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The UK’s greenhouse gas emissions fell by 2.4% in 2025 to their lowest level in more than 150 years, according to new Carbon Brief analysis.

The biggest factors were gas use falling to a 34-year low and coal use dropping to levels last seen in 1600, when Queen Elizabeth I was on the throne and William Shakespeare was writing Hamlet.

These shifts were helped by record-high UK temperatures, elevated gas prices, the end of coal power in late 2024 and a sharp slowdown in the steel industry.

Other key findings of the analysis include:

  • The UK’s greenhouse gas emissions fell to 364m tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (MtCO2e) in 2025, the lowest level since 1872.
  • Coal use roughly halved, with more than half of this due to the end of coal power and another third due to closures and other issues in the steel industry.
  • Gas use fell by 1.5% to the lowest level since 1992, with roughly equal contributions from cuts in heat for buildings and industry, more than offsetting a small rise in gas power.
  • Oil use fell by 0.9%, despite rising traffic, helped by more than 700,000 new electric vehicles (EVs), electric vans and plug-in hybrids on the nation’s roads.
  • The UK’s emissions are now 54% below 1990 levels, while its GDP has nearly doubled.

The 2.4% (8.9MtCO2e) fall in emissions in 2025 was only slightly more than half of the 15MtCO2e cut needed each year on average until 2050, to reach the UK’s legally binding net-zero target.

The analysis is the latest in a decade-long series of annual estimates from Carbon Brief, covering emissions during 2024, 2023, 2022, 2020, 2019, 2018, 2017, 2016, 2015 and 2014.

Emissions fall to 150-year low

The UK’s territorial greenhouse gas emissions – those that occur within the country’s borders – have now fallen in 27 of the 36 years since 1990.

(The recent fall in territorial emissions has not been “offset” by a rise in the amount of CO2 embedded in imports, which has stayed relatively constant since around 2008.)

Apart from brief rebounds after the global financial crisis and the Covid-19 lockdowns, UK emissions have fallen every year for the past two decades.

The latest 9MtCO2e (2.4%) reduction takes UK emissions down to 364MtCO2e, according to Carbon Brief’s analysis, which is 54% below 1990 levels.

This is the lowest since 1872, as shown in the figure below.

Chart showing that UK emissions fell 2.4% in 2025 to 54% below 1990 levels
UK territorial greenhouse gas emissions, MtCO2e, 1850-2024. Note the impact of general strikes in 1921 and 1926; the miners’ strike of 1984 had a smaller impact. Source: Jones et al. (2023) and Carbon Brief analysis of figures from the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ).

The latest fall puts UK emissions below the level seen during the 1926 general strike, when the nation’s industrial base was brought to a standstill.

It means that UK emissions are now at sustained lows not seen since Victorian times.

Nevertheless, emissions will need to continue falling in order to meet the UK’s legal climate goals and its net-zero target, which is part of international efforts under the Paris Agreement to stop dangerous warming.

Record lows for coal and gas

The key factors in driving down UK emissions in 2025 were coal and gas use falling to their lowest levels since 1600 and 1992, respectively.

For gas, this was mainly down to lower demand from building heat and from industry, likely at least partly related to record-high temperatures and elevated gas prices. For coal, this was a combination of the end of coal power and a steel-industry slowdown, as shown below.

Chart showing that record-low use of coal and gas helped UK cut emissions in 2025
Contributions to emissions changes in 2025, MtCO2e. Left to right: Reduction due to building heat and industry; Reduction due to the end of coal power; Reduction due to the steel-industry slowdown; Reduction due to other factors; Overall reduction. Source: Carbon Brief analysis.

These were not the only factors driving the change in UK emissions in 2025.

The UK saw record generation from renewable sources, particularly wind and solar, but a further decline in nuclear generation, the end of coal power and an increase in electricity demand for the second year running meant that gas-fired power output also went up slightly.

In the transport sector, demand for oil fell by 0.9% year-on-year, even though traffic levels went up by around 1%, according to provisional figures through to September 2025.

This partly reflects the changing makeup of vehicles on the road.

By 2024, there were 2.8m fewer diesel vehicles than there were in 2019, a trend likely to continue due to falling diesel car sales. In contrast, there are now nearly 3m EVs, plug-in hybrids or electric vans on the nation’s roads, making up 5% of the car fleet overall and 2% of vans.

These electrified vehicles are cutting UK emissions by more than 7MtCO2 every year, according to Carbon Brief analysis, with the 700,000 new EVs in 2025 alone saving nearly 2MtCO2.

