At COP29 in Baku, Carbon Brief spoke with Prof Wang Can, director of the department of environmental planning and management at Tsinghua University, to discuss its new study on global carbon neutrality progress.
Tsinghua University is located in Beijing and publishes some of the country’s most prominent climate research, which is often used to inform related policymaking.
The study, published by the university’s Institute for Carbon Neutrality and School of Environment, evaluates different countries’ progress on “[climate and carbon] targets, technology, finance and international cooperation”.
It also identifies “implementation gaps between carbon neutrality targets and emission reduction outcomes”.
In this wide-ranging interview, Wang introduces the institute’s findings and identifies key barriers for the world to reach net-zero emissions.
He also shares reflections on the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), China’s upcoming 2035 climate pledge (NDC), its carbon market, “dual control of carbon” policy, the 14th “five-year plan”, carbon “peaking” timeline, electrification, energy storage and hydrogen.
The interview is transcribed in full below, following a summary of key quotes. The transcript has been edited for length and clarity.
- On the need to implement climate pledges: “We follow the idea of looking at actions rather than declarations.”
- On developing countries’ commitment to climate action: “The determination and the sense of urgency from developing countries in dealing with climate change is very strong. [This is] because they are more vulnerable and more affected by climate change, so they are more active.”
- On China’s 2035 climate pledge (NDC): “The main update will be to benchmark our target against the timeline in the [UN] convention, such as extending our goals through to 2035.”
- On global renewable deployment: “[Global renewable energy] has grown very fast, but if we want to implement the 2030 [tripling target for renewable capacity], it must grow faster.”
- On barriers to tripling renewables: “[Renewable energy] could have been deployed faster…but one of the important factors for why it hasn’t is recent trade barriers…[We found that countries] including the US have such policies.”
- On the EU’s CBAM: “We think that the EU’s CBAM is positive for the EU, because it added to its carbon emissions regulations. It is considered to have improved the EU’s domestic policies. However, it is negative for international cooperation, because it is a unilateral policy.”
- On different pathways to net-zero: “[Some] other countries have already decoupled [the growth of emissions and the economy]. After seeing their economic growth does not require an increase in carbon emissions, [they] then announced carbon peak and carbon neutrality [goals]. China has not yet achieved this, so I think this is also a distinguishing feature and it is representative for developing countries.”
- On China’s carbon market: “I think progress in this area will become faster…A total amount [of emissions reduction] has been set first and then the carbon market can help achieve the total amount target at a low cost.”
- On missing China’s 2025 energy intensity goal: “The individual targets, ultimately, serve China’s broader climate action, so we are not obsessed with whether this goal is achieved or not.”
- On China’s emissions peaking early: “I personally would not rule out that there could be a rebound or emissions increase at a certain point, such as 2024 or 2025…Overall, [judging from] recent developments and trends…we are in a stage close to reaching the peak, or similarly a plateau period. I think I agree with this judgment.”
- On China’s electrification: “Electrification is not in a competitive relationship with renewable energy, but a complement – they support each other…In the process of building such a new energy and renewable energy-dominated power system, electrification at the end-use is very helpful.”
- On the need for energy-storage systems: “Energy storage is an indispensable component in the construction of the new energy system, whose main component is renewable energy.”
- On hydrogen: “There are many problems now, such as high costs, difficulty in storing and transporting and, in the long run, these need to be solved. We must work hard to solve them, because without it, the future system and the path for carbon neutrality may fail.”
Carbon Brief: What’s the most important finding of your research?
Wang Can: We tracked the progress [of countries’ carbon neutrality efforts] from the perspective of implementation. We paid more attention to actions and used scientific methods to evaluate them. Carbon goals are set for decades in the future – if we simply look at the goals, it is difficult to evaluate whether our current actions are sufficient, so a scientific and systematic method is needed to evaluate them. We think actions are important, and the method of evaluating action is also important.
CB: Your report found developing countries have a higher “ambition index” while developed countries have a lower ambition index. What does “ambition index” mean here?
