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For the first time, the growth in China’s clean power generation has caused the nation’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions to fall despite rapid power demand growth.

The new analysis for Carbon Brief shows that China’s emissions were down 1.6% year-on-year in the first quarter of 2025 and by 1% in the latest 12 months.

Electricity supply from new wind, solar and nuclear capacity was enough to cut coal-power output even as demand surged, whereas previous falls were due to weak growth.

The analysis, based on official figures and commercial data, shows that China’s CO2 emissions have now been stable, or falling, for more than a year.

However, they remain only 1% below the latest peak, implying that any short-term jump could cause China’s CO2 emissions to rise to a new record.

Other key findings include:

  • Growth in clean power generation has now overtaken the current and long-term average growth in electricity demand, pushing down fossil fuel use.
  • Power-sector emissions fell 2% year-on-year in the 12 months to March 2025.
  • If this pattern is sustained, then it would herald a peak and sustained decline in China’s power-sector emissions.
  • The trade “war” initiated by US president Donald Trump has prompted renewed efforts to shift China’s economy towards domestic consumption, rather than exports.
  • A new pricing policy for renewables has caused a rush to install before it takes effect.
  • There is a growing gap that would need to be bridged if China is to meet the 2030 emissions targets it pledged under the Paris Agreement.

If sustained, the drop in power-sector CO2 as a result of clean-energy growth could presage the sort of structural decline in emissions anticipated in previous analysis for Carbon Brief.

The trend of falling power-sector emissions is likely to continue in 2025.

However, the outlook beyond that depends strongly on the clean energy and emissions targets set in China’s next five-year plan, due to be published next year, as well as the economic policy response to the Trump administration’s hostile trade policy.

China’s emissions decline due to clean power

Over the past decade, China’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement have risen by nearly a fifth, but there have been ups and downs along the way.

The shallow decline in 2015 and 2016 was due to a slump that followed a round of stimulus measures, while zero-Covid controls caused a sharper fall in 2022. Overall, however, emissions have continued to increase, pausing only during periods of economic stress.

More recently, there have been signs that China’s CO2 emissions could be close to reaching a peak and plateau, or even a period of structural decline.

The latest data, for the first quarter of 2025, shows that China’s CO2 emissions have now been stable or falling for more than a year, as shown in the figure below.

However, with emissions remaining just 1% below the recent peak, it remains possible that they could jump once again to a new record high.

Line chart: China's CO2 emissions are now 1% below their March 2024 peak
China’s emissions from fossil fuels and cement, million tonnes of CO2, rolling 12-month totals. Source: Emissions are estimated from National Bureau of Statistics data on production of different fuels and cement, China Customs data on imports and exports and WIND Information data on changes in inventories, applying emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory and annual emissions factors per tonne of cement production until 2024. Sector breakdown of coal consumption is estimated using coal consumption data from WIND Information and electricity data from the National Energy Administration.

Therefore, the future path of China’s CO2 emissions hangs in the balance, depending on trends within each sector of its economy, as well as China’s response to Trump’s tariffs.

These sectoral trends are explored further in the sections below, along with signals on what could be coming next from Chinese policymakers as they consider the country’s international climate pledge for 2035 and the five-year plan for 2026-2030.

Power-sector emissions fall while other sectors rebound

The reduction in China’s first-quarter CO2 emissions in 2025 was due to a 5.8% drop in the power sector. While power demand grew by 2.5% overall, there was a 4.7% drop in thermal power generation – mainly coal and gas.

Increases in solar, wind and nuclear power generation, driven by investments in new generating capacity, more than covered the growth in demand. The increase in hydropower, which is more related to seasonal variation, helped push down fossil power generation.

Power-sector emissions fell by more than total generation from fossil fuels, as the share of biomass and gas increased, while average coal power plant efficiency improved.

Specifically, the average amount of coal needed to generate each unit of electricity at coal-fired power plants fell by 0.9% year-on-year.

The first-quarter reduction in CO2 emissions from coal use in the power sector is shown at the bottom of the figure below, below CO2 changes in other sectors.

Chart: Falling CO2 due to clean power outweighed rises elsewhere
Year-on-year change in China’s CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement, for the period January-March 2025, million tonnes of CO2. Source: Emissions are estimated from National Bureau of Statistics data on production of different fuels and cement, China Customs data on imports and exports and WIND Information data on changes in inventories, applying emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory and annual emissions factors per tonne of cement production until 2024. Sector breakdown of coal consumption is estimated using coal consumption data from WIND Information and electricity data from the National Energy Administration.

Outside of the power sector, emissions increased 3.5%, with the largest rises in the use of coal in the metals and chemicals industries.

The coal-to-chemicals industry is undergoing rapid expansion, driven by concerns about dependence on imported oil and gas. During the first quarter of 2025, it was also benefiting from more favourable economics due to lower coal prices and relatively high oil prices.

Crude steel production increased 0.6% year-on-year, metal products output by 6% and non-ferrous metals production by 2%. All of these increases were mainly due to a jump in March. Metals demand was boosted by the bump in exports ahead of the tariffs, but high output has continued well into April.

Real-estate construction “starts” fell by 24% and sales of new properties by 3%, indicating that the demand for cement, steel and glass from the construction sector continues to decline.

In contrast, economic output in vehicle and machinery production increased by 12% and 13%, respectively, signalling increased demand for metals.

Cement production fell by 1.4%, a slower rate of decrease than in previous years, likely due to an earlier start to weather-dependent construction activity thanks to warm weather.

