Nations are “back on track” to adopt a framework for curbing global shipping emissions, following the latest International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) meeting in London, UK.
The proposed “net-zero framework” had been expected to be approved by countries at the IMO towards the end of 2025.
Instead, the Trump administration was accused of “bully-boy” tactics as the US led a concerted effort to reject the framework, leading to its approval being delayed.
Since then, the US, other fossil-fuel producers and some industry groups have called for the framework to be stripped of its carbon-pricing mechanism, or abandoned entirely.
At the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC84) meeting in London, UK, last week, nations tried once again to reach an agreement on the framework.
Opponents said they were trying to seek consensus, but supporters, such as Brazil, the EU and Pacific islands, pointed out the framework was already a “careful balance of interests”.
Liberia and Panama – “flag states” for a third of the world’s commercial shipping – led a counter-proposal, alongside Argentina, which effectively cut carbon pricing from the framework.
Ultimately, however, the meeting ended with a reconfirmation that delegations are committed to rebuilding consensus on global shipping emissions.
The framework survived the negotiations and the committee will now try to adopt it at its December 2026 meeting.
Below, Carbon Brief explains why the framework has proved so contentious, who the major players have been and what the final outcome was at the latest IMO meeting.
- Why was the net-zero framework delayed last year?
- Why do some countries oppose the net-zero framework?
- What ‘alternative frameworks’ were discussed?
- What do supporters of the net-zero framework want?
- What was the final outcome from the IMO meeting?
Why was the net-zero framework delayed last year?
In April 2025, nations at the IMO had agreed on a “net-zero framework” at their MEPC83 meeting in London, despite the US withdrawing halfway through.
Later that year, in October 2025, they failed to formally adopt the framework after a fraught meeting that saw US negotiators accused of “bully-boy tactics”.
The framework was meant to be a practical set of measures to achieve the global net-zero target for shipping, agreed at the IMO in 2023. The target is significant, as international shipping is responsible for more than 2% of emissions and is not covered by the Paris Agreement.
Following a week of negotiations at the April 2025 meeting, the remaining nations had voted on approving a compromise proposal for an emissions levy – effectively a carbon tax on global shipping – and a credit-trading system.
A majority of nations had agreed to this framework that would have set a lower emissions-intensity reduction target of 4% in 2028, rising to 30% in 2035. It had also included an upper target that would have increased from 17% in 2028 to 43% in 2035.
Ships that failed to lower their emissions intensity in line with these limits would have needed to purchase “remedial units” for $380 per “tier two” unit. This would have fed into a new IMO “net-zero fund”.
Those who met the lower target, but fell short of the more difficult upper target, would have had to pay into the IMO fund, but at the lower rate of $100 per “tier one” unit.
The number of compliant ships had been expected to grow under this framework, reducing the number of vessels reliant on buying units and helping to reduce emissions intensity by over 40%, as the chart below shows.

The purchase of units to comply with the rules had been expected to raise $10-15bn annually in the initial years of the fund, as well as help with the development of zero and near-zero (ZNZ) greenhouse gas fuels and energy sources, according to thinktank IDDRI.
In turn, the fund would have been used to support developing countries to decarbonise shipping.
A clear majority of 80% of the eligible voters – not including those who abstained or the US – approved the framework at the April 2025 meeting.
The 63 countries that voted in favour included the EU, China, India and Brazil, while those that voted against included major fossil-fuel producers, such as Saudi Arabia, Russia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
Following this “landmark” agreement, countries had then been expected to formally adopt the framework at the next MEPC session in October 2025.
However, the meeting proved challenging. The US “unequivocally rejected” the proposal and lobbied extensively against adoption, including by threatening governments, individual diplomats and shipping companies with sanctions, visa restrictions, tariffs and port fees.
During the October meeting, the US and its allies pushed for a shift from a “tacit” approval system for the net-zero framework to one that would require explicit acceptance by governments. This would mean it would only come into force if, six months later, two-thirds of nations actively accepted the deal, Climate Home News explained at the time.
Negotiations continued throughout the week before Saudi Arabia called to adjourn the meeting, a move that was passed after it was backed by 57 countries.
