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The UK’s greenhouse gas emissions fell by 3.6% in 2024 as coal use dropped to the lowest level since 1666, the year of the Great Fire of London, according to new Carbon Brief analysis.

Major contributions came from the closure of the UK’s last coal-fired power station in Nottinghamshire and one of its last blast furnaces at the Port Talbot steelworks in Wales.

Other factors include a nearly 40% rise in the number of electric vehicles (EVs) on the road, above-average temperatures and the UK’s electricity being the “cleanest ever” in 2024.

Carbon Brief’s analysis, based on preliminary government energy data, shows emissions fell to just 371m tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (MtCO2e) in 2024, the lowest level since 1872.

Other key findings from the analysis include:

  • The UK’s emissions are now 54% below 1990 levels, while GDP has grown by 84%.
  • About half of the drop in emissions in 2024 was due to a 54% reduction in UK coal demand, which fell to just 2m tonnes – the lowest level since 1666.
  • Another third of the drop in 2024 emissions was due to falling demand for oil and gas, with the remainder down to ongoing reductions in non-CO2 greenhouse gases.
  • UK coal demand fell at power stations (one-third of the reduction overall) and at industrial sites (two-thirds). In 2024, the UK closed its last coal-fired power station, as well as the final blast furnace at the Port Talbot steelworks. Furnaces at Scunthorpe paused operations. Both sites are due to convert to electric-arc furnaces that do not rely on coal.
  • Oil demand fell 1.4% despite increased road traffic, largely due to the rise in the number of EVs. The UK’s 1.4m EVs, 0.8m plug-in hybrids and 76,000 electric vans cut oil-related emissions by at least 5.9MtCO2e, Carbon Brief analysis finds, only slightly offset by around 0.5MtCO2e from higher electricity demand.
  • The UK’s EV motorists each saved around £800, on average, in 2024 – some £1.7bn in total – relative to the cost of driving petrol or diesel vehicles.
  • Gas demand for heating increased, despite warmer average temperatures than in 2023, as prices eased from the peaks seen after the global energy crisis.
  • However, gas demand fell overall due to lower gas-fired electricity generation, thanks to higher electricity imports and increased output from low-carbon sources.

The UK would need to cut its emissions by a larger amount each year than it did in 2024, to reach its international climate goal for 2035, as well as its national target to reach net-zero by 2050.

The analysis is the latest in a decade-long series of annual estimates from Carbon Brief, covering emissions during 2023, 2022, 2020, 2019, 2018, 2017, 2016, 2015 and 2014.

Lowest since 1872

The UK’s territorial greenhouse gas emissions – those that occur within the country’s borders – have now fallen in 26 of the 35 years since 1990.

(Consumption-based emissions, including CO2 embedded in imported goods and services, were increasing until 2007, but have since fallen at a similar rate to territorial emissions.)

Apart from brief rebounds after the global financial crisis and the Covid-19 lockdowns, UK emissions have fallen every year for the past two decades.

The latest 14MtCO2e (3.6%) reduction takes UK emissions down to 371MtCO2e, according to Carbon Brief’s new analysis.

This is the lowest since 1872 and on par with 1926, when there was a general strike, as shown in the figure below. In 1872, Queen Victoria was on the throne and Wanderers beat Royal Engineers in the first-ever FA Cup final, held at Kennington Oval in south London.

UK territorial greenhouse gas emissions, MtCO2e, 1850-2024.
UK territorial greenhouse gas emissions, MtCO2e, 1850-2024. Note the impact of general strikes in 1921 and 1926; the miner’s strike of 1984 had a smaller impact. Source: Jones et al. (2023) and Carbon Brief analysis of figures from the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ).

The UK’s emissions are now definitively below the level reached only temporarily during the height of Covid in 2020, having fallen steadily in each of the past three years.

They are now at levels not seen consistently since Victorian times.

Coal collapse

The largest factor in emissions falling last year, accounting for around 7MtCO2e or two-thirds of the reduction overall, was a massive 54% drop in UK coal demand.

In percentage terms, this was the fastest annual reduction in UK coal demand on record, in figures going back to the 16th century. (In absolute terms, the 2.4Mt fall in coal use in 2024 is easily eclipsed by the 34Mt reduction seen during the 1984 miners’ strike.)

The UK used just 2.1Mt of coal in 2024. As shown in the figure below, this is the lowest amount since 1666, when the UK’s capital city was engulfed in the Great Fire of London.

Annual UK coal demand, million tonnes, 1560-2024.
Annual UK coal demand, million tonnes, 1560-2024. Note the impact of general strikes in 1921 and 1926, as well as the miners’ strike of 1984. Source: Carbon Brief analysis of data from DESNZ and Paul Warde.

Roughly one-third of the drop in coal use overall last year was due to the closure of the UK’s last coal-fired power station, at Ratcliffe-on-Soar in Nottinghamshire. (For more on how the UK became the first G7 country to phase out coal power, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth interactive feature.)

The plant supplied power to the grid for the last time in September 2024, bringing to an end a 142-year era of using coal to generate electricity in the UK.

The shift away from coal power towards low-carbon sources has been one of the driving forces of UK emissions cuts in recent years.

Indeed, in the period since the UK’s Climate Change Act was passed, the amount of coal used to generate electricity has dropped by 99%, from 48Mt in 2008 to less than 1Mt in 2024. This accounts for the large majority (84%) of the total reduction in coal use over the same period.

Steel slide

In 2024, however, two-thirds of the drop in UK coal consumption – and one-third of the drop in emissions overall – came from lower coal use by heavy industry.

This was largely due to lower steel production, which fell from 5.6Mt in 2023 to 4.0Mt in 2024, a reduction of 29%. This 1.6Mt drop in production was mostly offset by a 1.3Mt increase in imports.

The Port Talbot steelworks in Wales shut down its last two blast furnaces in April and September, with owner Tata blaming losses of £1m a day for the closures.

Since the site last made a profit in 2022, UK and global steel prices have fallen sharply, as shown in the figure below. US credit rating agency Fitch Ratings says the decline in prices, down to weak demand and high exports from China, is “putting pressure on producers’ margins”.

Steel rebar price index, 2015=100.
Steel rebar price index, 2015=100. Source: Department for Business and Industry.

Many commentators have tried to blame climate policy or electricity prices for the steel sector’s problems. However, energy only makes up a tiny fraction of coal-based steel production costs.

Moreover, steelmakers around the world – from China to South Africa – are facing similar challenges, with prices falling as a result of supply being significantly greater than demand.

Industry group Eurofer says the European market is being “flooded by cheap foreign steel”. It adds that economic headwinds in China, including its real-estate slowdown, have seen “around 100m tonnes of Chinese steel…flooding major markets at dumping prices”.

