The UK’s greenhouse gas emissions fell by 2.4% in 2025 to their lowest level in more than 150 years, according to new Carbon Brief analysis.
The biggest factors were gas use falling to a 34-year low and coal use dropping to levels last seen in 1600, when Queen Elizabeth I was on the throne and William Shakespeare was writing Hamlet.
These shifts were helped by record-high UK temperatures, elevated gas prices, the end of coal power in late 2024 and a sharp slowdown in the steel industry.
Other key findings of the analysis include:
- The UK’s greenhouse gas emissions fell to 364m tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (MtCO2e) in 2025, the lowest level since 1872.
- Coal use roughly halved, with more than half of this due to the end of coal power and another third due to closures and other issues in the steel industry.
- Gas use fell by 1.5% to the lowest level since 1992, with roughly equal contributions from cuts in heat for buildings and industry, more than offsetting a small rise in gas power.
- Oil use fell by 0.9%, despite rising traffic, helped by more than 700,000 new electric vehicles (EVs), electric vans and plug-in hybrids on the nation’s roads.
- The UK’s emissions are now 54% below 1990 levels, while its GDP has nearly doubled.
The 2.4% (8.9MtCO2e) fall in emissions in 2025 was only slightly more than half of the 15MtCO2e cut needed each year on average until 2050, to reach the UK’s legally binding net-zero target.
The analysis is the latest in a decade-long series of annual estimates from Carbon Brief, covering emissions during 2024, 2023, 2022, 2020, 2019, 2018, 2017, 2016, 2015 and 2014.
Emissions fall to 150-year low
The UK’s territorial greenhouse gas emissions – those that occur within the country’s borders – have now fallen in 27 of the 36 years since 1990.
(The recent fall in territorial emissions has not been “offset” by a rise in the amount of CO2 embedded in imports, which has stayed relatively constant since around 2008.)
Apart from brief rebounds after the global financial crisis and the Covid-19 lockdowns, UK emissions have fallen every year for the past two decades.
The latest 9MtCO2e (2.4%) reduction takes UK emissions down to 364MtCO2e, according to Carbon Brief’s analysis, which is 54% below 1990 levels.
This is the lowest since 1872, as shown in the figure below.
The latest fall puts UK emissions below the level seen during the 1926 general strike, when the nation’s industrial base was brought to a standstill.
It means that UK emissions are now at sustained lows not seen since Victorian times.
Nevertheless, emissions will need to continue falling in order to meet the UK’s legal climate goals and its net-zero target, which is part of international efforts under the Paris Agreement to stop dangerous warming.
Record lows for coal and gas
The key factors in driving down UK emissions in 2025 were coal and gas use falling to their lowest levels since 1600 and 1992, respectively.
For gas, this was mainly down to lower demand from building heat and from industry, likely at least partly related to record-high temperatures and elevated gas prices. For coal, this was a combination of the end of coal power and a steel-industry slowdown, as shown below.
These were not the only factors driving the change in UK emissions in 2025.
The UK saw record generation from renewable sources, particularly wind and solar, but a further decline in nuclear generation, the end of coal power and an increase in electricity demand for the second year running meant that gas-fired power output also went up slightly.
In the transport sector, demand for oil fell by 0.9% year-on-year, even though traffic levels went up by around 1%, according to provisional figures through to September 2025.
This partly reflects the changing makeup of vehicles on the road.
By 2024, there were 2.8m fewer diesel vehicles than there were in 2019, a trend likely to continue due to falling diesel car sales. In contrast, there are now nearly 3m EVs, plug-in hybrids or electric vans on the nation’s roads, making up 5% of the car fleet overall and 2% of vans.
These electrified vehicles are cutting UK emissions by more than 7MtCO2 every year, according to Carbon Brief analysis, with the 700,000 new EVs in 2025 alone saving nearly 2MtCO2.
Drivers with EVs saved a total of £2m in lower fuel costs in 2025, the analysis shows, as EVs are much more efficient and, therefore, cheaper to run than petrol or diesel vehicles. This amounts to more than £700 per EV per year and more than £1,100 for each electric van.
Despite falling demand for oil-derived fuels and the impact of the growing EV fleet, Carbon Brief estimates that the UK’s oil-related emissions actually increased by 0.2% in 2025. This is largely down to a shift in the amount and type of biofuel blended into diesel and petrol at the pump.
