2024年5月,尽管用电需求持续增长,清洁能源发电量占到中国全国总发电量的44%,创下历史新高;燃煤发电量占比降至53%,达到历史低点。
基于官方数据和其他数据,Carbon Brief 的新分析揭示了煤炭在能源结构中占比下降的真实程度。
2023年5月,煤炭在中国发电量中所占比例为60%。一年后,这一数字下降了7个百分点。
该分析揭示的其他关键信息包括:
- 国家统计局按发电方式分列的月度发电量数据现在对风能和太阳能发电量计入非常有局限性。例如,它未纳入“分布式”屋顶光伏和较小的集中式太阳能发电站,因此只能捕捉到约一半的太阳能发电量。
- 国家统计局的月度总发电量为718太瓦时(TWh),而国家能源局报告提出月度电力需求为775太瓦时,两者的差距显著。实际上,由于发电厂和电网损耗,发电量肯定应高于需求量。
- 媒体报道曾猜测,创纪录的新增可再生能源装机容量会在5月份触及电网上限,但新数据显示情况并非如此。
- 2024年5月,中国电力需求同比增长49太瓦时(7.2%)。
- 与此同时,清洁能源发电量创纪录地增长了78太瓦时,其中太阳能发电量创纪录地增长了41太瓦时(78%),水力发电量从早些时候干旱造成的低点回升了34太瓦时(39%),风力发电量小幅增长了4太瓦时(5%)。
- 随着清洁能源的增长超过电力需求增长,化石燃料发电量被迫回落,出现了自2019年新冠大流行以来最大的月度降幅。天然气发电量下降了4太瓦时(16%),燃煤发电量下降了16太瓦时(4%)。
- 化石燃料发电量的下降意味着电力行业的CO2排放量下降了3.6%,而电力行业的CO2排放量约占中国温室气体排放总量的五分之二,是近年来排放增长的主要来源。

从2024年3月开始,中国化石燃料和水泥行业的CO2排放量由增变减。新的研究结果表明,这一趋势仍在继续。
如果目前风能和太阳能的快速部署得以继续,那么中国的CO2排放量很可能会继续下降,从而使2023年成为中国碳达峰的一年。
月度数据差异
国家统计局每月都会公布中国按发电方式分列的发电量数据。2024年5月的数据是在近一个月前的6月中旬公布,并被广泛报道。
然而,这些数据的局限性越来越大,因为其中不包括“分布式”光伏电站,如家庭和企业屋顶上安装的光伏系统。本文的分析表明,这使得大约一半的太阳能发电总量被遗漏。
如果仔细审视用电量,国家统计局发电量数据不完整这一事实显而易见:国家能源局报告的5月份用电量为775太瓦时,而国家统计局报告的发电量仅为718太瓦时。实际上,由于发电厂和输电过程中的损耗,发电量肯定远远大于用电量。
国家统计局报告的太阳能和风能发电量似乎很少,这引起了人们的困惑,并导致有报道声称中国的风能和太阳能发电表现不佳。
中电联收集的“利用率”数据可跟踪风能和太阳能发电的表现,显示相对于最大潜力的实际出力。这些数据通常包含在国家能源局发布的月度统计数据中。
国家能源局因在5月份发布的数据中略过了利用率,这导致彭博社和路透社猜测背后原因可能是风能和太阳能数据不佳。这一猜测在中电联直接提供其数据后基本被证明不成立,因为太阳能发电利用率大幅上升;风能利用率虽然下降,但在正常的年度变化范围内。
另一个数据集追踪了由于电网灵活性低而浪费的太阳能和风能发电量的比例,结果显示两者分别小幅增长了0.8和1.7个百分点。这对电厂运营者来说是个问题,但该升幅远未达到会显著影响利用率的程度——消纳率的年际变化幅度通常超过5%。
现在有足够的数据来破解国家统计局发电数据的局限性,并描绘出中国5月份发电结构的全貌。
首先值得一提的是,国家统计局的数据是以30天为一个月进行归一化处理的,这造成了部分数据不匹配。本文剩余部分使用归一化后的30天数据。
除了使用国家统计局数据,还可根据报告的装机容量和利用率来估算太阳能和风能发电量。通过将这些估计值与其他技术的报告发电量相结合,得出总发电量为783太瓦时,同比增长8%。
报告的750太瓦时用电量(按30天为一个月进行归一化)与估计的783太瓦时发电量相符,另有4.2%的差异是由于传输损耗造成的。
目前尚无输电损耗的月度数据,但2023年的平均值为4.5%,与报告的用电量和预估发电量之间的差距非常吻合。
创纪录的结果
综合各种数据可以看出,2024年5月太阳能发电量创纪录地增长了78%,远高于不完整的国家统计局数据中29%的同比增幅。
