When General Motors (GM) committed $625 million to develop Thacker Pass in Nevada, it did more than fund a lithium project. It established a new model for how automakers secure critical minerals, and in doing so, it reshaped how investors should evaluate the next generation of U.S. lithium assets.
This was not a passive investment. It was a fully structured supply chain partnership, combining equity, long-term offtake, and pricing strategy into a single agreement.
For investors watching Nevada’s clay lithium sector, the implication is clear: the first project has been validated – now the market is looking for what comes next.
A Landmark Deal and a New Partnership Model
GM’s $625 million investment in Lithium Americas remains one of the largest commitments by an automaker into upstream battery materials. The structure of the deal matters as much as its size.
GM secured exclusive access to Phase 1 production, locking in long-term supply from Thacker Pass, which is expected to produce around 40,000 tonnes per year of battery-grade lithium carbonate. That output alone could support hundreds of thousands to up to 1 million EVs annually.
More importantly, the agreement evolved into a joint venture structure, with GM ultimately taking a 38% ownership stake in the project while securing long-term offtake rights. This started as a TopCo equity investment but changed into a JV.
John Evans, LAC CEO, said in an interview on the GM agreement:
“They view this as an investment as much as they do a hedge to ensure that they get low-cost lithium. They want to run this JV as a business.”
A key highlight of the Thacker Pass deal is GM’s offtake agreement, which now serves as a template for a world-class OEM arrangement. GM must purchase at least 20% of its North American lithium demand, with the option to increase to 100%.
The floor price is “meaningfully above” the August 2024 low (~$10,000/t) but below current prices (~$21,000/t), as noted by Evans. GM was given an effective discount at higher price levels, lightly structured when prices at that time were at ~$60,000/t.
GM provides rolling three-year forecasts, with the next year’s volume fixed, allowing Lithium Americas to commit remaining volume to third parties. The agreement covers up to three years of contracted volume at a time.
GM Moves Upstream: From Automaker to Lithium Investor
The GM–Thacker Pass agreement highlights a shift in the lithium market. Automakers are moving upstream, directly into mining, to secure supply, manage costs, and reduce geopolitical risk. This approach is driven by both market forces and policy, with the U.S. pushing for domestic sourcing of critical minerals to support EV supply chains.
Key elements of this emerging model include:
Equity participation in the mining project,
Long-term offtake agreements tied to production, and
Structured pricing mechanisms to manage volatility.
Thacker Pass sits at the center of that strategy. It is widely recognized as the largest known lithium resource in the United States, and with construction underway, it is moving from concept to execution.
Breaking the Clay Lithium Barrier
For years, sedimentary clay lithium has carried a persistent discount in the market. Unlike brine operations in South America or hard-rock mining in Australia, clay deposits had never been proven at a commercial scale. The uncertainty around processing, recovery rates, and operating costs limited investor confidence.
Thacker Pass is now changing that, with construction underway, production targeted later this decade, and processing planned using sulfuric acid leaching at an industrial scale. Once operational, it will mark the first large-scale commercial validation of clay lithium extraction.
In resource markets, once a new extraction method is proven, capital follows. Financing improves, development timelines accelerate, and the entire category begins to reprice. This is exactly what happened in Chile’s brine sector decades ago. Clay lithium in Nevada may now be entering a similar phase.
GM’s investment provides a real-world benchmark for what a bankable lithium project looks like in today’s market. It demonstrates that:
OEMs are willing to invest upstream
Long-term offtake agreements can anchor financing
Domestic lithium supply is now a strategic priority
It also answers a key question that has held back the sector: Will major industrial players commit to clay lithium at scale? The answer is now yes.
The Next Project in the Queue: NNLP
With Thacker Pass moving forward, investor focus naturally shifts to the next project capable of attracting similar strategic interest. That brings attention to Surge Battery Metals’ Nevada North Lithium Project (NNLP), a structurally aligned next-tier candidate.
NNLP is not competing with Thacker Pass as a first mover; it is emerging as a next-generation project within a now-validated category.
