assessment will only be possible” once data for 2024 and 2025 are included.
An earlier draft of the report included language noting that biodiversity-related “official development assistance” remains “well below the agreed 2025 milestone”. This was cut from the summary in this latest iteration of the report.
References to the OECD reporting a “shortfall in funding” and projecting “a decrease for 2024 and 2025” – suggesting the $20bn target was “unlikely to be met” – were also removed from the latest draft.
The chart below shows how international public funding for biodiversity has varied from 2020 to 2023, according to the report.
By comparison, domestic spending makes the largest cumulative contribution to biodiversity finance, at ($135.9bn) over the four years. However, spending has “declined” as a share of GDP. It also notes that spending varies “greatly”, from 0.1% to 2.7% of GDP.
According to the report, many countries highlighted that national budget allocations for biodiversity are “far too low” and that biodiversity “frequently loses out to competing development priorities”, including “defence, food security and infrastructure”.
At COP15 in Montreal, the EU and several other countries pushed for the inclusion of “all sources” of finance in the final text – including private finance and “innovative” schemes.
Private and “innovative” biodiversity finance – which spans a plethora of sources such biodiversity offsets and debt-for-nature swaps – was eventually included in target 19.
The report, however, notes that private finance “peaked in 2021 and fell afterwards” and “remains particularly undeveloped”, with a cumulative total of $32.7bn between 2020-23.
At the same time, the report notes that only 26% of all countries had reported data on private biodiversity finance, making it harder to assess funding declines in 2022 and 2023.
Genetic resources
The report finds there has been limited progress on sharing genetic biodiversity data.
”Digital sequence information” (DSI) refers to genetic data derived from biodiversity, which is often sourced from species in biodiversity-rich developing countries.
These countries have long called for an international mechanism to ensure that the benefits of DSI are shared fairly with the people living where the resources were “discovered”, including Indigenous communities.
At COP16, countries agreed to the first-ever global fund, called the Cali Fund, for companies profiting from genetic data to contribute to conservation goals on a voluntary basis.
However, experts have cautioned that much rests on whether countries develop strong national laws to support the COP16 agreement. This could include incentivising companies in their regions to contribute to the fund.
In the GBF, target 13 and goal C address elements of DSI, including the sharing of benefits from genetic resources and their digital derivatives.
According to the report, 79% of countries submitted national targets that address legal, policy and administrative measures to enable benefit-sharing from DSI. Some 71% included measures to facilitate access to genetic resources.
The report finds that the “strongest progress” has been in developing laws and policies, which are now at an intermediate stage.
The “most fundamental regulatory barrier”, according to many countries cited, is the lack of a “dedicated” national framework to enable access to genetic resources and share benefits with communities.
This would involve enacting laws compatible with the GBF, setting up digital registries to catalogue and trace genetic resources, as well as implementing tracking systems to monitor how they are used. It would also include a financial mechanism to pay communities for the use of their traditional knowledge.
Progress in monitoring monetary and non-monetary benefits from DSI is “much weaker” and is “particularly limited” for measures related to the Cali fund.
According to the report, most parties have “no monitoring systems [for evaluating benefits from genetic resources] in place, or [are] still developing them”. It says they add that the benefits from genetic resources are hard to track “across borders and along value chains through to the final product”.
For those that have tracked benefits, it says that countries reported a cumulative $6.9m in receipts from the use of genetic resources between 2022 and 2025. It adds that “several parties reported that they had received no monetary benefits” to date.
Countries also reported more than 960 non-monetary benefits, ranging from technical training to research participation. The report cautions that these “fluctuated over time rather than increasing consistently, and cannot be seen as indicative of global benefit-sharing”.
In December 2025, Carbon Brief reported that the Cali fund had received only one contribution of $1,000 as an “icebreaker”. No other major companies have stepped up to fill the fund.
Meanwhile, the report states that the formal protection of traditional knowledge held by Indigenous peoples and local communities remained “underdeveloped”.
It says that a “significant number” of countries raised concerns about gaps in recognition of Indigenous peoples’ rights and dedicated registries to document their traditional knowledge.