太阳能发电装机容量增加52%至691吉瓦(gigawatt),产能利用率从16%提高到19%,太阳能发电量从2023年5月的53太瓦时增至2024年5月的94太瓦时,增加了41太瓦时,创下中国各发电方式发电量中最大的增幅。
水电发电量的增幅位居第二,虽然发电量仅增长了1%,但利用率却从31%跃升至41%,因为该行业正从2022年至2023年创纪录的干旱中恢复过来。这使得水电发电量增加了39%(34太瓦时),达到115太瓦时。
风电装机大幅增长了21%,但其利用率却有所下降,这可能是由于风力条件逐月变化所致。因此,发电量的增幅相对较小,仅为5%(4太瓦时),达到83太瓦时。核电和生物质发电的发电量也有小幅增长,但核电站的利用率从87%下降到85%。
如下图所示,清洁能源发电量总计增长了78太瓦时。这足以超过49太瓦时的需求增长。
因此,尽管燃气发电装机增加了9%,但发电量却大幅下降16%,利用率急剧下降了24%。燃煤发电装机增加了3%,但发电量却下降了3.7%,平均利用率下降了7%。需求下降可能会抑制过去两年火热的对新建煤炭产能的投资。
燃煤和燃气发电量的变化,加之燃煤电厂热耗率的轻微下降,意味着电力行业的CO2排放量下降了3.6%。

在发电量发生上述变化后,中国的发电结构在2024年5月已大幅减少了对化石燃料的依赖。如下图所示,燃煤发电份额从去年同期的60%降至53%,是有记录以来的最低份额。
与此同时,太阳能发电占比从去年同期的7%上升到12%,创历史最高纪录。其余为风电(11%)、水电(15%)、核电(5%)、天然气发电(3%)和生物质发电(2%)。

非化石能源的总体份额达到创纪录的44%,间歇性可再生能源(太阳能和风能)的比例也创下新高,达到23%。
如上图所示,尽管需求不断增长,但太阳能和风能在中国电力结构中的份额正在迅速增加。2016年5月,它们仅占总量的7%。
与此同时,2024年5月,清洁能源发电装机继续强劲增长,新增太阳能发电装机19吉瓦 ,风电3吉瓦 ,核电1.2吉瓦。
在2024年的前五个月,中国新增了约79吉瓦的太阳能和20吉瓦的风能。如下图所示,这两个新增发电装机数字比去年分别增长了29%和21%,而去年的数字已经创下历史新高。
就太阳能发电具体而言,2024年5月的月新增装机高于4月,与2023年5月相比也有同比增长。

太阳能发电量的快速增长表明,太阳能产能的激增正在提供新的电力供应,其规模足以满足中国大部分的需求增长。
这进一步印证了中国的CO2排放量正处于结构性下降时期的观点。
如果清洁能源的新增装机保持在2023年和2024年初的水平,那么CO2排放量可能会持续下降,这将确定2023年是中国实现碳达峰的一年。
由于中国将在明年初宣布新的气候目标,政府对清洁能源增长的雄心水平仍有待观察。
关于数据
风能和太阳能发电量,以及按燃料划分的火电发电量系通过将每月末的发电装机乘月利用率计算得出,数据来自万得金融终端提供的中电联报告数据。
火电、水电和核电的总发电量来源于国家统计局的月度发布数据。由于无法获得生物质发电的月度利用率数据,因此采用2023年的年平均利用率52%。
发电产生的碳排放量估算基于中国最新的2018年国家温室气体排放清单中的排放因子,以及国家能源局公布的燃煤电厂月平均热耗率,并假设燃气电厂平均热耗率为50%。
The post 分析:中国清洁能源发展使五月燃煤发电份额降至53%的历史低点 appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Greenhouse Gases
COP30: Carbon Brief’s second ‘ask us anything’ webinar
As COP30 reaches its midway point in the Brazilian city of Belém, Carbon Brief has hosted its second “ask us anything” webinar to exclusively answer questions submitted by holders of the Insider Pass.