Gas consumption increased by an estimated 6% in the power sector, due to a 14% increase in gas-fired power generation capacity, even as the average utilisation of the plants fell. However, gas consumption fell in other sectors, outweighing the increase for power.

Oil products consumption increased slightly, as shown by the bar at the top in the figure above. Warmer weather meant that weather-dependent construction and agricultural activity rose earlier in the year than usual.

However, structural factors, particularly vehicle electrification and the shift to liquified natural gas (LNG) in the freight sector, point to continued declines in oil demand.

Have China’s emissions peaked?

Following the 1.6% decline in the first quarter of 2025, China’s emissions have now been stable or falling for more than a year, starting from the beginning of March 2024.

However, emissions in the 12 months to the end of March 2025 were down only 1% from their recent peak, implying that any short-term jump could lead to a new record high.

After the sharp reduction in the first quarter, emissions from power generation are now down year-on-year for the most recent 12 months.

This has happened four times before over the past four decades – in 2009, 2012, 2015 and 2022. However, the current drop is the first time that the main driver is growth in clean power generation.

The falls in 2009 and 2012 were related to the global financial crisis and the Euro area crisis, while the drop in 2015 was driven by the construction and industrial sector slump that followed the 2008-12 stimulus program.

These economic shocks resulted in the sharp reduction in electricity demand shown in the figure below. The drop in 2022 was a combination of slow power demand growth due to strict “zero-Covid” measures and relatively strong clean-power additions.

Chart: For the first time, clean energy growth has cut China's fossil-fuel power in the face of surging electricity demand
Year-on-year change in electricity generation from fossil fuels and clean energy, terawatt hours, rolling 12-month totals. The total annual change in demand is shown by the solid line and the average annual increase is shown by the dotted line. Sources: China Electricity Council; Ember; analysis for Carbon Brief by Lauri Myllyvirta.

Importantly, the growth in clean power generation in the first quarter of 2025 was not only larger than the rise in demand overall, it was also higher than the average increase in demand over the past 15 years, marked by the dashed line in the figure above.

Moreover, hydropower has been stable year-on-year in the past six months, implying that the clean-energy growth has been driven by increases in solar, wind and nuclear power capacity, not year-to-year variation in hydropower output.

Looking beyond electricity generation, all sectors registered a fall in emissions over the most recent four months from December 2024 to March 2025, except for coal-to-chemicals.

In order for China’s emissions overall to peak and then start declining, CO2 cuts in declining sectors will need to outweigh continued growth elsewhere.

For example, process emissions from cement production peaked in 2021 and have declined by 27% since then, as shown in the top left chart in the figure below.

Six line charts of China's sectoral emissions: CO2 emissions have fallen in most sectors this year
Sectoral emissions from fossil fuels and cement, million tonnes of CO2, rolling 12-month totals. Source: Emissions are estimated from National Bureau of Statistics data on production of different fuels and cement, China Customs data on imports and exports and WIND Information data on changes in inventories, applying emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory and annual emissions factors per tonne of cement production until 2024. Sector breakdown of coal consumption is estimated using coal consumption data from WIND Information and electricity data from the National Energy Administration.

Coal use outside the power and chemicals sectors peaked at the same time as cement, but has been rebounding since then and is now close to previous peak levels.

The China Coal Association expects coal use in the steel and building materials industries to fall, while coal consumption in the chemical industry is projected to continue growing.

Hopes of future growth in demand for coal are pinned on the chemical sector, described as a shift from using coal primarily as a fuel to a role as both a fuel and a raw material.

The association also believes that coal-fired power generation will resume growth – at least in the short term – but it recently revised down its projections for 2025 compared with the outlook at the end of 2024.

The tariff “war” may have affected expectations. One analysis suggests a 0.5 to 1 percentage point reduction in China’s GDP growth rate due to the tariffs could result in a similar reduction in demand for thermal coal – mainly used at power stations.

Oil product consumption has been declining since the post-Covid rebound ended in March 2024, falling 2% from its peak. The long-term trend is expected to be downwards, due to the electrification of transportation, despite rising demand for chemicals and aviation.

Gas use has been falling for a few months, but the trend is likely still increasing.

The table below lists the 12-month periods with the highest emissions for each sector, as well as the reduction since the latest peak in each case.

Sector Date of highest emissions Reduction since peak
Cement April 2021 -28.2%
Coal and gas: Power November 2024 -1.7%
Coal-to-chemicals March 2025 Still increasing
Coal: Other sectors April 2021 -3.0%
Gas: Other sectors December 2024 -0.8%
Oil products April 2024 -1.0%
Total CO2 February 2024 -0.8%

For all of the sectors other than cement production, it is too early to declare a definitive peak in emissions. Still, there are signs that other sectoral peaks could be past their peak, too.

Indeed, for oil products consumption and steel production, industry projections indicate that the future trend is likely to be falling.

For the power sector, clean-energy additions at or above current levels would likely lead to a structural peak, as clean-energy growth would more than cover electricity demand growth.

Together, these sectors cover more than 80% of China’s total emissions. If all of them enter a structural decline, then total emissions are very likely to do so too.

China pushes domestic demand in response to US tariffs

The economic and emissions outlook for this year and beyond will be affected by the Trump administration’s unprecedented trade tariffs – and China’s counter-measures.

The initial impact was a drop in emissions due to lower factory output in export-oriented coastal provinces and possible knock-on impacts on investment and consumer spending.

