根据全球能源监测组织(GEM)的最新年度报告,2023年中国煤电建设活动占全球新建煤电活动的95%。
GEM的全球煤电行业年度报告称,中国有70吉瓦(GW)的煤电装机容量破土动工,相较2019年增长了四倍。
相比之下,世界其他地区新开工煤电装机容量不足4吉瓦,是2014年以来的最低水平。
除中国外,只有32个国家有处于拟建阶段的新建煤电项目,只有七个国家有在建电厂。
虽然2023年全球煤电装机容量(包括总装机容量和中国以外地区的装机容量)有所增长,但GEM表示,这很可能只是“昙花一现”,随着未来几年美国和欧洲加速煤炭退役,这一增长将会被抵消。
该报告的其他主要发现包括:全球燃煤电厂——中国以外地区——建设连续第二年下降。然而,全球煤电厂的退役率也处于2011年以来的最低水平。
中国的“关键时刻”
GEM表示,2023年中国有47.4吉瓦的煤电装机容量投产。这一增量占全球在运煤电装机容量增长的三分之二,全球装机容量整体增长了2%,达到2130吉瓦。
2023年,中国有70.2吉瓦的新建项目开工,是世界其他国家,合计3.7吉瓦,的19倍。如下图所示,中国的发展轨迹(红线)与世界其他地区(橙色线)存在显著差异。
中国的新开工装机容量几乎是2019年的四倍,彼时中国的新建燃煤电厂开工量创下了九年来的新低。

这是中国每年开工建设的新燃煤电厂装机容量连续第四年增长。GEM指出,这与中国在2021年提出的“严控”新增煤电产能的承诺不符。
2022年初,中国国家能源局的《“十四五”现代能源体系规划》指出,到2025年将淘汰30吉瓦的煤电产能。
然而,GEM指出,如果算上发电装机容量至少达到30兆瓦(megawatts)的大型煤电机组,过去三年中关停的电厂不到9吉瓦,而且几乎没有其他电厂有退役计划。
GEM补充说,如果中国要实现30吉瓦的退役目标,“就必须立即采取行动”。
能源与清洁空气研究中心(CREA)中国分析师秦琦在一份声明中说:“最近中国煤电开发的激增与全球趋势形成了鲜明对比,使中国2025年的气候目标面临风险。在此关键时刻,中国必须对煤电项目实施更严格的控制,并加快向可再生能源转型,以重新履行其气候承诺。”
根据GEM的报告,中国、印度、孟加拉国、津巴布韦、印度尼西亚、哈萨克斯坦、老挝、土耳其、俄罗斯、巴基斯坦和越南共占全球拟建容量的95%。
该组织发现,剩下的5%分布在21个国家。报告补充称,其中11个国家仅有一个拟建项目,有望实现“无新煤电”这一退煤里程碑。
GEM追踪器显示,2023年,位于中国之外、全新规划的煤电项目装机容量达到20.9吉瓦。其中,印度新规划煤电装机容量达到11.4吉瓦,超过了2016年以来的任何一年。GEM解释说,这在一定程度上是由于该国几个停滞项目的重新启用。
哈萨克斯坦也有4.6吉瓦的新规划项目,印度尼西亚则有2.5吉瓦。另外还有4.1吉瓦之前被暂停或取消、但在去年被重新“规划”的项目。
另有几个国家——俄罗斯、菲律宾、博茨瓦纳和尼日利亚——也在2023年有项目重新规划和开工。
退役速度缓慢
GEM发现,2023年全球共有69.5吉瓦的煤电投产,同时有21.1吉瓦的煤电退役。这使得全球煤电在运装机容量的净增长达到自2016年以来的最高水平,猛增了48.4吉瓦。
此外,印度尼西亚(5.9吉瓦)、印度(5.5吉瓦)、越南(2.6吉瓦)、日本(2.5吉瓦)、孟加拉国(1.9吉瓦)、巴基斯坦(1.7吉瓦)、韩国(1吉瓦)、希腊(0.7吉瓦)和津巴布韦(0.3吉瓦)也有新增装机容量投产。
该组织发现,在2023年间,中国境外总共有22.1吉瓦装机容量投产,17.4吉瓦退役。这使得在中国以外运营的全球煤电机组净增加了4.7吉瓦。2023年,全球煤电装机容量达到2130吉瓦,比上年增长2%。
GEM表示,美国贡献了近一半的退役煤电机组装机容量,2023年有9.7吉瓦被关闭。不过,与2022年的14.7吉瓦和2015年的21.7吉瓦的峰值相比,退役量有所下降。
在其他地区,欧盟和英国的煤电机组退役量接近四分之一,其中英国有3.1吉瓦退役,意大利有0.6吉瓦退役,波兰有0.5吉瓦退役。目前,英国只有一家燃煤电厂在运营,这个位于索尔河畔拉特克利夫(Ratcliffe-on-Soar)的电厂计划于2024年9月关闭。
总体而言,全球退役的煤电装机容量处于2011年以来的最低水平,如下图所示。

GEM指出,中国以外地区新开工建设的煤电项目规模连续第二年下降,创下(该机构)自2015年收集数据以来的最低水平。
2023年,中国以外地区新开工建设的项目不到4吉瓦,远低于2015年至2022年16吉瓦的平均水平。仅有七个国家有新项目破土动工,其中印度、老挝、尼日利亚、巴基斯坦和俄罗斯各有一座电厂,印度尼西亚有三座电厂。