The webinar kicked off with an overview of where the negotiations are on Day 8, plus what it was like to be among the 70,000-strong “people’s march” on Saturday.
At present, there are 44 agreed texts at COP30, with many negotiating streams remaining highly contested, as shown by Carbon Brief’s live text tracker.
Topics discussed during the webinar included the potential of a “cover text” at COP30, plus updates on negotiations such as the global goal on adaptation and the just-transition work programme.
Journalists also answered questions on the potential for a “fossil-fuel phaseout roadmap”, the impact of finance – including the Baku to Belém roadmap, which was released the week before COP30 – and Article 6.
The webinar was moderated by Carbon Brief’s director and editor, Leo Hickman, and featured six of our journalists – half of them on the ground in Belém – covering all elements of the summit:
- Dr Simon Evans – deputy editor and senior policy editor
- Daisy Dunne – associate editor
- Josh Gabbatiss – policy correspondent
- Orla Dwyer – food, land and nature reporter
- Aruna Chandrasekhar – land, food systems and nature journalist
- Molly Lempriere – policy section editor
A recording of the webinar (below) is now available to watch on YouTube.
Watch Carbon Brief’s first COP30 “ask us anything” webinar here.
The post COP30: Carbon Brief’s second ‘ask us anything’ webinar appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Greenhouse Gases
DeBriefed 14 November 2025: COP30 DeBriefed: Finance and 1.5C loom large at talks; China’s emissions dip; Negotiations explained
Welcome to Carbon Brief’s DeBriefed.
An essential guide to the week’s key developments relating to climate change.
This week
Finance and 1.5C dominate talks
AGENDA ADOPTED: Negotiations at the COP30 UN climate talks began in the Brazilian city of Belém this week, attended in person by Carbon Brief’s Daisy Dunne, Josh Gabbatiss and Anika Patel. The Brazilian hosts scored an unexpected early win by dodging an “agenda fight” over proposals to add various contentious issues to the official docket. Despite the neat footwork, four issues kept off the agreed agenda – climate finance; emissions reporting; trade measures; ambition and 1.5C – still loom large, having merely been diverted into “presidency consultations”.
PRESIDENCY PROMISES: By Wednesday, the presidency was promising “good news” at a plenary later that day, which had been due to offer an update on progress with the four extra items. Instead, it ended abruptly, with COP30 president André Corrêa do Lago promising to say more at another plenary scheduled for tomorrow. It remains unclear how the presidency intends to deal with these thorny issues, leaving the COP rumour-mill in full swing.
MINISTERIAL MAGIC: Aside from the extra issues, the official agenda at COP30 already has more than 100 items to contend with, including how to track progress on adaptation and how to ensure a “just transition” as emissions-cutting measures are implemented. (You can follow them all via the Carbon Brief text tracker.) While draft texts have started to emerge, many items remain stalled, with persistent divisions along familiar lines (see below). Negotiators will be hoping that ministers arriving over the weekend are primed to unlock progress. Brazil has appointed pairs of these politicians to push for deals in key areas.
Around the world
- Ethiopia has said it will host COP32 after beating out a bid from Nigeria, Reuters reported. Turkey and Australia are still in deadlock over who should host COP31, with a decision due by the end of these talks, BBC News reported.
- China will not contribute to Brazil’s Tropical Forest Forever Facility, Bloomberg reported, while Devex said two multilateral development banks are considering paying in. More than $5.5bn has been pledged so far, which BusinessGreen noted is “well short” of a $25bn target. The fund was labelled a “false solution” by some Indigenous and civil society groups.
- After Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva called for a “roadmap” away from fossil fuels ahead of COP’s opening, rumours are swirling over how this might take shape. A new declaration spearheaded by Colombia and a roadmap with backing from a number of countries, including Denmark, the UK, France, Kenya and Germany, are being floated as possible options.