As such, the decision on the adoption of the net-zero framework was pushed back by a year.
Among the 63 countries that supported the IMO net-zero framework at MEPC83 in April 2025, 15 supported the adjournment and 10 abstained – showing that some nations that had previously supported the framework had softened on the deal, following lobbying by the US, Saudi Arabia and their allies.
Going into the April 2026 MEPC84 meeting, it was clear that agreement on the framework would not be straightforward. A report ahead of the meeting from University College London (UCL) noted:
“The level of support is noticeably weaker than in April [2025] and likely reflects the effectiveness and efforts made by sides supporting or opposing the net-zero framework over the intervening period.”
In the week ahead of the MEPC84, US IMO delegation lead Wayne Arguin told a meeting that there was a “clear, strong and sizable bloc of countries opposed to the [net-zero framework]” and “no prospect of achieving consensus”, according to Politico.
As the meeting kicked off on 27 April 2026, IMO secretary-general Arsenio Dominguez called on parties to engage in “engage in constructive and pragmatic exchanges”.
Why do some countries oppose the net-zero framework?
A coalition of countries, including the US, Saudi Arabia and various fossil-fuel producers, strongly oppose the IMO net-zero framework that was agreed last year.
They were supported by a wider group of industry bodies and major flag states – countries where many ships are registered – which were instrumental in advancing “alternative frameworks” at the latest meeting. (See: What ‘alternative frameworks’ were discussed?)
Documents submitted ahead of the April 2026 meeting laid out the basis for this opposition, with the US criticising the net-zero framework’s “significant shortcomings”, concluding:
“The most appropriate path forward is to end consideration of the IMO net-zero framework entirely.”
More nuance came in a statement from a group of primarily large fossil-fuel producers, including Saudi Arabia, Russia and Algeria, which was also backed by the US.
It stressed the need for “alternative” frameworks, with an emphasis on achieving consensus, as well as “practicability, equity and trust”. In practice, this meant a system without any carbon pricing, “top-down restrictions” or “international penalties”.
Opposing countries said any outcome should be “technology-neutral”, meaning it should not disadvantage specific fuels, potentially including liquified natural gas (LNG) and other fossil fuels.
These nations also stressed what they claimed were the potential impact of additional net-zero costs on “food and energy security”.
Much of their criticism was based on supposed economic harm that the net-zero framework would cause, particularly in developing countries.
These arguments purported to be about fairness for these countries. Yet some opponents of the framework were also calling for the IMO fund to be abandoned.
If this IMO fund were lost, then developing countries could lose out on a potential source of support for their own maritime decarbonisation, as well as potentially their broader energy transitions.
As well as supporting the fossil-fuel producers’ call for “alternative frameworks”, the UAE filed its own submission questioning the legitimacy of the IMO in establishing a new fund.
The US submission to the IMO stated that the fund would provide “pennies on the dollar compared to the economic hardship” brought about by the framework overall.
US delegates distributed flyers at the IMO meeting, emphasising the financial burden they claimed the framework would place on developing countries. While low-carbon shipping will come with substantial costs, analysts said the US figures were “not credible”.
Campaigners accused the US of “pretending to care about other countries’ economies”, pointing out that the energy crisis – triggered by the US-led war on Iran – is costing the shipping industry billions.
Moreover, they stated that the Trump administration’s new port entry fees would be a far greater financial burden for the global shipping industry than the mooted net-zero rules.
Analysis by UCL shipping researchers ahead of MEPC84 concluded that the Trump administration would potentially be less able to exert “soft power and influence” at the talks than last year. Additionally, it pointed to a Supreme Court ruling that limited the US’s capacity to impose punitive tariffs.
In practice, the US was less vocal at the talks, choosing to support alternative framework ideas proposed by other IMO members.
What ‘alternative frameworks’ were discussed?
There were two main alternatives to the net-zero framework considered at MEPC84.
Japan suggested some ideas as a “possible basis for discussion”, which included removing the need for ships to pay into an IMO fund when they fail to meet emissions targets.