GEM表示,自2016年以来,拉丁美洲没有任何燃煤电厂开工建设,经济合作与发展组织(OECD)、欧洲或中东国家自2019年以来也没有任何燃煤电厂破土动工。
报告称,尼日利亚乌格博巴(Ugboba)发电站是自2019年以来非洲已知的首个煤电建设项目,该发电站位于三角洲州阿尼奥查北地区的伊多乌法洛拉煤矿(Idowu Falola Coal Mines)矿口。
七国集团(G7)目前占全球在运煤电装机容量的15%(310吉瓦),低于2015年的32%(443吉瓦)。该集团成员国已没有任何在建煤电项目。不过,日本和美国仍分别有一个和两个新煤电项目提案。
美国的两个新煤电项目提案,即宾夕法尼亚州0.4吉瓦的CONSOL项目和阿拉斯加州新宣布的0.4吉瓦的苏西特纳(Susitna)电站,预计都将采用碳捕集与封存技术(CCS)。
GEM表示,这些技术“具有很强的不确定性。相比退煤的迫切需求,它们是一个昂贵的转移注意力的方式”。
二十国集团(G20)拥有全球92%的在运煤电装机容量(1968吉瓦),其拟建的煤电装机容量总和占全球总量的88%(336吉瓦)。
现任G20轮值主席国巴西的拟建装机容量在2023年下降,但仍有两个正在推进的项目,它们也是拉丁美洲最后的拟建煤电项目。
“无新煤电”国家
GEM追踪器显示,总体而言,2023年的全球煤电装机容量达到了历史新高。
如下图所示,由于2023年退役的煤电装机容量为十多年来最低,中国以外的在运煤电装机容量自2019年以来首次出现增长。

自2015年以来,全球在运的煤电装机容量增长了11%。当年,《巴黎协定》使各国政府同意将全球平均温度保持在工业化前水平以上低于2℃之内,并将气温上升限制在工业化前水平以上1.5°C以内。
中国以外,正在建设的煤电装机总量达到113吉瓦。GEM表示,尽管这一数字仅比上一年的110吉瓦略有上升,但仍凸显出煤炭行业不符合国际能源署(IEA)对如何把气候控制在1.5°C以内情景的预测。
在IEA做出的所有符合国际气候目标的情景中,全球炭排放量都应在迅速下降。
GEM报告称,2023年全球拟建装机容量增长了6%,“这明确了呼吁停止规划和开工建设煤电厂的重要性”。
报告还补充称,目前在运的煤电装机容量中,只有15%(317吉瓦)承诺将按照《巴黎协定》的目标退役。
GEM指出,根据国际能源署提出的1.5°C路径,如果要在2040年前淘汰未减排的燃煤发电量,就需要在未来17年内平均每年淘汰126吉瓦的煤电装机容量。这相当于每周淘汰两座煤电厂。
GEM表示,如果把拟建和在建的578吉瓦项目计算在内,则需要更大幅度的削减。
有12个新国家加入了“助力淘汰煤炭联盟”(Powering Past coal Alliance),承诺在2023年不再开发新的煤电项目。GEM指出,总共有101个国家或已正式作出了“无新煤电”的承诺,或已在过去十年里放弃了任何新煤电建造。
GEM发现,自2015年以来,全球拟建装机容量减少了68%。目前,除中国外,新开工项目处于该数据开始收集以来的最低水平。
GEM的报告认为,新煤电建设提议的“最后阵地”是利用碳捕集与封存技术、以及将煤电用于工业活动。(碳捕集与封存技术,CCS,可减少燃煤产生的温室气体进入大气)
例如,津巴布韦在2023年规划了1.9吉瓦的新建煤电装机容量,其包括两个项目“声望”(Prestige)发电站和格韦鲁(Gweru)发电站,旨在为铬冶炼厂提供电力。
除中国和印度外,津巴布韦是去年新增总规划装机容量的六个国家之一,其他国家包括哈萨克斯坦、吉尔吉斯斯坦、俄罗斯、美国和菲律宾。
在COP28气候峰会上,130国签署了《全球可再生能源和能源效率承诺》,表示有意在2030年前逐步淘汰未减排的煤电,并停止投资未减排的新建燃煤电厂。
此外,COP28的最终“全球盘点”(Global Stocktake)协议重申了COP26大会关于逐步减少未减排的煤电的承诺,但仍未定义“未减排”(Unabated)的含义。此外,早期草案中关于停止核准新煤电项目的措辞在最终文本中被省略。
GEM报告指出:“煤电正处于悬崖边缘,面临着政治和民间的反对,经济上也越来越缺乏竞争力。”
GEM煤炭项目主任弗洛拉·尚普努瓦(Flora Champenois)在一份声明中说:“今年煤炭的变化趋势反常,因为所有迹象都表明,煤炭将从加速扩张的趋势中逆转。但是,那些要淘汰燃煤电厂的国家需要加快步伐,而那些计划新建燃煤电厂的国家必须确保这些电厂永远不会建成。否则,我们就别想实现《巴黎协定》的目标,也别想享有迅速过渡到清洁能源所带来的好处。”
The post 报告: 2023年中国新建煤电项目占全球的95% appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Climate Change