As such, it is not at all clear that the UK steel sector would have fared differently – or that the Port Talbot blast furnaces would have remained open – in the absence of climate policy.

For example, the sector is part of the UK emissions trading scheme (UKETS), meaning it nominally faces a carbon price that imports from outside the EU would not have to pay.

Yet UK (and EU) steelmakers continue to receive free allowances to shield them from the risk of “leakage” due to competition from abroad. The Port Talbot steelworks received more than 21m free allowances to cover its emissions in the period 2021-2025, worth roughly £1bn. Similarly, the Scunthorpe steelworks received nearly 17m allowances worth around £0.8bn.

From 2027, the UK plans to follow the EU in shifting from free allowances to a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), under which importers must pay an equivalent carbon price.

The closure of the UK’s blast furnaces is not the end of the story for steelmaking in the country. Indeed, Tata has pledged an investment worth £1.25bn to reopen its Welsh site with electric arc furnaces, which do not rely on coal. This includes up to £0.5bn from the government. Tata says it will have the capacity to produce 3Mt of steel per year from late 2027 or early 2028.

Production also paused in 2024 at the Scunthorpe steelworks, run by the Chinese-owned British Steel, reportedly due to managers ordering the wrong type of coal. Its blast furnaces are now operating again, but it is also looking to shift to electric arc furnaces with government support.

The UK steel industry has welcomed the shift to electric arc furnaces, but has called for efforts to reduce electricity prices, including the 2024 “supercharger” scheme that exempts heavy industry from additional costs relating to renewable subsidies and electricity network charges.

The government’s February 2025 steel strategy looks at issues including “overcapacity in global markets” and the “influence of electricity prices on the competitiveness of the steel sector”.

Rise of EVs

After coal, the next-largest chunk of emissions cuts in 2024 came from lower demand for oil and gas, which accounted for around a third of the reduction overall.

The 1.4% drop in oil demand is particularly interesting, given that traffic on the UK’s roads has been increasing in recent years.

The number of miles driven on UK roads increased by more than 1% in 2024 and is now close to pre-pandemic levels. Yet UK demand for road-transport fuels fell by another 1.6% in 2024 and is now nearly 14% lower than it was in 2019, as shown in the figure below.

UK demand for petrol and diesel, million tonnes.
UK demand for petrol and diesel, million tonnes. Source: DESNZ.

Along with improvements in fuel efficiency, the rise of EVs is a key part of this phenomenon.

The UK’s right-leaning newspapers have been busy finding new driving-related wordplay for what they have misleadingly described as a “stalling” market for EVs, which is apparently “going into reverse”.

The reality is that the number of EVs on the UK’s road rose from 1m in 2023 to 1.4m in 2024, an increase of 39% in just one year. The number of plug-in hybrids was up 28% to 0.8m.

Along with 76,000 electric vans, these EVs cut oil-related emissions by at least 5.9MtCO2e in 2024, Carbon Brief analysis finds, relative to similar vehicles burning petrol or diesel fuel.

These electrified vehicles have added around 4 terawatt hours to UK electricity demand in 2024, around 1% of the total. As such, the emissions associated with additional electricity generation, at around 0.5MtCO2e, offsets less than 10% of the savings from reduced oil use.

(On a lifecycle basis, EVs in the UK cut emissions by around 70% taking into account the emissions associated with manufacturing the cars, their batteries and fuelling them during use.)

Even more strikingly, the UK’s EV drivers saved around £1.7bn in lower fuel costs in 2024, Carbon Brief analysis finds, relative to petrol or diesel vehicles.

These savings, averaging roughly £800 per vehicle per year, conservatively assume that charging takes place at domestic retail electricity prices, rather than reduced-rate overnight tariffs.

Greenhouse gas emissions from burning gas also dipped in 2024, as demand for the fuel reached a record low. The roughly 2MtCO2e drop in emissions from gas made up around a sixth of the reduction in the UK overall and reflects the combined impact of competing trends.

Demand for heating in buildings (+3.8%) and offices (+0.6%) increased, despite temperatures being above average and higher than a year earlier. Industrial gas use also increased (+0.3%).

This is likely the result of lower fuel prices, which have eased since the peaks seen during the early phase of the global energy crisis precipitated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

In contrast, gas demand for generating power fell by 13%, helping to make the UK’s electricity in 2024 the “cleanest ever”. This reduction was due to an increase in output from low-carbon sources, as well as an increase in the amount of cheap electricity imported from overseas.

A small, but still notable contributor to lower UK gas demand in 2024 came from reduced imports of liquified natural gas (LNG), which roughly halved compared with a year earlier.

Following Russia’s invasion, the UK had acted as an import hub for the rest of Europe, taking deliveries of LNG and then re-exporting the gas to the continent via pipelines. In 2024, however, European demand for gas eased and UK exports via the pipeline to Belgium also halved.

Import terminals use some of the gas they handle to “regasify” the supercooled LNG cargo that arrives by ship, turning it back into a gas that can be fed into pipelines. (The emissions associated with this process count towards the UK’s territorial total, even if the gas is burned overseas.)

In 2023, these terminals had used some 3TWh of gas, equivalent to the heating needs of half the homes in Birmingham. In 2024, LNG terminals used half this amount.

Emissions decoupling

While the UK’s emissions have fallen in most years since 1990, the baseline for the nation’s climate goals, the size of its economy has nearly doubled.

Specifically, emissions are “decoupling” from economic growth, having fallen to 54% below 1990 levels while GDP is up 84%, as shown in the figure below.

Change since 1990, %, in UK greenhouse gas emissions (red) and GDP adjusted for inflation (blue).
Change since 1990, %, in UK greenhouse gas emissions (red) and GDP adjusted for inflation (blue). Source: Carbon Brief analysis of figures from DESNZ, the Office for National Statistics and the World Bank.

Taking an even longer view, the UK’s £2tn economy is now about 20 times larger than it was in 1872, after adjusting for inflation, whereas emissions are roughly the same.

Moreover, considering its population is now nearly 70 million people compared to 32m in 1872, the UK’s per-capita emissions have fallen two-fold, from 11.3tCO2e in 1872 to 5.4CO2e in 2024.

The 14MtCO2e drop in emissions in 2024 can be compared with the trajectory needed to reach the UK’s national and international climate pledges for 2035 and 2050.

If emissions fell by the same amount every year as they did in 2024, then the UK would miss both targets. It would need to cut emissions by 20MtCO2e each year to meet the 2035 target and by an average of 15MtCO2e per year to reach net-zero emissions by 2050.