- China is currently among the countries pushing for “provision of finance from rich countries and unilateral trade measures” to be included on the agenda, reported Climate Home News. Chinese delegation head Li Gao told Agence France-Presse it is “crucial” for developed countries to fulfil their $300bn commitment.
- Dozens of Indigenous protesters forced their way into COP’s blue zone on Tuesday night, expressing anger at a lack of access to the negotiations, Reuters said. On Friday, a peaceful protest blocked the entrance to the blue zone, causing lengthy queues as delegates were forced to use a side door.
344%
The rise in the global use of solar from 2024 to 2035 under “stated policies”, according to Carbon Brief’s analysis of the latest World Energy Outlook from the International Energy Agency.
Latest climate research
- The 2025 Global Carbon Budget, covered in detail by Carbon Brief, finds that CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and cement will rise 1.1% in 2025 | Earth System Science Data
- In its November 2025 update, Climate Action Tracker says that its projections of global warming by 2100 have “barely moved” in four years | Climate Action Tracker
- The AI server industry in the US is unlikely to meet its 2030 net-zero goals “without substantial reliance on highly uncertain” carbon offsets | Nature Sustainability
(For more, see Carbon Brief’s in-depth daily summaries of the top climate news stories on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday.)
Captured

China’s carbon dioxide emissions have “now been flat or falling for 18 months” since March 2024, analysis for Carbon Brief has found, due, in particular, to the transport, cement and steel sectors. The analysis has been covered widely in publications including China’s Global Times, the New York Times, Financial Times, Reuters, Bloomberg and on the frontpage of the Guardian.
Spotlight
What to expect from COP30 talks
This week, Carbon Brief’s expert team walk through what is happening with the biggest issues being negotiated at COP30.
‘Cover text’
Can you judge a COP by its cover text? At COP, the presidency has the option to pull together a new negotiated “cover text”, an overarching political overview of decisions agreed at the summit, along with other issues not on the agenda that it wants to draw attention to.
COP30 president André Corrêa do Lago might have dismissed a catch-all “cover decision” as a “last-minute solution” ahead of COP and dodged the question since, but other parties have been less shy in hinting that a cover text is, indeed, coming.
Cover decisions are often the product of fraught negotiations, high stakes, too little time and too many parties to accommodate.
This year, there is added pressure to address what is happening in the wider world outside the “negotiations” and to politically signal that the UN climate process is alive and making progress, despite the withdrawal of the US.
What elements could go into it? As a member of the “BASIC” group of nations comprising Brazil, South Africa, India and China, trade measures could find a place. But ideas pushed by Brazilian president Lula for new “roadmaps” away from fossil fuels and deforestation might find a place. Finance, however, could be much trickier to fit in.
Adaptation
One of the key expected outcomes of COP30 is agreement on a list of 100 indicators that can be used to measure progress under the “global goal on adaptation” (GGA). After two years of work by experts, negotiations got underway with a suggested list that had been whittled down from nearly 10,000 possible indicators.
Despite the focus on the GGA by the COP30 presidency and others, division has quickly emerged around the timeline for the adoption of the indicators. The African Group has notably requested a two-year work programme to further refine the list, while other parties are pushing for the indicators to be adopted in Belém as planned.
On Wednesday, an informal note was published that compiled elements for a draft decision. Significantly, for the first time under the GGA, this included a call for developed countries to “at least triple their collective provision” of adaptation finance by 2030, with a target to reach $120bn. This echoed a suggested target originally set out by the negotiating group of least developed countries (LDCs), supported by the African Group, Arab Group and the Association of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC) countries.
Just transition and mitigation work programmes
Over the past year, civil society groups have been calling for the establishment of a mechanism to enact the agreed UNFCCC principles of a “just transition”. This gained momentum on Wednesday within negotiations of the just transition work programme (JTWP), when the G77 and China called for the development of the “Belem Action Mechanism” (BAM).
Chile, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), India and other developing countries supported the mechanism. However, Norway, the UK, Australia and Japan pushed back. Other long-standing points of contention have also raised their heads, including around unilateral trade measures and references to fossil fuels and aligning to global temperature goals.
Within the mitigation work programme (MWP) talks, negotiators are looking to build on two dialogues held this year. The main themes at COP30 are the links between the MWP and the global stocktake (see below) and the future of the programme itself.
