Published

1 year ago

February 5, 2025

Alice Rush

At COP29 in Baku, Carbon Brief spoke with Prof Wang Can, director of the department of environmental planning and management at Tsinghua University, to discuss its new study on global carbon neutrality progress.

Tsinghua University is located in Beijing and publishes some of the country’s most prominent climate research, which is often used to inform related policymaking.

The study, published by the university’s Institute for Carbon Neutrality and School of Environment, evaluates different countries’ progress on “[climate and carbon] targets, technology, finance and international cooperation”.

It also identifies “implementation gaps between carbon neutrality targets and emission reduction outcomes”.

In this wide-ranging interview, Wang introduces the institute’s findings and identifies key barriers for the world to reach net-zero emissions.

He also shares reflections on the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), China’s upcoming 2035 climate pledge (NDC), its carbon market, “dual control of carbon” policy, the 14th “five-year plan”, carbon “peaking” timeline, electrification, energy storage and hydrogen.

The interview is transcribed in full below, following a summary of key quotes. The transcript has been edited for length and clarity.

On the need to implement climate pledges: “We follow the idea of looking at actions rather than declarations.”
On developing countries’ commitment to climate action: “The determination and the sense of urgency from developing countries in dealing with climate change is very strong. [This is] because they are more vulnerable and more affected by climate change, so they are more active.”
On China’s 2035 climate pledge (NDC): “The main update will be to benchmark our target against the timeline in the [UN] convention, such as extending our goals through to 2035.”
On global renewable deployment: “[Global renewable energy] has grown very fast, but if we want to implement the 2030 [tripling target for renewable capacity], it must grow faster.”
On barriers to tripling renewables: “[Renewable energy] could have been deployed faster…but one of the important factors for why it hasn’t is recent trade barriers…[We found that countries] including the US have such policies.”
On the EU’s CBAM: “We think that the EU’s CBAM is positive for the EU, because it added to its carbon emissions regulations. It is considered to have improved the EU’s domestic policies. However, it is negative for international cooperation, because it is a unilateral policy.”
On different pathways to net-zero: “[Some] other countries have already decoupled [the growth of emissions and the economy]. After seeing their economic growth does not require an increase in carbon emissions, [they] then announced carbon peak and carbon neutrality [goals]. China has not yet achieved this, so I think this is also a distinguishing feature and it is representative for developing countries.”

On China’s carbon market: “I think progress in this area will become faster…A total amount [of emissions reduction] has been set first and then the carbon market can help achieve the total amount target at a low cost.”
On missing China’s 2025 energy intensity goal: “The individual targets, ultimately, serve China’s broader climate action, so we are not obsessed with whether this goal is achieved or not.”
On China’s emissions peaking early: “I personally would not rule out that there could be a rebound or emissions increase at a certain point, such as 2024 or 2025…Overall, [judging from] recent developments and trends…we are in a stage close to reaching the peak, or similarly a plateau period. I think I agree with this judgment.”
On China’s electrification: “Electrification is not in a competitive relationship with renewable energy, but a complement – they support each other…In the process of building such a new energy and renewable energy-dominated power system, electrification at the end-use is very helpful.”
On the need for energy-storage systems: “Energy storage is an indispensable component in the construction of the new energy system, whose main component is renewable energy.”
On hydrogen: “There are many problems now, such as high costs, difficulty in storing and transporting and, in the long run, these need to be solved. We must work hard to solve them, because without it, the future system and the path for carbon neutrality may fail.”

Carbon Brief: What’s the most important finding of your research?

Wang Can: We tracked the progress [of countries’ carbon neutrality efforts] from the perspective of implementation. We paid more attention to actions and used scientific methods to evaluate them. Carbon goals are set for decades in the future – if we simply look at the goals, it is difficult to evaluate whether our current actions are sufficient, so a scientific and systematic method is needed to evaluate them. We think actions are important, and the method of evaluating action is also important.

CB: Your report found developing countries have a higher “ambition index” while developed countries have a lower ambition index. What does “ambition index” mean here?

WC: When we talk about ambition index or use index to express what I said earlier, we follow the idea of looking at actions rather than declarations. Hence we revise countries’ ambition indexes. For example, a country might advertise that it wants to achieve carbon neutrality as soon as possible, but take the action of setting up various barriers to hinder the flow of technology and hinder global cooperation. [Therefore,] it may be very ambitious in terms of goals, but its actions have negative effects. Our index will take these into account and, after considering these factors, assign a score. As of last year, some developing countries have scored higher, while some developed countries have relatively lower ambition indexes.