Drivers with EVs saved a total of £2m in lower fuel costs in 2025, the analysis shows, as EVs are much more efficient and, therefore, cheaper to run than petrol or diesel vehicles. This amounts to more than £700 per EV per year and more than £1,100 for each electric van.

Despite falling demand for oil-derived fuels and the impact of the growing EV fleet, Carbon Brief estimates that the UK’s oil-related emissions actually increased by 0.2% in 2025. This is largely down to a shift in the amount and type of biofuel blended into diesel and petrol at the pump.

Coal falls to lowest level in 400 years

There have been dramatic declines in UK coal use over the past decade, in particular resulting from the phaseout of coal-fired electricity generation.

UK coal demand fell by another 56% in 2025 to just under 1m tonnes (Mt). This is down 97% from the 37Mt burned in 2015 and is 99.6% below the peak of 221Mt in 1956.

As shown in the figure below, coal demand is now at the lowest level since 1600, when Elizabeth I was the queen of England and Ireland.

(It was during her five-decade reign that coal had become the country’s main source of fuel, following an Elizabethan “energy crisis” triggered by a lack of wood for making charcoal.)

Chart showing that UK coal demand in 2025 fell to lowest level since 1600
Annual UK coal demand, million tonnes, 1500-2025. Note the impact of general strikes in 1921 and 1926, as well as the miners’ strike of 1984. Source: Carbon Brief analysis of data from DESNZ and Roger Fouquet.

The UK’s last coal-fired power plant, at Ratcliffe-on-Soar in Nottinghamshire, closed down on 30 September 2024. It had run at low levels that year, but still burned some 0.7m tonnes of coal. The end of coal power contributed nearly three-fifths of the fall in demand for the fuel in 2025.

There has also been a marked reduction in UK steel production in recent years, particularly since the closure of two of the nation’s last blast furnaces at Port Talbot in south Wales in 2024.

The last blast furnaces in the country are at the British Steel plant in Scunthorpe in Lincolnshire, which had been due for closure in early 2025 until the government stepped in to keep it open.

The slowdown in coal-based steel production accounts for around a third of the decline in UK coal use in 2025, but only 14% of the drop in the past decade, which was mainly due to coal power.

Globally, the steel industry is facing intense competition in an oversupplied market, with a growing “glut” that has driven down prices. At the same time, the industry in the UK has ageing equipment and expensive electricity, which UK Steel says is largely a result of high gas prices.

The Port Talbot site is being converted to “electric arc furnace” (EAF) steelmaking, which does not rely on coal. The same shift is under discussion for the Scunthorpe site. Analysis from thinktank Green Alliance suggests EAFs would be the cheapest option for both sites.

Gas falls to lowest level in 34 years

There have also been dramatic declines in UK demand for gas over the past 15 years. After another 1.5% drop in 2025, gas use is now at the lowest level since 1992, as shown below.

This means gas demand is now similar to when the UK began its “dash for gas” in the early 1990s. Starting in 1991, this period saw a wave of new gas-fired power stations being built. It was triggered by a change in regulations to allow the use of gas to generate electricity, advances in turbine technology, a period of low gas prices and the privatisation of the UK electricity system.

In total, UK gas demand has fallen by nearly two-fifths since 2010. Half of this overall reduction is due to a 50% fall in gas-fired electricity generation, which has been displaced by falling demand and renewable sources. Another third of the overall reduction is from home heating, where demand has dropped due to more efficient gas boilers and improved insulation.

Chart showing that UK gas demand in 2025 fell to lowest level since 1992
Annual UK gas demand, terawatt hours, 1822-2025. Source: Carbon Brief analysis of data from DESNZ and Roger Fouquet.

In 2025, the 1.5% reduction in gas use was caused by roughly equal contributions from lower demand for building heat and from industrial users.

This was helped by 2025 being the hottest year on record, with high gas prices likely also a factor.

Gas prices have remained significantly above the levels seen before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. At the start of March 2026, UK gas prices roughly doubled as a result of the conflict in the Middle East triggered by the US and Israeli attacks on Iran.

Whereas the UK’s fleet of EVs is already having a significant impact on emissions, domestic heat pump sales remain at relatively low levels, particularly compared with other European nations.

After a 25% year-on-year increase in 2025, there were still only 125,000 heat pump sales in the UK. These new installations will have cut UK emissions by around 0.2MtCO2 in 2025 relative to gas heating, shows Carbon Brief analysis.