The report says it is not yet possible to assess progress towards goal C:
“To date it is not possible to comment on whether benefits are being shared fairly and equitably nor on the role played by traditional knowledge and Indigenous peoples and local communities. Therefore, progress towards goal C cannot yet be assessed.”
Pollution
Target 7 of the GBF focuses on tackling pollution from pesticides, chemicals, plastic and other sources.
It calls for countries to reduce pollution risks and negative impacts “from all sources” to “levels that are not harmful” to biodiversity and ecosystems by 2030.
It also aims to reduce excess nutrients in the environment and overall risks from pesticides and hazardous chemicals by “at least half”.
The draft report finds that there is no significant change or insufficient progress on 60% of national targets categorised as being highly aligned with target 7. Only one-third of these national targets (35%) are on track to be achieved by 2030.
On average, it says countries have addressed around half of the various elements of target 7 “to some extent” in their national targets.
The most frequently-mentioned aspect of the target – addressed by 72% of countries – refers to reducing pollution from all sources by 2030.
One headline indicator related to target 7 focuses on the concentration of pesticides in the environment.
Just five countries out of 125 submitted estimates on this, according to the report. It says only one country has met the aim of halving the overall risk from pesticides on a national basis so far.
Measures to address plastic pollution are the most frequently reported actions by countries in relation to this target, including bans on single-use bags and straws.
A number of countries in Europe and Asia have also implemented measures to reduce nutrient losses from fertilisers and slurry.
A “major challenge” for countries in advancing pollution aims is “effectively and fairly considering and managing impacts on food security and livelihoods”, according to the report.
Several countries point to a lack of national funding to implement measures towards achieving this target.
Some developing countries also list poor wastewater-treatment infrastructure as a “persistent challenge” on this issue.
Invasive species
Invasive alien species refers to those that have moved to and become established in a region outside their natural habitat, as a result of human activities. This has negative impacts for local biodiversity and ecosystems.
Target 6 of the GBF calls for countries to, among other things, reduce the rates of introduction and establishment of invasive alien species by 50% by 2030.
The draft report says countries are “taking action” on this target, but progress is “difficult to assess”.
Two-thirds of national targets aligned with target 6 show “no significant progress or insufficient progress”, it finds. Fewer than one-third are on track to be achieved by 2030 and just 1% of these national targets have already been achieved.
But most countries have made progress in putting in place measures to manage invasive species – mostly focusing on reducing the introduction rate and impact of species.
Countries have addressed around half of the different elements of the invasive species target “to some extent” in their national targets, finds the report.
But fewer than one-third (30%) have set national targets that put a numeric goal on reducing invasive species.
Island biosecurity programmes and measures to intercept invasive species at country borders are among the actions countries have put in place to tackle the issue.
The report lists some barriers countries say stand in the way of achieving the target. These include a lack of baseline data from which to measure a 50% reduction rate, poor early-detection systems and a lack of funding for long-term reduction efforts.
Some countries also cite capacity and technical challenges in monitoring invasive species, according to the report.
They say many of these species “go unnoticed for years before impacts become apparent”, it adds, with countries arguing that setting a specific reduction target is “challenging”.
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The post World falling short on 22 of 23 nature targets for 2030, says draft UN report appeared first on Carbon Brief.
World falling short on 22 of 23 nature targets for 2030, says draft UN report
Rising temperatures are redistributing the risk of childhood malaria in sub-Saharan Africa, resulting in areas of “new risk” in the east and south of the continent, but also “relief hotspots” in western Africa.
This is according to a new study, published in Nature, which provides the “most comprehensive look to date at the impact of climate change on any infectious disease”.
The research finds that since the year 1900, climate change has resulted in one extra case of malaria for every 1,000 children in sub-Saharan Africa on average.
Over the 21st century, climate change is expected to drive down malaria rates across the continent on average, as temperatures rise above the optimum range for mosquitoes.
However, the authors emphasise that continent-wide averages hide more detailed local trends.