Germany election 2025: What the manifestos say on energy and climate change
A federal election is taking place in Germany on 23 February, following the collapse of the coalition government at the end of last year.
Germans will vote to elect 630 members of the nation’s parliament.
Polling suggests there will be a political shift to the right, with the centre-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) in the lead and far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) set to make significant gains.
A “traffic light” coalition of parties has ruled since 2021, led by the centre-left Social Democratic Party (SPD), alongside the Green Party and the Free Democratic Party (FDP).
However, successive crises led to its breakup at the end of 2024, when the liberal, free market-oriented FDP split from the rest.
This prompted a vote of no confidence by the German parliament, which, in turn, triggered a snap election several months earlier than previously scheduled.
The coalition government has been plagued by ideological differences, particularly between the FDP and its two centre-left partners.
Climate policies were at the heart of many of the disputes.
The centre-left SPD and Greens have broadly favoured more public spending on climate issues, while the FDP is opposed to state intervention of any sort.
In the interactive grid below, Carbon Brief tracks the commitments made by each of the main parties in their election manifestos, across a range of issues related to climate and energy.
The parties covered are:
- Christian Democratic Union (CDU)/Christian Social Union (CSU): The centre-right CDU and its regional Bavarian “sister party”, CSU, has been the dominant political force in modern Germany and is currently polling highest ahead of the election.
- Social Democratic Party (SPD): The centre-left SPD has led the ruling coalition in Germany since the last election in 2021 and has traditionally been the other dominant party in the nation’s politics.