NNLP stands out based on core project metrics that directly impact economics. Its average lithium grade of 3,010 ppm is significantly higher than Thacker Pass Phase 1 material, which ranges from 1,500 to 2,500 ppm. Higher grades typically translate into more efficient recovery and lower processing intensity per tonne.
The project also benefits from near-surface mineralization and a low strip ratio of approximately 1.16:1. This may reduce mining complexity and indicate efficient material movement.
From a cost perspective, NNLP’s estimated operating cost of around $5,243 per tonne LCE compares favorably to LAC’s Thacker Pass guidance of roughly $6,200 per tonne.
Beyond geology, NNLP aligns with the same development framework that defines Thacker Pass. The project has secured a strategic partnership with Evolution Mining, funding up to C$10 million toward the Pre-Feasibility Study (PFS), while Fluor Corporation, the engineering firm involved in Thacker Pass, is leading the PFS at NNLP.
Leadership expertise also matters: Steffen Ball, a key member of the team, previously led battery raw material sourcing strategies at major automakers. These include Nissan North America and Ford Motor Company, aligning with the type of OEM agreements now seen in GM–Thacker Pass.
Scale, Market Tailwinds, and Second-Wave Opportunities
Scale is critical to attract major OEM partners. NNLP outlines a 42-year mine life with average annual production of approximately 86,300 tonnes of lithium carbonate equivalent. That output positions it to support long-term anchor offtake agreements, similar in structure to what GM secured at Thacker Pass.
Market fundamentals continue to support these developments:
Global lithium demand is projected to more than double by 2030.
EV production is scaling rapidly across major markets.
Governments are prioritizing domestic supply chains for critical minerals.
Even with recent lithium price volatility, long-term fundamentals remain intact. GM’s investment reflects a forward-looking strategy: secure supply today to avoid constraints tomorrow.
Thacker Pass carries the burden of being first, proving the process, building infrastructure, and validating the economics of clay lithium. This creates opportunities for projects that follow, like NNLP, which benefit from reduced technical uncertainty, clearer financing pathways, and a market that now understands clay lithium.
First Project Validated, Next Project Poised to Follow
GM’s $625 million investment was not just a bet on one project. It was a commitment to a new supply chain model for lithium—one that integrates mining, manufacturing, and long-term demand into a single structure. Thacker Pass is now proving that model, and NNLP is positioned to fit within it.
With higher grades, favorable mining characteristics, strong development partners, and the right scale, NNLP aligns with the criteria that attracted one of the world’s largest automakers to Nevada clay lithium in the first place.
For investors, the takeaway is straightforward: the first project is being built, the template is established, and the next project in the queue is becoming easier to identify.
New Era Publishing Inc. and/or CarbonCredits.com (“We” or “Us”) are not securities dealers or brokers, investment advisers, or financial advisers, and you should not rely on the information herein as investment advice. Surge Battery Metals Inc. (“Company”) made a one-time payment of $75,000 to provide marketing services for a term of three months. None of the owners, members, directors, or employees of New Era Publishing Inc. and/or CarbonCredits.com currently hold, or have any beneficial ownership in, any shares, stocks, or options of the companies mentioned.
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CAUTIONARY STATEMENT AND FORWARD-LOOKING INFORMATION
Certain statements contained in this news release may constitute “forward-looking information” within the meaning of applicable securities laws. Forward-looking information generally can be identified by words such as “anticipate,” “expect,” “estimate,” “forecast,” “plan,” and similar expressions suggesting future outcomes or events. Forward-looking information is based on current expectations of management; however, it is subject to known and unknown risks, uncertainties, and other factors that may cause actual results to differ materially from those anticipated.
These factors include, without limitation, statements relating to the Company’s exploration and development plans, the potential of its mineral projects, financing activities, regulatory approvals, market conditions, and future objectives. Forward-looking information involves numerous risks and uncertainties and actual results might differ materially from results suggested in any forward-looking information. These risks and uncertainties include, among other things, market volatility, the state of financial markets for the Company’s securities, fluctuations in commodity prices, operational challenges, and changes in business plans.