Conversely, the temporary easing of tariffs for 90 days will lead to a rush of orders from the US to make up for the short-lived slowdown in trade and to stockpile goods before the relief ends.

China’s reactions to the tariffs focused on counteracting the economic impacts with stimulus.

An anonymous comment piece in People’s Daily, the main Communist party affiliated newspaper, says the country should “strive to make consumption the main driving force and ballast stone of economic growth”, leveraging China’s large domestic market.

(The piece has the byline “People’s Daily commentator”, which implies that it is written by someone with authority.)

The article says that this will involve increasing consumer income, while easing financial and social burdens to boost purchasing power and willingness to consume.

While the temporary easing of tariffs will reduce the urgency of these measures, the US tariff rate on China, at 40%, remains much higher than it was before Trump’s presidency – and China’s leaders will likely want to prepare against the risk of renewed tariff hikes.

The focus will be creating domestic markets for the products China exports to the US. The long-held aim of rebalancing China’s economy towards consumption could finally become reality as a result. A successful rebalancing could mean less energy-intensive growth.

China’s response also includes redoubling its focus on “new quality productive forces”, a concept that emphasises new technology.

The concept includes the clean-energy industry, which has become such an important economic driver in China that it would be hard to leave out of stimulus plans.

A new list of low-carbon demonstration projects, published by the National Development and Reform Commission, provides a look at China’s priorities for clean-energy investment. Green hydrogen, energy storage, “virtual power plants” and industrial decarbonisation based on hydrogen are new growth areas.

In terms of the emissions implications of China’s response to Trump’s tariffs, the big question is whether stimulus focused at these favoured sectors – including the new low-carbon focus areas and other clean-energy industries – is deemed sufficient.

Some traditional recipients of stimulus spending, such as shipbuilding and public infrastructure, have already posted strong growth in the first quarter of this year as a result of stimulus measures announced in 2024.

New wind and solar pricing policy increases uncertainty

An additional source of uncertainty for China’s emissions comes in the form of its new electricity pricing policy for renewable energy, which enters into force in June.

The new policy removes price guarantees pegged to coal-power prices, with new wind and solar projects supposed to secure direct contracts with electricity buyers. This is likely to lead to lower prices being paid to new wind and solar projects.

However, it offers more favourable pricing – via “contracts for difference” – to the amount of new capacity needed to meet central government energy targets.

The immediate effect of the policy will likely be a rush of projects rushing to complete installation before the June deadline, so as to secure guaranteed prices.

This rush was already apparent in the latest data: 23 gigawatts (GW) of solar and 13GW of wind was added in March alone, up 80% and 110% from previous records for the month.

Furthermore, this year’s installations are likely to be very strong, even topping last year’s record, as a lot of centralised solar power and wind-power projects are racing to complete before the end of the 14th five-year plan period.

The China Wind Energy Association expects a new record of 105-115GW installed this year across onshore and offshore wind projects – up from the record-breaking 80GW last year – based on very active bidding last year. It also expects volumes to stay at that level even in 2026 and to then grow further towards 2030.

The China Electricity Council predicts an even larger wind-power capacity addition of 120GW in 2025. Another analyst projects a 20% drop in wind-power capacity additions in 2026, but after an even steeper increase in 2025 to 120-130GW of capacity added. So he also expects 2026 installations to be far above the current record year of 2024.

For solar, the China Photovoltaic Industry Association forecasts a drop in installations of 8-23% this year, from the staggering record of 278GW last year. Even the low end of this projection would see installations stay at 2023 levels in 2025 and then recover from there. The China Electricity Council’s projection for solar additions in 2025 matches the low end of the industry association’s forecast.

The figure below, based on these various projections, shows that additional electricity generation from new clean power capacity is expected to remain above last year’s record-breaking levels in both 2025 and 2026.

Bar chart: Newly added clean generation is set to remain above the record levels set in 2024
Annual electricity generation from clean power capacity newly added each year, terawatt hours by source. Two alternative projections for 2025 are taken from a range of different organisations, while the 2026 projection is a combined total from the wind and solar industry associations. Power generation from new capacity is projected using average capacity factors for each technology over 2015–2024. Sources: Historical data from China Electricity Council; projections from China Wind Energy Association, China Photovoltaic Industry Association and China Electricity Council; analysis for Carbon Brief by Lauri Myllyvirta.

The projections shown in the figure above illustrate that the energy industry expects to be able to navigate the new renewable pricing policy and to maintain a high level of wind and solar additions over the next two years.

The policy has, however, created a lot more uncertainty. The stop-go cycle of a flood of installations in the first half of this year and then a slowdown in the second half – likely especially in the distributed solar segment – is likely to be a tough time for the industry.

The uncertainty relates above all to two things. First is the local implementation of the policy, as provincial governments have a lot of leeway here. Given the economic significance of clean energy for many provinces, they can be expected to seek to implement the policy in a way that minimises disruptions to the industry.

The other source of uncertainty is central government targets. The pricing policy ties the availability of more favorable pricing to central government energy targets, after clean-energy growth outpaced those targets by a wide margin in the past few years.

This emphasises the importance of the targets set for the next five year plan. The National Energy Administration (NEA) is targeting “more than 200GW” per year of clean-energy capacity added, which is far lower than the 360GW added last year.

The effect of the pricing policy also depends on market conditions, of course, with a risk of oversupply of coal-fired power due to the ongoing rapid addition of new coal-fired power plants.