- Green Party: The centre-left and environmentalist Greens have been part of the coalition government since 2021.
- Free Democratic Party (FDP): The FDP is an economically liberal party that prioritises free markets and privatisation. It was part of the coalition government, but its departure at the end of 2024 ultimately triggered the federal election.
- Left Party: In recent years, this left-wing, democratic-socialist party has lost much of its support base in the east of the country.
- Alternative for Germany (AfD): The far-right party has become a major force in the country’s politics over the past decade, particularly in eastern Germany.
- Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW): The party was only founded last year, as an offshoot of the Left Party, but it has rapidly risen in popularity with a left-wing economic message and a conservative approach to some social and cultural issues.
Each entry in the grid represents a direct quote from a manifesto document.
Net-zero and climate framing
Climate action has become a divisive topic in German politics.
This is evident in the major parties’ manifestos, which range from supporting more ambitious net-zero goals to outright climate scepticism.
Germany is currently aiming to reach net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2045, with interim targets including a 65% cut by 2030.
Government climate advisors on the Council of Experts on Climate Change have stated that the nation is on track to miss the 2030 target.
Despite starting out with ambitious aims, the coalition’s climate progress has faltered, with the FDP successfully pushing for weaker climate policies. Moreover, a major court ruling curtailed the government’s climate spending by enforcing Germany’s limit on debt.
Amid these wider tensions, Germany’s two traditionally dominant parties still want to retain the nation’s headline climate target. The CDU, which is leading the polls in the run-up to election day, commits to meeting the Paris Agreement goals in its manifesto, saying its sights are “firmly set” on net-zero by 2045.
The SPD, which is currently third in the polls and likely to end up in coalition with the CDU, also supports the 2045 net-zero target, as well as the interim goals.
However, the two parties differ substantially in their approach to meeting the 2045 target. The CDU prioritises carbon pricing and rejects the tougher policies to decarbonise heating and transport favoured by the SPD. (See: Heating dispute and Combustion engine phaseout.)
Meanwhile, the AfD manifesto repeatedly questions the “supposed scientific consensus” on “man-made climate change”. The party, which is currently second in the polls, “therefore rejects every policy and every tax that is related to alleged climate protection”.
Mainstream German parties across the spectrum have long agreed to a “firewall” against far-right groups, meaning they will not form coalitions with the AfD. However, the CDU recently sparked controversy when it backed an anti-immigration policy with the AfD.
The Green Party also supports the 2045 net-zero target in its manifesto, emphasising Germany’s status as the EU member state with the highest emissions. The Left Party goes further, calling for a 2040 net-zero goal.
As for the FDP, its manifesto argues for the 2045 net-zero goal to be pushed back to 2050, stating that this would align Germany with the EU target. Prior to exiting the coalition government last year, the party had demanded this policy change, claiming that it would be a way to boost the German economy.
(Germany already revised its net-zero target, bringing it forward by five years, following a supreme court ruling in 2021 that its 2050 goal was insufficient. Moreover, even with a later goal, Germany would still need to align with wider EU targets, meaning its climate policies may not change much due to its “effort sharing” obligations.)
Finally, the BSW is not specific about when the net-zero goal should be achieved, but pushes for a “departure from the wishful thinking of quickly achieving complete climate neutrality”.
It does not reject climate policies outright, stating that climate change should be “taken seriously”. However, it frames many climate policies as being “extremely expensive and often unrealistic”.
Heating dispute
Home heating has become a major political issue in Germany. Along with transport, buildings make up one of the key German sectors that have repeatedly missed their decarbonisation goals, prompting the coalition government to take action.
Towards the end of 2023, the German parliament passed an amendment to the Building Energy Act, meaning that newly installed heating systems had to be powered by at least 65% renewable energy.
This covered heat pumps, “hydrogen-ready” gas boilers and other low-carbon systems. There are caveats to ensure the law is phased in gradually in different areas and types of homes, starting with new builds.
The amendment had been watered down compared to the coalition’s initial proposal, with allowances for people to keep gas boilers for longer. This followed relentless campaigning by the AfD and the right-leaning tabloid newspaper Bild, which dubbed the policy the “heizhammer” – or “heating hammer”.