Coal falls to lowest level in 400 years
There have been dramatic declines in UK coal use over the past decade, in particular resulting from the phaseout of coal-fired electricity generation.
UK coal demand fell by another 56% in 2025 to just under 1m tonnes (Mt). This is down 97% from the 37Mt burned in 2015 and is 99.6% below the peak of 221Mt in 1956.
As shown in the figure below, coal demand is now at the lowest level since 1600, when Elizabeth I was the queen of England and Ireland.
(It was during her five-decade reign that coal had become the country’s main source of fuel, following an Elizabethan “energy crisis” triggered by a lack of wood for making charcoal.)
The UK’s last coal-fired power plant, at Ratcliffe-on-Soar in Nottinghamshire, closed down on 30 September 2024. It had run at low levels that year, but still burned some 0.7m tonnes of coal. The end of coal power contributed nearly three-fifths of the fall in demand for the fuel in 2025.
There has also been a marked reduction in UK steel production in recent years, particularly since the closure of two of the nation’s last blast furnaces at Port Talbot in south Wales in 2024.
The last blast furnaces in the country are at the British Steel plant in Scunthorpe in Lincolnshire, which had been due for closure in early 2025 until the government stepped in to keep it open.
The slowdown in coal-based steel production accounts for around a third of the decline in UK coal use in 2025, but only 14% of the drop in the past decade, which was mainly due to coal power.
Globally, the steel industry is facing intense competition in an oversupplied market, with a growing “glut” that has driven down prices. At the same time, the industry in the UK has ageing equipment and expensive electricity, which UK Steel says is largely a result of high gas prices.
The Port Talbot site is being converted to “electric arc furnace” (EAF) steelmaking, which does not rely on coal. The same shift is under discussion for the Scunthorpe site. Analysis from thinktank Green Alliance suggests EAFs would be the cheapest option for both sites.
Gas falls to lowest level in 34 years
There have also been dramatic declines in UK demand for gas over the past 15 years. After another 1.5% drop in 2025, gas use is now at the lowest level since 1992, as shown below.
This means gas demand is now similar to when the UK began its “dash for gas” in the early 1990s. Starting in 1991, this period saw a wave of new gas-fired power stations being built. It was triggered by a change in regulations to allow the use of gas to generate electricity, advances in turbine technology, a period of low gas prices and the privatisation of the UK electricity system.
In total, UK gas demand has fallen by nearly two-fifths since 2010. Half of this overall reduction is due to a 50% fall in gas-fired electricity generation, which has been displaced by falling demand and renewable sources. Another third of the overall reduction is from home heating, where demand has dropped due to more efficient gas boilers and improved insulation.
In 2025, the 1.5% reduction in gas use was caused by roughly equal contributions from lower demand for building heat and from industrial users.
This was helped by 2025 being the hottest year on record, with high gas prices likely also a factor.
Gas prices have remained significantly above the levels seen before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. At the start of March 2026, UK gas prices roughly doubled as a result of the conflict in the Middle East triggered by the US and Israeli attacks on Iran.
Whereas the UK’s fleet of EVs is already having a significant impact on emissions, domestic heat pump sales remain at relatively low levels, particularly compared with other European nations.
After a 25% year-on-year increase in 2025, there were still only 125,000 heat pump sales in the UK. These new installations will have cut UK emissions by around 0.2MtCO2 in 2025 relative to gas heating, shows Carbon Brief analysis.
By the end of 2025, the UK had a total of around 450,000 domestic heat pumps, generating total savings of roughly 0.7MtCO2 after accounting for the increase in electricity demand.
The 2.3m domestic heat pumps expected by 2030 in the National Energy System Operator’s “future energy scenarios” would save the UK around 4.5MtCO2 per year.
Emissions continue to decouple from growth
In total, UK greenhouse gas emissions in 2025 fell to 54% below 1990 levels, the baseline year for its legally binding climate goals.
Since then, the UK economy has nearly doubled in size, with GDP growing by 95% according to data from the World Bank, as shown in the figure below.
Transport remains the single-largest sector, accounting for around 30% of UK emissions, followed, in order, by buildings, agriculture, industry and electricity generation.