By the end of 2025, the UK had a total of around 450,000 domestic heat pumps, generating total savings of roughly 0.7MtCO2 after accounting for the increase in electricity demand.

The 2.3m domestic heat pumps expected by 2030 in the National Energy System Operator’sfuture energy scenarios” would save the UK around 4.5MtCO2 per year.

Emissions continue to decouple from growth

In total, UK greenhouse gas emissions in 2025 fell to 54% below 1990 levels, the baseline year for its legally binding climate goals.

Since then, the UK economy has nearly doubled in size, with GDP growing by 95% according to data from the World Bank, as shown in the figure below.

Chart showing that UK emissions are 54% below 1990 while economy has nearly doubled
Change since 1990, %, in UK greenhouse gas emissions (red) and GDP adjusted for inflation (blue). Source: Carbon Brief analysis of figures from DESNZ and the World Bank.

Transport remains the single-largest sector, accounting for around 30% of UK emissions, followed, in order, by buildings, agriculture, industry and electricity generation.

The majority of emissions cuts over recent decades have come in the power sector – formerly, the UK’s largest emitter – as coal has been phased out and renewables have replaced gas.

This is set to change over the next 10-15 years. The rise of EVs is set to make transport the largest source of emissions cuts from now until 2040, according to the Climate Change Committee.

While industrial emissions have also declined significantly since 1990, falling some 74% by 2025, the size of UK manufacturing output has also roughly doubled.

Despite the progress in cutting emissions to date, the UK has a long way to go if it is to meet its climate goals in the future, including the yet-to-be legislated seventh “carbon budget”, covering the years 2038-2042, as well as the 2050 net-zero target.

Emissions would need to fall by 15MtCO2e each year until 2050 on average, in order to meet the net-zero target. Meeting the UK’s 2035 international pledge under the Paris Agreement, a 78% reduction below 1990 levels, emissions would need to fall by 22MtCO2e per year.

These figures can be compared with the 9MtCO2e cut achieved in 2025. Emissions did, in fact, fall by an average of 15MtCO2e per year over the past decade – and by an average of 13MtCO2e per year since the turn of the century.

Methodology

The starting point for Carbon Brief’s analysis of UK greenhouse gas emissions is preliminary government estimates of energy use by fuel. These are published monthly, with the final month of each year appearing in figures published at the end of the following February. The same approach has accurately estimated year-to-year changes in emissions in previous years (see table, below).

Annual change in UK greenhouse gas emissions, %

Year Official figures Carbon Brief Difference
2010 2.5 2.7 0.1
2011 -7.2 -7.7 -0.4
2012 3.1 3.6 0.6
2013 -2.1 -4.1 -2.0
2014 -7.4 -7.5 -0.1
2015 -3.8 -3.7 0.0
2016 -5.4 -5.7 -0.3
2017 -2.4 -2.0 0.4
2018 -1.6 -1.7 -0.1
2019 -3.6 -3.9 -0.3
2020 -8.9 -8.8 0.1
2021 3.6 3.5 -0.1
2022 -4.3 -3.6 0.7
2023 -5.0 -5.2 -0.2
2024 -2.7 -3.0 -0.3
2025 -2.4

One large source of uncertainty is the provisional energy use data, which is revised at the end of March each year and often again later on.

Emissions data is also subject to revision in light of improvements in data collection and the methodology used, with major revisions in 2021 and more minor changes in early 2026.

The latest changes to the DESNZ emissions methodology have led to 2% reduction in baseline 1990 emissions, but the impact on recent years is minimal.

This does not affect the UK’s carbon budgets, which are set in terms of tonnes of emissions over a five-year period, rather than a percentage reduction compared with 1990 levels.

The table above applies Carbon Brief’s emissions calculations to the comparable energy use and emissions figures, which may differ from those published previously.

Another source of uncertainty is the fact that Carbon Brief’s approach to estimating the annual change in emissions differs from the methodology used for the government’s own provisional estimates. The government has access to more granular data not available for public use.

Carbon Brief’s analysis takes figures on the amount of energy sourced from coal, oil and gas reported in Energy Trends 1.2. These figures are combined with conversion factors for the CO2 emissions per unit of energy, published annually by the UK government. Conversion factors are available for each fuel type, for example, petrol, diesel, gas and coal for electricity generation.

For oil, the analysis also draws on Energy Trends 3.13, which further breaks down demand according to the subtype of oil, for example, petrol, jet fuel and so on. Similarly, for coal, the analysis draws on Energy Trends 2.6, which breaks down solid fuel use by subtype.