WC: When we talk about ambition index or use index to express what I said earlier, we follow the idea of looking at actions rather than declarations. Hence we revise countries’ ambition indexes. For example, a country might advertise that it wants to achieve carbon neutrality as soon as possible, but take the action of setting up various barriers to hinder the flow of technology and hinder global cooperation. [Therefore,] it may be very ambitious in terms of goals, but its actions have negative effects. Our index will take these into account and, after considering these factors, assign a score. As of last year, some developing countries have scored higher, while some developed countries have relatively lower ambition indexes.
CB: So you mean you check goals of countries announced in their NDCs and give positive or negative points for their climate actions, and then calculate a score for their ambition index?
WC: Yes.
CB: Were you surprised by the results?
WC: I am not surprised, because I have been involved in the negotiation of the [UN] climate convention for more than ten years. From the negotiation process, we can feel that the determination and the sense of urgency from developing countries in dealing with climate change is very strong. [This is] because they are more vulnerable and more affected by climate change, so they are more active. Although developed countries have the ability and technology, and their scientists have more systematic and scientific knowledge in this regard, they are not as persistent as developing countries like China. Once [China] announced [its climate] goal, it systematically and continuously progresses. [Developed countries did not do the same] due to considerations for economy and international trade competition.
CB: The west is particularly interested in China’s 2035 NDC. What new climate goal do you think China would propose or what should be written in the next NDC?
WC: I think the next NDC will still be in line with our “dual carbon” policy [of peaking emissions before 2030 and reaching carbon neutrality before 2060]. The main update will be to benchmark our target against the timeline in the [UN] convention, such as extending our goals through to 2035. We already have a target for what we should achieve by 2030, and [the next NDC instead prompts] a new round of what we should achieve by 2035. Different stages have different tasks, but they both are under the same overall framework. China has already [announced] its “dual carbon’” goals, [set] two time points [of 2030 and 2060], and [established] the “1+N” policy system. I think [the NDC] is nothing more than specifying tasks for from 2030 to 2035 under such a system. This is my personal understanding and expectation.
CB: Your report said that the current speed of renewable energy development globally is insufficient to meet COP28’s tripling target for 2030 and there is a “large gap” in the deployment scale required to meet climate targets. What are the main factors holding back faster growth?
WC: I’m not sure if your question is completely consistent with the point we want to express in the report. My understanding of what we said in the report is that although we have seen rapid development of renewable energy, and it is very optimistic in recent years, there is still a gap compared to the requirements of tripling global renewable power capacity by 2030 and the global net-zero target by 2050.
[Global renewable energy] has grown very fast, but if we want to implement the 2030 [tripping target for renewable capacity], it must grow faster, especially from a global perspective. Now there are a few countries, such as China and Indonesia in south-east Asia, that have deployed [renewable energy] very quickly in the past one or two years, but globally we have not seen the speed we expected. This is what we want to convey at the core, or what we especially want to convey.
The reason behind this is that we believe that [renewable energy] technology has developed to a stage, from our research, that it could have been deployed faster. After it is deployed faster and more widely [in the future], the speed of progress of this technology will accelerate, and it will enter a positive cycle. This could have happened, but one of the important factors for why it hasn’t is recent trade barriers, and the extension of trade barriers from [targeting] originally high-tech and communications products to [also targeting] renewable energy that addresses climate change.
This type of trade barrier is a typical practice, based on traditional and very narrow economic interests. It may have ignored the fact, which actually comes from western international trade theory, that free international trade can promote economic development, technological progress, and thus bring a new round of win-win situation. Short-sighted behavior ignores [this]. In the field of renewable energy, the medium- and long-term economic benefits, as well as a firm commitment to climate change, have both been given up [by western countries]. So this, in our view, is a problem facing the development of renewable energy that needs to be solved.
CB: Can you please give an example of the trade barrier you mentioned?
WC: Increased tariffs, for instance – imposing [high] tariffs on renewable energy equipment imports, and the intentional imposition of such tariffs. This example is what we referenced in our country analysis. [We found that countries] including the US have such policies. Our report set a framework in which we checked whether there are trade barrier policies in place, whether [such policies] are enforced, and then, if they are, we look at whether they targeted green and low-carbon technology that we need for cutting emissions. If so, we then gave different weights and negative scores.
CB: What is the trade barrier or barriers that bring the worst impacts currently?