It also suggested simply relaxing the emissions targets, in order to make them easier for shipping companies to meet.
The second – and more significant – counter-proposal to the net-zero framework was not submitted by the US or its fossil-fuel producer allies.
Instead, it came from Liberia, Panama and Argentina, three countries that have strong political and historical ties with the US.
This was particularly notable given Liberia and Panama’s status as the top two “flags of convenience”, as shown in the chart below. A third of the world’s commercial shipping is registered in these small states, giving them disproportionate significance within the talks.

Their proposal, offered in the spirit of “consensus‑building”, said that only fuels already considered “commercially viable” should be included in the IMO’s carbon-intensity targets.
The Argentina-Liberia-Panama proposal was dismissed by observers as “business-as-usual”, as it removes incentives to develop clean fuels, any substantial means of enforcement and opportunities to raise funds to help developing countries.
Delaine McCullough, director of the shipping programme at the Ocean Conservancy, tells Carbon Brief:
“By removing the mandatory greenhouse gas price, you take away the ability to provide any kind of rewards or other incentives, and you also take away the regulatory incentive, so you just end up where we are today.”
This was the proposal that the net-zero framework’s most prominent opponents, including the US and the Gulf states, rallied around at MEPC84.
Among those also backing the idea during the talks were some developing countries, such as Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, that also said they wanted the IMO outcome to provide them with financial support.
This came in spite of the proposal stating there should be “no establishment of an IMO fund”. Speaking on condition of anonymity, a small-island state delegate tells Carbon Brief:
“Many countries that support the Liberia-Panama-Argentina submission also seek support for transition, capacity-building and mitigation of negative impacts. This support will not be available if [that] approach is taken.”
Some delegates questioned the decision by Liberia and Panama to lead this pushback against the net-zero framework. Both nations had previously supported an emissions levy on shipping, which would have been far more ambitious than the framework they now oppose.
Observers noted ties between nations that opposed the framework and parts of the shipping sector – including US-based interests and LNG assets.
Among the industry voices arguing strongly against the net-zero framework have been the American Bureau of Shipping and a group of international shipping companies and registries – including the national registries of Liberia and Panama.
The latter group voiced “significant concerns” and called for “alternative proposals”. Rather than a domestic entity, the Liberian registry that issued this statement is a privately owned US company.
Reflecting on these issues, Prof Tristan Smith, an energy and transport expert at UCL, wrote on LinkedIn:
“Privately owned registries have leverage over their host governments because one angry shipowner’s personal wealth is more than the flag state’s GDP and governments of low-income countries can’t easily take risks with even small volume revenues.”
Major Greek shipowners, including some with US-linked LNG interests, also opposed the net-zero framework, citing the “absence of support from major and influential states representing a significant share of global tonnage”.
Greece itself had reportedly pushed back against the framework behind the scenes, despite the EU’s public, unified position of support.
What do supporters of the net-zero framework want?
There were many vocal supporters of the net-zero framework at MEPC84, including a broad range of developed and developing countries.
Among them were the EU, Brazil, Mexico, Kenya, Pacific island states, Australia and the UK.
Having supported the net-zero framework last April, but voted to postpone its adoption in October, China expressed support for a carbon-pricing system and an IMO fund in a technical submission issued ahead of MEPC84.
The major shipping nation had remained quiet during the US-Saudi disruption in October last year, so its submission was viewed as a positive for backers of the framework.
Colombia, which was simultaneously hosting a global conference on “transitioning away” from fossil fuels, also emerged as a supporter of the net-zero framework.
There has also been support from some sections of the shipping industry, including a large coalition of ports, logistics companies and clean-fuel providers.
Supportive nations pointed out that the net-zero framework was the result of years of talks and already represented what Pacific island states called a “fragile compromise”. They framed it as the “only politically viable option” for hitting the IMO’s net-zero goal.
Pacific islands and around 50 other nations had originally called for a universal carbon levy on shipping. Ultimately, they were forced to accept the net-zero framework as a compromise, but Pacific islands said they would revert to their call for a levy if they felt the framework was being “watered down”.
The demand for a levy was strongly opposed by numerous countries, including some of the current framework’s supporters, such as Brazil and Australia.