Emissions from each fuel are then estimated from the energy use multiplied by the conversion factor, weighted by the relative proportions for each fuel subtype.

For example, the UK uses roughly 50m tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe) in the form of oil products, around half of which is from road diesel. So half the total energy use from oil is combined with the conversion factor for road diesel, another one-fifth for petrol and so on.

Energy use from each fossil fuel subtype is mapped onto the appropriate emissions conversion factor. In some cases, there is no direct read-across, in which case the nearest appropriate substitute is used. For example, energy use listed as “bitumen” is mapped to “processed fuel oils – residual oil”. Similarly, solid fuel used by “other conversion industries” is mapped to “petroleum coke” and “other” solid fuel use is mapped to “coal (domestic)”.

The energy use figures are calculated on an inland consumption basis, meaning they include bunkers consumed in the UK for international transport by air and sea. In contrast, national emissions inventories exclude international aviation and shipping.

The analysis, therefore, estimates and removes the part of oil use that is due to the UK’s share of international aviation. It draws on the UK’s final greenhouse gas emissions inventory, which breaks emissions down by sector and reports the total for domestic aviation.

This domestic emissions figure is compared with the estimated emissions due to jet fuel use overall, based on the appropriate conversion factor. The analysis assumes that domestic aviation’s share of emissions is equivalent to its share of jet fuel energy use.

In addition to estimating CO2 emissions from fossil fuel use, Carbon Brief assumes that CO2 emissions from non-fuel sources, such as land-use change and forestry, are the same as a year earlier. The remaining greenhouse gas emissions are assumed to change in line with the latest government energy and emissions projections.

These assumptions are based on the UK government’s own methodology for preliminary greenhouse gas emissions estimates, published in 2019.

Note that the figures in this article are for emissions within the UK measured according to international guidelines. This means they exclude emissions associated with imported goods, including imported biomass, as well as the UK’s share of international aviation and shipping.

The Office for National Statistics (ONS) has published detailed comparisons between various approaches to calculating UK emissions, on a territorial, consumption, “environmental accounts” or “international accounting” basis.

The UK’s consumption-based CO2 emissions increased between 1990 and 2007. Since then, however, they have fallen by a similar number of tonnes as emissions within the UK.

Bioenergy is a significant source of renewable energy in the UK and its climate benefits are disputed. Contrary to public perception, however, only around one-quarter of bioenergy is imported.

International aviation is considered part of the UK’s carbon budgets and faces the prospect of tighter limits on its CO2 emissions. The international shipping sector has a target to at least halve its emissions by 2050, relative to 2008 levels.

The post Analysis: UK emissions fall 2.4% in 2025 as coal hits 400-year low appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Analysis: UK emissions fall 2.4% in 2025 as coal hits 400-year low

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The UN climate process was built for negotiation – now it must support implementation

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By Paul Watkinson, Stefan Ruchti-Crowley, Anju Sharma, Ovais Sarmad and Benito Müller.

In the corridors of the World Conference Centre in Bonn, where the June Climate Meetings (SB64) will conclude on Thursday, the need for change is palpable.

Delegates are grappling once again with overcrowded agendas, growing demands on limited negotiating time, external geopolitical pressures that reverberate internally to test the limits of a consensus-based process, and concerns over its future financial sustainability.

Bonn Bulletin: Finance row threatens to scupper work on adaptation goal

There is growing frustration with a process that consumes vast amounts of time to produce outcomes that are often too incremental to match the accelerating reality of the climate crisis.

The climate regime has delivered. But it is in danger of not delivering enough.

More effective multilateralism

There is no denying the successes of the UN climate process. Over three decades, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement established a universal framework for climate action, created transparency and accountability mechanisms, and sent powerful signals to governments, businesses and investors.

Thanks in large part to this framework, the world is no longer on a trajectory of more than 4°C of warming, clean technology costs have fallen dramatically, and participation in the global climate effort remains nearly universal.

Yet, global temperatures continue to break records. Climate impacts are intensifying across every region. The world remains far off track to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement. As warming approaches – and may exceed – 1.5°C, every additional fraction of a degree brings greater losses of lives, livelihoods and ecosystems, with the greatest burdens falling on the most vulnerable countries and communities.

    We remain convinced that the answer to the climate crisis is not less multilateralism, but more effective multilateralism.

    The hard truth is that the UNFCCC remains largely organised around the logic of treaty-making, while the central challenge of climate action has shifted to implementation. A process designed to negotiate agreements and deliver decision text as the outcome is now required to support implementation on the ground—and it is struggling.