In other words, annual emissions cuts would need to accelerate in the short- to medium-term, but could start to ease off later on. This is consistent with the cost-effective pathway to net-zero set out last month by the Climate Change Committee in its latest advice to the government.

Methodology

The starting point for Carbon Brief’s analysis of UK greenhouse gas emissions is preliminary government estimates of energy use by fuel. These are published quarterly, with the final quarter of each year appearing in figures published at the end of the following February. The same approach has accurately estimated year-to-year changes in emissions in previous years (see table, below).

Year Reported Carbon Brief Difference
2010 2.4 2.6 0.2
2011 -7.3 -7.7 -0.4
2012 2.9 3.6 0.7
2013 -2.2 -4.1 -1.9
2014 -7.5 -7.5 -0.0
2015 -3.9 -3.8 0.0
2016 -5.2 -5.7 -0.4
2017 -2.5 -2.0 0.5
2018 -1.5 -1.8 -0.3
2019 -3.6 -4.0 -0.4
2020 -8.8 -8.9 -0.0
2021 3.6 3.8 0.2
2022 -4.2 -3.5 0.7
2023 -4.9 -5.1 -0.2
2024 -3.6

Annual change in UK greenhouse gas emissions, %

One large source of uncertainty is the provisional energy use data, which is revised at the end of March each year and often again later on. Emissions data is also subject to revision in light of improvements in data collection and the methodology used, with major revisions in 2021.

The table above applies Carbon Brief’s emissions calculations to the comparable energy use and emissions figures, which may differ from those published previously.

Another source of uncertainty is the fact that Carbon Brief’s approach to estimating the annual change in emissions differs from the methodology used for the government’s own provisional estimates. The government has access to more granular data not available for public use.

Carbon Brief’s analysis takes figures on the amount of energy sourced from coal, oil and gas reported in Energy Trends 1.2. These figures are combined with conversion factors for the CO2 emissions per unit of energy, published annually by the UK government. Conversion factors are available for each fuel type, for example, petrol, diesel, gas and coal for electricity generation.

For oil, the analysis also draws on Energy Trends 3.13, which further breaks down demand according to the subtype of oil, for example, petrol, jet fuel and so on. Similarly, for coal, the analysis draws on Energy Trends 2.6, which breaks down solid fuel use by subtype.

Emissions from each fuel are then estimated from the energy use multiplied by the conversion factor, weighted by the relative proportions for each fuel subtype.

For example, the UK uses roughly 50m tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe) in the form of oil products, around half of which is from road diesel. So half the total energy use from oil is combined with the conversion factor for road diesel, another one-fifth for petrol and so on.

Energy use from each fossil fuel subtype is mapped onto the appropriate emissions conversion factor. In some cases, there is no direct read-across, in which case the nearest appropriate substitute is used. For example, energy use listed as “bitumen” is mapped to “processed fuel oils – residual oil”. Similarly, solid fuel used by “other conversion industries” is mapped to “petroleum coke”, and “other” solid fuel use is mapped to “coal (domestic)”.

The energy use figures are calculated on an inland consumption basis, meaning they include bunkers consumed in the UK for international transport by air and sea. In contrast, national emissions inventories exclude international aviation and shipping.

The analysis, therefore, estimates and removes the part of oil use that is due to the UK’s share of international aviation. It draws on the UK’s final greenhouse gas emissions inventory, which breaks emissions down by sector and reports the total for domestic aviation.

This domestic emissions figure is compared with the estimated emissions due to jet fuel use overall, based on the appropriate conversion factor. The analysis assumes that domestic aviation’s share of emissions is equivalent to its share of jet fuel energy use.

In addition to estimating CO2 emissions from fossil fuel use, Carbon Brief assumes that CO2 emissions from non-fuel sources, such as land-use change and forestry, are the same as a year earlier. The remaining greenhouse gas emissions are assumed to change in line with the latest government energy and emissions projections.

These assumptions are based on the UK government’s own methodology for preliminary greenhouse gas emissions estimates, published in 2019.

Note that the figures in this article are for emissions within the UK measured according to international guidelines. This means they exclude emissions associated with imported goods, including imported biomass, as well as the UK’s share of international aviation and shipping.

The Office for National Statistics (ONS) has published detailed comparisons between various different approaches to calculating UK emissions, on a territorial, consumption, environmental accounts or international accounting basis.

The UK’s consumption-based CO2 emissions increased between 1990 and 2007. Since then, however, they have fallen by a similar number of tonnes as emissions within the UK.

Bioenergy is a significant source of renewable energy in the UK and its climate benefits are disputed. Contrary to public perception, however, only around one-quarter of bioenergy is imported.
International aviation is considered part of the UK’s carbon budgets and faces the prospect of tighter limits on its CO2 emissions. The international shipping sector has a target to at least halve its emissions by 2050, relative to 2008 levels.

The post Analysis: UK emissions fall 3.6% in 2024 as coal use drops to lowest since 1666 appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Analysis: UK emissions fall 3.6% in 2024 as coal use drops to lowest since 1666

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Q&A: What we do – and do not – know about the blackout in Spain and Portugal

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At 12.33pm on Monday 28 April, most of Spain and Portugal were plunged into chaos by a blackout.

While the initial trigger remains uncertain, the nationwide blackouts took place after around 15 gigawatts (GW) of electricity generating capacity – equivalent to 60% of Spain’s power demand at the time – dropped off the system within the space of five seconds.

The blackouts left millions of people without power, with trains, traffic lights, ATMs, phone connections and internet access failing across the Iberian peninsula.

By Tuesday morning, almost all electricity supplies across Spain and Portugal had been restored, but questions about the root cause remained.

Many media outlets were quick to – despite very little available data or information – blame renewables, net-zero or the energy transition for the blackout, even if only by association, by highlighting the key role solar power plays in the region’s electricity mix.

Below, Carbon Brief examines what is known about the Spanish and Portuguese power cuts, the role of renewables and how the media has responded.

What happened and what was the impact?

The near-total power outage in the Iberian Peninsula on Monday affected millions of people.

Spain and Portugal experienced the most extensive blackouts, but Andorra also reported outages, as did the Basque region of France. According to Reuters, the blackout was the biggest in Europe’s history.

In a conference call with reporters, Spanish grid operator Red Eléctrica set out the order of events.

Shortly after 12.30pm, the grid suffered an “event” akin to loss of power generation, according to a summary of the call posted by Bloomberg’s energy and commodities columnist Javier Blas on LinkedIn. While the grid almost immediately self-stabilised and recovered, about 1.5 seconds later a second “event” hit, he wrote.