In a bid to revive the net-zero framework, a submission by Brazil sought to “dispel any possible potential misunderstandings”, stressing that the approach is “flexible” and “should not be mistaken for a ‘global tax’”.
For example, Brazil notes that the framework “does not exclude any fuels” and that even existing “bunker” fuels and LNG could be used, as long as carbon intensity targets are met. (Ships could, for example, use carbon capture and storage to meet the goals.)
Michael Mbaru, a low-carbon shipping expert for the Kenya climate special envoy, told a briefing ahead of the conference that the net-zero framework was in developing countries’ interests:
“If the global package unravels, pressure grows for more regional and unilateral measures instead, and this is particularly difficult for African and other developing countries, because fragmented regulation raises compliance, complexity [and] transaction costs.”
In response to the Argentina-Liberia-Panama proposal that opponents of the framework had coalesced around, the Solomon Islands pointed out that, in seeking “consensus”, this group was ignoring the numerous parties that wanted more ambition, rather than less. It stated in a submission:
“There is no reason to expect that a new proposal, that differs from the IMO net-zero framework, would find a majority, much less a consensus.”
Nevertheless, supporters of the net-zero framework also acknowledged that there were some areas where greater clarity might help countries to finalise the details.
These areas include clarifying technical considerations such as: how fuel intensity is calculated; addressing the potential impacts of net-zero rules on food security; the governance of the IMO fund; and regulation of sustainable fuel certification schemes.
Given this, there was broad support for more discussions at an extra “intersessional” meeting later this year, in order to hash out these final details before attempting to approve the net-zero framework once more.
What was the final outcome from the IMO meeting?
Ultimately, the IMO’s net-zero framework was agreed and will now be negotiated further in the uutumn, ahead of the next MEPC meeting in December 2026.
The decision, as well as the general willingness to move forward noted by numerous observers, was broadly welcomed. IMO secretary-general Arsenio Dominguez said:
“We are back on track, but we have to rebuild trust. I encourage you to maintain this momentum through your intersessional work and to prepare submissions that can bring the membership together.”
Over the week of negotiations, nearly 100 delegations took to the floor to voice their opinions on the adoption of the net-zero framework.
Of these, over half were in favour of it, including countries like the EU, Brazil, Colombia, Kenya, Tuvalu and others.
Others pushed for reopening the framework for substantial changes, including the US, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Liberia and others.
On Friday 1 May, the discussion turned to the terms of reference for further negotiation and countries agreed to move the net-zero forward as the only option in the final outcome text.
Em Fenton, senior director of climate diplomacy at Opportunity Green, tells Carbon Brief:
“The framework has survived, but survival is not a victory and we cannot end up in a cycle of open-ended negotiations. Taking forward consideration of multiple proposals is only acceptable as a bridge, not a destination.
“We must now look forward to moving towards adoption of the framework later this year in a way that maintains urgency and ambition, and delivers justice and equity for countries on the frontlines of climate impacts.”
The IMO committee agreed to establish an intersessional working group to resolve a number of outstanding concerns and “drive broader convergence on a global measure” ahead of the next MEPC meeting.
Member states will be able to submit new amendments and adjustments to complement those already approved.
The two intersessional meetings will take place in September and November, ahead of MEPC85 in December.
Christiaan De Beukelaer, senior lecturer in culture and climate at the University of Melbourne, tells Carbon Brief:
“The ship is mostly built, though it’s obvious that more work needs doing on its interior. Right now, some are trying to finish the build while others are trying to scuttle it.”
The post Q&A: How countries got the global ‘net-zero’ shipping deal ‘back on track’ appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: How countries got the global ‘net-zero’ shipping deal ‘back on track’
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Climate Change
Q&A: The current state of ‘carbon dioxide removal’ around the world
Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies will need to be deployed at rates even faster than those seen for solar power, if the world is to have a chance of limiting global warming to 1.5C by 2100, says a new report.
Nearly all pathways to meeting the Paris Agreement’s highest ambition of keeping global temperatures to 1.5C above pre-industrial levels in 2100 involve CDR techniques – ranging from tree-planting to sucking CO2 from air with machines.