CB: So you mean you check goals of countries announced in their NDCs and give positive or negative points for their climate actions, and then calculate a score for their ambition index?

WC: Yes.

CB: Were you surprised by the results?

WC: I am not surprised, because I have been involved in the negotiation of the [UN] climate convention for more than ten years. From the negotiation process, we can feel that the determination and the sense of urgency from developing countries in dealing with climate change is very strong. [This is] because they are more vulnerable and more affected by climate change, so they are more active. Although developed countries have the ability and technology, and their scientists have more systematic and scientific knowledge in this regard, they are not as persistent as developing countries like China. Once [China] announced [its climate] goal, it systematically and continuously progresses. [Developed countries did not do the same] due to considerations for economy and international trade competition.

CB: The west is particularly interested in China’s 2035 NDC. What new climate goal do you think China would propose or what should be written in the next NDC?

WC: I think the next NDC will still be in line with our “dual carbon” policy [of peaking emissions before 2030 and reaching carbon neutrality before 2060]. The main update will be to benchmark our target against the timeline in the [UN] convention, such as extending our goals through to 2035. We already have a target for what we should achieve by 2030, and [the next NDC instead prompts] a new round of what we should achieve by 2035. Different stages have different tasks, but they both are under the same overall framework. China has already [announced] its “dual carbon’” goals, [set] two time points [of 2030 and 2060], and [established] the “1+N” policy system. I think [the NDC] is nothing more than specifying tasks for from 2030 to 2035 under such a system. This is my personal understanding and expectation.

CB: Your report said that the current speed of renewable energy development globally is insufficient to meet COP28’s tripling target for 2030 and there is a “large gap” in the deployment scale required to meet climate targets. What are the main factors holding back faster growth?

WC: I’m not sure if your question is completely consistent with the point we want to express in the report. My understanding of what we said in the report is that although we have seen rapid development of renewable energy, and it is very optimistic in recent years, there is still a gap compared to the requirements of tripling global renewable power capacity by 2030 and the global net-zero target by 2050.

[Global renewable energy] has grown very fast, but if we want to implement the 2030 [tripping target for renewable capacity], it must grow faster, especially from a global perspective. Now there are a few countries, such as China and Indonesia in south-east Asia, that have deployed [renewable energy] very quickly in the past one or two years, but globally we have not seen the speed we expected. This is what we want to convey at the core, or what we especially want to convey.

The reason behind this is that we believe that [renewable energy] technology has developed to a stage, from our research, that it could have been deployed faster. After it is deployed faster and more widely [in the future], the speed of progress of this technology will accelerate, and it will enter a positive cycle. This could have happened, but one of the important factors for why it hasn’t is recent trade barriers, and the extension of trade barriers from [targeting] originally high-tech and communications products to [also targeting] renewable energy that addresses climate change.

This type of trade barrier is a typical practice, based on traditional and very narrow economic interests. It may have ignored the fact, which actually comes from western international trade theory, that free international trade can promote economic development, technological progress, and thus bring a new round of win-win situation. Short-sighted behavior ignores [this]. In the field of renewable energy, the medium- and long-term economic benefits, as well as a firm commitment to climate change, have both been given up [by western countries]. So this, in our view, is a problem facing the development of renewable energy that needs to be solved.

CB: Can you please give an example of the trade barrier you mentioned?

WC: Increased tariffs, for instance – imposing [high] tariffs on renewable energy equipment imports, and the intentional imposition of such tariffs. This example is what we referenced in our country analysis. [We found that countries] including the US have such policies. Our report set a framework in which we checked whether there are trade barrier policies in place, whether [such policies] are enforced, and then, if they are, we look at whether they targeted green and low-carbon technology that we need for cutting emissions. If so, we then gave different weights and negative scores.

CB: What is the trade barrier or barriers that bring the worst impacts currently?

WC: The import controls on wind and solar, adding tariffs on them, or commerce control lists of this kind.

CB: Mainly in the US?

WC: Mainly in the US.

CB: What do you think about the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM)?

WC: In our evaluation, we think that the EU’s CBAM is positive for the EU, because it added to its carbon emissions regulations. It is considered to have improved the EU’s domestic policies. However, it is negative for international cooperation, because it is a unilateral policy, and its impact may hinder the flow of technology mentioned earlier, the rapid diffusion of technology and the rapid deployment of advanced technology around the world.