WC: The import controls on wind and solar, adding tariffs on them, or commerce control lists of this kind.
CB: Mainly in the US?
WC: Mainly in the US.
CB: What do you think about the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM)?
WC: In our evaluation, we think that the EU’s CBAM is positive for the EU, because it added to its carbon emissions regulations. It is considered to have improved the EU’s domestic policies. However, it is negative for international cooperation, because it is a unilateral policy, and its impact may hinder the flow of technology mentioned earlier, the rapid diffusion of technology and the rapid deployment of advanced technology around the world.
Of course, we have to look further and look at it in more detail, because the scope of the industry that CBAM covers will change in the years ahead. At present, from the perspective of international cooperation, its negative weight is not high. From the perspective of execution, although it mainly covers electricity and hydrogen energy [as well as other industries], its scope is not very large at present.
CB: Your report says that there is no “single zero-carbon pathway” that would be universally applicable for all. Instead, it says “differentiated measures are needed for different types of countries”. What’s the best pathway for China to reach carbon neutrality and how does that differ to others?
WC: Yes, what we want to say is that there is no single model that is suitable for all countries to achieve net-zero. Different countries are at different stages of development, their economic structures are different, their resources are different, and even their institutional political structure as well as cultural characteristics are different, so the paths to achieve net-zero will definitely be different. Countries do have differences in policies, [climate] targets, technologies, funds, and international cooperation methods – what we just discussed – [so] we think that different countries should have different models.
For China, “dual carbon” is a policy goal with Chinese characteristics. We need to reach carbon peak before 2030 and achieve neutrality before 2060. The carbon peak before 2030 means that we still need time to decouple economic development from carbon emissions. If we don’t reach the peak, it means that we haven’t decoupled these things yet. Economic growth [still leads to] an increase in carbon emissions. Why is that? Because we are still a developing country, and the largest developing country – the developing country with the most industry in the world. Our manufacturing industry is relatively large, our population is large, and we are still in the process of urbanisation and industrialisation. Carbon emissions and economic development have not yet been completely decoupled. Even in such a situation, we have proposed the goal of achieving carbon neutrality, which further reflects our ambition and determination.
[Some] other countries have already decoupled [the growth of emissions and the economy]. After seeing their economic growth does not require an increase in carbon emissions, [they] then announced carbon peak and carbon neutrality [goals]. China has not yet achieved this, so I think this is also a distinguishing feature, and it is representative for developing countries. Many developing countries are similar to us. They have not achieved decoupling, but want to specify response to climate change and achieve the two goals [of carbon peak and neutrality]. To reach net-zero globally by the middle of this century, developing countries introduced some targets and paths.
So what is the path? Achieve neutrality after peaking. First, there is a stage of rapid peaking, and to peak as low as possible. In this stage, technical support, financial support, and even some capacity buildings are needed. For example, China is building a carbon market as a policy tool. Currently it is still in the stage of capacity building – collecting carbon emission data, [improving] professional trading capabilities of the market, and so on. This stage is very important for China. If the foundation is not laid solid at this stage, then after reaching the peak, the stage of carbon reduction and achieving carbon neutrality may take a relatively long time, making it more difficult for us to achieve carbon neutrality.
CB: Speaking of China’s carbon market, in our previous Carbon Brief reports, some analysts said that it is not fully active yet, and that trade may have not achieved its maximum potential. How can we maximise the potential of the carbon market?
WC: I think progress in this area will become faster. Because this year [2024], the State Council issued a work plan for the transition from “dual control of energy” consumption to “dual control of carbon”, and clarified a timetable [for this]. From now to 2030, the main mechanism is controlling carbon intensity [the emissions per unit of GDP], with total control [in tonnes of carbon emissions] as a secondary mechanism. But at the same time, [developing] some total control mechanisms should be explored. After China’s carbon emissions peak in 2030, total control [in tonnes of CO2] will be the main mechanism [of controlling carbon emissions], supplemented by [carbon] intensity control.