This is in addition to steep and immediate emissions cuts.
Scientists expect carbon emissions to push warming beyond 1.5C in the decade ahead, meaning that the target can only be achieved “from above” via large-scale CDR that brings down global temperatures.
These temperature trajectories are known as “overshoot” pathways.
The third “state of CDR” report, written by more than 50 scientists, says that countries’ current CDR plans would fall short of what is needed to limit warming to 1.5C by more than 5bn tonnes of CO2 (GtCO2) per year by 2050.
Global CDR would have to increase fourfold – from 2.2GtCO2 in 2026 to 8.75GtCO2 by 2050 – to have a chance of meeting the 1.5C target by 2100, according to the report.
It adds that deploying CDR can be a “gradual process”, making the period 2026-30 “crucial” for “establishing CDR’s role in limiting climate damages” in the future.
Below, Carbon Brief covers the key findings of the third state of CDR report. (This follows from Carbon Brief’s coverage of the first report in 2023 and second report in 2024.)
- What is CDR?
- What are current levels of CDR?
- How much CDR is needed to reach net-zero goals?
- What does the science say about the potential and costs of CDR?
- What have governments pledged on CDR?
- What is the current funding and research landscape for CDR?
- How is policy impacting CDR demand?
What is CDR?
According to the report, the definition of CDR is:
“Human activities capturing CO2 from the atmosphere and storing it durably in geological, terrestrial or ocean reservoirs, or in products. This includes human enhancement of natural removal processes but excludes natural uptake not directly caused by anthropogenic [human-caused] activities.”
In addition to this, the report includes “three key principles” for CDR, which are:
- The captured CO2 must come from the atmosphere, not from “fossil sources”.
- The subsequent storage “must be durable”, so that the CO2 is not soon reintroduced to the atmosphere.
- The removal must result from human intervention that is in addition to Earth’s natural processes.
In this report, a CDR method is considered durable if it is able to lock up carbon for “decades or more”.
The report classifies CDR techniques as either “conventional” or “novel”.
“Convential” CDR techniques are “well established, already deployed at scale and widely reported by countries as part of [land-use] activities”.
The methods included in this group are tree-planting, ecosystem restoration, agroforestry (trees in agriculture), improving soil carbon in croplands and natural lands, and durable wood production.
“Novel” CDR techniques have “lower level of readiness for deployment and, as a consequence, are currently deployed at smaller scales”, says the report.
Some examples of different CDR methods are listed on the graphic below.
The graphic also shows whether carbon is captured through biological or chemical processes, as well as how “ready” the method is and for how long it can store carbon, among other features.
The report says that CDR is “needed alongside deep and rapid emissions reductions” to give Earth a chance of limiting global warming to 1.5C. It continues:
“It should play a smaller role than emissions reductions given uncertainty around the feasible levels of scaling, sustainability limits, storage availability and the risk of reversal, among other constraints.
“In general, CDR should be seen as a limited resource that will need to be used prudently.”
It adds that CDR can “fulfil three major functions”.
In the near term, CDR can help reduce “net emissions”, it says.
In the medium term, CDR can “counterbalance residual emissions” to achieve net-zero CO2 or net-zero greenhouse gas emissions, the report continues.
(“Residual emissions” are those that cannot be eradicated through technologies or societal changes, such as methane emissions from rice production.)
Research suggests that global warming is likely to stop, more or less, once net-zero is achieved globally.
In the long term, CDR can “help achieve net-negative emissions”, a state where CO2 removal exceeds emissions, says the report.
In this state, humans could lower global temperatures. This may allow the world to limit global warming to 1.5C by 2100, even if the temperature target is surpassed earlier on in the century.
Future trajectories where temperatures exceed the 1.5C limit before being brought back down again through CDR techniques are known as “overshoot” pathways.
What are current levels of CDR?
The report says that, at present, “99.9%” of existing CDR is conventional, land-based techniques such as tree-planting and ecosystem restoration.
The world currently removes 2.2GtCO2 per year, equivalent to around 5% of gross global CO2 emissions, it continues.