There were also attacks from within the coalition, with the FDP criticising the law proposed by its partners in the Greens and SDP. Opponents framed the policy as an excessive burden on consumers.
These disputes are reflected in the election manifestos, with many parties outright rejecting the amended law. The CDU, FDP and AfD all say they would abolish it, as does the populist left BSW.
Meanwhile, the Green Party pledges to provide more government support for the installation of new heating systems by covering up to 70% of the price. The Left Party commits to covering 100% of the cost for low-income households.
(The current law covers 30% of the cost as a starting subsidy, with more available for low-income households and people who replace their boilers before 2028.)
Combustion engine phaseout
Several German political parties are pushing back against the EU-wide ban on the sale of new petrol and diesel cars, which is set to come into effect in 2035.
The CDU says the “ban on combustion engines must be reversed”, while the AfD says the “one-sided preference for electromobility must be stopped immediately”.
(EVs are “likely crucial” for tackling transport emissions, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC].)
The FDP and the BSW also argue that the 2035 phaseout date should be dropped, with less focus on the transition to electric cars. (This is in spite of Germany being the second-biggest manufacturer of electric cars in the world.)
These parties also favour getting rid of supposed “anti-car” policies. For example, they oppose speed limits on the German “autobahns” and support funding for alternative fuels, such as synthetic fuels.
The issue with ending the 2035 ban on new combustion-engine cars is that this policy is set at the EU level. Far-right and centre-right coalitions within the EU, including German parties, have been pushing hard to weaken the ban across the bloc.
However, the centre-left parties that may end up forming a coalition with the CDU, notably the SPD, stand by the 2035 phaseout date.
There is growing pressure on Germany’s car industry, linked to global competition and slow economic growth. Some German industry figures have stressed the need for consistent policy signals from the government, regarding the transition to electric vehicles.
Clean energy and fossil fuels
Broadly speaking, German parties on the left tend to be more supportive of renewables, while strongly opposing nuclear power. Those on the right are generally more open to nuclear and in some cases coal power.
Germany, which uses more coal than any other EU member state, has a coal power phaseout date of 2038. This is supported by the CDU and the FDP, but the Greens and the Left Party want a quicker phaseout by 2030.
(When the coalition government formed in 2021, the parties agreed to “ideally” move the coal phaseout date to 2030, but this has not happened formally. The SPD manifesto does not include any mention of coal power,)
Only the AfD advocates for the construction of new coal power plants, framing them as filling a gap until new nuclear plants are built.
Last year, Germany closed down its final nuclear reactors, bringing an end to a long-term plan to phase out the power source. However, nuclear power continues to be a politicised topic, with some arguing that its continued use is necessary to ensure the nation’s energy security.
Notably, the CDU suggests in its manifesto that it is open to reviving nuclear power in the future. It proposes an “expert review” around restarting closed plants and advocates for research on advanced nuclear technologies, such as small modular reactors.
Despite this wording, CDU leader Friedrich Merz has conceded that it is unlikely any old reactors will be restarted. This echoes views expressed by German utility companies and energy experts.
Both the CDU and the SPD support the expansion of renewables in their manifestos. The Greens include a specific target to achieve a net-zero electricity grid by 2035. By contrast, the AfD calls for an end to wind power expansion, in favour of other technologies.
Finally, both the far-right AfD and the BSW say the German government should repair the damaged Nord Stream pipelines in order to import what the BSW refers to as “cheap” gas from Russia. (The Baltic Sea pipelines were blown up in 2022 under mysterious circumstances.)
Germany has tried to wean itself off Russian gas since the country’s invasion of Ukraine, with considerable success. However, both the AfD and the BSW are more open to cooperating with Russia, and less supportive of Ukraine, than mainstream German parties.
The post Germany election 2025: What the manifestos say on energy and climate change appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Germany election 2025: What the manifestos say on energy and climate change
Climate Change
Guest post: How atmospheric rivers are bringing rain to West Antarctica
“Atmospheric rivers” are bringing rain to the frozen slopes of the West Antarctic ice sheet, hitting the ice shelves that play a major role in holding back rapidly retreating glaciers.