Old divisions have emerged in negotiations, focused predominantly on the mandate of the MWP and the potential development of a digital platform as part of its continuation.
UAE dialogue
The landmark outcome of the first “global stocktake”, agreed at COP28 in Dubai, called on all countries to contribute to a “transition away from fossil fuels”. It also mandated a “UAE dialogue” on “implementing the global stocktake outcomes”.
Two years later, countries remain deadlocked over what this dialogue should discuss. Many want it to cover all parts of the stocktake, including the energy transition, while others want an exclusive focus on climate finance. They also disagree on whether the dialogue should have substantive outcomes, including a formal process to keep discussing the issues raised.
Having failed to reach agreement at COP29 last year, the latest draft text shows parties are just as far apart in Belém, nearly halfway into the summit.
Finance
Climate finance for developing countries does not occupy a high-profile position in the formal COP30 negotiations. Yet, as demonstrated by its role in adaptation talks and the agenda dispute, finance still has the potential to derail proceedings.
Ahead of the conference, the COP30 and COP29 presidencies released their “Baku to Belém roadmap”, exploring how finance could be ramped up to $1.3tn by 2035.
An influential group of experts also released new analysis showing a “feasible path” to this goal, leaning on private finance. They said this work would provide a “valuable signal” to those in the finance sector.
However, with no position in the Belém negotiations, it was unclear how – or whether – the roadmap would be taken forward by governments beyond COP30.
Instead, finance negotiators have been occupied with technical matters, but these still show signs of division. For example, some developing-party groups have pushed back against an EU priority goal to extend a “dialogue” about “making finance flows consistent” with climate objectives.
Watch, read, listen
UNDER THREAT: The Bureau of Investigative Journalism told the story of Kim Rebholz – an environmentalist who was threatened for his work curbing illegal logging in Democratic Republic of Congo’s mangrove parks.
SPOTLIGHT ON STARMER: YouTuber Simon Clark has published a video of himself interviewing prime minister Keir Starmer about the UK’s actions on climate and nature, at COP30 and domestically.
INSIDE COP:Outrage and Optimism is running a “special edition” podcast series in partnership with the COP30 presidency, bringing “exclusive, behind-the-scenes access” to the conference.
Coming up
- 14-21 November: UN Climate Change conference (COP30) heads into its crucial second week in Belém
- 15 November: Informal stocktaking plenary of COP30 talks by the Brazilian presidency
- 17 November: Launch of the Global Methane Status Report
Pick of the jobs
- International Energy Agency, intern, China programme | Stipend: €1,000/month. Location: Paris
- Channel 4, sustainability production executive | Salary: £48,125. Location: Bristol, Glasgow or Leeds, UK
- World Bank, environmental specialist | Salary: “GF” grade. Location: Yaounde, Cameroon
- Greenpeace, climate and energy campaigner | Salary: Unknown. Location: Bangkok, Thailand
DeBriefed is edited by Daisy Dunne. Please send any tips or feedback to debriefed@carbonbrief.org.
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The post DeBriefed 14 November 2025: COP30 DeBriefed: Finance and 1.5C loom large at talks; China’s emissions dip; Negotiations explained appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Greenhouse Gases
Analysis: Seven charts showing how the $100bn climate-finance goal was met
Developed countries have poured billions of dollars into railways across Asia, solar projects in Africa and thousands of other climate-related initiatives overseas, according to a joint investigation by Carbon Brief and the Guardian.
A group of nations, including much of Europe, the US and Japan, is obliged under the Paris Agreement to provide international “climate finance” to developing countries.
This financial support can come in forms such as grants and loans from various sources, including aid budgets, multilateral development banks (MDBs) and private investments.
The flagship climate-finance target for more than a decade was to hit “$100bn a year” by 2020, which developed countries met – albeit two years late – in 2022.
Carbon Brief and the Guardian have analysed data across more than 20,000 global climate projects funded using public money from developed nations, including official 2021 and 2022 figures, which have only just been published.
The data provides a detailed insight into how the $100bn goal was reached, including funding for everything from sustainable farming in Niger to electricity projects in the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
With developed countries now pledging to ramp up climate finance further, the analysis also shows how donors often rely on loans and private finance to meet their obligations.