The largest contributors to removing CO2 from the atmosphere are China, the US, the EU, Brazil and Russia.
The chart below shows the amount of CO2 removed each year over 2014-23 by the largest contributors, through tree-planting (afforestation) and forest restoration (reforestation).

“Novel” CDR, such as biochar and direct air capture, currently removes just 2m tonnes of CO2 annually at present, according to the report.
However, these methods have been growing at a rate of 40% per year – “similar to successful technologies like solar energy, but insufficient for the scale-up required to meet the Paris temperature goal”, says the report.
The graphic below illustrates how the contribution of conventional CDR currently dwarfs novel CDR, but how the latter techniques are quickly growing.

The report says that investment in CDR companies recovered in 2025 following a dip – and its “share of all climate-tech funding” grew to 2.6%.
The report also notes that, at present, most CDR efforts are unevenly distributed across the world.
For example, two-thirds of conventional CDR in voluntary carbon markets is in Latin America, according to the report. (Voluntary carbon markets are where companies can buy credits for carbon-reducing or removing projects, such as tree-planting, to claim that they have “offset” some of their own emissions.)
In addition, most pilot projects that aim to demonstrate novel CDR methods are located in only a few countries, such as Sweden, Denmark and the US, says the report.
The chart below shows the location and timeline of demonstration projects that have been announced, are under construction or in operation globally.

The report continues:
“While first-movers play important roles, if their actions do not diffuse more widely, vulnerability emerges, as evidenced by the impact of US climate policy dismantling.”
(For more, see: How is policy impacting CDR demand?)
How much CDR is needed to reach net-zero goals?
The report examines three scenarios where global temperature rise is limited to “well below” 2C by 2100:
- A current ambition scenario, based on national climate pledges (but omitting the US);
- A highest-possible ambition scenario;
- A delayed ambition scenario, which is consistent with current targets until 2035 and then switches to the highest ambition scenario.
The pledges considered in the report are “nationally determined contributions”, or NDCs, which countries submit periodically to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). NDCs lay out a country’s climate ambition.
Under the current ambition scenario, the report projects a total of 5.9GtCO2 of CDR by 2050 and 12GtCO2 by 2100.
This scenario would result in end-of-century warming of 1.7-2.7C. Importantly, the report says, this scenario does not result in the world reaching net-zero CO2 levels, “meaning that global temperatures would continue to rise, albeit at a much more gradual pace, beyond 2100”.
Under the highest-possible ambition scenario, CDR scales up to 8.8GtCO2 by mid-century and 15.3GtCO2 by the end of the century.
This scenario assumes “full buy-in by all nations”, with economics, scale-up and sustainability providing the main constraints on CDR deployment, the report says.
The highest ambition scenario results in global temperatures peaking at 1.7-1.8C around 2050 and the world achieving net-zero emissions around that time.
Under the delayed ambition scenario, CDR would scale up to 7GtCO2 by 2050 and 23.6GtCO2 by 2100. This scenario shows global temperatures peaking between 1.7C and 2.0C.
This scenario requires larger CDR deployment in the long term than the highest-ambition scenario does, due to the larger cumulative emissions caused by delaying deep emissions reductions.
In both the high ambition and delayed ambition scenarios, the world reaches “deeply net-negative CO2 emissions” by 2100, the report says. This continued deployment of CDR will further draw CO2 from the atmosphere, lowering global temperatures back down to 1.5C.
The chart below shows annual global greenhouse gas emissions through the end of the century under current ambition (red), highest ambition (green) and delayed ambition (blue) scenarios.

While global CDR capacity scales up more slowly in the first and third scenarios, the report notes that, in all three cases, “novel CDR reaches gigatonne-scale deployment by 2050”.
What does the science say about the potential and costs of CDR?
There is a wide range of both carbon-removal potential and associated costs between different methods of CDR, according to the report.
However, it also notes that these numbers “range widely” in the scientific literature.
The discrepancies in estimates of carbon-removal potential are due to a number of factors, the report says, including a lack of available scientific data, inconsistencies in the assumptions made in assessing technical feasibility and a lack of agreement on what, exactly, “potential” means.
