The UK is roughly halving the climate aid it allocates to developing countries, when accounting changes and inflation are factored in, according to new analysis by Carbon Brief.
On 19 March, the government announced that the UK would provide “around £6bn” of international “climate finance” over the next three years.
This replaces a previous goal to provide £11.6bn across the 2021-2026 period to help nations in the global south cut their emissions and deal with climate threats.
The new target was reported as a spending reduction of up to 14% compared to recent years, reflecting the UK’s wider plan to cut development aid and spend more on defence.
In fact, Carbon Brief analysis reveals that the cut is far larger in real terms, with the new target worth around 30% less per year once inflation is taken into account.
When also excluding the government’s use of widely criticised “creative accounting” to boost apparent spending, the new pledge is roughly 50% lower than the old one.
The drop in climate finance means that – alongside other major donors – the UK is diverging from an international target, agreed in 2024 at COP29 in Baku, to ramp up climate aid to $300bn a year by 2035.
‘Innovative reforms’
Under the Paris Agreement, the UK and other developed countries committed to provide financial support for climate action in developing countries. This “climate finance” comes from the UK’s wider budget for “official development assistance”.
Successive governments have pledged set amounts of climate finance over five-year periods, supporting everything from solar energy in Nigeria to mangroves in Indonesia.
In 2019, the Conservative government promised to “double” the previous target of £5.8bn for the financial years 2016-17 to 2020-21 and reach a total of £11.6bn between 2021-22 and 2025-26.
The current Labour government inherited this goal in 2024, at a time of geopolitical instability, conflict and threats to global climate action.
Alongside other developed countries, the UK then pledged at the COP29 climate summit in2024 to roughly triple the total amount of global climate finance to $300bn a year by 2035.
With its £11.6bn target expiring in April 2026, the government has been under pressure to set a new goal that would increase climate finance in line with this global ambition.
Instead, since COP29, the UK has announced it will cut overall aid spending to 0.3% of gross national income, compared to the historic 0.7%, to raise money for military spending.
This continues a trend of aid cuts started by the former Conservative government and mirrors similar cuts taking place in other countries. Most notably, the US has virtually eliminated its contribution to international climate finance.
In March, foreign secretary Yvette Cooper finally announced details of how the UK’s headline cuts in overseas aid would impact specific spending priorities between 2026-27 and 2028-29, including climate finance. She said:
“Over the next three years, the UK will spend around £6bn of official development assistance as international climate finance. We will balance support between mitigation and adaptation and maintain a focus on nature.”
This amounts to a clear cut in annual climate-finance spending, even without considering the impact of inflation or accounting changes, as the chart below shows.

Despite Cooper’s pledge to “maintain a focus on nature”, the government also scrapped the “ring-fencing” of funds for nature and forest conservation, as well as the practice of setting five-year goals to provide more certainty to climate-aid recipients.
(The relatively vague “around” £6bn is also notable, given the previous targets were set at precisely £11.6bn and £5.8bn. This could allow the government to ultimately spend less than £6bn.)
The government is also clear that it is shifting its focus to using public development aid to “unlock private investment for development”, framing its overall approach as “innovative development reforms”. Cooper stated that, as well as the £6bn in climate finance:
“We will aim to generate an additional £6.7bn of UK-backed climate and nature positive investments and to mobilise billions more in private finance.”
Cooper described “climate and nature” as two of the government’s four “priority” themes for its dwindling aid spending.
Nevertheless, the international development committee of MPs expressed “deep concern” about the new climate pledge and NGOs called it a “backward step”.
Accounting changes
Media coverage of Cooper’s announcement stated that the new climate-finance target was 13-14% lower than the previous one.
This is based on the difference between average annual contributions out to 2029 under the new pledge – around £2bn – and the £2.3bn average from the previous period.
However, Carbon Brief analysis suggests that this straightforward approach makes the target seem more ambitious than it actually is.
When the £11.6bn target was set in 2019, only specific, climate-related projects funded directly by the UK government counted towards it. Then, in 2023, the Conservative government decided to loosen the criteria for the funds it counted towards the target.
This included relabelling existing support for multilateral development banks (MDBs), humanitarian aid and more private-sector investments as “climate finance”.
This approach – which mirrors that of other climate-finance donors – means the government is now on track to hit the £11.6bn target. (For more details, see Carbon Brief’s previous coverage.)