- The $100bn target was reached in 2022, boosted by private finance and the US
- Relatively wealthy countries – including China and the UAE – were major recipients
- A tenth of all direct climate finance went to Japan-backed rail projects
- There was funding for more than 500 clean-power projects in African countries
- Some ‘least developed’ countries relied heavily on loans
- US shares in development banks significantly inflated its total contribution
- Adaptation finance still lags, but climate-vulnerable countries received more
- Methodology
The $100bn target was reached in 2022, boosted by private finance and the US
A small handful of countries have consistently been the top climate-finance donors. This remained the case in 2021 and 2022, with just four countries – Japan, Germany, France and the US – responsible for half of all climate finance, the analysis shows.
Not only was 2022 the first year in which the $100bn goal was achieved, it also saw the largest ever single-year increase in climate finance – a rise of $26.3bn, or 29%, according to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
(It is worth noting that while OECD figures are often referenced as the most “official” climate-finance totals, they are contested.)
Half of this increase came from a $12.6bn rise in support from MDBs – financial institutions that are owned and funded by member states. The rest can be attributed to two main factors.
First, while several donors ramped up spending, the US drove by far the biggest increase in “bilateral” finance, provided directly by the country itself.
After years of stalling during the first Donald Trump presidency, when Joe Biden took office in 2021, the nation’s bilateral climate aid more than tripled between that year and the next.
Meanwhile, after years of “stagnating” at around $15bn, the amount of private investments “mobilised” in developing countries by developed-country spending surged to around $22bn in 2022, according to OECD estimates.
As the chart below shows, the combination of increased US contributions and higher private investments pushed climate finance up by nearly $14bn in 2022, helping it to reach $115.9bn in total.

Both of these trends are still pertinent in 2025, following a new pledge made at COP29 by developed countries to ramp up climate finance to “at least” $300bn a year by 2035.
After years of increasing rapidly under Biden, US bilateral climate finance for developing countries has been effectively eliminated during Trump’s second presidential term. Other major donors, including Germany, France and the UK, have also cut their aid budgets.
This means there will be more pressure on other sources of climate finance in the coming years. In particular, developed countries hope that private finance can help to raise finance into the trillions of dollars required to achieve developing countries’ climate goals.
Some higher-income countries – including China and the UAE – were major recipients
The greatest beneficiaries of international climate finance tend to be large, middle-income countries, such as Egypt, the Philippines and Brazil, according to the analysis.
(The World Bank classifies countries as being low-, lower-middle, upper-middle or high-income, according to their gross national income per person.)
Lower-middle income India received $14.1bn in 2021 and 2022 – nearly all as loans – making it by far the largest recipient, as the chart below shows.
Most of India’s top projects were metro and rail lines in cities, such as Delhi and Mumbai, which accounted for 46% of its total climate finance in those years, Carbon Brief analysis shows. (See: A tenth of all direct climate finance went to Japan-backed rail projects.)

As the world’s second-largest economy and a major funder of energy projects overseas, China – classified as upper-middle income by the World Bank – has faced mounting pressure to start officially providing climate finance. At the same time, the nation received more than $3bn of climate finance over this period, as it is still classed as a developing country under the UN climate system.
High-income Gulf petrostates are also among the countries receiving funds. For example, the UAE received Japanese finance of $1.3bn for an electricity transmission project and a waste-to-energy project.
To some extent, such large shares simply reflect the size of many middle-income countries. India received 9% of all bilateral and multilateral climate finance, but it is home to 18% of the global population.
The focus on these nations also reflects the kind of big-budget infrastructure that is being funded.
“Middle-income economies tend to have the financial and institutional capacity to design, appraise and deliver large-scale projects,” Sarah Colenbrander, climate programme director at global affairs thinktank ODI, tells Carbon Brief.
Donors might focus on relatively higher-income or powerful nations out of self-interest, for example, to align with geopolitical, trade or commercial interests. But, as Colenbrander tells Carbon Brief, there are also plenty of “high-minded” reasons to do so, not least the opportunity to help curb their relatively high emissions.
A tenth of all direct climate finance went to Japan-backed rail projects
Japan is the largest climate-finance donor, accounting for a fifth of all bilateral and multilateral finance in 2021 and 2022, the analysis shows.