The majority of emissions cuts over recent decades have come in the power sector – formerly, the UK’s largest emitter – as coal has been phased out and renewables have replaced gas.
This is set to change over the next 10-15 years. The rise of EVs is set to make transport the largest source of emissions cuts from now until 2040, according to the Climate Change Committee.
While industrial emissions have also declined significantly since 1990, falling some 74% by 2025, the size of UK manufacturing output has also roughly doubled.
Despite the progress in cutting emissions to date, the UK has a long way to go if it is to meet its climate goals in the future, including the yet-to-be legislated seventh “carbon budget”, covering the years 2038-2042, as well as the 2050 net-zero target.
Emissions would need to fall by 15MtCO2e each year until 2050 on average, in order to meet the net-zero target. Meeting the UK’s 2035 international pledge under the Paris Agreement, a 78% reduction below 1990 levels, emissions would need to fall by 22MtCO2e per year.
These figures can be compared with the 9MtCO2e cut achieved in 2025. Emissions did, in fact, fall by an average of 15MtCO2e per year over the past decade – and by an average of 13MtCO2e per year since the turn of the century.
Methodology
The starting point for Carbon Brief’s analysis of UK greenhouse gas emissions is preliminary government estimates of energy use by fuel. These are published monthly, with the final month of each year appearing in figures published at the end of the following February. The same approach has accurately estimated year-to-year changes in emissions in previous years (see table, below).
Annual change in UK greenhouse gas emissions, %
| Year | Official figures | Carbon Brief | Difference |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2010 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 0.1 |
| 2011 | -7.2 | -7.7 | -0.4 |
| 2012 | 3.1 | 3.6 | 0.6 |
| 2013 | -2.1 | -4.1 | -2.0 |
| 2014 | -7.4 | -7.5 | -0.1 |
| 2015 | -3.8 | -3.7 | 0.0 |
| 2016 | -5.4 | -5.7 | -0.3 |
| 2017 | -2.4 | -2.0 | 0.4 |
| 2018 | -1.6 | -1.7 | -0.1 |
| 2019 | -3.6 | -3.9 | -0.3 |
| 2020 | -8.9 | -8.8 | 0.1 |
| 2021 | 3.6 | 3.5 | -0.1 |
| 2022 | -4.3 | -3.6 | 0.7 |
| 2023 | -5.0 | -5.2 | -0.2 |
| 2024 | -2.7 | -3.0 | -0.3 |
| 2025 | -2.4 |
One large source of uncertainty is the provisional energy use data, which is revised at the end of March each year and often again later on.
Emissions data is also subject to revision in light of improvements in data collection and the methodology used, with major revisions in 2021 and more minor changes in early 2026.
The latest changes to the DESNZ emissions methodology have led to 2% reduction in baseline 1990 emissions, but the impact on recent years is minimal.
This does not affect the UK’s carbon budgets, which are set in terms of tonnes of emissions over a five-year period, rather than a percentage reduction compared with 1990 levels.
The table above applies Carbon Brief’s emissions calculations to the comparable energy use and emissions figures, which may differ from those published previously.
Another source of uncertainty is the fact that Carbon Brief’s approach to estimating the annual change in emissions differs from the methodology used for the government’s own provisional estimates. The government has access to more granular data not available for public use.
Carbon Brief’s analysis takes figures on the amount of energy sourced from coal, oil and gas reported in Energy Trends 1.2. These figures are combined with conversion factors for the CO2 emissions per unit of energy, published annually by the UK government. Conversion factors are available for each fuel type, for example, petrol, diesel, gas and coal for electricity generation.
For oil, the analysis also draws on Energy Trends 3.13, which further breaks down demand according to the subtype of oil, for example, petrol, jet fuel and so on. Similarly, for coal, the analysis draws on Energy Trends 2.6, which breaks down solid fuel use by subtype.
Emissions from each fuel are then estimated from the energy use multiplied by the conversion factor, weighted by the relative proportions for each fuel subtype.
For example, the UK uses roughly 50m tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe) in the form of oil products, around half of which is from road diesel. So half the total energy use from oil is combined with the conversion factor for road diesel, another one-fifth for petrol and so on.