Forward-looking information is based on several key expectations and assumptions, including, without limitation, that the Company will continue with its stated business objectives and will be able to raise additional capital as required. Although management of the Company has attempted to identify important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially, there may be other factors that cause results not to be as anticipated, estimated, or intended.
There can be no assurance that such forward-looking information will prove to be accurate, as actual results and future events could differ materially. Accordingly, readers should not place undue reliance on forward-looking information. Additional information about risks and uncertainties is contained in the Company’s management’s discussion and analysis and annual information form for the year ended December 31, 2025, copies of which are available on SEDAR+ at www.sedarplus.ca.
The forward-looking information contained herein is expressly qualified in its entirety by this cautionary statement. Forward-looking information reflects management’s current beliefs and is based on information currently available to the Company. The forward-looking information is made as of the date of this news release, and the Company assumes no obligation to update or revise such information to reflect new events or circumstances except as may be required by applicable law.
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What auditors actually test, where projects actually fail, and the contract clauses that protect you before signature.
The meeting happens about fourteen months after the contract was signed. Your assurance provider has reached the nature-based investment line in your Scope 3 file, and the partner across the table has exactly two questions. How do you know the reductions happened? And how do you know they would not have happened anyway?
The first question is MRV: measurement, reporting, and verification. The second is additionality. Between them, they decide whether your nature-based investment counts, in your inventory, in your disclosure, and in front of your board. Everything else in the project documentation is supporting material for these two answers.
This article walks through what each question actually tests, where projects most commonly fail, what digital MRV has changed (and what it has not), and the contract clauses that protect you. The goal is to give you the diligence framework before you sign, because after the credit issues is the wrong time to discover the answers were weak.
What MRV actually verifies
MRV is the machinery that turns a field intervention into a defensible number. Measurement covers the data: biomass surveys, soil sampling, remote sensing, activity records from participating farms. Reporting covers the translation of that data into claimed reductions under a recognised methodology. Verification covers the independent check: an accredited third party tests the reporting against the methodology and the evidence.
The methodologies live in registries. Verra’s Verified Carbon Standard and the Gold Standard are the two largest for nature-based projects, and each publishes the methodology documents, monitoring requirements, and verification protocols that a project must follow. The ICVCM Assessment Framework now sits above the registries, assessing whole methodologies against the Core Carbon Principles and granting the CCP label to those that pass.
For a buyer, the practical questions are concrete. What is the monitoring frequency, and is it specified in the project design document or left vague? Who is the verifier, how were they selected, and how often do they rotate? What raw data do you, the buyer, get access to, and in what format? A project that answers these in writing is a different procurement than one that answers them in a sales call.
What additionality actually proves
Additionality asks whether the intervention caused the reduction, or whether the reduction would have happened anyway. The test is a counterfactual: what would this landscape, this farm, this forest have done without the project’s money?
Three forms matter in practice. Financial additionality asks whether the project needed the carbon revenue to proceed. Regulatory additionality asks whether the activity was already required by law. Common-practice additionality asks whether the activity is already standard in the region, in which case paying for it buys you nothing the world was not getting for free.
The reason additionality dominates audit conversations is recent history. Research published in 2023, including the Science paper examined at length in our piece on conventional offsets and boardroom credibility, found that a large share of REDD+ credits failed the counterfactual test because baselines were inflated. The market response was a wave of methodology revisions at Verra and the arrival of independent ratings agencies whose entire business is re-testing additionality claims. The Carbon Credit Quality Initiative publishes transparent scoring of methodologies on exactly this dimension, and it is free to consult before you sign anything.
Where projects most commonly fail the test
Five failure modes account for most of the wreckage.
Inflated baselines. The counterfactual assumes more deforestation, more degradation, or lower yields than the evidence supports. The claimed reduction is the gap between reality and the baseline, so an inflated baseline manufactures reductions from nothing.
Unaccounted leakage. The project protects one forest and the logging moves to the next valley. The methodology is supposed to net this out; weak projects estimate it optimistically.
Thin permanence protection. Nature-based carbon can reverse: fire, pest, drought, or a change of landowner. Buffer pools and insurance mechanisms exist for this, but their adequacy varies enormously between projects.