China’s nuclear construction also keeps accelerating, with another 10GW of reactor projects approved in April, on top of 10GW approved in each of the previous two years. These projects will contribute to clean power supply towards 2030 as they are completed.

China faces widening gap to Paris pledge

The uncertainty around wind and solar expansion also has implications for China’s international climate pledges under the Paris Agreement.

After exceptionally slow progress in 2020-23, China is significantly off track for its 2030 commitment to reduce carbon intensity – the emissions per unit of economic output. It is almost certain to miss its 2025 target. Carbon intensity fell by 3.4% in 2024, falling short of the rate of improvement needed to meet the 2025 and 2030 targets.

The government work plan for 2025 did not set a carbon intensity target. It only included a target for reducing the intensity per unit of GDP for energy supply from fossil fuels by 3%, excluding use for raw materials.

This provides an indirect indication of the targeted improvement in carbon intensity. In 2024, carbon intensity fell by 3.4%, while fossil energy intensity fell by 3.8%. If the ratio is similar in 2025, then carbon intensity would need to fall by around 2.5% at a minimum, allowing CO2 emissions to increase by more than 2%, if the target for 5% GDP growth is also met.

The absence of a carbon intensity target and the lack of emphasis on reducing carbon intensity also signals that meeting the target is not seen as a priority at the moment.

The government work plan emphasised the “dual-carbon” goals of peaking CO2 emissions before 2030 and achieving carbon neutrality before 2060.

However, these goals allow CO2 emissions to continue to increase until the end of the decade, implying the potential for a significant absolute emission increase from 2024 levels by 2030. The “dual-carbon” goals, even if met, therefore do not guarantee the delivery of China’s current key international climate commitment, the 2030 carbon-intensity target.

Even if emissions fell this year, improvements to carbon intensity would need to accelerate sharply in the next five years to meet China’s 2030 Paris commitment.

If China remains committed to its 2030 pledge, then this acceleration would need to be reflected in the targets set in the country’s next five-year plan.

Outlook for 2025 and beyond

The past 12 months mark a potentially significant turning point for China’s CO2 emissions, with clean-energy growth for the first time outpacing demand growth and displacing fossil fuel use in the power sector.

Record-breaking clean energy additions expected in 2025, despite new pricing policy uncertainties, suggest that the trend will continue this year.

The longer-term trajectory depends heavily on the targets set in the upcoming five-year plan and on the economic policy response to US tariffs and other economic headwinds.

In the short term, the US tariffs will dampen energy demand growth and emissions. Economic policy designed to offset the impacts of Trump’s tariffs will likely boost the clean-energy sector further and might lead to a shift towards domestic consumption as an economic driver, implying lower energy consumption growth relative to GDP.

On the other hand, previous rounds of economic stimulus in China have led to sharp increases in emissions. If China is to deliver stimulus that targets consumption and new technology, rather than emissions-intensive construction and heavy industry, then it will require a significant break with earlier patterns.

Whether power-sector emissions have peaked will be determined by a race between growth in clean energy supply and total power demand growth.

The new renewable electricity pricing policy, which ties the volume of “contracts for difference” given out to new solar and wind projects to national clean energy targets, further increases the importance of target-setting in China’s upcoming 2035 climate targets under the Paris Agreement and in the next 15th five-year plan, covering 2026-2030.

Sector-by-sector analysis suggests that, in addition to the power sector, emissions have likely also peaked in the building materials and steel sectors, as well as oil products consumption.

These sectors together represent over 80% of China’s fossil fuel-related CO2 emissions. However, there are uncertainties and potential for short-term rebound in all of these sectors.

The sector with remaining potential for substantial emissions growth is coal-to-chemicals. The drop in oil prices after US tariff announcements will undermine the profitability of this sector and likely lead to lower utilisation of plants, even as more capacity is added. China’s counter-tariffs on imports of petrochemical products from the US could have benefited the industry – but these have reportedly been waived.

All of this suggests that there is potential for China’s emissions to continue to fall and for the country to achieve substantial absolute emissions reductions over the next five years.

However, policy choices working in the opposite direction could just as easily see emissions increase further towards 2030.

About the data

Data for the analysis was compiled from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, National Energy Administration of China, China Electricity Council and China Customs official data releases, and from WIND Information, an industry data provider.

Wind and solar output, and thermal power breakdown by fuel, was calculated by multiplying power generating capacity at the end of each month by monthly utilisation, using data reported by China Electricity Council through Wind Financial Terminal.

Total generation from thermal power and generation from hydropower and nuclear power was taken from National Bureau of Statistics monthly releases.

Monthly utilisation data was not available for biomass, so the annual average of 52% for 2023 was applied. Power sector coal consumption was estimated based on power generation from coal and the average heat rate of coal-fired power plants during each month, to avoid the issue with official coal consumption numbers affecting recent data.

When data was available from multiple sources, different sources were cross-referenced and official sources used when possible, adjusting total consumption to match the consumption growth and changes in the energy mix reported by the National Bureau of Statistics.

CO2 emissions estimates are based on National Bureau of Statistics default calorific values of fuels and emissions factors from China’s latest national greenhouse gas emissions inventory, for the year 2018. Cement CO2 emissions factor is based on annual estimates up to 2024.

For oil consumption, apparent consumption is calculated from refinery throughput, with net exports of oil products subtracted.

The post Analysis: Clean energy just put China’s CO2 emissions into reverse for first time appeared first on Carbon Brief.