Energy use from each fossil fuel subtype is mapped onto the appropriate emissions conversion factor. In some cases, there is no direct read-across, in which case the nearest appropriate substitute is used. For example, energy use listed as “bitumen” is mapped to “processed fuel oils – residual oil”. Similarly, solid fuel used by “other conversion industries” is mapped to “petroleum coke” and “other” solid fuel use is mapped to “coal (domestic)”.
The energy use figures are calculated on an inland consumption basis, meaning they include bunkers consumed in the UK for international transport by air and sea. In contrast, national emissions inventories exclude international aviation and shipping.
The analysis, therefore, estimates and removes the part of oil use that is due to the UK’s share of international aviation. It draws on the UK’s final greenhouse gas emissions inventory, which breaks emissions down by sector and reports the total for domestic aviation.
This domestic emissions figure is compared with the estimated emissions due to jet fuel use overall, based on the appropriate conversion factor. The analysis assumes that domestic aviation’s share of emissions is equivalent to its share of jet fuel energy use.
In addition to estimating CO2 emissions from fossil fuel use, Carbon Brief assumes that CO2 emissions from non-fuel sources, such as land-use change and forestry, are the same as a year earlier. The remaining greenhouse gas emissions are assumed to change in line with the latest government energy and emissions projections.
These assumptions are based on the UK government’s own methodology for preliminary greenhouse gas emissions estimates, published in 2019.
Note that the figures in this article are for emissions within the UK measured according to international guidelines. This means they exclude emissions associated with imported goods, including imported biomass, as well as the UK’s share of international aviation and shipping.
The Office for National Statistics (ONS) has published detailed comparisons between various approaches to calculating UK emissions, on a territorial, consumption, “environmental accounts” or “international accounting” basis.
The UK’s consumption-based CO2 emissions increased between 1990 and 2007. Since then, however, they have fallen by a similar number of tonnes as emissions within the UK.
Bioenergy is a significant source of renewable energy in the UK and its climate benefits are disputed. Contrary to public perception, however, only around one-quarter of bioenergy is imported.
International aviation is considered part of the UK’s carbon budgets and faces the prospect of tighter limits on its CO2 emissions. The international shipping sector has a target to at least halve its emissions by 2050, relative to 2008 levels.
The post Analysis: UK emissions fall 2.4% in 2025 as coal hits 400-year low appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: UK emissions fall 2.4% in 2025 as coal hits 400-year low
Claver Gatete is Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa. Jason Veysey is Energy Modeling Program Director and Senior Scientist at the Stockholm Environment Institute. Lisa Sachs is Director of the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment at Columbia University.
The case for global energy transition has rarely been clearer. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz earlier this year exposed the cost of unplanned, fossil-dependent systems, while the falling cost of renewables, the rising penetration of electric vehicles, and the growing value of demand flexibility have made the direction of travel obvious. The benefits of a clean, secure, integrated system are no longer in dispute. What remains unclear is how to build it.
Countries around the world have called for faster renewable energy deployment and alternative energy arrangements. A secure, affordable, resilient, decarbonised system requires specific investments in specific places in a specific sequence, optimised across sectors and borders. But very few governments have the analytical foundation to translate those imperatives into investment.
The two instruments that are supposed to determine investment priorities for decarbonisation – Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and country platforms – cannot answer the most basic question facing any country undertaking an energy transition: what should the energy system look like?
-
New coal mine openings slow as East Asian demand plateaus
China and Australia drove global decline in new capacity additions in 2025, but planned production kept growing
To close this gap, every country needs a bankable, economy-wide optimisation model for its energy system. A model is not a plan, but it can help answer the critical question of what the future energy system should look like. It shows how optimal scenarios vary as assumptions and policies are adjusted, calculates investment requirements and sequencing, and quantifies how system costs are affected by assumptions, policies, and exogenous variables like trade policy and financing terms.
Tool for efficient investment
Optimisation is a simplified way of simulating an energy system, but it can be an extremely powerful tool for moving energy planning from reactive (how do we manage the disparate actions in the energy system?) to intentional (what energy system underpins our national objectives?). A model can show how optimal scenarios vary as assumptions and policies are adjusted, and how investment requirements are quantified and sequenced.
Optimisation models can treat the energy system and the sectors it serves as an integrated whole, optimising across sectors and projects in ways that can be mutually reinforcing. If considered independently, growth in industrial demand, transport electrification, and digital infrastructure can add stress to the energy system. But an optimised plan can arrange these and other changes in an efficient, synergistic way.