Of the 20 largest bilateral projects, 13 were Japanese. These include $7.6bn of loans for eight rail and metro systems in major cities across India, Bangladesh and the Philippines.
In fact, Japan’s funding for rail projects was so substantial that it made up 11% of all bilateral finance. This amounts to 4% of climate finance from all sources.

While these rail projects are likely to provide benefits to developing countries, they also highlight some of the issues identified by aid experts with Japan’s climate-finance practices.
As was the case for more than 80% of Japan’s climate finance, all of these projects were funded with loans, which must be paid back. Nearly a fifth of Japan’s total loans were described as “non-concessional”, meaning they were offered on terms equivalent to those offered on the open market, rather than at more favourable rates.
Many Japan-backed projects also stipulate that Japanese companies and workers must be hired to work on them, reflecting the government’s policies to “proactively support” and “facilitate” the overseas expansion of Japanese business using aid.
Documents show that rail projects in India and the Philippines were granted on this basis.
This practice can be beneficial, especially in sectors such as rail infrastructure, where Japanese companies have considerable expertise. Yet, analysts have questioned Japan’s approach, which they argue can disproportionately benefit the donor itself.
“Counting these loans as climate finance presents a moral hazard…And such loans tied to Japanese businesses make it worse,” Yuri Onodera, a climate specialist at Friends of the Earth Japan, tells Carbon Brief.
There was funding for more than 500 clean-power projects in African countries
Around 730 million people still lack access to electricity, with roughly 80% of those people living in sub-Saharan Africa.
As part of their climate-finance pledges, donor countries often support renewable projects, transmission lines and other initiatives that can provide clean power to those in need.
Carbon Brief and the Guardian have identified funding for more than 500 clean-power and transmission projects in African countries that lack universal electricity access. In total, these funds amounted to $7.6bn over the two years 2021-22.
Among them was support for Chad’s first-ever solar project, a new hydropower plant in Mozambique and the expansion of electricity grids in Nigeria.
The distribution of funds across the continent – excluding multi-country programmes – can be seen in the map below.

A lack of clear rules about what can be classified as “climate finance” in the UN climate process means donors sometimes include support for fossil fuels – particularly gas power – in their totals.
For example, Japan counted an $18m loan to a Japanese liquified natural gas (LNG) company in Senegal and roughly $1m for gas projects in Tanzania.
However, such funding accounted for a tiny fraction of sub-Saharan Africa’s climate finance overall, amounting to less than 1% of all power-sector funding across the region, based on the projects identified in this analysis.
Some ‘least developed’ countries relied heavily on loans
One of the most persistent criticisms levelled at climate finance by developing-country governments and civil society groups is that so much of it is provided in the form of loans.
While loans are commonly used to fund major projects, they are sometimes offered on unfavourable terms and add to the burden of countries that are already struggling with debt.
The International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) has shown that the 44 “least developed countries” (LDCs) spend twice as much servicing debts as they receive in climate finance.
Developed nations pledged $33.4bn in 2021 and 2022 to the 44 LDCs to help them finance climate projects. In total, $17.2bn – more than half of the funding – was provided as loans, primarily from Japan, France and development banks.
The chart below shows how, for a number of LDCs, loans continue to be the main way in which they receive international climate funds.
For example, Angola received $216.7m in loans from France – primarily to support its water infrastructure – and $571.6m in loans from various multilateral institutions, together amounting to nearly all the nation’s climate finance over this period.

Oxfam, which describes developed countries as “unjustly indebting poor countries” via loans, estimates that the “true value” of climate finance in 2022 was $28-35bn, roughly a quarter of the OECD’s estimate. This is largely due to Oxfam discounting much of the value of loans.
However, Jan Kowalzig, a senior policy adviser at Oxfam Germany, tells Carbon Brief that, “generally, LDCs receive loans at better conditions” than they would have been able to secure on the open market, sometimes referred to as “concessional” loans.
US shares in development banks significantly raised its total contribution
The US has been one of the world’s top climate-finance providers, accounting for around 15% of all bilateral and multilateral contributions in 2021 and 2022.
Despite this, US contributions have consistently been viewed as relatively low when considering the nation’s wealth and historical role in driving climate change.