Of course, we have to look further and look at it in more detail, because the scope of the industry that CBAM covers will change in the years ahead. At present, from the perspective of international cooperation, its negative weight is not high. From the perspective of execution, although it mainly covers electricity and hydrogen energy [as well as other industries], its scope is not very large at present.

CB: Your report says that there is no “single zero-carbon pathway” that would be universally applicable for all. Instead, it says “differentiated measures are needed for different types of countries”. What’s the best pathway for China to reach carbon neutrality and how does that differ to others?

WC: Yes, what we want to say is that there is no single model that is suitable for all countries to achieve net-zero. Different countries are at different stages of development, their economic structures are different, their resources are different, and even their institutional political structure as well as cultural characteristics are different, so the paths to achieve net-zero will definitely be different. Countries do have differences in policies, [climate] targets, technologies, funds, and international cooperation methods – what we just discussed – [so] we think that different countries should have different models.

For China, “dual carbon” is a policy goal with Chinese characteristics. We need to reach carbon peak before 2030 and achieve neutrality before 2060. The carbon peak before 2030 means that we still need time to decouple economic development from carbon emissions. If we don’t reach the peak, it means that we haven’t decoupled these things yet. Economic growth [still leads to] an increase in carbon emissions. Why is that? Because we are still a developing country, and the largest developing country – the developing country with the most industry in the world. Our manufacturing industry is relatively large, our population is large, and we are still in the process of urbanisation and industrialisation. Carbon emissions and economic development have not yet been completely decoupled. Even in such a situation, we have proposed the goal of achieving carbon neutrality, which further reflects our ambition and determination.

[Some] other countries have already decoupled [the growth of emissions and the economy]. After seeing their economic growth does not require an increase in carbon emissions, [they] then announced carbon peak and carbon neutrality [goals]. China has not yet achieved this, so I think this is also a distinguishing feature, and it is representative for developing countries. Many developing countries are similar to us. They have not achieved decoupling, but want to specify response to climate change and achieve the two goals [of carbon peak and neutrality]. To reach net-zero globally by the middle of this century, developing countries introduced some targets and paths.

So what is the path? Achieve neutrality after peaking. First, there is a stage of rapid peaking, and to peak as low as possible. In this stage, technical support, financial support, and even some capacity buildings are needed. For example, China is building a carbon market as a policy tool. Currently it is still in the stage of capacity building – collecting carbon emission data, [improving] professional trading capabilities of the market, and so on. This stage is very important for China. If the foundation is not laid solid at this stage, then after reaching the peak, the stage of carbon reduction and achieving carbon neutrality may take a relatively long time, making it more difficult for us to achieve carbon neutrality.

CB: Speaking of China’s carbon market, in our previous Carbon Brief reports, some analysts said that it is not fully active yet, and that trade may have not achieved its maximum potential. How can we maximise the potential of the carbon market?

WC: I think progress in this area will become faster. Because this year [2024], the State Council issued a work plan for the transition from “dual control of energy” consumption to “dual control of carbon”, and clarified a timetable [for this]. From now to 2030, the main mechanism is controlling carbon intensity [the emissions per unit of GDP], with total control [in tonnes of carbon emissions] as a secondary mechanism. But at the same time, [developing] some total control mechanisms should be explored. After China’s carbon emissions peak in 2030, total control [in tonnes of CO2] will be the main mechanism [of controlling carbon emissions], supplemented by [carbon] intensity control.

As long as there is a total control target, the carbon trading and carbon market system can play a role in lowering emissions. Because a policy tool such as carbon trading essentially aims to achieve a certain set target for total emissions at a low cost. A target for total emissions control only gives an amount [to reach], but whether this target is allocated to emitting entities efficiently or not isn’t something the government has enough information to determine. Through carbon trading and carbon markets, emission reductions can be achieved at the lowest cost. So to answer your question directly, when a total amount [of emissions reduction] has been set first and then the carbon market can help achieve the total amount target at a low cost.

CB: You mentioned the transfer from “dual control of energy” to “dual control of carbon emissions”. There are suggestions that China’s total emission intensity target could be missed because this year’s GDP growth is slower than emissions rates. Do you think this has a big impact?

WC: What impact are you referring to?

CB: The 14th “five-year plan”. The 14th five-year plan has set a total energy intensity reduction goal but it could be missed because economic growth is slower than energy consumption.

WC: The energy intensity goal, yes.