    There is a structural mismatch between what the climate process was designed to do, and what it needs to do now.

    Consultations on reforms

    Discussions on the urgency of reform are widespread and no longer confined to the margins. Formally, the Arrangements for Intergovernmental Meetings (AIM) process is exploring ways of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the process.

    The UNFCCC Executive Secretary has also convened a High-Level Informal Consultative Roundtable for strategic reflection on how to strengthen the complementarity between the intergovernmental process and action in the real economy.

    Defending multilateralism today requires adapting it.

    The good news is that meaningful reform does not require reopening treaties, renegotiating the Paris Agreement, or indeed even resolving long-standing differences on the Rules of Procedure to change the consensus rule. Stefan Ruchti-Crowley and Paul Watkinson’s recent paper for ecbi (European Capacity Building Initiative), Quo Vadis COP? Reforming UNFCCC Sessions to Improve Negotiations and Support Implementation, outlines a practical toolbox of four reforms that can be pursued within the existing institutional framework.

    First, the process must improve its agendas.

    The formal process is burdened by crowded agendas and overlapping workstreams. Consolidating agenda items under broader thematic pillars (such as mitigation, adaptation, finance and transparency); developing good practices for agenda adoption; removing legacy “ghost” items; and concluding outstanding business on the Kyoto Protocol will create more space for substantive discussions and implementation.

    Second, the process must organise its work more strategically.

    The climate process currently attempts to address nearly every issue at every session. A more strategic approach would use thematic multi-year programmes of work; better align review cycles and timelines; improve coherence across the many bodies and processes that have accumulated over time, often to the extent that even insiders have lost oversight; and also make better use of inter-sessional and pre-sessional meetings.

    Third, the process must focus more deliberately on implementation.

    Critically, not every challenge requires a negotiated outcome. Negotiations should focus on issues that genuinely require collective decision-making. Other discussions should prioritise learning, cooperation and practical problem-solving.

    Existing formats such as Talanoa Dialogues, roundtables and other facilitative approaches should be expanded. Likewise, the Enhanced Transparency Framework should become a stronger mechanism for mutual learning and accountability rather than a largely procedural reporting and “box-ticking” exercise.

    Fourth, the process must make structural changes and broaden participation.

    National delegations should include a broader range of practitioners and policymakers, including a Head of Implementation. The process should strengthen engagement with sectoral ministers, investors, technology providers, scientists, local authorities and non-Party stakeholders.

    Stronger links are necessary between science policy and implementation, and with international institutions that shape the enabling conditions for climate action, particularly finance and development. Platforms to address systemic barriers along with AI-enabled learning by doing will equally support strengthened action.

    Delivering commitments with limited resources

    The case for reform is becoming even stronger as financial pressures intensify.

    Improving efficiency is not simply desirable; it has become unavoidable. The UNFCCC faces growing budgetary constraints arising from delayed contributions, uncertainty surrounding major donors, and broader reductions across the UN system.

    A process that is better organised, more implementation-focused and less encumbered by procedural overload will be far better equipped to navigate a future of tighter resources.

    Leadership will be crucial.

    Panama environment minister backs calls for reform of UN climate process

    COP presidencies have an important role to play, as do the Chairs of the Subsidiary Bodies. The UNFCCC Executive Secretary and Secretariat must take a bold approach to work in coordination with the COP Bureau to implement urgent changes.

    Careful diplomacy will, of course, be essential. Parties must be reassured that reform is intended to strengthen the effectiveness of the regime, not weaken its governance. The objective is not to replace mandates, but to ensure that mandates can be fulfilled more effectively. It is to ensure that negotiation is used where negotiation is needed, while other forms of cooperation are used where they can deliver better results.

    The UNFCCC remains the cornerstone of international climate cooperation. No other forum combines its legitimacy, universality and legal authority. But the multilateral climate process must evolve from a system primarily designed to negotiate commitments into one that is equally capable of supporting their delivery.

    The post The UN climate process was built for negotiation – now it must support implementation appeared first on Climate Home News.

    The UN climate process was built for negotiation – now it must support implementation

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    The vote that stopped a data center: US communities query resource-hungry AI

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    On quiet streets across the Californian city of Monterey Park, green-and-white “YES on Measure NDC” signs stood on front-yard lawns as volunteers walked door-to-door, drumming up support among residents to vote in favor of a ban on new data centers in their area.

    They clarified the ballot wording in English, Spanish and Chinese, while distributing multilingual flyers warning about the rise in electricity demand, industrial infrastructure and environmental impacts associated with AI-related data center development.