They find that cooler parts of Africa face an increase in malaria risk, as rising temperatures have made the regions more suitable for malaria-carrying mosquitoes, while warmer regions see a suppression in malaria cases.
The lead author tells Carbon Brief that this is the first study to use “attribution” – a field of climate science which uses models to compare conditions in a world with global warming to one without – to assess the impact of climate change on malaria.
The study also reveals that climate change is not the main driver of shifting malaria risk in Africa, with public health measures and government policy making a more significant impact.
The “most important” message from the study, according to another expert, is that to eliminate malaria entirely, “effective surveillance, prevention and treatment remain substantially more influential – and more actionable – than climate change alone”.
Childhood malaria
Malaria kills hundreds of thousands of people every year. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that 610,000 people died due to the disease in 2024.
The disease is transmitted to humans by bites from mosquitoes infected with the malaria parasite. Malaria spreads most rapidly in warm, wet regions, where the parasite-carrying mosquitoes can live and breed.
However, malaria is preventable. A total of 42 countries – mainly in Europe and the Americas – have eliminated the disease entirely through a combination of measures including insecticide use, draining the swamplands that provide breeding habitats for mosquitoes and improving basic healthcare services .Global mortality from malaria declined by 90% over the 20th century.
Today, the vast majority of malaria cases are recorded in Africa, which was home to 95% of malaria cases and deaths in 2024. Children under the age of five make up three-quarters of all African malaria deaths.
The malaria-causing parasite can be detected using a blood test. Over the last century, scientists, government officials and healthcare professionals have collected thousands of blood samples from people across sub-Saharan Africa and tested for the presence of the malaria parasite.
In 2017, scientists brought together more than 50,000 samples collected from sub-Saharan Africa over 1900-2016. This data provides a “snapshot” of the amount of malaria in the population in any year in the last century the study explains.
Dr Colin Carlson is an assistant professor of epidemiology at the Yale school of public health and lead author of the study. He tells Carbon Brief that malaria in Africa is “extraordinarily well documented”, as a result of academic interest and colonial rule in the continent.
The size and quality of the malaria dataset are “exceptionally rare”, Carlson says. He explains that the dataset stretches back to before the impacts of human-caused climate change were strongly felt, making it “extraordinarily” valuable for this analysis.
The chart below shows the percentage of children between two and 10 years old who tested positive for the malaria parasite over 1900-2016. Each dot indicates one blood test result and the pink vertical bars indicate periods of “successful malaria prevention intervention”, such as the 1955-69 global malaria eradication programme.
Attribution
The authors use the blood test survey data to develop a statistical model separating out the climatic, social and economic factors that affect malaria, such as temperature, rainfall, economic development, healthcare and population changes. This allows the authors to isolate the effects of the climate on malaria.
They find that malaria prevalence in children peaks when average monthly temperatures reach 24.9C, dropping off in warmer and cooler climates.
Mosquitoes also need stagnant or slow-moving water in which to lay their eggs. The authors find that periods of drought tend to decrease malaria prevalence one-to-two months later, whereas floods increase prevalence two-to-three months later. However, they conclude that rainfall is “less important than temperature” in predicting malaria rates.
They then combine the statistical models with climate models, to simulate childhood malaria rates in a range of past and future climates.
First, the authors simulate malaria rates in the present day, by running the models using the climate of 2000-14. They then carry out the same analysis, using the climate of a hypothetical world without human-caused climate change.
By comparing the two, the authors were able to attribute the impact of climate change on malaria rates across Africa.
The link between climate change and malaria in Africa is complex and “surprisingly contentious”, according to the authors. For example, they write that “malaria resurgence in the east African highlands became a particular point of contention, with over a dozen studies arguing for or against climate change as a substantial driver”.
It adds:
“Today, malaria experts generally agree that climate change has contributed to elevational shifts in malaria epidemics and the geographical ranges of mosquito vectors. However, the cumulative effect of climate change on the burden of malaria is still an open question.”
Lead author Carlson says this paper is “one of the first impact attributions on infectious disease” and the first attribution study on climate change and malaria. He adds:
“I think it’s the most clarity we’ve had on the malaria question.”