These elements also influence the cost of different CDR methods, but additional factors – such as deployment costs in different areas, technological approaches and scope – also play a role in establishing price differences. Because of this, the report says, “cost estimates are often difficult to compare across methods, complicating design and policy decisions”.
The chart below shows the reported range of mitigation potential (left) and reported range of costs (right) for different CDR methods. The top four rows indicate conventional CDR methods, while bottom 11 rows show novel CDR methods. The chart refers to “mitigation potential”, rather than removal potential, because some estimates do not distinguish between removals and avoided emissions.
(Avoided emissions refers to the difference in emissions from carrying out a project, compared to a hypothetical alternative – such as the reduced emissions from halting deforestation.)
The darker colours indicate estimates that are more constrained, meaning that they are either based on stricter assumptions or there is more agreement between different estimates.

The report notes that for most removal methods, the low end of the potential is around 1GtCO2 per year, while the upper limit of costs is more than $200/tCO2.
The least expensive CDR approaches are forestry-based methods, soil-carbon sequestration and biomass burial. For forestry-based methods, the report puts the cost of CDR at $5-$53 per tonne of CO2 removed. Soil-carbon sequestration costs reach as high as $150 per tonne of CO2 removed, but could have negative overall costs “when accounting for crop yield increases potentially resulting” from changed farm-management practices, the report says.
However, it adds that “these CDR methods are typically associated with lower levels of permanence” than other methods.
Other relatively low-cost methods include coastal wetland restoration, biochar, bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) and enhanced rock weathering, while ocean alkalinity enhancement is a medium-cost option.
The most expensive methods include direct air carbon capture and storage (DACCS) and direct ocean carbon capture and storage (DOCCS).
The report also notes that a total estimate of CDR removals cannot be obtained by adding up the removal potential of all of the separate methods, since different methods can compete for scarce resources. For example, BECCS, biochar, biomass burial and biomass sinking all rely on the same base input – biomass – and therefore cannot all be maximised at the same time.
What have governments pledged on CDR?
While many countries include some amount of CDR in their national climate plans, there is currently a large gap between the amount of CDR pledged in these plans and the amount that will be needed to limit global temperature rise to 1.5C by the end of the century, says the report.
This quantity is referred to as the “CDR gap” – the difference between what is pledged and what is needed.
The size of the CDR gap is dependent not just on the pledges made by countries, but also the choice of the “benchmark” scenario against which the pledges are measured. Lower – or delayed – emissions reductions lead to larger shortfalls in the long term, meaning “CDR must subsequently be scaled to very high levels”, says the report.
Current NDCs and other country submissions to the UNFCCC total 2.5GtCO2 per year of removals in 2030, 2.7GtCO2 per year in 2035 and 3.6GtCO2 per year in 2050.
This gives a CDR gap of 0.3GtCO2 in 2030, 1.2GtCO2 in 2035 and 5.2GtCO2 in 2050, according to the report. These figures are obtained using assumed “immediate, ambitious action at all levels to reduce emissions” and the most-ambitious estimates of CDR set out in national pledges. Together, this provides a “lower bound” for the CDR gap, says the report.
By comparison, a 10-year delay in implementing ambitious emissions reductions will result in the need to remove at least an additional 150GtCO2 from the atmosphere, compared to the most ambitious scenario. (See: How much CDR is needed to reach net-zero goals?)
The report says that the CDR gap has widened since the second state of CDR report was released in 2024, due to the US leaving the Paris Agreement. It adds that other countries have “not delivered a step change in ambition” in their latest round of climate pledges.
It also cautions that “credibility issues with national pledges may mean that the CDR gap is actually larger than what we assess here”.
The report notes that current CDR pledges by companies are “substantially higher than country pledges”, at 5GtCO2 per year in 2050. However, it adds, “credibility in these announcements is low”.
What is the current funding and research landscape for CDR?
Funding of CDR research and development – as well as investment in CDR companies – has continued to increase in recent years.