Around 3.5 seconds later, the interconnector between the Spanish region of Catalonia and south-west France was disconnected due to grid instability. Immediately after this, there was a “massive” loss of power on the system, Blas said.

This caused the power grid to “cascade down into collapse”, causing the “unexplained disappearance” of 60% of Spain’s generation, according to Politico.

It quoted Spanish prime minister Pedro Sánchez, who told a press conference late on Monday that the causes were not yet known:

“This has never happened before. And what caused it is something that the experts have not yet established – but they will.”

The figure below shows the sudden loss of 15GW of generating capacity from the Spanish grid at 12.33pm on Monday. In addition, a further 5GW disconnected from the Portuguese grid.

 Electricity generation capacity in Spain, megawatts (MW), from 27-29 April, showing the drop in generation.
Electricity generation capacity in Spain, megawatts (MW), from 27-29 April, showing the drop in generation. Credit: Red Eléctrica.

The Guardian noted in its coverage that “while the system weathered the first event, it could not cope with the second”.

A separate piece from the publication added that “barely a corner of the peninsula, which has a joint population of almost 60 million people, escaped the blackout”.

El País reported that “the power cut…paralysed the normal functioning of infrastructures, telecommunications, roads, train stations, airports, stores and buildings. Hospitals have not been impacted as they are using generators.”

According to Spanish newswire EFE, “hundreds of thousands of people flooded the streets, forced to walk long distances home due to paralysed metro and commuter train services, without mobile apps as telecommunications networks also faltered”.

It added that between 30,000 and 35,000 passengers had to be evacuated from stranded trains.

el_pais_madrid on X: Madrid recupera el servicio de Metro

The New York Times reported that Portuguese banks and schools closed, while ATMs stopped working across the country and Spain. People “crammed into stores to buy food and other essentials as clerks used pen and paper to record cash-only transactions”, it added.

Spain’s interior ministry declared a national emergency, according to Reuters, deploying 30,000 police to keep order.

Both Spain and Portugal convened emergency cabinet meetings, with Spain’s King Felipe VI chairing a national security council meeting on Tuesday to discuss an investigation into the power outage, Sky News reported.

By 10pm on Monday, 421 out of Spain’s 680 substations were back online, meaning that 43% of expected power demand was being met, reported the Guardian.

By Tuesday morning, more than 99% of the total electricity supply had been recovered, according to Politico, quoting Red Eléctrica.

In Portugal, power had been restored to every substation on the country’s grid by 11.30pm on Monday. In a statement released on Tuesday, Portuguese grid operator REN said the grid had been “fully stabilised”.

What caused the power cuts?

In the wake of the power cuts, politicians, industry professionals, media outlets, armchair experts and the wider public scrambled to make sense of what had just happened.

Spanish prime minister Sánchez said on the afternoon of the blackout that the government did not have “conclusive information” on its cause, adding that it “[did] not rule out any hypothesis”, Spanish newspaper Diario Sur reported.

Nevertheless, some early theories were quickly rejected by officials.

Red Eléctrica, “preliminarily ruled out that the blackout was due to a cyberattack, human error or a meteorological or atmospheric phenomenon”, El País reported the day after the event.

Politico noted that “people in the street in Spain and some local politicians” had speculated about a cyberattack.

However, it quoted Eduardo Prieto, Red Eléctrica’s head of system operation services, saying that while the conclusions were preliminary, the operator had “been able to conclude that there has not been any type of intrusion in the electrical network control systems that could have caused the incident”.

The Majorca Daily Bulletin reported that Spain’s High Court said it would open an investigation into whether the event was the result of a cyberattack.

Initial reporting by news agencies blamed the power cuts on a “rare atmospheric phenomenon”, citing the Portuguese grid operator REN, according to the Guardian. The newspaper added that REN later said this statement had been incorrectly attributed to it.

The phenomenon in question was described as an “induced atmospheric vibration”.

Prof Mehdi Seyedmahmoudian, an electrical engineer at Swinburne University of Technology in Australia, explained in the Conversation that this was “not a commonly used term”.

Nevertheless, he said the phenomenon being described was familiar, referring to “wavelike movements” in the atmosphere caused by sudden changes in temperature or pressure.

In general terms, Reuters explained that power cuts are often linked to extreme weather, but that the “weather at the time of Monday’s collapse was fair”. It added that faults at power stations, power distribution lines or substations can also trigger outages.

Another theory was that a divergence of electrical frequency from 50 cycles per second (Hz), the European standard, could have caused parts of the system to shut down in order to protect equipment, France 24 explained.

Some analysts noted that “oscillations” in grid frequency shortly before the events in Spain and Portugal could be related to the power cuts. Tobias Burke, policy manager at Energy UK, explained this theory in his Substack:

“The fact these frequency oscillations mirrored those in Latvia…at the other extreme of the Europe-spanning ENTSO-E network, might suggest complex inter-area oscillations across markets could be the culprit.”

This phenomenon can be seen in a chart shared by Prof Lion Hirth, an energy researcher at Hertie School, on LinkedIn.

Lion Hirth on LinkedIn: What caused the blackout in Spain and Portugal yesterday

With many details still unknown, much of the media speculation has focused on the role that renewable energy could have played in the blackouts. (See: Did renewable energy play a role in the cut?)

Many of the experts cited in the media emphasised the complexity of determining the cause of the outages. Eamonn Lannoye, managing director at the Electric Power Research Institute Europe, was quoted by the Associated Press stating:

“There’s a variety of things that usually happen at the same time and it’s very difficult for any event to say ‘this was the root cause’.”

Nevertheless, there are several efforts now underway to determine what the causes were.

Portugal’s prime minister, Luís Montenegro, announced on Tuesday that the government would set up an independent technical commission to investigate the blackouts, while stressing that the problem had originated in Spain, according to Euractiv.

Finally, EU energy commissioner Dan Jørgensen has indicated that the EU will open a “thorough investigation” into the reasons behind the power cuts, BBC News noted.

Dan Jørgensen on X: The energy situation in Spain and Portugal is back to normal

Did renewable energy play a role in the blackouts?

As commentators began to look into the cause of the blackout, many pointed to the high share of renewables in Spain’s electricity mix.

On 16 April, Spain’s grid had run entirely on renewable sources for a full day for the first time ever, with wind accounting for 46% of total output, solar 27%, hydroelectric 23% and solar thermal and others meeting the rest, according to PV Magazine.

Spain is targeting 81% renewable power by 2030 and 100% by 2050.

At the time of the blackout on Monday, solar accounted for 59% of the country’s electricity supplies, wind nearly 12%, nuclear 11% and gas around 5%, reported the Independent.