Dr Teresa Yamana, an associate research scientist at Columbia University, who was not involved in the study, praises its “rigorous” methodology. She tells Carbon Brief that the work “demonstrates the potential of climate attribution methods to quantify the impacts of climate change on infectious diseases”.
Warming world
The findings show that “climate change isn’t just making malaria worse or better – it’s moving it, says study author Prof Tamma Carleton, an assistant professor at UC Berkeley:
“Whether a place sees elevated malaria risks or reduced burdens under climate change depends on how hot it is today. We see relief in the hotspots and new risk nearly everywhere else.”
For example, in the Ethiopian highlands, low temperatures – which are unsuitable for mosquitoes to live and breed – have historically limited the spread of malaria. However, the region has seen childhood malaria rates increase by more than eight cases per 1,000 children since the year 1900 as rising temperatures have allowed the insects to expand their habitat.
The authors also found a similar increase in malaria prevalence in cooler southern African countries.
In contrast, global warming is pushing average temperatures above the ideal range for mosquitoes in many hotter parts of Africa, driving down malaria rates. The authors find that in western Africa, climate change has caused a reduction of four malaria cases per 1,000 children per year by 2014, reducing prevalence by 1-2%.
Overall, climate change has resulted in one extra case of malaria for every 1,000 children in sub-Saharan Africa since the year 1900, the study says.
The authors also run their models for three future climate scenarios: low (SSP1-2.6), intermediate (SSP2-4.5) and very-high (SSP5-8.5) emissions pathways. Comparing these to the present-day model results shows how climate change could affect malaria cases over the coming century.
They find that the trends observed so far will largely continue into the future – meaning climate change will lower the prevalence of malaria in warm regions and increase the prevalence in cool regions.
The study concludes that under the intermediate scenario, which is broadly in line with current climate policies, warming will drive down childhood malaria cases by about three cases per 1,000 children in central Africa and 16 cases per 1,000 children in west Africa by the end of the century.
By contrast, cases could increase by around 20% over the same period in regions such as the Rift Valley and coastal southern Africa – a rise of 30 cases per 1,000 children.
The maps below show changes in childhood malaria prevalence due to climate change in today’s climate (left) and the climate of 2096-2100 under the intermediate scenario (right).
Red indicates an increase in malaria prevalence and blue indicates a decrease. Greyer colours indicate greater uncertainty in the model results. White indicates regions where no data was collected.
Carlson tells Carbon Brief that this is “the first study to really confidently answer the highland East Africa debate”.
Eradicating malaria
Healthcare workers, governments and scientists have been working to eliminate malaria for decades.
On average, the authors find that climate change will reduce the prevalence of malaria in sub-Saharan Africa, as temperatures rise above the optimum range for mosquitoes. This effect is more pronounced at higher warming levels.
Under the low emissions scenario, about 1 case per 1,000 children will be averted by the end of the century. Meanwhile under the highest emissions scenario, average prevalence falls by 20 cases per 1,000 children, marking a 9% reduction.
The graph below shows childhood malaria rates over 1990-2024 in the historical climate (blue) and in a world without climate change (grey). These estimates are shown relative to baseline prevalence across 1901-30.
After the year 2014, the plot shows projected future changes in malaria prevalence, relative to a 2015-20 baseline, in the low (purple), intermediate (pink) and high (green) scenarios.
Carlson emphasises that this does not mean that climate change is “good news” for healthcare in sub-Saharan Africa. He explains that climate change will bring a wide range of negative health impacts that will strain healthcare systems, adding:
“A world that is too hot for malaria is not a good world for the health of children.”
He also notes that climate change is “not the primary driving factor of malaria dynamics”. For example, he notes that malaria prevalence fell over 2000-15, by about 16 percentage points, after the disease was identified as a “critical global target of the Millennium Development Goals”.
This reduction is 200 times greater than the increase seen so far because of climate change, Carlson says. He adds:
“It would not be tremendously hard both to keep malaria out of new places and to eliminate it where it is maybe going to get a little bit of an assist from climate change.”