Moreover, much of the climate finance that can be attributed to the US comes from its MDB shareholdings, rather than direct contributions from its aid budget.
These banks are owned by member countries and the US is a dominant shareholder in many of them.
The analysis reveals that around three-quarters of US climate finance provided in 2021-22 came via multilateral sources, particularly the World Bank. (For information on how this analysis attributes multilateral funding to donors, see Methodology.)
Among other major donors – specifically Japan, France and Germany – only a third of their finance was channelled through multilateral institutions. As the chart below shows, multilateral contributions lifted the US from being the fifth-largest donor to the third-largest.

While the Trump administration has cut virtually all overseas climate funding and broadly rejected multilateral institutions, the US has not yet abandoned its influential stake in MDBs.
Prior to COP29 in 2024, only MDB funds that could be attributed to developed country inputs were counted towards the $100bn goal, as part of those nations’ Paris Agreement duties.
However, countries have now agreed that “all climate-related outflows” from MDBs – no matter which donor country they are attributed to – will count towards the new $300bn goal.
This means that, as long as MDBs continue extensively funding climate projects, there will still be a large slice of climate finance that can be attributed to the US, even as it exits the Paris Agreement.
Adaptation finance still lags, but climate-vulnerable countries received more
Under the Paris Agreement, developed countries committed to achieving “a balance between adaptation and mitigation” in their climate finance.
The idea is that, while it is important to focus on mitigation – or cutting emissions – by supporting projects such as clean energy, there is also a need to help developing countries prepare for the threat of climate change.
Generally, adaptation projects are less likely to provide a return on investment and are, therefore, more reliant on grant-based finance.
In practice, a “balance” between adaptation and mitigation has never been reached. Over the period of this analysis, 58% of climate finance was for mitigation, 33% was for adaptation and the remainder was for projects that contributed to both goals.
This reflects a preference for mitigation-based financing via loans among some major donors, particularly Japan and France. Both countries provided just a third of their finance for adaptation projects in 2021 and 2022.
However, among some of the most climate-vulnerable countries – including land-locked parts of Africa and small islands – most funding was for adaptation, as the chart below shows.

Among the projects receiving climate-adaptation funds were those supporting sustainable agriculture in Niger, improving disaster resilience in Micronesia and helping those in Somalia who have been internally displaced by “climate change and food crises”.
Methodology
The joint Guardian and Carbon Brief analysis of climate finance includes the bilateral and multilateral public finance that developed countries pledged for climate projects in developing countries. It covers the years 2021 and 2022.
(These “developed” countries are the 23 “Annex II” nations, plus the EU, that are obliged to provide climate finance under the Paris Agreement.)
The analysis excludes other types of funding that contribute to the $100bn climate-finance target for climate projects, such as export credits and private finance “mobilised” by public investments. Where these have been referenced, the figures are OECD estimates. They are excluded from the analysis because export credits are a small fraction of the total, while private finance mobilised cannot be attributed to specific donor countries.
Data for bilateral funding comes from the biennial transparency reports (BTRs) each country submits to the UNFCCC. The lag in official reporting means the most recent figures – published around the end of 2024 and start of 2025 – only go up to 2022.
Many of the bilateral projects recorded by countries do not specify single recipients, but instead mention several countries. These projects have not been included when calculating the amount of finance individual developing countries received, but they are included in the total figures.
The multilateral funding, including projects funded by MDBs and multilateral climate funds, comes from the OECD. Many countries – including developing countries – pay into these institutions, which then use their money to fund climate projects and, in the case of MDBs, raise additional finance from capital markets.
This analysis calculated the shares of the “outflows” from multilateral institutions that can be attributed to developed countries. It adapts the approach used by the OECD to calculate these attributable shares for developed countries as a whole group.
As the OECD does not publish individual donor country shares that make up the total developed-country contribution, this analysis calculated each country’s attributable shares based on shareholdings in MDBs and cumulative contributions to multilateral funds. This was based on a methodology used by analysts at the World Resources Institute and ODI. There were some multilateral funds that could not be assigned using this methodology, which are therefore not captured in each country’s multilateral contribution.
The post Analysis: Seven charts showing how the $100bn climate-finance goal was met appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Analysis: Seven charts showing how the $100bn climate-finance goal was met
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