The initial “event” is thought to have originated in the south-western region of Extremadura, noted Politico, “which is home to the country’s most powerful nuclear power plant, some of its largest hydroelectric dams and numerous solar farms.”

On Tuesday, Red Eléctrica’s head of system operation services Eduardo Prieta said that it was “very possible that the affected generation [in the initial ‘events’] could be solar”.

This sparked further speculation about how grids that are highly reliant on variable renewables can be managed so as to ensure security of supply.

Political groups such as the far-right VOX – which has historically pushed back against climate action such as the expansion of renewables – also pointed to the blackout as evidence of “the importance of a balanced energy mix”.

However, others rejected this suggestion, with EU energy chief Dan Jørgensen telling Bloomberg that the blackout could not be pinned on a “specific source of energy”:

“As far as we know, there was nothing unusual about the sources of energy supplying electricity to the system yesterday. So the causes of the blackout cannot be reduced to a specific source of energy, for instance renewables.”

Others have sought to highlight that, while it was possible solar power was involved in the initial frequency event, this does not mean that it was ultimately the cause of the blackout.

Writing on LinkedIn, chief technology officer of Arenko, a renewable energy software company, Roger Hollies, noted:

“The initial trip may well have been a solar plant, but trips happen all the time across all asset types. Networks should be designed to withstand multiple loss of generators. 15GW is not one power station, this is the equivalent of 10 large gas or nuclear power stations or 75 solar parks.”

Others pointed to what they said was insufficient nuclear power on the grid – a notion that prime minister Sánchez rejected, according to El País.

Speaking on Tuesday, he said that those arguing the blackouts showed a need for more nuclear power were “either lying or showing ignorance”, according to the newspaper. It said he highlighted that nuclear plants were yet to fully recover from the event.

One key aspect of the transition away from electricity systems built around thermal power stations burning coal, gas or uranium is a loss of “inertia”, the Financial Times highlighted.

Thermal power plants generate electricity using large spinning turbines, which rotate at the same 50 cycles per second (Hz) speed as the electrical grid oscillates. The weight of these “large lump[s] of spinning metal” gives them “inertia”, which counteracts changes in frequency on the rest of the grid.

When faults cause a rise or fall in grid frequency, this inertia helps lower the rate of change of frequency, giving system operators more time to respond, noted Adam Bell, director of policy at Stonehaven, in a post on LinkedIn.

Solar does not include a spinning generator, and therefore, critics pointed to the lack of inertia on the grid due to the high levels of the technology as a cause of the blackout.

As Bell pointed out, this ignores the inertia provided by nuclear, hydro and solar thermal on the grid at the time of the blackout, alongside the Spanish grid operator having built “synchronous condensers” to help boost inertia and grid stability.

Bell added:

“A lack of inertia was therefore not the main driver for the blackout. Indeed, post the frequency event, no fossil generation remained online – but wind, solar and hydro did.”

While the ultimate cause of the blackouts remains to be seen, they have highlighted the need for an increased focus on grid stability, particularly as the economy is electrified.

A selection of comments from experts published in Review Energy emphasises the need for further resilience to be built into the grid as it transitions away from fossil fuels.

How has the media responded to the power cut?

As the crisis was still unfolding and its cause remained unknown, several climate-sceptic right-leaning UK publications clamoured to draw a link between the blackouts and the nations’ reliance on renewable energy.

It comes as right-leaning titles have stepped up their campaigning against climate policy over the past year.

George Mann on Bluesky: The Daily Telegraph: Net zero blamed for blackout chaos

On Tuesday, the Daily Telegraph carried a frontpage story headlined: “Net-zero blamed for blackout chaos.”

But the article contradicted its own headline by concluding: “What exactly happened remains unclear for now. And the real answer is likely to involve several factors, not just one.”

None of the experts quoted in the piece blamed “net-zero” for the incident.

The Daily Telegraph also carried an editorial seeking to argue renewable energy was the cause of the blackouts, which claimed that “over-reliance on renewables means a less resilient grid”.

The Daily Express had an editorial (not online) claiming that the blackout shows “relying on renewables is dim”.

Additionally, the Standard carried a comment by notorious climate-sceptic commentator Ross Clark breathlessly blaming the blackout on “unreliable” renewables, with a fear-monguering warning that the “same could happen in the UK”.

The Daily Mail published a comment by Rupert Darwall, a climate-sceptic author who is part of the CO2 Coalition – an organisation seeking to promote “the important contribution made by carbon dioxide to our lives” – which claimed that the blackout showed “energy security is being sacrificed at the altar of green dogma”.

Climate-sceptic libertarian publication Spiked had a piece by its deputy editor Fraser Myers titled: “Spain’s blackouts are a disaster made by net-zero.” The article claimed that “our elites’ embrace of green ideology has divorced them from reality”.

In Spanish media, Jordi Sevilla, the former president of Red Eléctrica, wrote in the financial publication Cinco Días that, while it is not known what caused the blackout, it is clear that the country’s grid “requires investments to adapt to the technical reality of the new generation mix”. He continued:

“In Spain, in the last decade, there has been a revolution in electricity generation to the point that renewable technologies ([solar] photovoltaic and wind, above all) now occupy the majority of the energy mix. This has had very positive impacts on CO2 emissions, lower electricity prices and increased national autonomy.

“But there is a technical problem: photovoltaic and wind power are not synchronous energies, whereas our transmission and distribution networks are designed to operate only with a minimum voltage in the energy they transport. Therefore, to operate with current technology, the electrical system must maintain synchronous backup power, which can be hydroelectric, gas or nuclear, to be used when photovoltaic and wind power are insufficient, either due to their intermittent nature (there may be no sun or wind) or due to the lack of synchronisation required by the generators to operate.”

For Bloomberg, opinion columnist Javier Blas said that “Spain’s blackout shouldn’t trigger a retreat from renewables”, but shows that “an upgraded grid is urgently needed for the energy transition”. He added:

“​​The world didn’t walk away from fossil-fuel and nuclear power stations because New York suffered a massive blackout in 1977. And it shouldn’t walk away from solar and wind because Spain and Portugal lost power for a few hours.

“But we should learn that grid design, policy and risk mapping aren’t yet up to the task of handling too much power from renewable sources.”

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Reflecting on the legacy of Laudato Si

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The co-organizers of the meeting sharing four sentences about their work with Pope Francis, with CCL’s Danny Richter taking a picture in the background.