Analysis: Clean energy just put China’s CO2 emissions into reverse for first time

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Climate Change

DeBriefed 6 February 2026: US secret climate panel ‘unlawful’ | China’s clean energy boon | Can humans reverse nature loss?

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Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed.
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.

This week

Secrets and layoffs

UNLAWFUL PANEL: A federal judge ruled that the US energy department “violated the law when secretary Chris Wright handpicked five researchers who rejected the scientific consensus on climate change to work in secret on a sweeping government report on global warming”, reported the New York Times. The newspaper explained that a 1972 law “does not allow agencies to recruit or rely on secret groups for the purposes of policymaking”. A Carbon Brief factcheck found more than 100 false or misleading claims in the report.

DARKNESS DESCENDS: The Washington Post reportedly sent layoff notices to “at least 14” of its climate journalists, as part of a wider move from the newspaper’s billionaire owner, Jeff Bezos, to eliminate 300 jobs at the publication, claimed Climate Colored Goggles. After the layoffs, the newspaper will have five journalists left on its award-winning climate desk, according to the substack run by a former climate reporter at the Los Angeles Times. It comes after CBS News laid off most of its climate team in October, it added.

WIND UNBLOCKED: Elsewhere, a separate federal ruling said that a wind project off the coast of New York state can continue, which now means that “all five offshore wind projects halted by the Trump administration in December can resume construction”, said Reuters. Bloomberg added that “Ørsted said it has spent $7bn on the development, which is 45% complete”.

Around the world

  • CHANGING TIDES: The EU is “mulling a new strategy” in climate diplomacy after struggling to gather support for “faster, more ambitious action to cut planet-heating emissions” at last year’s UN climate summit COP30, reported Reuters.
  • FINANCE ‘CUT’: The UK government is planning to cut climate finance by more than a fifth, from £11.6bn over the past five years to £9bn in the next five, according to the Guardian.
  • BIG PLANS: India’s 2026 budget included a new $2.2bn funding push for carbon capture technologies, reported Carbon Brief. The budget also outlined support for renewables and the mining and processing of critical minerals.
  • MOROCCO FLOODS: More than 140,000 people have been evacuated in Morocco as “heavy rainfall and water releases from overfilled dams led to flooding”, reported the Associated Press.
  • CASHFLOW: “Flawed” economic models used by governments and financial bodies “ignor[e] shocks from extreme weather and climate tipping points”, posing the risk of a “global financial crash”, according to a Carbon Tracker report covered by the Guardian.
  • HEATING UP: The International Olympic Committee is discussing options to hold future winter games earlier in the year “because of the effects of warmer temperatures”, said the Associated Press.

54%

The increase in new solar capacity installed in Africa over 2024-25 – the continent’s fastest growth on record, according to a Global Solar Council report covered by Bloomberg.


Latest climate research

  • Arctic warming significantly postpones the retreat of the Afro-Asian summer monsoon, worsening autumn rainfall | Environmental Research Letters
  • “Positive” images of heatwaves reduce the impact of messages about extreme heat, according to a survey of 4,000 US adults | Environmental Communication
  • Greenland’s “peripheral” glaciers are projected to lose nearly one-fifth of their total area and almost one-third of their total volume by 2100 under a low-emissions scenario | The Cryosphere

(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)

Captured

A blue and grey bar chart on a white background showing that clean energy drove more than a third of China's economic growth in 2025. The chart shows investment growth and GDP growth by sector in trillions of yuan. The source is listed at the bottom of the chart as CREA analysis for Carbon Brief.

Solar power, electric vehicles and other clean-energy technologies drove more than a third of the growth in China’s economy in 2025 – and more than 90% of the rise in investment, according to new analysis for Carbon Brief (shown in blue above). Clean-energy sectors contributed a record 15.4tn yuan ($2.1tn) in 2025, some 11.4% of China’s gross domestic product (GDP) – comparable to the economies of Brazil or Canada, the analysis said.

Spotlight

Can humans reverse nature decline?

This week, Carbon Brief travelled to a UN event in Manchester, UK to speak to biodiversity scientists about the chances of reversing nature loss.

Officials from more than 150 countries arrived in Manchester this week to approve a new UN report on how nature underpins economic prosperity.

The meeting comes just four years before nations are due to meet a global target to halt and reverse biodiversity loss, agreed in 2022 under the landmark “Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework” (GBF).

At the sidelines of the meeting, Carbon Brief spoke to a range of scientists about humanity’s chances of meeting the 2030 goal. Their answers have been edited for length and clarity.

Dr David Obura, ecologist and chair of Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES)

We can’t halt and reverse the decline of every ecosystem. But we can try to “bend the curve” or halt and reverse the drivers of decline. That’s the economic drivers, the indirect drivers and the values shifts we need to have. What the GBF aspires to do, in terms of halting and reversing biodiversity loss, we can put in place the enabling drivers for that by 2030, but we won’t be able to do it fast enough at this point to halt [the loss] of all ecosystems.

Dr Luthando Dziba, executive secretary of IPBES

Countries are due to report on progress by the end of February this year on their national strategies to the Convention on Biological Diversity [CBD]. Once we get that, coupled with a process that is ongoing within the CBD, which is called the global stocktake, I think that’s going to give insights on progress as to whether this is possible to achieve by 2030…Are we on the right trajectory? I think we are and hopefully we will continue to move towards the final destination of having halted biodiversity loss, but also of living in harmony with nature.