Attribution and double counting. In supply chain settings, the same reduction can be claimed by the supplier, the buyer, and a credit purchaser unless contracts prevent it. Our Insetting vs Offsetting piece covers the inventory rules; the point here is that the auditor will ask who else is counting this tonne.
Stale monitoring. Data collected at validation and never refreshed. The IPCC AR6 Working Group III land-sector chapter documents how quickly carbon stocks respond to disturbance; a three-year-old measurement is a historical artifact, not a current claim.
What digital MRV changes, and what it does not
Digital MRV is the genuine improvement in the field. Satellite remote sensing, including the free archives at NASA Earthdata, allows biomass and land-cover change to be monitored continuously rather than at multi-year verification intervals. Soil carbon models calibrated with physical sampling reduce the cost of agricultural measurement. The practical effect is more frequent data at lower cost, which compresses the window in which a problem can hide.
What digital MRV does not change is judgment. Baselines are still human decisions about counterfactuals. Additionality is still an argument, not a measurement. Research groups such as the Oxford Smith School have been clear on this point: better sensors improve the M in MRV, but the integrity questions live in the assumptions, and assumptions need governance, not gadgets.
For a buyer, the test is simple. Ask the provider what is measured by instrument, what is estimated by model, and what is assumed by methodology. A provider who can answer that question crisply understands their own evidence chain. A provider who cannot is selling you their confidence rather than their data.
What to require in your contract
The diligence above converts into five contract clauses.
Monitoring cadence and buyer data access, specified by dataset and frequency.
Verifier independence, named accreditation, and rotation terms.
Baseline revision triggers, so the counterfactual updates when the methodology or the evidence changes.
Reversal liability and buffer adequacy, with the mechanism named and sized.
Documentation handover in audit-ready form, so the evidence file your assurance provider needs already exists.
None of these clauses is exotic. All of them are absent from weak contracts, and their absence is the most reliable early signal that the MRV and additionality answers will be weak too.
If you are evaluating a nature-based investment and want the MRV and additionality stress-tested before signature rather than after, the carbon and sustainability experts at Carbon Credit Capital can run that review against any project on your shortlist, and design nature-based supply chain investments where the evidence chain is built audit-first. Schedule a consultation.
EU Directive: Empowering Consumers for the Green Transition (ECGT)
The EU Directive, Empowering Consumers for the Green Transition (ECGT), takes effect on September 27, 2026.(1) The goal of ECGT is to protect consumers by ensuring that environmental claims are fair, understandable, and reliable. This regulation does create a new compliance requirement for businesses, but it also provides sustainability and marketing teams with important guidance that helps create consistency in sustainability communications.
Key takeaways
ECGT takes effect September 27, 2026, and prohibits claims that a product or service has a neutral, reduced, or positive environmental impact based on offsetting alone.
Named example phrases the regulation prohibits include climate neutral, CO2 neutral certified, carbon positive, climate net zero, climate compensated, reduced climate impact, and limited CO2 footprint.
ECGT does not want to deter investment in carbon credits. It wants companies to communicate the real benefits of the projects they support instead.
SBTi’s guidance recommends framing carbon credits as taking responsibility for ongoing emissions, not as making a product or company neutral.
Voluntary carbon projects deliver real climate progress: reducing super-pollutants, protecting and restoring ecosystems, and supporting communities.
Regarding carbon credits specifically, voluntary carbon projects deliver important climate progress and environmental benefits that provide many talking points for companies. They reduce climate super-pollutants by removing industrial emissions like methane, N2O, HFCs and others. They protect and restore valuable ecosystems and carbon sinks like forests, mangroves and grasslands. They help communities by reducing local pollution, creating employment opportunities, improving access to healthcare, and more.
The Science Based Targets Initiative (SBTi), a global leader in business climate action, concludes that alongside aggressive decarbonization, we should also use high quality carbon credits to take responsibility for our ongoing emissions. SBTi recognizes that carbon credits are important “to help limit temperature overshoot, mitigate transition risks, and support climate solutions.”(2)
ECGT language on carbon offsetting says that they do not want to deter investment in carbon credits. They just want companies to focus on communicating the benefits of the projects they support and avoid claims beyond the scope of carbon credits, which is good for everyone, companies and consumers alike.