Dr Adugna Woyessa is a senior researcher at the Ethiopian Public Health Institute and was not involved in the study. He has previously carried out research on malaria in eastern Africa.
Woyessa praises the study, telling Carbon Brief that the research could bring about a “paradigm shift” in efforts to eliminate malaria. He argues that the study is a “tool for engaging giant development partners”, adding that “future work will be needed to situate these global trends in local contexts”.
Dr Janey Messina is an associate professor in the school of geography and the environment at the University of Oxford and was also not involved in the study. She praises the paper’s “strong” method.
However, she cautions that the findings “should not be interpreted as forecasts of total future malaria burden”, because they only model the impact of climate change on malaria, while excluding “social, demographic and public-health determinants”, such as inequality, migration, conflict and changing access to malaria interventions.
She adds:
“One of the paper’s most important messages is this: effective surveillance, prevention and treatment remain substantially more influential – and more actionable – than climate change alone.”
Carlson, C. et al. (2026) The past and future impact of climate change on childhood malaria in Africa, Nature, doi:10.1038/s41586-026-10840-w
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The post Climate change is driving a ‘shift’ in childhood malaria risk across Africa appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Climate change is driving a ‘shift’ in childhood malaria risk across Africa
China has released its “15th five-year plan for the development of renewable energy”, outlining key targets and policies for the sector in 2026-2030.
A key focus of the plan is boosting renewable generation and consumption as a share of China’s overall energy mix.
It calls for continued capacity additions of wind and solar – albeit at lower levels than previous years – as well as hydropower, biomass and other clean-energy sources.
Specifically, China will aim to install 3,500 gigawatts (GW) of renewables capacity by 2030, 2,800GW will be wind and solar.
The country had previously pledged to install 1,200GW of wind and solar by 2030, a goal that China met six years early.
Another major theme is the provision of wind and solar supply that is “dependable” and “grid-friendly”.
Setting a target for “dependable output” from wind and solar could help to entrench their role as a provider of “energy security”, according to analysts.
The government also aims to boost renewables consumption by developing non-power uses of renewable energy, in sectors such as steel and chemicals.
Below, Carbon Brief examines the key targets and policies outlined in the five-year plan and what they mean for China’s energy transition.
- Why are China’s five-year plans important?
- What overarching renewables targets are in the plan?
- Why does the plan focus on ‘firm capacity’ for renewables?
- What does the plan say about ‘distributed’ energy?
- What does the plan say about non-electricity use of renewables?
- What does the plan say about China’s cleantech dominance?
Why are China’s five-year plans important?
Five-year plans are key to China’s political system. An overarching plan, covering all socioeconomic issues of importance to policy leaders, is published at the beginning of each five-year cycle.
The plan for the 15th five-year period (2026-2030) was published in March 2026.
It includes what the government considers to be the most important targets and policy signals for climate and energy. For example, binding targets for carbon intensity, the share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption and total energy production capacity.
Following this overarching document, five-year plans focused on specific sectors or themes are then published over the course of the five-year plan period.
This year, the government has already published several five-year plans related to energy and climate change. One covers the development of the “new-type” energy sector more broadly. Another wraps climate goals together with other environmental targets under the “Beautiful China” programme.
By contrast, the renewables five-year plan focuses specifically on the development of hydropower, wind, solar, biomass, geothermal and wave energy.
It was published in late July by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the country’s top economic planning agency, and the National Energy Administration (NEA).
It covers topics including capacity and generation targets, as well as efforts to increase integration and reliability of wind and solar. It also has policies to encourage “non-power use” of renewable energy and ways to strengthen innovation of clean-energy technologies.
What overarching renewables targets are in the plan?
China will aim to install 3,500 gigawatts (GW) of renewables capacity by 2030, according to the five-year plan.
Of this, 2,800GW will be wind and solar – a pledge reiterated from China’s action plan for peaking carbon emissions, which was released earlier this month.
The goal more than doubles a previous 2030 target for wind and solar to reach 1,200GW, which China met six years early.