Reflecting on the legacy of Laudato Si

By Danny Richter

After sharing a joke over lunch, Paul and I clinked glasses. I am, rather improbably, referring to Paul Crutzen, the Nobel Laureate in Chemistry who coined the term “Anthropocene” to refer to the geologic period of time in which humans have had a substantial impact on our environment. Even more improbably, we were sitting next to each other inside Vatican City, two of 86 invited participants in the first ever joint meeting between the Pontifical Academy of Sciences and the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences. Though none of us knew it then, the contents of these proceedings, stretched over five days, would go on to form the substance of “Laudato Si,” Pope Francis’ encyclical on the environment published in 2015. With the recent passing of Pope Francis, it seemed appropriate to reflect on my experience at that meeting in the Vatican, and the legacy that Laudato Si has had since.

When I say “improbable,” I’m really referring to my own presence there. It was the spring of 2014, and I had graduated with my Ph.D. in Oceanography the year before. I was the Legislative and Science Director for Citizens’ Climate Lobby, a position I’d started just over a year before. At the time, CCL had about 3,000 members, and our largest D.C. conference to date had attracted perhaps 400 people. 

I managed an invitation as an “observer” to this meeting because I asked one of my grad school professors, Dr. Ram Ramanathan, if I could come. It turned out that he was one of the organizers of the conference. When I asked, I had been envisioning the meeting would be something like the rather large scientific conferences I had attended in the past, where individuals would give presentations on their work as part of a themed session, and there would be time to take questions and mingle, and then everyone moved on to the next talk. After the conference, perhaps the proceedings would be published, but that would be about it. 

Instead, only 86 people were invited to this conference — 43 speakers, 28 observers, and 15 members of the Pontifical Academies. The list was quite distinguished, including four Nobel laureates, assuming you don’t count all the IPCC authors who shared a portion of the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize. Nothing in my time in academia or in D.C. would have distinguished me sufficiently to attend on my merits alone. 

But there I was. As I mentioned, none of us knew that the series of 20-minute talks we listened to and the discussions that followed during 11-hour days would eventually become Laudato Si. As I reviewed the blogs I wrote for CCL at the time, I was struck by the uncertainty of where this was all heading, as well as my own skepticism that any lasting or meaningful result would come of this. Yet, the first time I read Laudato Si, it was immediately obvious that those talks had greatly informed the writing of the document. For many of the talks, it was 1 to 1 — what was said by the invited speakers ended up directly in the encyclical. 

To understand its impact, it’s essential to consider the context in which this encyclical was released. It was published in May of 2015. Barack Obama was president, John Boehner was Speaker of the House, and America was already six years removed from the last (unsuccessful) major efforts to arrive at comprehensive climate legislation. On Sept. 17 of that year, Rep. Chris Gibson of New York and 10 of his Republican colleagues submitted what we informally called “the Gibson Resolution” that did indeed say that climate change is real, humans have had an impact, and Congress should act to address this. CCL was a heavy supporter of this effort, and it felt like a big deal. 

A week later, Pope Francis addressed the U.S. Congress at the invitation of Speaker Boehner, highlighting messages of stewardship from his groundbreaking encyclical “Laudato Si” earlier that year. CCL took an active part in handing out a copy of Laudato Si to every congressional office ahead of that talk, delivering 540 copies to the Hill. Speaker Boehner wore a green tie, and the next day he announced he was stepping down as Speaker of the House. In 2015, bipartisan action on climate was actually more difficult to believe in than it is now. The contrast is especially sharp when contrasting the modesty of the Gibson Resolution with the Conservative Climate Caucus standing at 69 members, the climate provisions in the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) having passed with robust margins in 2021, and 21 House Republicans signing a letter to their own leadership calling to protect the clean energy provisions of the Inflation Reduction Act.  

The Paris Climate Agreement would be signed later that year. It has become the bedrock agreement for globally coordinated efforts to address climate change. The UN Millennium Development goals would be renamed “Sustainable Development Goals” at the end of 2015, a fact that was previewed for us in the Vatican in 2014. The caliber of people in the room during these discussions was such that it’s not a stretch at all to imagine such a renaming was entangled with the writing and publication of the encyclical. Achim Steiner, the UNEP Executive Director and under-secretary-general of UN, was a speaker in attendance. 

Laudato Si is rather unclear on the topic of a carbon price, but my reading of it is that a carbon tax can pass muster, but a cap-and-trade system is suspect, based on the brief skepticism expressed towards carbon credits. The U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops issued a statement of support for the Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act in 2019, which remains on their website. While the U.S. still doesn’t have a carbon price, every other developed economy in the world does have one. The International Maritime Organization just last week voted to place a price on global shipping. Especially since the EU CBAM went into place, adoption of carbon pricing (and border adjustments) around the world is accelerating

As you might expect, Laudato Si places a strong emphasis on the burden climate change, and the underlying processes driving it, places on the poor. President Biden’s presidency and legislative record are marked by his commitment to environmental justice, most notably the Justice 40 principle that manifested in the way he structured his administration and in the Inflation Reduction Act. Of course, President Biden was only the second Catholic president in U.S. history. Yet, the language of the encyclical and the language of the environmental justice movement in the U.S. strike me as oddly orthogonal. There is less overlap than I’d expect. 

Within the Church, progress feels like a slow burn. Curricula have been developed and outreach has been pursued by Catholic organizations such as the Catholic Climate Covenant, whose former Executive Director, Dan Misleh, was a fellow observer with me at the Vatican meeting. However, these have taken a very long time to catch on, and implementation in the U.S. has been patchy. Very anecdotally, as an American Catholic who is in the pews most Sundays, I’ve probably heard a priest mention Laudato Si in a sermon fewer times in the last 10 years than there have been years setting a new temperature record. Last year was the first year to exceed 1.5 degrees C. 

What does this all amount to? Within the Church, Laudato Si continues to be a living document that, at least to me, seems to be exerting more influence over time. Globally, Laudato Si was perhaps wind in the sails of the global consciousness ahead of the Paris Climate Agreement, which continues to be a foundational accord to which all subsequent meetings refer back to in global climate negotiations. The commitments it has inspired fall short of its own ambition, but it does continue to inspire ambition. In the United States, Laudato Si perhaps played a significant role in shifting the zeitgeist away from climate denial, and toward hope. Though its major theme is the impact of poor stewardship on the poor, that has not broken through in the United States, at least not in a way that rhymes with the language of the encyclical. 

These, at least, are the reflections of someone who was there at the beginning. My friend Paul is no longer with us, having passed in 2021. Walter Munk, the researcher who figured out how the tides worked in time to advise the Allies ahead of the D-Day invasion was also at our table for that lunch has also passed. So too, now, has Pope Francis. 