The regulation reinforces that carbon credits do not change the sustainability of your products, so carbon credit buyers should not suggest that their products are more sustainable because of carbon credits. Instead, companies need to promote their climate contributions as a way to compensate or take responsibility for their carbon emissions by supporting projects that do great things like reducing global carbon emissions, reducing pollution, preventing deforestation, restoring forests, and more.
ECGT language related to carbon offsetting
The regulation is particularly focused on prohibiting claims, based on offsetting greenhouse gas emissions, that a product or service has a neutral, reduced, or positive impact on the environment in terms of greenhouse gas emissions. These claims are prohibited in all circumstances because they mislead consumers into believing the claim relates to the product itself, or to how it was made and supplied, or into thinking that using the product carries no environmental impact at all.
Named examples of prohibited claims include:
climate neutral
CO2 neutral certified
carbon positive
climate net zero
climate compensated
reduced climate impact
limited CO2 footprint
These claims are only allowed when they rest on a product’s actual lifecycle impact, not on offsetting emissions outside that product’s value chain, since the two are not equivalent. This prohibition does not stop companies from advertising their investments in environmental initiatives, including carbon credit projects, as long as they present that information in a way that is not misleading and that meets the other requirements of Union law.(1)
SBTi also provides guidance on climate contribution language in its Corporate Net Zero Standard Version 2.0 Draft for Second Public Consultation, November 2025. While the SBTi language is fairly technical, it has a good framework for crafting a climate contribution message.
SBTi Language for Carbon Credits(3)
Take responsibility for ongoing emissions by delivering mitigation impact contributions
Carbon credits certify the mitigation outcomes of projects that reduce, avoid, or remove carbon emissions
Activities that reduce emissions from emission sources not located within the company’s value chain
Activities that conserve, protect, and enhance natural carbon sinks
Activities that capture and store carbon in storage pools
SBTi’s draft standard also walks through sample claim language for this kind of contribution. In general, the samples move from a simple percentage statement, to naming a specific verified tonnage tied to that percentage, to a fuller statement that breaks the tonnage into reductions versus removals. Across all three, the framing stays consistent: a company took responsibility for a defined share of its ongoing emissions over a set period, by funding a specific, verified amount of mitigation, achieved through emission reductions or removals.(3)
FAQ: ECGT and Carbon Credit Claims
When does the ECGT directive take effect?
The rules apply across the EU from September 27, 2026, after member states transposed the directive into national law by March 27, 2026.
Does ECGT ban carbon offsetting?
No. It bans specific marketing claims that a product or service is environmentally neutral, reduced impact, or positive based on offsetting. Advertising investment in carbon credit projects themselves is still allowed if it is not misleading.
What phrases does ECGT specifically prohibit?
Named examples include climate neutral, CO2 neutral certified, carbon positive, climate net zero, climate compensated, reduced climate impact, and limited CO2 footprint, when those claims are based on offsetting rather than a product’s actual lifecycle impact.
How should a company describe its carbon credit purchases instead?
SBTi’s guidance recommends stating the specific verified tonnage of emissions reductions or removals funded and describing that as taking responsibility for a defined share of ongoing emissions, rather than claiming the company or product is neutral.
Does this rule apply to company level sustainability claims too?
ECGT is focused on claims about specific products and services in consumer marketing. Broader company level sustainability communication is a separate matter still governed by other existing rules.
While ECGT does add a new compliance burden for businesses, it helps create consistency in sustainability messaging that is important to building confidence in voluntary carbon projects and scaling the industry to help us achieve progress on global carbon emissions.
Disclaimer: Terrapass does not provide legal or regulatory advice. Any interpretation of regulation must be approved by your legal representative.
Most businesses that decide to act on their net-zero targets reach the same point of friction. Buying carbon credits has meant tracking down brokers, sitting through sales calls, and requesting a quote just to learn a price, sometimes with limited proof of what you are buying.