As of June 2026, the country has installed just under 2,000GW of wind and solar capacity, as well as 454GW of hydropower. Biomass, geothermal and wave energy hold very small shares of the overall energy mix.
As such, China would need to build 160GW of wind and solar each year – and just under 220GW of renewable capacity in total – to meet the targets.
The country installed 277GW of new solar alone in 2024 – and 315GW in 2025.
A key part of meeting the targets will be the development of large-scale clean-energy bases in China’s northern regions. These will generate power to be exported elsewhere via ultra-high voltage lines. The plan also encourages greater “local consumption” and installations of distributed energy (see below).
The plan says that further research will be directed at increasing the renewable share of electricity generated by these large-scale energy bases to 100%.
A recent report by the thinktank Global Energy Monitor (GEM) finds that output from these bases “continues to be paired with coal-fired generation in the name of balancing and system flexibility”. It says that currently, coal generates 42% of the power transmitted to the rest of the country from these bases.
China will also add more hydropower, says the plan, with capacity rising from 448GW in 2025 to 570GW in 2030. Some 160GW of this will be pumped-storage hydropower.
Meanwhile, the plan sets a target for renewable power generation to reach 6,000 terawatt-hours (TWh), 4,000TWh of which would come from wind and solar.
This would be a 50% increase in five years as renewables generated just under 4,000TWh of electricity in 2025, according to the National Energy Administration.
By 2030, the plan says that total consumption of renewable energy will stand at 1.8bn tonnes of coal equivalent (Gtce).
This would be up from 1.2Gtce in 2025, which represented about one-fifth of China’s total energy consumption of 6.2Gtce that year.
The renewable targets in the plan are lower than those suggested in a recent study by high-profile Chinese scholars.
The study, from the department of energy and power engineering and the Institute of Climate Change and Sustainable Development at Tsinghua University in Beijing, assessed the “likelihood of China attaining its carbon peak” under different pathways.
It found that, in order to meet its climate commitments, China would need to either install more than 4,000GW of “non-fossil energy capacity” before 2030, or to “maintain a total energy consumption” below 6.5Gtce.
The table below outlines some of the key renewables targets for 2030, as specified in the plan.
| Key targets for 2030, adapted from 15th five-year plan for renewable energy | |||
| Type | 2025 | 2030 | Percentage change |
| Renewable energy use | 1.2Gtce | 1.8Gtce | 53% |
| Total renewables capacity | 2,340GW | 3,500GW | 50% |
| Wind and solar capacity | 1,840GW | More than 2,800GW | 52% |
| Of which: Solar thermal | 1.8GW | 15GW | 733% |
| Hydro capacity | 450GW | 570GW | 27% |
| Of which: Pumped storage hydropower | 66GW | 160GW | 142% |
| Wave energy | – | 0.4GW | – |
| Renewable generation | 4,000TWh | 6,000TWh | 50% |
| Of which: Wind and solar | 2,300TWh | 4,000TWh | 74% |
| Non-electricity use | 60Mtce | 150Mtce | 150% |
| Renewable hydrogen | 0.25Mt | 2Mt | 700% |
Why does the plan focus on ‘firm capacity’ for renewables?
As well as increasing the overall size of China’s renewable power supply, the country must also maintain an “uninterrupted and reliable power supply”, officials from the NDRC and NEA told state news agency Xinhua in coverage of the new plan.
To support this goal, the plan says that the development of renewables will “enter a new stage”. This will mean that “improving quality and serving as a reliable alternative” to fossil fuels will be as important as “expanding scale”.
The plan, therefore, proposes targets for the “firm capacity” from wind and solar (置信出力). This is the amount plants or grids can be relied on to produce during critical supply periods, in conjunction with on-site storage.
The target for wind is a firm capacity of at least 11% of total installed capacity by 2030, while the equivalent goal for solar is 6%.
Wind and solar will also be expected to supply more than 20% of total demand in peak periods during the summer and winter evenings, says the plan. It expects “reliable peak-shaving capacity from renewable sources” to reach more than 300GW.
The new targets are a “positive move”, says Yao Zhe, global policy advisor at Greenpeace East Asia, as it “only applies during peak load and critical supply periods, when coal power is typically used to stabilise the power supply”.