NGOs criticised this “creative accounting” at the time. Similarly, the UK’s official aid watchdog described the changes as “moving the goalposts”, as they meant the government could meet its target without providing as much new money. Nevertheless, the current Labour government has retained the changes.
The government released a list of specific aid allocations alongside Cooper’s recent announcement, which includes how much it plans to give to MDBs, as well as the UK-owned development body, British International Investment (BII).
Most of this money would not have been counted as climate finance under the old accounting system. Under the new system, a large portion of it will be.
Carbon Brief estimates that £1.7bn of new climate finance over the next three years – roughly 28% of the total – would not have counted as climate finance before the government’s accounting changes.

As the chart above shows, much of the money reclassified as climate aid will derive from automatically counting a fixed share of UK funding for MDBs as “climate-relevant”.
MDBs, including the World Bank and the African Development Bank, are major contributors to global climate finance. Member states, such as the UK, pay money into these banks, which then use their financial resources to support development projects.
Notably, while virtually all of the UK’s traditional climate finance has been provided as grants to developing countries, MDBs provide most of their support as loans. The prevalence of loans in global climate finance is a long-standing point of contention for developing countries.
Including inflation
The second key factor that influences the comparison between the UK’s old and new climate-finance targets is inflation. Experts have highlighted the importance of correcting for inflation when considering long-term finance targets.
This issue is particularly important now, as in recent years there has been significant inflation in the UK and around the world. This means the finance that the UK committed to give back in 2019 would not go as far today as it did then.
Adjusting for this inflation, Carbon Brief estimates that the £11.6bn target would equate to £14.3bn today, using 2021-22 – the start of the £11.6bn target – as the base year.
This means the government would have to pledge £14.3bn over five years – or £2.86bn a year – just to match the spending power of its previous goal. This new goal of £2bn a year is effectively a 30% real-terms cut in annual climate finance from the UK.
As the chart below shows, the previous climate target from five years ago is roughly twice as large per year as the new 2026 target, after correcting for inflation and once accounting changes have been removed.

Of course, ultimately, the government relied on accounting changes to meet the previous £11.6bn target as well.
Nevertheless, this comparison shows the significant backsliding in ambition, from 2021 when the plan was an £11.6bn goal, relying on a narrow range of sources – to a 2026 target that is lower in real terms, while drawing from a wider range of sources.
Global cuts
In 2024, developed countries such as the UK collectively agreed to raise their global climate-finance contributions to $300bn a year by 2035, as part of their Paris Agreement obligations.
This international target replaced the previous goal of $100bn per year by 2020, which was belatedly met in 2022.
While the new target will include large contributions from the private sector and MDBs, there is an expectation that a significant portion of it will still come directly from developed countries.
In this context, it is clear that the trajectory of UK climate finance is going in the wrong direction – falling, rather than increasing
The UK is certainly not alone in this regard. Speaking in parliament, Cooper told MPs that “allies such as Germany, France and Sweden have made similar choices” to cut aid in order to fund military spending.
Very few developed countries – and none of the biggest donors – have officially announced new or updated climate-finance targets for the coming years.
However, analysis by aid organisation CARE International last year concluded that other major climate-finance donors, including Germany and France, will also see their climate finance fall over the coming year, following cuts to their aid budgets.
The most significant drop has come from the US, which has effectively cut its international climate finance from several billion dollars a year to zero, under the Trump administration.
In addition to cutting its overall contribution, the UK is signalling that it will focus less on grant-based climate finance from government spending and more on “unlocking” billions of pounds in private-sector finance for climate action, as well as on “reform of the international development system”.
Such approaches may end up playing a major role in nations hitting the $300bn target by 2035.
However, this is highly contentious, with many developing countries arguing at UN negotiations that developed countries are reneging on their responsibilities to directly “provide” climate finance.
Methodology
The UK has announced that it will spend “around £6bn” on international climate finance between 2026-27 and 2028-29. Alongside this announcement, it released a list of “official development assistance (ODA) programme allocations 2026-27-2028-29”. These include details of “planned multilateral ODA programming” – covering MDBs – and spending on “arm’s-length bodies, private sector investments, subscriptions”, including BII.
Carbon Brief calculated the climate-related shares of core MDB finance – which the UK now counts as climate finance – using the climate shares for each MDB identified by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2023. These estimates may be conservative, as MDBs have committed to increasing the shares of their projects that are climate-related.