Prof Laura Pereira, scientist at the Global Change Institute at Wits University, South Africa

At the global level, I think it’s very unlikely that we’re going to achieve the overall goal of halting biodiversity loss by 2030. That being said, I think we will make substantial inroads towards achieving our longer term targets. There is a lot of hope, but we’ve also got to be very aware that we have not necessarily seen the transformative changes that are going to be needed to really reverse the impacts on biodiversity.

Dr David Cooper, chair of the UK’s Joint Nature Conservation Committee and former executive secretary of the Convention on Biological Diversity

It’s important to look at the GBF as a whole…I think it is possible to achieve those targets, or at least most of them, and to make substantial progress towards them. It is possible, still, to take action to put nature on a path to recovery. We’ll have to increasingly look at the drivers.

Prof Andrew Gonzalez, McGill University professor and co-chair of an IPBES biodiversity monitoring assessment

I think for many of the 23 targets across the GBF, it’s going to be challenging to hit those by 2030. I think we’re looking at a process that’s starting now in earnest as countries [implement steps and measure progress]…You have to align efforts for conserving nature, the economics of protecting nature [and] the social dimensions of that, and who benefits, whose rights are preserved and protected.

Neville Ash, director of the UN Environment Programme World Conservation Monitoring Centre

The ambitions in the 2030 targets are very high, so it’s going to be a stretch for many governments to make the actions necessary to achieve those targets, but even if we make all the actions in the next four years, it doesn’t mean we halt and reverse biodiversity loss by 2030. It means we put the action in place to enable that to happen in the future…The important thing at this stage is the urgent action to address the loss of biodiversity, with the result of that finding its way through by the ambition of 2050 of living in harmony with nature.

Prof Pam McElwee, Rutgers University professor and co-chair of an IPBES “nexus assessment” report

If you look at all of the available evidence, it’s pretty clear that we’re going to keep experiencing biodiversity decline. I mean, it’s fairly similar to the 1.5C climate target. We are not going to meet that either. But that doesn’t mean that you slow down the ambition…even though you recognise that we probably won’t meet that specific timebound target, that’s all the more reason to continue to do what we’re doing and, in fact, accelerate action.

Watch, read, listen

OIL IMPACTS: Gas flaring has risen in the Niger Delta since oil and gas major Shell sold its assets in the Nigerian “oil hub”, a Climate Home News investigation found.

LOW SNOW: The Washington Post explored how “climate change is making the Winter Olympics harder to host”.

CULTURE WARS: A Media Confidential podcast examined when climate coverage in the UK became “part of the culture wars”.

Coming up

Pick of the jobs

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China Briefing 5 February 2026: Clean energy’s share of economy | Record renewables | Thawing relations with UK

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Welcome to Carbon Brief’s China Briefing.

China Briefing handpicks and explains the most important climate and energy stories from China over the past fortnight. Subscribe for free here.

Key developments

Solar and wind eclipsed coal

‘FIRST TIME IN HISTORY’: China’s total power capacity reached 3,890 gigawatts (GW) in 2025, according to a National Energy Administration (NEA) data release covered by industry news outlet International Energy Net. Of this, it said, solar capacity rose 35% to 1,200GW and wind capacity was up 23% to 640GW, while thermal capacity – which is mostly coal – grew 6% to just over 1,500GW. This marks the “first time in history” that wind and solar capacity has outranked coal capacity in China’s power mix, reported the state-run newspaper China Daily. China’s grid-related energy storage capacity exceeded 213GW in 2025, said state news agency Xinhua. Meanwhile, clean-energy industries “drove more than 90%” of investment growth and more than half of GDP growth last year, said the Guardian in its coverage of new analysis for Carbon Brief. (See more in the spotlight below.)

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DAWN FOR SOLAR: Solar power capacity alone may outpace coal in 2026, according to projections by the China Electricity Council (CEC), reported business news outlet 21st Century Business Herald. It added that non-fossil sources could account for 63% of the power mix this year, with coal falling to 31%. Separately, the China Renewable Energy Society said that annual wind-power additions could grow by between 600-980GW over the next five years, with annual additions of 120GW expected until 2028, said industry news outlet China Energy Net. China Energy Net also published the full CEC report.

STATE MEDIA VOICE: Xinhua published several energy- and climate-related articles in a series on the 15th five-year plan. One said that becoming a low-carbon energy “powerhouse” will support decarbonisation efforts, strengthen industrial innovation and improve China’s “global competitive edge and standing”. Another stated that coal consumption is “expected” to peak around 2027, with continued “growth” in the power and chemicals sector, while oil has already peaked. A third noted that distributed energy systems better matched the “characteristics of renewable energy” than centralised ones, but warned against “blind” expansion and insufficient supporting infrastructure. Others in the series discussed biodiversity and environmental protection and recycling of clean-energy technology. Meanwhile, the communist party-affiliated People’s Daily said that oil will continue to play a “vital role” in China, even after demand peaks.

Starmer and Xi endorsed clean-energy cooperation

CLIMATE PARTNERSHIP: UK prime minister Keir Starmer and Chinese president Xi Jinping pledged in Beijing to deepen cooperation on “green energy”, reported finance news outlet Caixin. They also agreed to establish a “China-UK high-level climate and nature partnership”, said China Daily. Xi told Starmer that the two countries should “carry out joint research and industrial transformation” in new energy and low-carbon technologies, according to Xinhua. It also cited Xi as saying China “hopes” the UK will provide a “fair” business environment for Chinese companies.