In a new study, my colleagues and I show how rain is occurring in sub-zero temperatures due to these “rivers in the sky” – long, narrow plumes of air which transport heat and moisture from the tropics to the mid-latitudes and poles.
Rain in Antarctica is significant, not only because it is a stark indicator of climate change, but because it remains an under-studied phenomenon which could impact ice shelves.
Ice shelves in Antarctica are important gatekeepers of sea level rise.
They act as a buffer for glaciers that flow off the vast ice sheet, slowing the rate at which ice is released into the ocean.
In the study, we explore the causes of rain falling on ice shelves in the Amundsen Sea embayment region, which stand in front of the critically important Thwaites and Pine Island glaciers.
Researchers have warned the collapse of ice shelves in this region could trigger the loss of the entire West Antarctic ice sheet over several centuries.
Rivers in the sky
Atmospheric rivers are typically associated with bringing extreme rainfall to the mid-latitudes, but, in the frigid Antarctic, they can deliver metres of snow in just a few days.
In West Antarctica, atmospheric rivers deliver a disproportionate quantity of the year’s snowfall. Research shows they account for around 13% of annual snowfall totals, despite occurring on just a few days per year.
But what makes atmospheric rivers in Antarctica so interesting is that snow is only part of the story. In extreme cases, they can also bring rain.
To explore how extreme precipitation affects the Amundsen Sea embayment region, we focused on two events associated with atmospheric rivers in 2020. The summer case took place over a week in February and the winter case over six days in June.
We used three regional climate models to simulate the two extreme weather events around the Thwaites and Pine Island ice shelves, then compared the results with snowfall observations.
During both the winter and summer cases, we find that atmospheric rivers dumped tens of metres of snow over the course of a week or so.
Meanwhile, the quantities of rain driven by these events were not insignificant. We observed up to 30mm of rain on parts of the Thwaites ice shelf in summer and up to 9mm in winter.

A mountain to climb
Antarctica’s cold climate and steep, icy topography make it unique. It also makes the region prone to rain in sub-zero temperatures.
The first reason for this is the foehn effect, which is when air forced over a mountain range warms as it descends on the downward slope.
Commonly observed across Antarctica, it is an important cause of melting over ice shelves on the Antarctic peninsula, the northernmost point of the continent.
When air passes over the mountainous terrain of the West Antarctic ice sheet during atmospheric river events, temperatures near the surface of the ice shelves can climb above the melting point of 0C.
This can accentuate the formation of rain and drizzle that stays liquid below 0C – also known as “supercooled drizzle”.
Another factor which leads to liquid drizzle, rather than snow, in sub-zero conditions is a lack of dust and dirt – particles which are usually needed to trigger the formation of ice crystals in clouds.
In the pristine Antarctic, these particles – which act as “ice nuclei” – are few and far between. That means that pure liquid water can exist even when temperatures are below 0C.
The origins of rain over ice shelves
It is easy to assume that rain that reaches the surface in Antarctica is just snow that has melted after falling through a warm layer of air caused by the foehn effect. Indeed, this is what we initially supposed.
But our research shows that more rain reaches the surface of Antarctica when the air near the ground is within a few degrees of freezing.
At times when the foehn effect is strongest, there is often little or no rainfall, because it evaporates before it gets a chance to reach the surface.
However, we saw rain falling well above the warm layer of air near the surface, where temperatures were universally below 0C – and, in some cases, as low as -11C.
Rare rain
Rain in Antarctica is a rare occurrence. The region’s normally frigid temperatures mean that most precipitation over the continent falls as snow.
However, exactly how rare rain is in the region remains relatively unknown, because there are virtually zero measurements of rainfall in Antarctica.
There are a number of reasons for this – rain falls infrequently, and it is very difficult to measure in the hostile Antarctic environment.
Our results show that extreme events such as atmospheric rivers can bring rain. And it is likely that rain will become a more common occurrence in the future as temperatures rise and extreme weather events occur more frequently.