She adds that this could, theoretically, “prevent the construction of new coal-fired power projects that are proposed and approved for the reason of meeting peak demand”.
The new metrics mark a change in focus, says Lyu Wenbin, director general of the Energy Research Institute – a state thinktank under the NDRC – in an “explanatory reading” posted on BJX News. He says it “marks a shift in renewable energy development from the mere pursuit of installed capacity to…also taking into account system support capabilities”.
The plan pledges to “accelerate the construction of grid-friendly wind and solar power stations”. It says this will enhance “reliable peak-load generation” and strengthen renewables’ ability to ensure “safe and stable operation” of the grid.
It says this will particularly be a focus in the energy-hungry east, central and south areas of China.
It sets out a slightly different focus for areas that already have a high share of renewables in their power mix, such as north-west China. Here, the aim will be to develop wind and solar parks that are “capable of providing voltage, frequency and inertia support”.
“This is a real challenge”, says James Norman, research analyst at GEM. He says these challenges are particularly acute in some circumstances:
“[For example], when the share of wind and solar is very high, relatively few synchronous generators (like coal) are online or large volumes of electricity are being transferred through high voltage DC lines.”
The plan mentions many technological solutions to address the problem, he tells Carbon Brief. However, he adds, there are no quantitative details for the issue. For example, he notes there is no target for “how many gigawatts of wind and solar must gain grid-forming capability”. This is in contrast to the goals for overall renewables capacity or generation.
Norman was a co-author on the recent GEM report, which identified further barriers to renewable uptake. It said these include transmission bottlenecks, alongside systemic features such as dispatching and power-contract mechanisms.
As a result, said the report, renewable power – especially solar – is increasingly being “curtailed”, particularly in north-western and northern provinces.
Yao also notes that the plan does not “spell out specific measures to address systemic constraints” around the electricity grid and the role of coal in the power sector.
“I interpret this as evidence that the vested interests are still strong in the policy debate,” she adds.
What does the plan say about ‘distributed’ energy?
Alongside gigawatt-scale clean-energy megabases, China also aims to expand construction of “distributed” energy. This means smaller-scale installations, such as rooftop solar.
More than 300GW of “distributed new energy” is to be added over 2026-30, some 60GW per year.
The plan aims for distributed new energy to be adopted in sectors such as industry, transport, buildings and agriculture.
Applications include the use of distributed solar and wind in industrial parks, coal mines and oilfields, as well as encouraging residents to install solar panels on buildings and developing rural clean-energy grids.
In some regions, distributed solar and wind is “likely to meet a large proportion of local demand”, says Prof Pan Jiahua at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou). He tells Carbon Brief that micro- and mini-grids using such resources will be particularly important in central and coastal China.
The 60GW annual target for new distributed energy is not “overly ambitious”, says Isadora Wang, head of China at the thinktank Transition Asia. She tells Carbon Brief that distributed solar additions, alone, exceeded 100GW in both 2024 and 2025.
Cosimo Ries, analyst at the consultancy Trivium China, agrees that the target is reachable. The biggest question mark, he tells Carbon Brief, is whether it will continue to make sense for industry and utilities to build distributed power at the volumes seen during the 14th five-year plan period.
He adds that market conditions for distributed solar have deteriorated sharply over the past two years. He says a range of factors have hit investor confidence:
“[Distributed solar faces] growing exposure to market trading, worsening returns in spot markets, growing risks of curtailment and new policies limiting or forbidding the selling of power back to the grid.”
What does the plan say about non-electricity use of renewables?
The plan also sets goals for renewable energy’s role in “non-electricity use”.
This means using renewable energy for purposes other than generating electricity, through converting it to other forms, such as heat or mechanical energy.
The government is aiming for non-power use to nearly triple from 60m tonnes of coal equivalent (Mtce) in 2025 to 150Mtce in 2030.
Ries tells Carbon Brief that he thinks this target is “one of the main highlights” of the plan. However, he notes that limited available data means it is hard to assess the level of its ambition. He adds that, given the relative conservatism of China’s other recent clean-energy targets, this one may also be met relatively easily.