Carbon Brief calculated the extra BII contributions that the UK will count as climate finance by assuming, based on the most recent BII annual accounts, that 41% of its commitments each year will be climate-related. Previously, only 30% of BII contributions were counted as climate finance, so Carbon Brief assumed the difference between these shares would be additional.
The government has also said it now automatically counts 30% of all humanitarian assistance provided to the 10% most climate-vulnerable countries as climate finance. Based on figures provided to Carbon Brief via freedom of information request, this amounts to roughly 10% of all humanitarian assistance in recent years. The government has said it will “spend approximately £1.4bn each year in the places with the highest humanitarian need over the next three years”. Carbon Brief assumed that 10% of this – £140m each year – would count as climate finance.
To calculate the impact of inflation on the £11.6bn target, Carbon Brief used the UK Treasury’s GDP deflator, with 2021-22 as the baseline year.
The figures in this analysis are estimates based on the data released by the government so far. Climate-finance data is subject to various accounting changes and the final figures – when they are released – are likely to be different.
The post Analysis: UK is ‘halving’ its climate finance for developing countries appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: UK is ‘halving’ its climate finance for developing countries
Climate Change
Key green shipping talks to be held in late 2026
The future of the global shipping industry – and its 3% share of global emissions – will be decided in three weeks of talks in the third quarter of this year, after a decision taken in London on Friday.
At the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) headquarters this week, governments largely failed to substantively negotiate a controversial set of measures to penalise polluting ships and reward vessels running on clean fuels known as the Net-Zero Framework. The green shipping plan has been aggressively opposed by fossil fuel-producing nations, in particular by the US and Saudi Arabia.
This week, countries delivered statements outlining their views on the measures in a session that ran from Wednesday into Thursday. Then, late on Friday afternoon, they discussed when to negotiate these measures and what proposals they should discuss.
After a lengthy debate, which the talks’ chair Harry Conway joked was confusing, governments agreed to hold a week of behind-closed-door talks from 1 September to 4 September and from 23 November to 27 November.
Following these meetings, which are intended to negotiate disagreements on the NZF and rival watered-down measures proposed by the US and its allies, there will be public talks from November 30 to December 4.
Last October, talks intended to adopt the NZF provisionally agreed in April 2025 were derailed by the US and Saudi Arabia, who successfully persuaded a majority of countries to vote to postpone the talks by a year.
Those talks, known as an extraordinary session, are now scheduled to resume on Friday December 4 unless governments decide otherwise in the preceding weeks. While this Friday session will be in the same building with the same participants as the rest of the week’s talks, calling it the extraordinary session is significant as it means the NZF can be voted on.
Em Fenton, senior director of climate diplomacy at Opportunity Green said that the NZF “has survived but survival is not a victory” and called for it to be adopted later this year “in a way that maintains urgency and ambition, and delivers justice and equity for countries on the frontlines of climate impacts”.
NZF’s supporters
The NZF would penalise the owners of particularly polluting ships and use the revenues to fund cleaner fuels, support affected workers and help developing countries manage the transition.
Many governments – particularly in Europe, the Pacific and some Latin American and African nations – spoke in favour of it this week.
South Africa said the fund it would create is “the key enabler of a just transition” and its removal would take away predictable revenues from African countries. Vanuatu said that “we are not here to sink the ship but to man it”.
Australia’s representative called it a “carefully balanced compromise”, as it was provisionally agreed by a large majority after years of negotiations, and warned that failing to adopt it would harm the shipping industry by failing to provide certainty.
Santa Marta summit kick-starts work on key steps for fossil fuel transition
Canada’s negotiator said that if it was weakened to appease its critics like the US and Saudi Arabia, this would disappoint those who think it is too weak already like the Pacific islands.
A large group of mainly big developing countries like Nigeria and Indonesia did not rule out supporting the framework but called for adjustments to help developing countries deal with the changes. Nigeria called for developing countries to be given more time to implement the measures, a minimum share of the fund’s revenues and discounts for ships bringing them food and energy.
According to analysis from the University of College London’s Energy Institute, the countries speaking in support of the NZF include five countries which voted with the US to postpone talks in October and a further ten countries which did not take a clear position at that time. Most governments support the NZF as the basis for further talks, the institute said.