CB: Do you think this will slow down the entire emission reduction process [planned in the 14th “five-year plan”]?

WC: I think this [energy intensity] goal is to serve the broader goal of emissions reduction, so whether it was achievable or not may have been a factor that was considered when the goal was originally set. For example, when the goal was set around 2020, it did not take into account the economic form and technological changes of recent years. In fact, there is another goal corresponding to this goal, which is the total amount of renewable energy [for 1,200GW of wind and solar capacity by 2030]…[which was] achieved very quickly. So we set some goals that are easy to achieve and some goals that may be more difficult to achieve than expected. I think I should go back to my previous point that the individual targets, ultimately, serve China’s broader climate action, so we are not obsessed with whether this goal is achieved or not.

From the perspective of promoting “dual carbon” work in recent years, China has made great progress in the construction of its [climate] policies, reducing the cost of developing renewable energy technologies, and [increasing] the pace of deploying [them]. From the central government to the provincial government and then to the city-level government, there is a top-down push for capacity building and promotion of [the government’s] ecological work around raising public awareness and collecting data, such as the building blocks for baseline data, including exploring the integration of carbon assessments into environmental impact assessments. These are also the views expressed in our report on global progress on carbon neutrality. From this perspective, we think that China’s work over the past three years – since general secretary Xi Jinping announced the “dual-carbon” goals – has been on the right track, helping us achieve carbon peak before 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060.

We are doing solid ground work. It’s not a slogan or “campaign-style” work that could lead to [short-term] reductions that later rebound. If we want to reduce them sustainably, a systematic change in the economy and society is needed. This systematic change must come from the perspectives just mentioned, and we must do some ground work. [The changes brought about by] some work may not be fast in the short term, as [emissions] are still in a climbing stage, and the total amount [of emissions] has not been completely reduced. But this is what we are doing in the short term to prepare for the long term, and the short term is a stage that we can’t avoid.

CB: We previously published an analysis that China may have already achieved carbon peak in 2023, based on data. What do you think about this research finding?

WC: I think predicting a peak is not a scientific approach. So far, I have not seen any indicators or studies that can predict a country has reached a peak. It is something that must be judged by time, and it may take several years [after a peak appears to occur] because emissions may rebound. Of course, there are many factors to consider in analysis and research, such as the growth of the population, the growth of the economy, industrial structure, and energy demand and the energy technology behind it.

There are many indicators that could help us do this analysis. Based on analysis of the existing indicators, I think it is not wrong to [say China has] reached its peak in 2023, and this is definitely credible. But I personally would not rule out that there could be a rebound or emissions increase at a certain point, such as 2024 or 2025. Overall, [judging from] recent developments and trends, including the systematic preparations we have made and the determination of the central government work towards the “dual carbon” goals, we are in a stage close to reaching the peak, or similarly a plateau period. I think I agree with this judgment.

[Carbon Brief analysis published since this interview took place shows that China’s CO2 emissions stopped rising for the last 10 months of 2024, but still grew slightly overall.]

CB: Your previous work has pointed towards the economic benefits of electrification as an approach to cutting emissions. The IEA [International Energy Agency] has also recently highlighted China’s rapid progress on this front. Can you talk about China’s strategy here, the current situation with electrification and what China can do to move forward?

WC: In my articles, electrification is not in a competitive relationship with renewable energy, but a complement – they support each other. Renewable energy replaces fossil energy and builds a new power system – a goal we hope to achieve for net-zero [efforts]. In the process of building such a new energy and renewable energy-dominated power system, electrification at the end-use is very helpful. Why is that? Because electrification at the end-use has implications for energy saving and can also adjust the unstable supply of renewable energy. At the same time, electrification can better absorb some energy storage facilities [integrate energy storage into the energy system] and accelerate energy storage’s technological progress. In addition, electrification reduces dependence on fossil energy. It is not in an “either/or” [zero-sum game] with renewable energy. The more renewable energy develops, the more confident we are that it should be used for end-use consumption.

CB: Can you please explain a bit more? How can electrification ‘absorb energy storage’?

WC: Electrification is the direct consumption of energy at the end-use, such as boilers. So when we talk about electrification, we need to look at what is being electrified. Electrification is [using electric boilers] to replace the use of coal-fired and natural gas-fired boilers for heating in industries, or using electric vehicles (EVs) to replace gasoline cars, or using induction cookers to replace natural gas for cooking. All these directly reduce [the consumption of] fossil energy.