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OCTOPUS OVERSEAS: During the visit, UK power-trading company Octopus Energy and Chinese energy services firm PCG Power announced they would be starting a new joint venture in China, named Bitong Energy, reported industry news outlet PV Magazine. The move “marks a notable direct entry” of a foreign company into China’s “tightly regulated electricity market”, said Caixin.

PUSH AND PULL: UK policymakers also visited Chinese clean-energy technology manufacturer Envision in Shanghai, reported finance news outlet Yicai. It quoted UK business secretary Peter Kyle emphasising that partnering with companies “like Envision” on sustainability is a “really important part of our future”, particularly in terms of job creation in the UK. Trade minister Chris Bryant told Radio Scotland Breakfast that the government will decide on Chinese wind turbine manufacturer Mingyang’s plans for a Scotland factory “soon”. Researchers at the thinktank Oxford Institute for Energy Studies wrote in a guest post for Carbon Brief that greater Chinese competition in Europe’s wind market could “help spur competition in Europe”, if localisation rules and “other guardrails” are applied.

More China news

  • LIFE SUPPORT: China will update its coal capacity payment mechanism, which will raise thresholds for coal-fired power plants and expand to cover gas-fired power and pumped and new-energy storage, reported current affairs outlet China News.
  • FRONTIER TECH: The world’s “largest compressed-air power storage plant” has begun operating in China, said Bloomberg.
  • PARTNERSHIP A ‘MISTAKE’: The EU launched a “foreign subsidies” probe into Chinese wind turbine company Goldwind, said the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post. EU climate chief Wopke Hoekstra said the bloc must resist China’s pull in clean technologies, according to Bloomberg.
  • TRADE SPAT: The World Trade Organization “backed a complaint by China” that the US Inflation Reduction Act “discriminated against” Chinese cleantech exports, said Reuters.
  • NEW RULES: China has set “new regulations” for the Waliguan Baseline Observatory, which provides “key scientific references for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change”, said the People’s Daily.

Captured

New or reactivated proposals for coal-fired power plants in China totalled 161GW in 2025, according to a new report covered by Carbon Brief

Spotlight

Clean energy drove China’s economic growth in 2025

New analysis for Carbon Brief finds that clean-energy sectors contributed the equivalent of $2.1tn to China’s economy last year, making it a key driver of growth. However, headwinds in 2026 could restrict growth going forward – especially for the solar sector.

Below is an excerpt from the article, which can be read in full on Carbon Brief’s website.

Solar power, electric vehicles (EVs) and other clean-energy technologies drove more than a third of the growth in China’s economy in 2025 – and more than 90% of the rise in investment.

Clean-energy sectors contributed a record 15.4tn yuan ($2.1tn) in 2025, some 11.4% of China’s gross domestic product (GDP)

Analysis shows that China’s clean-energy sectors nearly doubled in real value between 2022-25 and – if they were a country – would now be the 8th-largest economy in the world.

These investments in clean-energy manufacturing represent a large bet on the energy transition in China and overseas, creating an incentive for the government and enterprises to keep the boom going.

However, there is uncertainty about what will happen this year and beyond, particularly due to a new pricing system, worsening industrial “overcapacity” and trade tensions.

Outperforming the wider economy

China’s clean-energy economy continues to grow far more quickly than the wider economy, making an outsized contribution to annual growth.

Without these sectors, China’s GDP would have expanded by 3.5% in 2025 instead of the reported 5.0%, missing the target of “around 5%” growth by a wide margin.

Clean energy made a crucial contribution during a challenging year, when promoting economic growth was the foremost aim for policymakers.

In 2024, EVs and solar had been the largest growth drivers. In 2025, it was EVs and batteries, which delivered 44% of the economic impact and more than half of the growth of the clean-energy industries.

The next largest subsector was clean-power generation, transmission and storage, which made up 40% of the contribution to GDP and 30% of the growth in 2025.

Within the electricity sector, the largest drivers were growth in investment in wind and solar power generation capacity, along with growth in power output from solar and wind, followed by the exports of solar-power equipment and materials.

But investment in solar-panel supply chains, a major growth driver in 2022-23, continued to fall for the second year, as the government made efforts to rein in overcapacity and “irrational” price competition.

Headwinds for solar

Ongoing investment of hundreds of billions of dollars represents a gigantic bet on a continuing global energy transition.

However, developments next year and beyond are unclear, particularly for solar. A new pricing system for renewable power is creating uncertainty, while central government targets have been set far below current rates of clean-electricity additions.

Investment in solar-power generation and solar manufacturing declined in the second half of the year.

The reduction in the prices of clean-energy technology has been so dramatic that when the prices for GDP statistics are updated, the sectors’ contribution to real GDP – adjusted for inflation or, in this case deflation – will be revised down.

Nevertheless, the key economic role of the industry creates a strong motivation to keep the clean-energy boom going. A slowdown in the domestic market could also undermine efforts to stem overcapacity and inflame trade tensions by increasing pressure on exports to absorb supply.

Local governments and state-owned enterprises will also influence the outlook for the sector.

Provincial governments have a lot of leeway in implementing the new electricity markets and contracting systems for renewable power generation. The new five-year plans, to be published this year, will, therefore, be of major importance.

This spotlight was written for Carbon Brief by Lauri Myllyvirta, lead analyst at Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA), and Belinda Schaepe, China policy analyst at CREA. CREA China analysts Qi Qin and Chengcheng Qiu contributed research.