Opposition remains
But a small group of mainly oil-producing nations said they are opposed to any financial penalties for particularly polluting ships.
They support a proposal submitted by Liberia, Argentina and Panama which has proposed weakening emission targets and ditching any funding mechanism for the framework involving “direct revenue collection and disbursement”.
Argentina argued that the NZF would harm countries which are far from their export markets and said concerns over that cannot be solved “by magic with guidelines”. They added that, as a result, the NZF itself needs to be fundamentally re-negotiated.
The UCL Energy Institute said that just 24 countries – less than a quarter of those who spoke – said they supported Argentina’s proposal.
While this week’s talks did not see the kind of US threats reported in October, their delegation did leave personalised flyers on every delegate’s desk which were described by academics, negotiators and climate campaigners as misleading.
One witness told Climate Home News that junior US delegates arrived early on Wednesday and placed flyers behind governments’ name plates warning each country of the costs they would incur if the NZF is adopted.
The figures on a selection of leaflets seen by Climate Home News ranged from $100 million for Panama to $3.5 billion for the Netherlands. “They are trying to scare countries away from supporting climate action with one-sided information”, one negotiator told Climate Home News.

They added that the calculations, by the US State Department’s Office of the Chief Economist, ignore the fact that the money raised would be shared to help poorer countries’ transition as well as ignoring the economic costs of failing to address climate change.
Tristan Smith, an academic representing the Institute of Marine Engineering, Science and Technology, told the meeting that the calculations were “opaque” and flawed as they overstate the contribution of fuel cost to trade costs.
A US State Department Spokesperson said in a statement that they “firmly stand behind our estimates” which were shared “in good faith” and to “provide an additional tool to policymakers as they contemplate the true economic burden over the NZF”.
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Climate Change
The energy transition has a rare earth problem: These startups are solving it
The gleaming electric motors rolling off the production line at a factory in northeastern England offer an answer to one of the energy transition’s thorniest challenges.
The Advanced Electric Machines (AEM) plant outside Newcastle is at the forefront of building a new generation of motors made without rare earths, a group of 17 nearly indistinguishable metals used to manufacture most of the high-performance permanent magnets that power electric vehicles.
CEO James Widmer, a former aerospace engineer who founded the company in 2017, compares heavy reliance on rare earths in EV motors to the ill-fated decision to add lead to gasoline to resolve a technical issue.
“Putting rare earths in motors is the same thing,” Widmer told Climate Home News in a video call from his office. “You don’t need it, but somebody did it because it was easy.”
Widmer’s firm is among a handful of startup companies working with researchers to eliminate the need for rare earths in magnets and motors – offering a pathway to ease pressure on new mining and refining for one of the world’s most concentrated value chains.
Unease over China’s grip on supplies
As countries strive to reduce their climate-warming emissions by switching to electric transportation, demand for rare earths is soaring. That is increasing pressure for mining new resources and raising concerns about China’s supply chain domination.
China controls more than 90% of global rare earth separation and refining capacity and makes nearly all of the world’s permanent magnets – one of the building blocks of advanced technologies from EV motors and wind turbines vital to the energy transition to microchips, AI data centres and fighter jets.

Beijing spooked Western governments last year when it announced new export restrictions on supplies of rare earths and technological know-how in response to US tariffs on imports of Chinese goods. Automakers were left facing shortages.
While some of Beijing’s retaliatory curbs were suspended within months, China’s willingness to use its industrial clout over technological chokepoints to advance its geopolitical objectives has injected momentum into the efforts of companies such as AEM to find alternatives to rare earths.
“The best way to avoid the problems with these materials…isn’t to drill, baby, drill.The best way is just not to use them in the first place,” said Widmer.
Cutting that dependency would help shrink the environmental footprint of EV motors by keeping costly-to-extract rare earths in the ground, Widmer said.
Rare earth-free motors?
The auto industry had already been manufacturing electric motors using rare earth magnets for 20 years when Widmer set up AEM after conducting PhD research at the University of Newcastle.
Toyota’s Prius model, which is widely recognised as the first mass-produced hybrid passenger car, was launched in 1997 and used rare earth magnets in its motor.
About 80% of modern EV drivetrains now rely on high-performance rare earth permanent magnets to convert electricity into torque, according to a 2024 study, fuelling demand for the metals as EV adoption gains traction across the world, from Europe to South Asia.