However, until rain starts being measured in Antarctica, scientists will have to rely entirely on models to predict rain, as we did in this research.
It is also not yet known exactly how rain could impact ice in Antarctica.
We do know that rain falling on snow darkens the surface, which can enhance melting, leading to greater ice losses. Meanwhile, rain that refreezes in the snowpack or trickles to the base of the ice can change the way that glaciers flow, impacting the resilience of ice shelves to fracture.
So, if we want to understand the future of the frozen continent, we need to start thinking about rain too. Because while rain may be rare now, it may not be for long.
The post Guest post: How atmospheric rivers are bringing rain to West Antarctica appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Guest post: How atmospheric rivers are bringing rain to West Antarctica
Climate Change
Colombia’s COP16 presidency in suspense as minister resigns
Susana Muhamad, Colombia’s minister of environment since 2022 and president of the COP16 UN biodiversity negotiations, has announced she will step down from government, but has asked President Gustavo Petro to let her stay in her post to conclude the UN nature talks later in February.
In her resignation letter, addressed to the president and dated February 8, Muhamad said she was quitting as a minister but urged him to consider “the need to conclude COP16” – the summit left unfinished in Colombia last year and now scheduled to resume from February 25 to 27 in Rome.
“I’ve led the complex negotiations in progress and I exercise the role of president (of the COP). Therefore, if you so decide, this resignation could be made effective from March 3,” the letter reads.
Buenos días, para clarificar cualquier malentendido, presento renuncia irrevocable al cargo de Ministra de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible. Por lo tanto, publico la carta que radiqué en el DAPRE el 8 de febrero, que es una carta motivada, no protocolaria. pic.twitter.com/71quT3CEdJ
— Susana Muhamad (@susanamuhamad) February 10, 2025
Muhamad has been one of the most vocal opponents of the recent appointment of former senator Armando Benedetti as Petro’s chief of staff. Benedetti has faced allegations of domestic abuse and corruption, and was previously fired as ambassador to Venezuela by Petro himself.
In a televised session of the council of ministers held last week, Muhamad heavily opposed Benedetti’s appointment and threatened to resign if he remained in the cabinet. “As a feminist and as a woman, I cannot sit at this table of our progressive project with Armando Benedetti,” she told Petro.
According to Oscar Soria, veteran biodiversity campaigner and CEO of think-tank The Common Initiative, the Colombian government is likely to keep Muhamad as COP president, but her resignation could have a negative impact on the talks.
“To have a good result in Rome, proactive and energetic diplomatic work by the presidency was needed in the last months. However, some key issues have not been discussed recently. The internal political crisis (in Colombia) has likely been a great distraction,” Soria told Climate Home.
Since Muhamad’s announcement, several other ministers have also resigned, leading Petro to place all of his cabinet on hold and asking for “protocolary resignations” from every member.
“It’s not clear how much support from the president and ministers (Muhamad) can count on when her counterparts from other countries need to be approached by the Colombian foreign service,” Soria added.
Upcoming nature talks
The COP16 biodiversity negotiations are set to resume later this month, with important decisions coming up on finance for nature and a monitoring framework to track progress on nature restoration. These decisions were left pending after negotiators ran out of time in Cali, Colombia, last year.
One of the most pressing issues is the future of the Global Biodiversity Framework Fund (GBFF), which currently sits under the Global Environment Facility (GEF) until 2030. Some developing countries have called for the creation of a new fund, citing barriers at the GEF to access the funds.
Observers said COP16 could play an important role in the future of biodiversity finance, especially as the new US president, Donald Trump, cuts development funding for climate and nature projects.
“In Rome, countries must give a firm response to the measures and visions promoted by the Trump administration, reaffirming [their] commitment to protecting biodiversity,” said Karla Maas, campaigner at Climate Action Network (CAN) Latin America.
“This implies guaranteeing public resources for conservation instead of depending on the will of private actors or philanthropy,” Maas added.
(Reporting by Sebastian Rodriguez; editing by Megan Rowling)
The post Colombia’s COP16 presidency in suspense as minister resigns appeared first on Climate Home News.
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