In total, there has been around $5.6bn in grant funding distributed to CDR research since 2005, according to the report’s analysis. Roughly one-third of this has come in the past three years.
Funding for CDR research grants grew 13% each year between 2022 and 2025, the report says, and the corresponding number of research publications grew at a similar rate.
Funding was largely targeted at a handful of key areas, notably soil carbon sequestration, biochar and forest-based CDR.
DACCS and BECCS only make up a small number of active grants, but together account for around two-fifths of all funding due to “substantially larger” project sizes.
Despite the growth of research grants and scientific publications, the report concludes that early-stage innovation in CDR is “uneven” and says there is “no strong evidence of a step-change”.
It notes that much of the support for CDR has come from projects with a broader focus, rather than those that focus specifically on CDR.
The authors also point to a decline in “inventive activity”, as measured by patenting of CDR-related innovations. While patenting for emissions-cutting technologies in general has been on an upward trajectory, CDR patenting peaked in 2011.
Meanwhile, the report highlights the “remarkable” sustained investment in CDR companies, against a backdrop of falling investment in climate-related technologies. It notes that CDR now accounts for around 3% of overall “climate-tech funding”.
Yet, again, it says future developments remain “uncertain”. Since the previous 2024 “state of CDR” report, companies have scaled back their ambitions and policy reversals – notably in the US – “underscore that funding uncertainty remains a key barrier”. (See: How is policy impacting CDR demand?)
An upward tick in funding in 2025 was driven primarily by a “surge” in grants from predominantly public institutions, as well as $0.5bn in debt financing for a single BECCS project in Sweden.
Reliance on such funding sources “highlight[s] the volatility of the CDR innovation ecosystem”, according to the report.
The report also has a chapter focusing on the voluntary carbon market, which it describes as “propelling most of the current demand for novel CDR”.
The scale of this market remains fairly small, with contracts for 0.04GtCO2 of removals signed last year.
Moreover, the concentration of sales within a small number of buyers – particularly Microsoft – remains a “critical vulnerability”, the authors note.
How is policy impacting CDR demand?
The report analyses CDR policies in G20 nations – which together account for three-quarters of global emissions – to assess how they are acting to support CDR across their economies.
In total, 140 countries have announced net-zero targets, including virtually all of the world’s major emitters. In doing so, the report points out that the governments of these nations have “implicitly included a role for CDR in their climate plans”.
However, this does not always translate into measures specifically designed to scale up CDR.
Only the EU has adopted a binding, quantified removals target into law – namely, the goal to reach 310m tonnes of CO2 equivalent (MtCO2e) of annual net removals in the land sector by 2030.
Overall, conventional CDR is the main focus of policy, with various governments focusing on tree planting to absorb CO2 from the atmosphere.
Among G20 nations, only the UK and Australia have set specific goals to scale up novel CDR, such as BECCS and DACCS, over the coming decade.
The report highlights some nations, including Canada, Germany, Switzerland and the UK, as taking proactive steps to incentivise CDR.
The authors point to national strategies, financial support for CDR and efforts to integrate it into emissions trading systems (ETS) as examples of effective policy making.
(The report also stresses that the US, which was previously a “leader” on CDR, has now “frozen or dismantled funding and support” for CDR under the Trump administration.)
Most of the successful policies highlighted in the report focus on supporting the supply of CDR, with “less attention so far on creating demand”.
This is significant because CDR “generally lacks a natural market”, meaning there are not automatically buyers willing to spend money on emissions removals. Therefore, the authors say, policy interventions are important to create markets and boost demand.
“Compliance” carbon credits – referring to credits that can be used to meet legally mandated emissions targets – provide a way to support demand, according to the report authors.
Only some ETSs, such as those used in New Zealand and Australia, allow the use of credits based on forest-related removals for compliance. (It is worth noting that such credits are controversial, as removals by forests are not always permanent.)
The report also highlights the need for “foundational policies to create a governance framework for CDR, including rules for quantification of removal, guidelines for community engagement and the minimisation of negative environmental impacts”.
The post Q&A: The current state of ‘carbon dioxide removal’ around the world appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: The current state of ‘carbon dioxide removal’ around the world
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