Watch, read, listen

PROVINCE INFLUENCE: The Institute for Global Decarbonization Progress, a Beijing-based thinktank, published a report examining the climate-related statements in provincial recommendations for the 15th five-year plan.

‘PIVOT’?: The Outrage + Optimism podcast spoke with the University of Bath’s Dr Yixian Sun about whether China sees itself as a climate leader and what its role in climate negotiations could be going forward.

COOKING FOR CLEAN-TECH: Caixin covered rising demand for China’s “gutter oil” as companies “scramble” to decarbonise.

DON’T GO IT ALONE: China News broadcast the Chinese foreign ministry’s response to the withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement, with spokeswoman Mao Ning saying “no country can remain unaffected” by climate change.


$6.8tn

The current size of China’s green-finance economy, including loans, bonds and equity, according to Dr Ma Jun, the Institute of Finance and Sustainability’s president,in a report launch event attended by Carbon Brief. Dr Ma added that “green loans” make up 16% of all loans in China, with some areas seeing them take a 34% share.


New science

  • China’s official emissions inventories have overestimated its hydrofluorocarbon emissions by an average of 117m tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (mtCO2e) every year since 2017 | Nature Geoscience
  • “Intensified forest management efforts” in China from 2010 onwards have been linked to an acceleration in carbon absorption by plants and soils | Communications Earth and Environment

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China Briefing is written by Anika Patel and edited by Simon Evans. Please send tips and feedback to china@carbonbrief.org

The post China Briefing 5 February 2026: Clean energy’s share of economy | Record renewables | Thawing relations with UK appeared first on Carbon Brief.

China Briefing 5 February 2026: Clean energy’s share of economy | Record renewables | Thawing relations with UK

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Congress rescues aid budget from Trump’s “evisceration” but climate misses out

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Under pressure from Congress, President Donald Trump quietly signed into law a funding package that provides billions of dollars more in foreign assistance spending than he had originally wanted to for the fiscal year between October 2025 and September 2026.

The legislation allocates $50 billion, $9 billion less than the level agreed the previous year under President Biden but $19 billion more than Trump proposed, restoring health and humanitarian aid spending to near pre-Trump levels.

Democratic Senator Patty Murray, vice-chair of the committee on appropriations, said that “while including some programmatic funding cuts, the bill rejects the Trump administration’s evisceration of US foreign assistance programmes”.

But, with climate a divisive issue in the US, spending on dedicated climate programmes was largely absent. Clarence Edwards, executive director of E3G’s US office, told Climate Home News that “the era of large US government investment in climate policy is over, at least for the foreseeable future”.

The package ruled out any support for the Climate Investment Funds’ Clean Technology Fund, which supports low-carbon technologies in developing countries and had received $150 million from the US in the previous fiscal year.

The US also made no pledge to the Africa Development Fund (ADF) – a mechanism run by the African Development Bank that provides grants and low-interest loans to the poorest African nations. A government spokesperson told Reuters that decision reflected concerns that “like too many other institutions, the ADF has adopted a disproportionate focus on climate change, gender, and social issues”.

GEF spared from cuts

Trump did, however, agree to Congress’s request to make $150 million – more than last year – available for the Global Environment Facility (GEF), which tackles environmental issues like biodiversity loss, land degradation and climate change.

Edwards said that GEF funding “survived due to Congressional pushback and a refocus on non-climate priorities like biodiversity, plastics and ocean ecosystems, per US Treasury guidance”.

Congress also pressured Trump into giving $54 million to the Rome-based International Fund for Agricultural Development. Its goals include helping small-scale farmers adapt to climate change and reduce emissions.

    Without any pressure from Congress, Trump approved tens of millions of dollars each for multilateral development banks in Asia, Africa and Europe and just over a billion dollars for the World Bank’s International Development Association, which funds development projects in the world’s poorest countries.

    As most of these banks have climate programmes and goals, much of this money is likely to be spent on climate action. The largest lender, the World Bank, aims to devote 45% of its finance to climate programmes, although, as Climate Home News has reported, its definition of climate spending is considered too loose by some analysts.

    The bill also earmarks $830 million – nearly triple what Trump originally wanted – for the Millennium Challenge Corporation, a George W. Bush-era institution that has increasingly backed climate-focussed projects like transmission lines to bring clean hydropower to cities in Nepal.

    No funding boost for DFC

    While Congress largely increased spending, it rejected Trump’s call for nearly $4 billion for the Development Finance Corporation (DFC), granting just under $1 billion instead – similar to previous years.

    Under Biden, there had been a push to get the DFC to support clean energy projects. But the Trump administration ended DFC’s support for projects like South Africa’s clean energy transition.

      At a recent board meeting, the DFC’s board – now dominated by Trump administration officials – approved US financial support for Chevron Mediterranean Limited, the developers of an Israeli gas field.

      Kate DeAngelis, deputy director at Friends of the Earth US told Climate Home News it was good for the climate that Trump had not been able to boost the DFC’s budget. “DFC seems set up to focus mainly on the dirtiest deals without any focus on development,” she said.

      US Congressional elections in November could lead to Democrats retaking control of one or both houses of Congress. Edwards said that “Democratic gains might restore funding [in the next fiscal year], while Republican holds would likely extend cuts”.

      But he warned that “budgetary pressures and a murky economic environment don’t hold promise of increases in US funding for foreign assistance and climate programs, regardless of which party controls Congress”.

      The post Congress rescues aid budget from Trump’s “evisceration” but climate misses out appeared first on Climate Home News.

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