[If] all the traditional fossil energy uses are replaced by electricity, our demand for energy storage will not grow. EVs are applications of lithium batteries being used in the automotive field. Heat pumps and electronic heat pumps for industr[ial production] can also be equipped with energy storage. This opens up a new demand for energy storage at the end-use. Energy storage is an indispensable component in the construction of the new energy system, whose main component is renewable energy. As we mentioned above, energy storage is a link in this system.

CB: Electric heat pumps are generally used in the south while central heating with coal is more common in the north. Are there methods, such as policy support, that can help the north to quickly transfer to heat pumps?

WC: I am not particularly clear about this issue, but I believe that it is centred on technical difficulties. Because the demand for heat in the north is more fundamental and urgent than that in the south. For example, heating under low temperature conditions is a livelihood issue [in the north]. In the south, the demand for heat pumps may be met by low-temperature boilers for production, which can be produced today, tonight, or tomorrow, with certain production flexibility. Therefore, the supply of heat pumps in the south is not so urgent. In the north, [central heating with coal] can be more secure. So there may be different [requirements] in security, technology and applicability of heat pumps. I think it is not just a policy issue, it needs further developments in technology.

CB: What do you think about hydrogen?

WC: I would think that, just like electrification, it may be a very important technical field for the construction of a carbon-neutral technology system in the future. One of the characteristics of renewable energy, once the supply becomes high, is that it is intermittent, so it requires energy storage. Energy storage means that it can store energy when there is no demand, and provide some when supply cannot meet demand. [Hydrogen] is both a better energy storage and a way to develop chemical reserves, because its production method, electrolysis, can use surplus renewable energy. This surplus renewable energy comes from solar and wind energy.

Such an energy storage method is [different from] traditional hydrogen production, where hydrogen is a by-product of the chemical industry or even converted directly from oil and fossil fuels. This is a [current] trend and form of energy conversion, not a form of energy storage. [But] in the carbon-neutral technical system, hydrogen is a form of energy storage.

The core difference is a power system featured with renewable energy, whose marginal cost is very low – almost zero marginal running costs. So after wind and solar are deployed – after the costs of infrastructure and fixed asset investment – the cost for electricity generation via wind and solar is almost zero. The zero marginal running cost can be used for electrolysis. You can understand it as using zero cost for hydrogen production. At that time, the cost of hydrogen will be very low.

CB: But I heard the cost for hydrogen production is quite high currently?

WC: Yes, that’s because enough progress hasn’t been made yet. When we are still using water electrolysis to make hydrogen, the cost of wind and solar power is spread over the electricity used to electrolyse water. It is not using surplus [renewable] electricity for electrolysis, because there is not that much surplus electricity. When the proportion of wind and solar power in our power system reaches a certain level, there will be more surplus electricity. In order to store the surplus electricity, we currently use lithium batteries and other [technologies] to store this electricity, instead of using electrolysis to make hydrogen. So I think hydrogen is a new form of energy storage.

At the same time, hydrogen is also a clean new energy form for end-use. It can replace natural gas and gasoline. After it is converted into ammonia, it can also replace oil used in heavy trucks and even cruise ships. It is a foreseeable clean energy form and an end-use energy. So I think it is very critical. There are many problems now, such as high costs, difficulty in storing and transporting and, in the long run, these need to be solved. We must work hard to solve them, because without it, the future system and the path for carbon neutrality may fail. So it is a key and indispensable technology.

The interview was conducted by Wanyuan Song at COP29 in Baku on 16 November 2024.

The post The Carbon Brief interview: Prof Wang Can appeared first on Carbon Brief.

The Carbon Brief interview: Prof Wang Can

Climate Change

Proposal for ‘Hyperscale’ data centre in remote Northern Territory demonstrates need for urgent moratorium

Published

5 hours ago

July 1, 2026

Alice Rush

SYDNEY, Wednesday 1 July 2026 — The proposal for the ‘Project Ares’ data centre in remote Northern Territory, which would be powered by off-grid gas and renewables, has prompted renewed calls from Greenpeace for an urgent moratorium, citing serious concerns about emissions and environmental harm.

The application for the project under the EPBC Act reveals the gas-fired generation for the project would be approximately 1,038MW at full build-out, which would more than double the NT’s current gas-fired generating capacity.

A recent report by Greenpeace Australia Pacific and independent expert Ketan Joshi, Energy Vampires: the AI data centres draining Australia, revealed how the frenzied rollout of AI data centres in Australia is set to derail the renewable energy transition, entrench gas and turbocharge climate pollution.