Two to tango: How governments can unlock private investment for national climate goals
New load can be added where low-cost power is available; industrial customers can ensure the viability of investments in energy supply; electric vehicle charging policy can smooth load curves and reduce costs for all consumers.
Additionally, optimisation modeling can also change the financeability of investments. Taken alone, each project faces uncertainty about the rest of the system, which raises the cost of capital and causes projects to stall or unwind after contracts are signed. A coherent, optimised plan makes visible the coordination that private capital would otherwise have to bet on: identified offtake, sequenced and committed transmission, contracted power supply, and so on.
What COP31 and COP32 should do
The upcoming COPs in Turkey and Ethiopia can shift the center of gravity of international climate cooperation from fragmented commitments to planning. Three moves are urgently needed.
First, optimised, economy-wide, long-term energy system planning must be the foundation on which any meaningful NDC, country platform, or finance commitment rests. NDCs are typically drafted by environment or single-line ministries, with limited cross-sectoral input from ministries of energy, finance, and planning. They contain targets, derived from sectoral strategies or national commitments, not from an analytically grounded picture of what the energy system should look like and what investments would make it work. Country platforms are generally a portfolio of investments assembled from existing project pipelines, rather than derived from a system-level analysis of what an optimised, decarbonised energy system would require.
Second, recognise regions as a key planning unit. Modern integrated energy systems are inherently regional. Renewable endowments are unevenly distributed; balancing variable supply across borders lowers aggregate cost, reduces redundant backup capacity, and unlocks economies of scale no individual nation can achieve. Many energy investments in Southeast Asia, East Africa, Southern Africa and Central Asia may only be financeable in a regional context. Assessing domestic infrastructure without regional optimisation perpetuates the perception that decarbonisation is more expensive than it is.
COP31 leaders unveil global targets, with spotlight on electrification
Third, finance the planning capacity. A coordinated commitment by multilateral development banks, bilateral donors, and philanthropic partners to help every region and its constituent countries develop and maintain their own modelling capability, with open-source tools and regional analytical hubs, would close the most consequential gap in the current architecture. The cost is small relative to current spending on country platforms, failed project preparation, and misallocated infrastructure investment.
This includes supporting regional institutions such as the ASEAN Centre for Energy, the African Energy Commission, regional power pools, and the Latin American and Caribbean Energy Organization to determine what optimised regional systems require. Country-by-country pledging, repeated at every COP, will not deliver what meaningfully integrated systems can.
The 2026 energy crisis made the cost of unplanned, fossil-dependent systems newly visible. That window of clarity will close. The international community should seize the moment to build the planning foundation that has been missing for thirty years, rather than commissioning another round of NDCs or pledges, striving for outcomes neither was designed to deliver.
The post Every country needs a model to help optimise its energy transition appeared first on Climate Home News.
Every country needs a model to help optimise its energy transition
The world is currently experiencing what is expected to become the strongest El Niño on record – dubbed a “super El Niño” by many.
El Niño is the warm phase of a recurring climate pattern in the tropical Pacific that releases heat from the ocean into the atmosphere.
This temporarily raises global temperatures and reshapes rainfall and extreme weather around the world – impacting the lives of billions of people.
The current El Niño event began in June and is expected to last into 2027.
El Niño is part of a wider climate pattern called the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) cycle.
The ENSO cycle also has a cool phase, known as La Niña, as well as a “neutral” phase. El Niño and La Niña events typically last between nine and 12 months, but can go on longer.
Below, Carbon Brief explains how the ENSO cycle works, its impacts on extreme weather and global temperatures and why this El Niño event is projected to be the most intense since records began.
The post Explainer: How the ‘super El Niño’ will reshape the world’s weather appeared first on Carbon Brief.
https://interactive.carbonbrief.org/el-nino-explainer/index.html
The second-largest reservoir in the US reached a record-low water height on Saturday – just days after the country’s largest reservoir broke its own record.
Both Lake Mead and Lake Powell are located on the Colorado River.
They provide water for populations across seven US states in the south-western US, with around 40 million people getting some or all of their municipal water from the Colorado River.
The river also provides water for around 5.5m acres (22,258 square kilometres) of farmland across Colorado, Arizona, California and the other states in the river basin.