    Less than a month later, on June 2, Monterey Park voters overwhelmingly approved the ban in the San Gabriel Valley east of Los Angeles, with 86.4% voting in favor and 13.6% opposed, according to county election results.

    Social opposition to data centers is on the rise, especially in the US, as artificial intelligence (AI) and the technology hubs needed to support it stoke competition for electricity, water and land in communities where they are based. Industry advocates say data centers bring economic benefits and do not always result in higher power prices for households.

    A front-yard sign encourages Monterey Park residents to vote “YES on Measure NDC” (No Data Centers) in the San Gabriel Valley, LA County on May 9, 2026 (Photo: Kristen Mayol)

    A front-yard sign encourages Monterey Park residents to vote “YES on Measure NDC” (No Data Centers) in the San Gabriel Valley, LA County on May 9, 2026 (Photo: Kristen Mayol)

    The result in Monterey Park made it the first city in the United States to enact a citywide prohibition on data centers through a voter-approved ballot measure.

    “This week our city has been celebrating the landslide results from Measure NDC,” Monterey Park Mayor Elizabeth Yang said in a phone interview.

    On social media, Yang described the city’s response as the result of sustained resident organizing and civic engagement. “We want to fulfill our duty of listening to residents,” Yang told Climate Home News.

    A community campaign takes shape

    The vote came after months of public testimony, neighborhood outreach and organizing surrounding a proposed data center project on Saturn Street in Monterey Park. Here, developers planned to replace an existing commercial office building with a nearly 50-megawatt data center intended to serve growing demand for AI computing.

    Supporters of Measure NDC (Measure No Data Centers) argued that keeping this, and other such centers, out of their community would help protect air quality, drinking water resources, public health and local infrastructure.

    According to CoStar News, a real estate information platform, the backers of the Saturn Street project – Digico Infrastructure REIT and HMC Capital’s StratCap – had already withdrawn their planning application on April 3 amid growing local opposition and regulatory uncertainty, including the city’s decision to place a data center ban before voters.

    Subsequently, on April 20, the Monterey Park City Council adopted an ordinance prohibiting all data centers within the city limits.

    Explainer: Will AI data centres make or break the energy transition?

    Company representatives later said they would explore future “productive land uses … supported by the broader community”. Potential alternatives discussed publicly have included housing, although no formal proposal has been submitted.

    Reuters reported in May that DigiCo Infrastructure, an Australian company, was exploring “monetisation options” for its two Los Angeles sites after rowing back on the Monterey Park proposal. DigiCo is also selling its Chicago data center for $750 million to pay down debt and fund the development of another site in Sydney.

    DigiCo and HMC Capital did not respond to requests for comment for this article.

    Potential local benefits of data centers

    Industry lobby groups argue that data centers can provide economic benefits to host communities. According to the US-based Data Center Coalition, which represents major operators and developers, data centers generate tax revenue, support construction and technical jobs, and provide infrastructure needed for cloud computing, scientific research and AI development.

    The industry has also challenged claims that data centers necessarily raise electricity costs for households. A recent report by energy consulting firm Energy + Environmental Economics (E3), commissioned by the coalition, found no historical evidence that data centers had driven up residential electricity rates under existing utility pricing structures. It argued that factors including inflation, grid modernization costs, natural gas price volatility and investments in wildfire resilience have played a bigger role in rising electricity bills.

    According to E3, large users can, under certain regulatory frameworks, reduce prices for other customers by contributing more revenue to utilities than they cost to serve. In a previous analysis of Amazon data centers, the consultancy found that payments from the facilities exceeded the incremental costs incurred by utilities. The report also noted that regulators across the US have increasingly adopted specialized pricing structures as data center demand has expanded.

    An aerial photo shows the Alibaba Zhejiang Cloud Computing Renhe Data Center in Hangzhou, China, on April 11, 2024. (Photo by Costfoto/NurPhoto)

    An aerial photo shows the Alibaba Zhejiang Cloud Computing Renhe Data Center in Hangzhou, China, on April 11, 2024. (Photo by Costfoto/NurPhoto)

    Hefty carbon, water and land footprints

    The concerns raised in Monterey Park mirror debates over the environmental and infrastructure demands of AI being heard in many countries around the world, from Europe to North America and Asia.

    This month, a UN report estimated that the data centers required for AI globally could consume 945 terawatt-hours of electricity annually by 2030 – roughly twice France’s 2025 power consumption.