He met us on the last day of the Conference. We waited for 30 minutes for him to arrive, in the Roman sun a stone’s throw from St. Peter’s Basilica. I reflected at the time about how interesting it was to observe what people who had steered the world’s consciousness do when they have 30 minutes to kill. Turns out, they do what other people do. They make idle chit chat, crack jokes, complain, and turn tourist. Underlining the uncertainty of what these five days of effort would yield, the organizers of the conference got to speak to Pope Francis, and they were allowed four sentences. Though such limited interaction fueled my doubts at the time, in light of what has happened since, it’s pretty clear that Pope Francis was always on our side. He wanted that conference to be a success, and he wanted Laudato Si to be a meaningful document that pushed the world toward action. I cannot speak to whether its impact had the effect he hoped it would, but to me at least, it seems as if it has played a positive role in moving the world away from denial, toward action, and toward considering the direct connection between people and the environment, and especially the poor. 

Connect with CCL’s Catholic Action Team on CCL Community.

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CCC: England’s approach to climate adaptation is ‘not working’

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The “vast majority” of the UK government’s plans to prepare for climate hazards have made virtually no progress over the past two years, according to the Climate Change Committee (CCC).

In that time, the world has experienced the hottest year on record, while England has seen its wettest ever 18-month stretch between 2022 and 2024.

(Climate adaptation – outside of some issues such as defence – is mostly a devolved matter, with separate plans in place from the administrations for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.)

The previous government introduced a new adaptation strategy for England in 2023, covering plans for rising temperatures and more extreme weather in the country.

However, in its latest analysis of the government’s progress, the CCC states that the current approach to adaptation in England is “not working” and requires “urgent strengthening”.

The government is failing to make “good” progress in adapting to climate change on any of the 46 outcomes measured by the committee, ranging from better healthcare during heatwaves to preparing financial institutions for climate risk.

The report marks the latest in a series of appraisals by the CCC that have repeatedly identified large gaps in the nation’s adaptation efforts.

This time, with a relatively new Labour government that has said it will act on adaptation, the committee says its report “must serve as the turning point”.

But the CCC also says it is “seriously concerned” that the government will cut funding for adaptation, ultimately leading to much higher future costs as temperatures continue to rise.

Climate adaptation is ‘vital’

There is “unequivocal evidence” that climate change is already making extreme weather in the UK “more likely and more extreme”, the CCC says.

The report lays out major risks facing the country, noting that the number of properties at risk from flooding is set to increase from 6.3m today to 8m by 2050. Roads and railways at risk from flooding could increase from a third of the total length to half over the same timeframe.

At least 59% of top-quality farmland is already at risk from flooding, the report says, adding that this could also increase over the coming decades.

Meanwhile, annual heat-related deaths could increase “several times over” to pass 10,000 in an average year by 2050, the CCC says.

It also cites an Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) report from 2024 that concludes the UK’s GDP could be around 3% lower by 2074, even under the Paris Agreement’s “below 2C” goal. It says this could increase to 5% in a “below 3C” scenario, according to the OBR.

High-quality climate adaptation is therefore “vital to ensure that these risks are managed most efficiently and at least cost”, according to the committee. Otherwise, government policy could “lock in” risks or even make them worse.

The CCC reports on adaptation progress in England every two years, as required under the 2008 Climate Change Act. These reports have consistently highlighted adaptation as an issue that has been “underfunded and ignored” by successive governments.

There have been a few major developments since the committee’s last report.

Notably, the previous Conservative government launched its third national adaptation programme (NAP3), which is the cornerstone of the nation’s adaptation policy, in summer 2023. (NAP3 covers adaptation policy in England, as well as non-devolved issues that affect the whole UK, such as defence.)

In a highly critical initial appraisal of the programme, the CCC concluded that it fell “far short of what is needed” and “must be strengthened”. NAP3 has also faced an ultimately unsuccessful legal challenge from activists, arguing that it breached people’s human rights.

Another big development since the committee’s last report is Labour winning the general election in 2024. The CCC acknowledges that the new government “inherited a NAP that fell short of the task”, but says it finds “little evidence of a change of course”.

What progress has been made?

The report looks at both the “policies and plans” underpinning climate adaptation, as well as the actual “delivery and implementation” of those plans. It states:

“Whilst there is some evidence of policies and plans improving [since 2023], it is clear that NAP3 has been ineffective in driving the critical shift towards effective delivery of adaptation.”

The CCC assesses the planning and delivery of 46 outcomes from adaptation policy across five overarching themes. It scores them using roughly the same monitoring framework used in its last report in 2023.

It notes that 11 policies and plans have improved over the past two years, including a new adaptation strategy from the Ministry of Justice and a green finance strategy.

Over the same period, it says four have gotten worse, among them investment in flood protection projects, as plans no longer align with their stated objectives”.

The lack of significant improvement between 2023 and 2025, based on the CCC’s scoring system, can be seen in the chart below.

Climate adaptation outcome scores for “policies and plans”, assigned by the CCC in its progress report.
Climate adaptation outcome scores for “policies and plans”, assigned by the CCC in its progress report. This chart compares the 2023 CCC report, which is based on an assessment of 45 outcomes, with the 2025 report, which uses the same outcomes plus one extra, bringing the total to 46. Source: Carbon Brief analysis of CCC adaptation progress reports from 2023 and 2025.

As for the government actually delivering on its plans, the CCC says the “vast majority of our outcomes have received the same score as in 2023, most at low levels”.

The small number of improvements mainly relate to the latest round of implementation of the “adaptation reporting power”, which allows the government to ask infrastructure providers to disclose how they deal with climate risks.

The chart below, which compares the scores given to different adaptation outcomes between 2023 and 2025, demonstrates the lack of progress in the intervening years.

The CCC concludes that none of the outcomes could be classified as making “good” progress, in terms of delivery. Only four of them saw improvements over this period.

It highlights the water supply as an area where there has been backsliding over the past two years, noting that “continued slow rate of leakage reduction is now clearly inconsistent with meeting the sector’s targets”.

Climate adaptation outcome scores for “delivery and implementation”,  assigned by the CCC in its progress report.
Climate adaptation outcome scores for “delivery and implementation”, assigned by the CCC in its progress report. This chart compares the 2023 CCC report, which is based on an assessment of 45 outcomes, with the 2025 report, which uses the same outcomes plus one extra, bringing the total to 46. The 2023 report used the category “mixed” instead of “limited” or “partial”, both of which are used in 2025. Source: Carbon Brief analysis of CCC adaptation progress reports from 2023 and 2025.

The CCC also points out that “tracking progress on adaptation remains challenging due to limited national-scale, up-to-date and relevant data”.