Rapid electrification has doubled demand for magnet rare earths since 2015 and it is projected to increase by another 30% by 2030, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA). It recently put the cost of adequately diversifying the supply chain at $60 billion over the next decade.
Demand for EVs and concerns over oil dependence have rocketed back onto the political agenda after the Iran war sparked unprecedented disruptions to global oil markets, reigniting simmering debates about supply chain sovereignty for energy.

Contrary to their name, rare earths are found nearly everywhere on the planet in small quantities. However, larger, economically viable deposits are difficult to find and costly to extract.
On top of the expense, getting rare earths out of the ground is energy-intensive and generates toxic waste and sometimes radioactive by-products. This has led to large-scale environmental damage in China and Myanmar, where unregulated mines have become a major source of rare earth elements and are driving environmental destruction and violence, according to NGOs.
Lighter, greener, less risky
Instead of rare earth magnets, AEM’s motors rely on electrical steel laminations – thin stacked sheets of specialised metal – that create a magnetic field when powered.
The company says its electric motors are more energy-efficient and, in some configurations, more power-dense than traditional rare earth motors and reduce the emissions and polluting waste associated with permanent magnet motor manufacturing processes.
“And we’ve gotten rid of this enormous liability in the supply chain at the same time,” Widmer said.
The company, which manufactures electric motors for passenger cars and trucks as well as for the agricultural and aerospace sectors, expects demand for its technology to grow as buyers become increasingly aware of the risks of supply chain disruption and the environmental harm caused by rare earth mining.
AEM’s motors are already being used in commercial vehicles, for example in truck axles in the Netherlands, and the company aims to expand into new regions through a joint venture with Indian manufacturing firm Sterling Tools, a company spokesperson said.

‘Reinventing the wheel’
Some 8,000 kilometres from AEM’s factory floor, a group of Silicon Valley engineers has been inundated with enquiries since Beijing announced its export restrictions on technologies to mine and smelt rare earths, magnet production and recycling.
As manufacturers worried about shortages, the rare earths supply chain bottleneck became a board-level conversation and executives started scouting for alternatives, said Ankit Somani, a former Google engineer and the co-founder of Conifer.
“Every startup needs an unfair advantage – and that was ours,” he told Climate Home News, adding that the challenge is now to keep up with demand.
The San Francisco-based startup’s technology removes rare earths from electric scooters and small delivery vehicles by placing the motor directly inside the wheel hub, an innovation it describes as “literally reinventing the wheel”.

To transfer power inside vehicles, the company uses a refined form of iron oxide – the same basic compound as rust – known as a ferrite magnet.
Somani said the technology reduces the costs of manufacturing electric vehicles by eliminating the need for expensive rare earth supplies.
Conifer’s first production line already produces 75,000 motor components a year in the city of Pune in western India, the hub of its manufacturing operations, where electric two- and three-wheelers are booming.
To keep up with demand, the company is planning to open a 250,000-unit capacity facility, Somani said.
The next generation of magnets
At Minnesota-based Niron Magnetics, which produces permanent magnets using iron nitride instead of rare earths, vice president Tom Grainger said last year’s supply chain disruption had been a wake-up call.
“What was always possible but never quite material – the risk of geopolitical interference in magnet supply chains – became real in 2025,” he told Climate Home News.
In contrast to magnets that depend on Chinese rare earth supplies, the company’s iron nitride magnets are made from the abundant and inexpensive elements, iron and nitrogen.
Niron estimates that iron nitride magnets could replace roughly two-thirds of the global permanent magnet market.
Niron Magnetics’ first consumer-facing magnet, used in a professional loudspeaker, was rolled out earlier this year and the firm has already received investment from automotive giants General Motors, Stellantis and parts provider Magna International.
The company is developing its first full-scale manufacturing plant in Sartell, Minnesota, which aims to produce up to 1,500 tonnes of magnets annually when it opens in 2027, targeting consumer electronics, as well as the automobile sector, data-centre cooling pumps, robotics and drones.
By Chinese standards, that is a modest start: a typical factory in China can produce between 5,000 and 20,000 tonnes of rare earth magnets, said Grainger. But Niron’s model is designed to be replicated anywhere with basic industrial infrastructure. Unlike rare earth processing, it requires no proximity to a mine or complex chemical permitting.