Solaye Snider, Campaigner at Greenpeace Australia Pacific, said: “Proposals like Project Ares, which would have significant off-grid gas powered generation and emissions, should not be moving along while there are still zero binding regulations to limit the impacts of AI data centres on our communities and environment.

“This hyperscale project proposes massive new off-grid gas infrastructure, making a mockery of the Federal Government’s unenforceable ‘expectations’ that data centres will cover their own power use with renewables. Communities will pay the price for the data centre industry’s endless hunger for energy at any cost.

“This proposal also raises serious questions about where this new gas would come from. Could it come from fracking the Beetaloo? Communities deserve to have the full picture before this project is approved.

“The Australian Government is asleep at the wheel when it comes to the rapid roll-out of AI data centres. We need an urgent moratorium on the construction and approval of new data centres, so our government can take appropriate time to legislate the regulations and safeguards we so desperately need.”

-ENDS-

Media contact

Lucy Keller on 0491 135 308 or lucy.keller@greenpeace.org

Proposal for ‘Hyperscale’ data centre in remote Northern Territory demonstrates need for urgent moratorium

Climate Change

Can giant batteries unlock Africa’s green industrial future?

Published

6 hours ago

July 1, 2026

Alice Rush

When Tropical Storm Ana made landfall in Malawi in 2022, it hit the landlocked country’s electricity system hard, destroying a third of its hydropower capacity and causing nationwide system shutdowns.

Even before the storm, Malawi’s power supply – generated mostly from renewables including solar and hydro – had been unreliable for many years, suffering from persistent outages.

The Malawian government is now hoping to improve the stability of its grid power with the construction of a battery energy storage system (BESS) in its capital that will charge up with surplus electricity generated when the sun is shining and hydropower dams are running, and release it when needed.

More than 80% of Malawi’s electricity comes from renewables and the country has been expanding capacity by adding more solar power while decommissioning 78 megawatts (MW) of diesel generation. But climatic impacts such as cyclones disrupt the grid and threaten to reverse energy transition gains.

West Africa’s first lithium mine awaits go-ahead as Ghana seeks better deal

To ensure a more stable supply, Malawi is building the 20 MW/30 megawatt hour (MWh) battery storage system in Lilongwe with support from the Global Energy Alliance (GEA), under Mission 300 – an initiative led by development banks and their partners to connect 300 million Africans to electricity by 2030.

The project in Malawi aims to stabilise the country’s grid, smooth its intermittent power supply, and reduce its reliance on diesel generators, as well as averting about 10,000 tonnes of carbon emissions per year.

Battery energy storage systems act like giant power banks, absorbing clean electricity during periods of lower demand and releasing it for use when demand is high or generation drops. A typical BESS includes battery packs, inverters that allow electricity to flow between the batteries and the grid, transformers, and cooling and safety systems.

Damola Omole, director of the ‘Grids of the Future, Africa’ programme at the GEA, a philanthropic organisation, said BESS offers the “flexibility needed to smoothly integrate high levels of variable renewables” into the power grid. In doing so, it can reduce reliance on expensive diesel generation and protect consumers and industries from rising energy costs, he added.

Can BESS drive Africa’s industrialisation?

As calls to develop local green industries grow louder in Africa, Omole said there is a need to prioritise upgrading national grids with BESS so they can “transmit reliable, cost-reflective power directly to commercial clusters”.

While financiers previously doubted that intermittent solar and wind could meet the needs of industrial production, utility-scale BESS has demonstrated that renewables can deliver “predictable, steady output just like traditional fossil-fuel baseload power”, he added.

An electrical power engineer performs preventative maintenance using a digital voltmeter to monitor battery charge efficiency. (Photo: Nitat Termmee/ Getty Images)

In recent years, African leaders, including William Ruto of Kenya, Felix Tshisekedi of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Emmerson Mnangagwa of Zimbabwe, have called for the continent to use the energy transition to drive green industrialisation and create value from its resources at home.

At a mining investment conference in Nairobi in April, Ruto said Africa had stayed at the bottom of the value chain for too long but would now collaborate to process its minerals within the continent. “We will refine them here and we will manufacture them here,” he told African ministers and business executives.

Kenya seeks regional coordination to build African mineral value chains

However, deploying energy at scale to advance this industrial ambition has long been a problem, while about 600 million Africans still lack access to electricity. BESS could therefore become a critical technology in the continent’s development drive, experts say.