While there has been an improvement since 2023, nine of the 46 assessed outcomes for England still lacked enough evidence to assess progress, the report says.

These include important areas such as the impact of climate change on food supplies and the vulnerability of telecommunications and information and communication technology (ICT) assets.

In addition, ahead of NAP3, the CCC recommended – as part of its 2023 progress report – a list of 89 actions to close what it viewed as “policy gaps in government’s adaptation planning”.

It suggested that these could be dealt with either in NAP3 itself, or as part of other policy programmes.

However, only four of these recommendations have been achieved, with a further 14 seeing “partial progress”.

The report highlights food security, community preparedness and buildings as some of the areas where the government did not follow through on its recommendations.

What does the CCC recommend?

The CCC’s report echoes previous advice that, despite some improvements in NAP3 on previous efforts, the nation’s climate adaptation strategy needs an overhaul:

“The UK’s current approach to adaptation policy making is not working. Adaptation is not the cross-government priority that it needs to be, which is holding back delivery.”

NAP3 covers a five-year period from 2023 to 2028. With the latest report coming at a halfway point in this cycle, the committee says it “must serve as the turning point” for the government on climate adaptation.

As part of the “urgent strengthening” suggested in the report, the committee sets out key areas that it says should be improved.

“Adaptation” can mean different things in different contexts. The CCC stresses the need for a set of “specific and measurable sectoral targets” that can be used to guide progress, with clarity on how to monitor them and who is responsible.

The government has signalled its intention to strengthen adaptation objectives. The committee says that such objectives “must” be developed as a priority, no later than the end of 2025.

The CCC report highlights the “data gaps” that need to be closed, with “monitoring and evaluation…still not treated with sufficient urgency”. It says the government should direct relevant agencies to collect data on climate risks and the delivery of adaptation measures.

Adaptation is a topic that affects every area of government, from healthcare to education. Yet the CCC highlights that there is not enough coordination of activities between departments and says this should be improved.

In order to carry out adaptation policies, the CCC also stresses that the government “needs to ensure sufficient funding is available” as it undertakes its spending review. Baroness Brown, chair of the CCC’s adaptation committee, told journalists in a press briefing:

“We are seriously concerned that resilience and climate adaptation may be cut in the spending review. [The] government needs to recognise that this is not a future problem, this is today’s problem…I know the government is under a lot of pressure to make cuts, but this isn’t the easy one.”

Given the cost of future climate risk, the committee stresses that ignoring adaptation would not, ultimately, save money. In fact, acting early would “minimise the overall costs of tackling climate change”, it explains.

In the press briefing, CCC chief executive Emma Pinchbeck emphasised the “real need” for the government to think about the future when implementing key policies, such as home-building programmes and other major infrastructure developments.

“If you think about potential waste in terms of investment into the NHS, if we then have to retrofit hospitals to make them cooler,” she said, as an example.

How prepared are different sectors for climate change?

The CCC progress report looks at specific outcomes broken down across five broad sectors.

Within these, it highlights key problems and makes specific recommendations for each area.

Land, nature and food

The CCC highlights various “foundational” strategies covering farming and land that the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) is expected to publish in the coming months, including the land-use framework and the food strategy.

Delays in publishing such documents have “hampered” adaptation progress. However, the report highlights them as opportunities to set out clear objectives and responsibilities for the sector.

As it stands, important issues such as boosting climate-resilient farming and protecting food supply chains are rated “insufficient” for both government planning and implementation.

The CCC highlights the relatively new “environmental land management schemes” (Elms), which constitute England’s successor to the EU’s farm payments policy.

The report says these schemes lack guidance for climate adaptation, adding that the government should provide “certainty” about how much farmers will be paid for such measures.

As for the fishing industry, the report has downgraded its climate-adaptation plans, noting that they “no longer look credible”. It says the government’s marine strategy, published earlier this year, “does not include any specific or targeted adaptation actions”.

Infrastructure

According to the CCC, when the government publishes its 10-year infrastructure strategy, it should set out “clear resilience standards” for new infrastructure projects.

It also notes that major funding packages – for new roads and electricity networks, for example – should include incentives to fund climate adaptation.

Two out of the three adaptation policies that are scored as “good” are in the infrastructure sector, namely the plans for maintaining reliability in the road and rail networks.

Despite this, actual progress in improving transport resilience is largely “stagnant”, the committee says. It highlights increased flooding on railways and an increased number of roads deemed “susceptible” to flooding.

This is also the sector that has seen the most improvement in terms of delivery and implementation. The water, energy, telecommunications and transport sectors are all described as improving the identification and management of “interdependencies”.

This refers to better evidence of links between different sectors, which is being unveiled via adaptation reporting power. Notably, none of the sectors that have seen improvements are rated as “good”, indicating they still have work to do in this area.

Built environment and communities

Flooding is highlighted as the key risk facing many communities around England.

While the Environment Agency-led flood defence programme has been successful, “its budget in real terms is shrinking as risks are escalating, meaning delivery is falling short of targets and the condition of flood defence assets is declining”, according to the CCC.

The government’s investment programme needs “long-term” targets for cutting the risk posed by floods and coastal erosion, supported by sufficient funds, the report concludes.

It also recommends a “long-term cross-sector plan to manage future heat risk and drive joined-up action”.

The CCC is currently unable to track many of the important measures around heat risk, such as how many buildings are overheating, due to a lack of data.

Overall, none of the efforts to implement better protections for homes and communities have seen any positive change since 2023, despite this being a record period of heat and flooding.

Health and wellbeing

The CCC notes that there are only “limited” policies and plans in place to protect population health and healthcare delivery in the face of escalating climate hazards.

Extreme heat is the main risk identified in this context. As it stands, there are long-term, increasing trends of heat-associated deaths and overheating in hospital settings, the committee says.

In this context, the report recommends that the government develop an “improved climate and public health adaptation plan” that builds on the existing adverse weather and health plan.

Also, as part of the government’s decade-long plan to improve the NHS, the CCC says any upgrades must “make it more resilient to climate extremes today and in the future”.

Economy

The committee says that while businesses can take action to protect their own affairs from climate change, “barriers remain” and adaptation finance “remains nascent”.

It therefore highlights an important role for the government in removing these barriers, providing high-quality information and “correcting market failures”.

The report recommends setting up a portal for adaptation-related data that can be accessed by companies.

It also says the government should ensure that the UK’s sustainable disclosure requirements incorporate “adaptation-related disclosure”, to better prepare the private sector for climate risks.

The CCC also points out that an adaptation finance “deliverables and action plan”, promised for 2024, has not been produced. Among other things, this plan should lay out ways to “mobilise” private investment into adaptation projects, it adds.

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