“The goal…is a factory that has the scale to deliver in sufficient quantities for large programmes – with the economics that come with scale,” Grainger said.
The firm is already looking for a second site in the US to build a 10,000-tonne per year facility, equivalent to approximately 1-2% of the global permanent magnet market share, according to the company.
Governments ramp up support
Anxious to protect their industries from potential supply gaps, Western countries are supporting research into innovative rare earth alternatives.
Jean-Michel Lamarre, a team leader at Canada’s National Research Council, said the government’s science agency, which has been developing rare earth-free motor technologies, is working on using 3D printing to produce magnets.
Lamarre said that while removing rare earths from electric motors significantly reduces the costs of materials, making new designs commercially viable remains a challenge.
Difficulties include scaling up manufacturing capability and responding to rapidly changing market conditions, a spokesperson for Canada’s Department of Natural Resources said.

The US, Canada and the European Union have announced billions in subsidies and financial support to mine and produce more of the materials themselves, as well as funding research on rare earths substitutes. The US government is also investing heavily in American rare earths and magnet producers.
Recycling rare earth elements from discarded computers, motors and wind turbines also has a role to play in boosting domestic production, said Nicola Morley, a professor of materials physics at the University of Sheffield in the UK, who advises major manufacturers including Siemens and Volkswagen.
Recycling alone has the potential to reduce the need for primary rare earths supplies by up to 35% by 2050, according to the IEA.
Today, around 1% of the rare earths used in end-products is recycled because of technical and economic challenges. But startups are seizing on interest in creating circular supply chains that reduce reliance on China.
Better than rare earths
While recycling may be a relatively quick way for major markets to bolster their supplies of magnet metals, some researchers expect scientists to come up with groundbreaking alternatives to rival rare earths within a matter of years.
At Georgetown University in Washington DC, physicist Kai Liu and his team are working to create new materials for magnet production using a machine that bombards atoms of up to six different metals onto a surface simultaneously – like six games of pool played at once. As they land, the atoms bond into new crystal structures, which Liu’s team tests for magnetic properties.
Their research has already led to a discovery of magnet materials, Liu said, adding that he is hopeful for further breakthroughs by the scientific community.
“I am cautiously optimistic that within the next five to 10 years, the community might find something comparable or better than rare earths,” he said.
Main image: An employee working on an AEM motor at the company’s factory outside Newcastle (Photo: Advanced Electric Machines)
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Climate Change
How Shell is still benefiting from offloaded Niger Delta oil assets
When Shell sold its onshore oil operations in Nigeria to the Renaissance Africa Energy Company last year, the divestment transformed the fossil fuel giant’s climate performance – helping it become the first energy major to report zero routine flaring.
One year on, gas flaring at some of these assets has increased significantly, while Shell has continued to benefit commercially from them, according to a new investigation by nonprofit group Data Desk, shared exclusively with Climate Home News.
Since March 2025, Shell has traded 8 million barrels of oil from the Niger Delta’s Forcados terminal, which was included in the Renaissance deal, Data Desk’s analysis of information supplied by commodities data firm Kpler found.
It is a similar picture at the Bonny terminal, where Shell’s operations were also transferred as part of its onshore exit. Shell is recorded as having traded 3 million barrels of oil from this facility, south of the city of Port Harcourt, since the deal went through.
Multimillion-dollar oil shipments
Using an average 2025 global Brent crude price of $69 per barrel, 11 million barrels of oil shipped from the two terminals since the completion of Shell’s divestment would be worth $759 million.
Shell chartered the tankers carrying the oil to buyers around the world – from Ivory Coast and South Africa, to Canada and Italy, the Kpler data shows.
“Whoever is running Shell’s old oilfields in Nigeria needs to get that oil to market,” said Neil Atkinson, former head of the Oil Industry and Markets Division at the International Energy Agency (IEA).
“So it may well be that while Shell no longer runs a facility, the firm that took it over may have an arrangement to continue selling oil through Shell, thereby making use of their connections and trade networks,” Atkinson said.
Shell’s shipping and chartering arm made a profit of £24.8 million (about $33 million) in 2024, the most recent date available, up from £17 million the year before.
Asked about Shell’s continuing ties to the two terminals, a Shell spokesperson said: “We don’t comment on trading activities or specific customer relationships.”