Michael Iwu, West Africa business development manager at Empower New Energy, which finances and co-develops renewable energy, said BESS is challenging the narrative that solar and wind power alone cannot provide enough reliable electricity to run factories and other energy-intensive industries. Modern battery systems can now support business operations for several hours, helping maintain production during grid outages, he added.

For GEA’s Omole, the key question has shifted to how quickly countries can build the battery storage, grid infrastructure and market frameworks needed to unlock the potential of renewables.

BESS to help renewables displace fossil fuels

While BESS is still in its initial stages of deployment in Africa, interest is growing as countries look for ways to make renewable energy more reliable.

South Africa is leading with the largest and first of its kind utility-scale BESS on the continent. With the capacity to discharge up to five uninterrupted hours of power, the system is keeping homes and businesses running in Worcester, a southwestern town of more than 100,000 people.

Egypt is also investing heavily in battery storage. In 2025, the country launched its first utility-scale BESS, a 300-MWh facility integrated with a 500 MW solar plant in the southern city of Aswan. It has also committed more than $1 billion to strengthen its electricity grid and update regulation to support battery storage projects.

Africa needs more than export bans to cash in on critical minerals, experts say

Falling battery prices are helping drive the rapid deployment of energy storage. According to BloombergNEF, battery packs for stationary storage (used in BESS) cost an average of $70 per kilowatt-hour in 2025, down 45% from 2024.

Soon the role of BESS in supporting the grid integration of wind and solar could reduce reliance on fossil fuels and help the world meet ambitious climate goals, according to a GEA report released in April.

Stephen Nicholls, director of South-Africa based energy think-tank African Energy Futures, said the rapid pace of technological development and the falling costs of BESS are attracting growing attention.

He said improvements in storage duration could further strengthen the role of renewables in industrial power systems. While most commercial and utility-scale battery systems currently provide around four to eight hours of storage, Nicholls said researchers are developing units capable of storing electricity for extended periods.

“The cheaper the storage and the longer the storage, the more [BESS] will replace fossil fuels like gas,” he added.

Workers are busy on a product at a Polarium energy-storage facility, where they make energy storage and optimization solutions, built on lithium-ion battery technology for businesses within telecom, commercial and industrial facilities across the world, in Cape Town, South Africa, April 5, 2023. (Photo: REUTERS/Esa Alexander)

Limited awareness and data

However, significant obstacles to BESS deployment still stand in the way of its massive potential. Iwu of Empower New Energy said limited awareness of utility-scale BESS, as well as concerns about financing and a lack of long-term performance data continue to slow investment across Africa.

Governments and developers need to build more pilot projects and demonstration sites to generate evidence of the technology’s value and benefits and boost confidence among investors and policymakers, he added. To scale BESS, we need to “keep amassing this [evidence] data and keep talking about it and exploring it,” Iwu said.

Two to tango: How governments can unlock private investment for national climate goals

To help address those barriers, Omole said a BESS Consortium under the Global Energy Alliance is working with governments, development banks and other technical partners to de-risk the sector for private financiers by generating evidence from early projects, mobilising public finance to attract private capital, and introducing policies that make battery storage commercially viable.

“This coordinated action helps African nations bypass legacy infrastructure constraints, integrate massive volumes of clean energy, and secure the reliable power required for large-scale industrialisation,” Omole explained.

The post Can giant batteries unlock Africa’s green industrial future? appeared first on Climate Home News.

Can giant batteries unlock Africa’s green industrial future?

Climate Change

With extreme heat now a public health crisis, local data can save lives

Published

1 day ago

June 30, 2026

Alice Rush

Eric Mackres is senior manager of urban analytics for the WRI Ross Center for Sustainable Cities and attended London Climate Action Week during the June 2026 heatwave. Usama Bilal is an associate professor of epidemiology and co-director of the Urban Health Collaborative at Drexel University.

As thousands gathered in London for one of the year’s largest climate gatherings last week, Western Europe faced its most severe heatwave ever recorded. The irony was not lost.

Across Europe, over a dozen countries issued urgent heat warnings and Spain registered significant deaths. In London, where air conditioning is rare in buildings and on trains and buses, temperatures soared past 36 degrees Celsius (97F) and schools closed early. The mayor announced the city’s first heat action plan – an important step.