Key applications for non-power use of renewables include “green hydrogen, ammonia and methanol”, says the plan. It also points to using wind and solar for heat, as well as to biomass and geothermal for heating and cooling.
Green hydrogen, ammonia and methanol are the “centrepiece” of the non-power push, according to state-owned newspaper Economic Information Daily.
For hydrogen alone, China plans to scale up renewable hydrogen production to 2m tonnes in 2030, up from 250,000 tonnes in 2025.
Today, non-power use of renewables accounts for only around 1% of China’s total energy consumption, NEA and NDRC officials said in a Q&A. They added that there is “considerable room for growth” in sectors such as industry, transport and buildings.
Potential new applications include the use of wind and solar for heat. This could see the use of centralised wind and solar heating stations in the chemicals, textiles, pharmaceuticals, papermaking and food sectors.
New projects in the steel and cement sectors should use locally-generated wind and solar to power electric-arc furnaces and kilns, adds the plan.
Wang tells Carbon Brief that she believes the naming of individual sectors is a “clear indication” that they will be included in China’s renewable consumption quotas. These already cover aluminium and other heavy industry sectors.
She adds that power and heat demand from the named sectors may help absorb distributed renewable energy. It will also serve as a testing ground for matching demand with supply through increased grid flexibility and power price reforms.
To Ries, the growing focus on non-power use signals that China’s decarbonisation efforts are “now entering deeper waters”. That means regulators are turning from easier-to-abate sectors, such as aluminium, to more challenging industries, such as steel.
The plan could create a “second growth curve” for the new-energy industry, says He Zhao, in a commentary for China Power News Net. He, the vice-president of the China Electric Power Planning and Engineering Institute (EPPEI). says this might begin with non-power use, before shifting to fuel, feedstock and heat substitution.
What does the plan say about China’s cleantech dominance?
The next five years is a prime opportunity for China to “consolidate our leading position across the entire industrial chain” for clean-energy technologies, says the plan.
It adds that the government will “strengthen technological innovation” and accelerate the roll-out of new applications of artificial intelligence in China’s renewable-energy system.
A particular focus for new R&D will be “cutting-edge, original and disruptive technologies”. It also points to technologies that “enhance the reliability of renewable energy” as a substitute for fossil fuels.
The plan names technologies for further development. For wind power, these include “reliable and low-cost” blades, ultra-tall towers and new types of floating platforms. It also mentions the development of “high-altitude wind power”. For solar, it points to the development of perovskite and other “high efficiency” solar cells, as well as space-solar technologies.
The plan also pledges to develop a power market that supports the “full entry” of renewable-energy companies. It underscores that companies should plan for an increasingly market-based and competitive environment.
Meanwhile, the government will also deepen cooperation with other countries on clean energy and “advance” global climate cooperation, it says.
A priority will be “strengthening” international coordination on investment and development in “green energy projects”. Another is “actively promoting the free circulation of China’s high-quality green technologies and products in global markets”.
Chinese exports of clean-energy technologies have been surging, especially since the closure of the strait of Hormuz.
At the same time, Chinese investment in clean-energy projects in Belt and Road Initiative member states totalled $20bn in the first half of 2026. This is also driven by the crisis.
The US, EU and others have launched tariffs and pricing mechanisms to curb imports of Chinese cleantech. This has contributed to pushback from China, against what it and others refer to as “unilateral trade measures”.
China is transitioning from a “major energy nation” (能源大国) to an “energy powerhouse” (能源强国), writes the Energy Research Institute’s Lyu in his explanatory reading. He says this will enable China to increasingly shift to building “systemic” advantages in developing clean-energy technologies.
He continues that, from 2026-2030, China will “move to the very forefront of the global stage” on clean energy, “venturing into uncharted territory”. This will create both “major new challenges and significant opportunities” for the country, he adds.
The post Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ for renewables mean for climate change? appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: What does China’s 15th ‘five-year plan’ for renewables mean for climate change?
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