Renaissance did not address a question from Climate Home News about its ongoing commercial ties with Shell.
Environmental legacy
The new reporting raises fresh questions about how energy majors present their climate performance to investors and consumers, and the environmental legacy they are leaving behind after selling fossil fuel assets in countries such as Nigeria, where Shell has operated for nearly a century.
Many of Shell’s onshore oil fields had been in production for decades by the time the company sold its Nigerian onshore subsidiary over a year ago for $2.4 billion to Renaissance, a consortium of Nigerian companies and an international firm that aims to double oil production by 2030.
Six months after finalising the deal, Renaissance CEO Tony Attah said the company had already boosted output at Shell’s former fields by 100,000 barrels per day.


At the same time, gas flaring increased at most of the fields where the activity was detected, according to Data Desk’s analysis of satellite data, despite Renaissance’s pledges to foster sustainable energy development and protect local communities.
Gas is a by-product of oil drilling. In places that lack infrastructure to process this gas, like the Niger Delta, it gets burned off instead.
Earlier this year, Climate Home News reported on the impact on local communities of increased gas flaring at several other fields in the Niger Delta since they were sold by Shell to different Nigerian companies in recent years.
Besides billowing out toxic chemicals that cause air pollution and wasting a potential energy source, global gas flaring is estimated by the World Bank to release the equivalent of 400 million tonnes of CO2 annually – higher than France’s greenhouse gas emissions each year.
Gas flaring renaissance?
Comparing the year before the sale’s completion to the year after, satellite data shows daily flaring rose at 10 of the 13 Renaissance blocks where it was detected. Flaring fell at two blocks and was unchanged at one other, while five had no detectable flaring in the dataset.
The OML 32 block, located in the heart of the Niger Delta, was one of the assets that Renaissance took over last year. Here, average daily flaring was more than 20 times higher in the year ending March 2026 compared to the year before, according to Data Desk’s analysis of satellite data from the Colorado School of Mines’ Earth Observation Group.
The Renaissance-operated OML 21 and OML 28 onshore blocks saw increases of 390% and 93%, respectively, in average daily flaring in the year after the sale’s completion.

A spokesperson for Renaissance said the company’s environmental management framework included a plan to reduce flaring.
“Renaissance Africa Energy Company Limited has a multi-year gas flaring reduction strategy through its Flare Elimination and Monetisation Plan, developed in accordance with applicable laws and regulations,” the spokesperson said.
Shell’s spokesperson said it “cannot comment on operational matters relating to assets under new owners/operators”, adding that both the company and the Nigerian government had conducted “extensive due diligence” with regard to its divestments in Nigeria.
“Dodging accountability”
Before the deal, Shell said three years ago that its remaining Nigerian assets accounted for about half of the total routine and non-routine flaring in its integrated gas and upstream facilities. Shortly after selling these assets, the company announced it had achieved zero routine flaring – five years ahead of a global 2030 target set by the World Bank.


Shell’s exit from onshore operations in Nigeria followed years of accusations of environmental harm, including oil spills. Residents of two Nigerian communities are currently taking legal action against the oil major in the UK and a trial at the High Court is due to begin next year.
Shell says the majority of spills in the Niger Delta were caused by theft and sabotage and it is therefore not liable.
According to Atkinson, Shell pivoted away from onshore oil fields that “might have become more trouble than they were worth” while remaining a major player in Nigeria’s oil industry.
Top green jet fuel producer linked to suspect waste-oil supply chain
The London-based company has invested billions in offshore gas development in the country. It has also retained a 25.6% stake in Nigeria LNG Limited (NLNG), a liquefied natural gas producer based on Bonny Island.
As the world’s biggest fossil fuel companies seek to meet their climate targets, a strategic shift “to dodge accountability” by selling more problematic assets is under way, said Sophie Marjanac, director of legal strategy at the Polluter Pays Project, an organisation that campaigns for the oil industry to cover the cost of its environmental damage.
“By dumping ageing, polluting infrastructure onto smaller operators, they leave behind contamination, and communities facing ongoing harm with little chance of justice,” Marjanac said.
The post How Shell is still benefiting from offloaded Niger Delta oil assets appeared first on Climate Home News.
How Shell is still benefiting from offloaded Niger Delta oil assets
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Bill Discounting Climate Change in Florida’s Energy Policy Awaits DeSantis’ Approval
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