Extreme heat is now a public health crisis for many of the world’s cities, as the urban heat island effect intensifies dangerous temperatures – and it’s growing worse. Around 500,000 people die from extreme heat every year. As global temperatures rise, and with a severe El Niño getting underway, even more people will die and be hospitalised unless cities act soon.

But most cities are still taking a far too one-sized-fits-all approach to tackling heat, looking only at temperatures and not its local effects on people and their health.

People experience heat differently

How extreme heat affects people’s health can vary widely across a country and city, depending on their environment and demographics. Cities can save far more lives and prevent more hospitalisations by taking a tailored approach, using data to understand who’s most vulnerable and directing solutions toward them.

The good news: better data now exists that enable cities to pinpoint who’s most at risk. And that data can inform customised adaptation strategies to save lives. Indeed, the future of cities will hinge on their ability to deliver solutions to extreme heat tailored to at-risk people and neighborhoods.

Comment: Climate adaptation in Africa needs investment, not imported solutions

First, cities should start by measuring heat’s risks to people’s health locally. Our work in Brazil and across Latin America shows big differences in what temperatures are dangerous and how quickly risks escalate at higher temperatures. These variations exist between cities, between demographic groups and between neighbourhoods.

But it’s not as simple as finding the hottest places. In temperate Porto Alegre, in southern Brazil, a person’s risk of death increases by 25% at temperatures of 27 degrees Celsius (81F). In tropical Teresina, in northern Brazil, which is hot year-round, the same temperature does not elevate the risk of death. At 32 degrees Celsius (90F), a person’s risk of death increases by a milder 10%.

These differences also exist within cities where the climate is the same. Elderly people, the very young, lower-income communities and those without air-conditioning and shaded green spaces are all more likely to get sick, be hospitalised, or die from heat. Areas with more trees and green spaces usually have lower temperatures, and therefore lower impacts of heat.

Targeted heat alerts

Second, cities can use this data to develop early warning systems and outreach campaigns that give people more targeted heat alerts. Research in the UK found that the elderly, despite being among the most at-risk, often were unable to heed warnings during the 2022 heatwave. Well-designed heat warning systems and city responses strengthen people’s trust in health services. They can change people’s behaviours and better prepare municipal services, helping reduce illness, hospital visits and deaths.

Rio de Janeiro adopted a heat alert system in 2024 with five alert levels based on past heatwaves’ impacts on health and forecasts of when temperature and humidity will hit those dangerous levels again. The alert levels activate services like cooling centres, extra public drinking water, and changes to outdoor events. When a heatwave struck during Carnival in 2025, the city was able to deploy resources to protect and warn people while still allowing events to go on.

WHO issues new guidance on heat-health action plans, as El Niño sets in

Finally, cities should use local heat data to target cooling solutions to where they can help people the most. Solutions like tree cover, shade structures and cool roofs lower temperatures and can provide targeted relief for the most vulnerable people, like outdoor workers and those who travel by foot, bike or public transit.

In Florianópolis, Brazil, we helped the local government use heat impact modeling to design a green corridor and urban forestry project that will reduce pedestrians’ heat stress up to 7 degrees C. In Hermosillo, Mexico, our researchers worked with the city and found that certain neighbourhoods could feel up to 14 degrees C hotter than the shaded city center. A park is now under construction that will bring better shade and heat relief to one of the city’s most at-risk areas.

A modular street shade structure on display during an event at New York Climate Action Week on Governors Island, NYC in September 2025. (Photo: Megan Rowling)

Connecting health and climate planning

Momentum to address extreme heat in cities is growing, from both national and local governments. At last year’s UN climate summit in Brazil, the Belém Health Action Plan saw 30 national health ministries commit to build climate-resilient health systems based on local data and evidence-based policies.

And over 160 local governments joined the Beat the Heat initiative, committing to develop urban heat action plans and deliver passive cooling projects to reduce health risks.

But there’s still a disconnect between health, urban and climate officials. Only 23% of World Meteorological Organization member countries integrate weather information into health surveillance systems. Heat-health impact models, though increasingly easy to scale, are not yet built for every city. Some cities still need to collect local data for specific demographics and neighbourhoods – and many need support.

National and local governments will need to partner on this tailored approach. It will require integrating local heat and health data into public health systems, city planning, infrastructure, and disaster preparedness.

We have the data to know who will be most impacted by extreme heat when – and the solutions to keep people alive and out of the hospital. It’s time for governments to use them.

The post With extreme heat now a public health crisis, local data can save lives appeared first on Climate Home News.