    This, it calculated, would have a carbon footprint needing some 6.7 billion trees grown over 10 years to offset, a water footprint equal to the annual domestic needs of 1.3 billion people in Sub-Saharan Africa, and a land footprint of more than 14,500 square kilometers, roughly twice the Jakarta metropolitan area. 

    In a 2026 report, Key Questions on Energy and AI, the International Energy Agency (IEA) found that electricity consumption from AI-focused data centers grew by approximately 50% in 2025 alone.

    It warned that “social acceptability is also a growing issue, as communities push back against data center projects”, citing concerns about environmental sustainability, electricity affordability, infrastructure strain and democratic participation in land-use decisions.

    Global data center electricity consumption by sensitivity case, 2020-2035

    Left axis shows terawatt hours. (IEA: Licence CC BY 4.0)

    Left axis shows terawatt hours. (IEA: Licence CC BY 4.0)

    AI-focused facilities consume substantially more electricity than traditional data centers and often require extensive supporting infrastructure, including cooling systems, industrial electrical equipment, backup generators running on diesel and large-scale energy storage systems.

    The IEA also noted that operators are increasingly exploring onsite natural gas generation and battery infrastructure to maintain electrical reliability as AI workloads intensify.

    Local concern over industrial infrastructure

    Samuel Brown Vazquez, an East San Gabriel Valley community organizer, said doubts about the proposed data center in Monterey Park were informed by broader debates over industrial development in the area.

    Brown cited community opposition to proposals that could bring battery energy storage facilities – and potentially data centers – to the former Puente Hills Mall site  in the City of Industry, where residents have raised concerns about pollution, fire risks, and the impacts of new industrial infrastructure on nearby residential neighborhoods and schools.

    Many viewed the campaign as part of a larger conversation about how communities should respond to the rapid expansion of AI-related infrastructure across Southern California.

    Power-hungry AI data centres seen driving demand for fossil fuels

    According to nonprofit Data Center Watch, around $64 billion-worth of data center projects nationwide were delayed or blocked between May 2024 and March 2025 amid increasing local opposition.

    Mayor Yang wants Monterey Park’s experience to encourage other communities to take a more active role in decisions about AI-related infrastructure. “We’re hoping other cities can follow similarly in banning data centers with proposed ballot measures,” she said, adding that whether such efforts succeed elsewhere will depend in part on how local officials respond to residents’ concerns.

    Materials for the “Yes on Measure NDC” campaign, May, 2026 (Photos: Kristen Mayol)

    Materials for the “Yes on Measure NDC” campaign, May, 2026 (Photos: Kristen Mayol)

    The new UN report this month called on governments and companies to address AI’s environmental impacts proactively to ensure that the technology develops sustainably and its benefits are shared fairly.

    Kaveh Madani, director of the United Nations University Institute for Water, Environment and Health, who led the investigation team for the report, said AI “is a technological transformation that is improving the lives of billions of people around the world”. But, he added, it must be used “responsibly”.   

    “We have a narrow window to ensure that the backbone of the technological revolution of our era develops within planetary limits, and that the communities who provide the critical minerals for advancing AI and the ones that host its infrastructure and e-waste are also among those who benefit from it,” he said.

    This story was developed, reported and produced under the Covering Climate Now (CCNow) Climate Journalism Student Mentorship, which connects USC student journalists with professional newsrooms in CCNow’s global network. Participants receive training, editorial mentorship, and the opportunity to report and publish original climate stories with partner outlets while being paid professional freelance rates.

    The post The vote that stopped a data center: US communities query resource-hungry AI appeared first on Climate Home News.

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    Warning against ‘consumer club’ as G7 forms critical minerals alliance

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    Wealthy nations in the G7 have agreed to work more closely together to secure the minerals they need for the energy transition, AI and defence, and to diversify supply chains away from China, calling for more cooperation with “like-minded partners”.

    But the agreement adopted at this week’s G7 leaders’ summit in France is vague on what co-operation with resource-rich developing countries could look like, with critics warning against creating a consumer club of powerful nations that excludes others from shaping standards and building green supply chains.

    “The G7 communiqué reaffirms our suspicion that, for the G7, it is all about resource security, not just energy transition,” Claude Kabemba, executive director of Southern Africa Resource Watch, told Climate Home News.

      In a joint communique, the leaders of some of the world’s largest economies said they would step up coordination within the group and with partner countries to establish mineral processing and industrial capacity, support local value addition, promote innovation, develop standards, improve mineral traceability and share information on stockpiling systems.