Experts tell Carbon Brief that climate change, population growth and over-consumption are all contributing to the current record-low levels of the reservoirs.
Record lows
At full capacity, Lakes Mead and Powell can hold a combined 68 cubic kilometres of water – enough to supply all household consumption in the contiguous US for nearly 1.5 years. However, the water level in both reservoirs has been declining for decades.
The chart below shows the water level of Lake Mead, in metres above mean sea level. The reservoir, which began to fill in 1935 following the construction of the Hoover Dam, has a “full pool” maximum capacity of 347.60 metres. The water level in Lake Mead reached a record low of 317.11 metres on 7 August.
The following chart shows the water level of Lake Powell, in metres above mean sea level. Lake Powell’s full-pool level is 1,127.76 metres.
While the reservoir reached its maximum capacity several times in the 1980s, it has not done so since. On 15 August, the water level in Lake Powell was recorded at a new record-low of 1,072.87 metres.
Both reservoirs have continued to decline in the days since breaking their respective records. The downward trend will largely continue in both lakes until next spring, when the snowpack in the mountains of the Upper Colorado River Basin begins to melt, says Dr Jack Schmidt, a senior research scientist at Utah State University’s Center for Colorado River Studies. He tells Carbon Brief:
“The big dilemma of the moment is that we’re only in the middle of August, and we have no assurance of what the coming winter will be. The only thing we can be sure of is that we will be depleting overall total basin reservoir storage from now until, roughly, early April.”
Compounding factors
The record lows across the two reservoirs are the result of several compounding factors, experts tell Carbon Brief.
Since the turn of the 20th century, the amount of water flowing along the Upper Colorado River has declined by about 20%. Research suggests that half of this decline can be attributed to human-induced climate change.
Most of the river’s streamflow comes from the snowpack of the Upper Colorado River Basin, which stretches across five western US states but is primarily located in Colorado and Utah.
This region has been gripped by a historic “megadrought” for more than a quarter of a century. Nearly half of the megadrought’s intensity over 2000-18 is attributable to climate change, according to a 2020 study.
At the same time, the increasing population in the US south-west has put added pressure on the Colorado River’s water supply. The number of people obtaining some or all of their water from the Colorado system has grown by 15 million (around 60%) since 1992.
Schmidt tells Carbon Brief:
“There’s an ultimate cause of the present water crisis, and there’s a proximate cause. The ultimate cause is a warming climate, a warming planet and a pretty clear correlation between warming conditions and decreased runoff in the Colorado River Basin.
“The proximate cause is that in this messy democratic republic of ours, big policy decisions that match the variability of the climate occur painfully slowly – with intense political negotiations – and only incrementally.”
On 31 July, the US Bureau of Reclamation, which manages water resources in the western US, released an environmental impact statement on its proposed post-2026 strategy for managing Lakes Powell and Mead. The strategy itself has not been released yet.
Schmidt notes that the statement does appear to give the Bureau flexibility to “respond to crisis” by reducing the delivery of water to several states. However, he adds:
“They acknowledge it won’t work if we just stay critically dry, and of course every climate model for the 21st century, especially with a continually warming planet, says that that’s exactly what’s going to happen.”
The post Analysis: The two largest reservoirs in the US have hit record-low levels appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: The two largest reservoirs in the US have hit record-low levels
-
Climate Change1 year ago
Guest post: Why China is still building new coal – and when it might stop
-
Greenhouse Gases1 year ago
Guest post: Why China is still building new coal – and when it might stop
-
Greenhouse Gases2 years ago嘉宾来稿：满足中国增长的用电需求 光伏加储能“比新建煤电更实惠”
-
Climate Change2 years ago嘉宾来稿：满足中国增长的用电需求 光伏加储能“比新建煤电更实惠”
-
Climate Change2 years ago
Bill Discounting Climate Change in Florida’s Energy Policy Awaits DeSantis’ Approval
-
Renewable Energy10 months agoSending Progressive Philanthropist George Soros to Prison?
-
Greenhouse Gases1 year ago
嘉宾来稿：探究火山喷发如何影响气候预测
-
Carbon Footprint2 years agoUS SEC’s Climate Disclosure Rules Spur Renewed Interest in Carbon Credits