      They agreed to create a joint crisis-prevention mechanism with the support of the International Energy Agency to monitor mineral supply and demand disruptions, as well as establish harmonised platforms to provide information about the origin of minerals, starting with lithium and nickel.

      The statement was endorsed by France, the UK, Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, the US and the European Union at the end of the three-day summit in Evian, on the French shores of Lake Geneva. Australia, which isn’t a G7 member, also supported the declaration.

      Breaking dependency on China

      Western governments have been scrambling to secure the minerals they need to produce clean energy technologies such as batteries, electric vehicles and wind turbines, as well as hardware for artificial intelligence and military equipment while breaking their dependence on China.

      China controls most supply chains for the strategic minerals they need, dominating the processing of 19 out of 20 critical minerals. The only exception is nickel, where Indonesia leads on supply and processing. Last year, Beijing spooked governments in Europe and the US when it imposed restrictions on rare earths exports, signalling its willingness to use its industrial clout to achieve its geopolitical objectives.

      “We are all faced with risks of over-dependence and therefore vulnerability in our value chains,” French President Emmanuel Macron told a press conference, citing the “risks of divisions” among the group on how to respond to China’s control over strategic resources. “We have decided to move forward together,” he said.

      Leaders agreed to aggregate demand to support the development of minerals projects and set targets for reducing dependencies on any single country outside the G7 by the end of the year.

      A US proposal to regulate mineral prices and a French push to establish a permanent secretariat to track G7 initiatives on minerals failed to reach consensus among the group, according to Reuters.

      Who has a seat at the table?

      The declaration recognises the need for “mutually beneficial partnerships” and “plurilateral trade agreements” between G7 countries and “like-minded” and “trusted” partners to build diversified supply chains. Other parts of the text refer to “developing countries” and “emerging economies”.

      A separate G7 statement on “mutually beneficial international partnerships” mentions the need for international cooperation along the whole of mineral supply chains.

      “Who is going to be part of this conversation is unclear,” said Sébastien Treyer, executive director of France think-tank IDDRI, citing the ambiguity of the language and calling for developing countries to be part of the conversation.

      Trade agreements that support green industrialisation can be “an entry point” for investment into value-addition projects in developing countries, said Treyer, but “how this is going to be operationalised is the key question”.

      Moving beyond a ‘consumer club’

      Resource-rich developing countries, particularly in Africa, have called for investment to build their industrial capacity to turn raw materials into high-value components for clean energy technologies such as batteries, capturing more domestic value and creating jobs.

      But Kabemba, whose organisation is based in South Africa, said the declaration says “nothing about transferring industrial capacity to previously exploited regions such Africa”.

      “Africa needs to react with its own coalition of the willing to put Africa’s interests first, otherwise, Africa risks being locked into a role as a raw material supplier in a new economic order it is not helping to build,” he said.

        Patrick Schröder, a resource governance expert at Chatham House, agreed that the G7 remains overwhelmingly focused on securing minerals supplies and reducing its dependence on China. “The benefits for developing country producers are only marginal in the G7 discussions,” he said.

        Brazil, which is rich in rare earths, graphite and copper, was invited to attend the G7 meeting but did not endorse the minerals declaration – highlighting the need for future minerals framework to be more inclusive and responsive to producer-country concerns, said Schröder.

        For Luc Tezenas, head of policy and advocacy at the Resource Justice Network, “the answer to rising geopolitical fragmentation cannot be to shrink multilateralism into a smaller club of ‘like-minded’ consumer economies”.

        Instead, a non-binding minerals framework put forward by South Africa during its presidency of the G20 last year “shows more promise as a pathway forward because it attempts to link supply resilience with regional value chains and economic justice,” he said. The UK, which is presiding over the G20 next year, has the opportunity to build a more inclusive way forward, he added.

        Circularity: another way to capture value

        G7 nations also described the circular economy and the substitution of minerals in designing technologies as “key” to meet growing demand and secure sufficient supplies.

        This, they said, includes increasing recycling capacity by setting targets, combatting the illegal transfer of used products and components, and promoting the recovery of minerals from secondary sources such as mining waste.

        “We also recognise the opportunity for emerging market and developing economies to benefit from capturing added value through the recycling and secondary processing of their mining waste, as well as from circular economy innovations,” they said.

        Schröder, of Chatham House, said the challenge now lies in demonstrating that intentions can be turned into creating a circular economy for minerals through investments, business support and a favourable policy environment.

        The post Warning against ‘consumer club’ as G7 forms critical minerals alliance appeared first on Climate Home News.

        Warning against ‘consumer club’ as G7 forms critical minerals alliance

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