As long as there is a total control target, the carbon trading and carbon market system can play a role in lowering emissions. Because a policy tool such as carbon trading essentially aims to achieve a certain set target for total emissions at a low cost. A target for total emissions control only gives an amount [to reach], but whether this target is allocated to emitting entities efficiently or not isn’t something the government has enough information to determine. Through carbon trading and carbon markets, emission reductions can be achieved at the lowest cost. So to answer your question directly, when a total amount [of emissions reduction] has been set first and then the carbon market can help achieve the total amount target at a low cost.
CB: You mentioned the transfer from “dual control of energy” to “dual control of carbon emissions”. There are suggestions that China’s total emission intensity target could be missed because this year’s GDP growth is slower than emissions rates. Do you think this has a big impact?
WC: What impact are you referring to?
CB: The 14th “five-year plan”. The 14th five-year plan has set a total energy intensity reduction goal but it could be missed because economic growth is slower than energy consumption.
WC: The energy intensity goal, yes.
CB: Do you think this will slow down the entire emission reduction process [planned in the 14th “five-year plan”]?
WC: I think this [energy intensity] goal is to serve the broader goal of emissions reduction, so whether it was achievable or not may have been a factor that was considered when the goal was originally set. For example, when the goal was set around 2020, it did not take into account the economic form and technological changes of recent years. In fact, there is another goal corresponding to this goal, which is the total amount of renewable energy [for 1,200GW of wind and solar capacity by 2030]…[which was] achieved very quickly. So we set some goals that are easy to achieve and some goals that may be more difficult to achieve than expected. I think I should go back to my previous point that the individual targets, ultimately, serve China’s broader climate action, so we are not obsessed with whether this goal is achieved or not.
From the perspective of promoting “dual carbon” work in recent years, China has made great progress in the construction of its [climate] policies, reducing the cost of developing renewable energy technologies, and [increasing] the pace of deploying [them]. From the central government to the provincial government and then to the city-level government, there is a top-down push for capacity building and promotion of [the government’s] ecological work around raising public awareness and collecting data, such as the building blocks for baseline data, including exploring the integration of carbon assessments into environmental impact assessments. These are also the views expressed in our report on global progress on carbon neutrality. From this perspective, we think that China’s work over the past three years – since general secretary Xi Jinping announced the “dual-carbon” goals – has been on the right track, helping us achieve carbon peak before 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060.
We are doing solid ground work. It’s not a slogan or “campaign-style” work that could lead to [short-term] reductions that later rebound. If we want to reduce them sustainably, a systematic change in the economy and society is needed. This systematic change must come from the perspectives just mentioned, and we must do some ground work. [The changes brought about by] some work may not be fast in the short term, as [emissions] are still in a climbing stage, and the total amount [of emissions] has not been completely reduced. But this is what we are doing in the short term to prepare for the long term, and the short term is a stage that we can’t avoid.
CB: We previously published an analysis that China may have already achieved carbon peak in 2023, based on data. What do you think about this research finding?
WC: I think predicting a peak is not a scientific approach. So far, I have not seen any indicators or studies that can predict a country has reached a peak. It is something that must be judged by time, and it may take several years [after a peak appears to occur] because emissions may rebound. Of course, there are many factors to consider in analysis and research, such as the growth of the population, the growth of the economy, industrial structure, and energy demand and the energy technology behind it.
There are many indicators that could help us do this analysis. Based on analysis of the existing indicators, I think it is not wrong to [say China has] reached its peak in 2023, and this is definitely credible. But I personally would not rule out that there could be a rebound or emissions increase at a certain point, such as 2024 or 2025. Overall, [judging from] recent developments and trends, including the systematic preparations we have made and the determination of the central government work towards the “dual carbon” goals, we are in a stage close to reaching the peak, or similarly a plateau period. I think I agree with this judgment.
[Carbon Brief analysis published since this interview took place shows that China’s CO2 emissions stopped rising for the last 10 months of 2024, but still grew slightly overall.]
CB: Your previous work has pointed towards the economic benefits of electrification as an approach to cutting emissions. The IEA [International Energy Agency] has also recently highlighted China’s rapid progress on this front. Can you talk about China’s strategy here, the current situation with electrification and what China can do to move forward?
WC: In my articles, electrification is not in a competitive relationship with renewable energy, but a complement – they support each other. Renewable energy replaces fossil energy and builds a new power system – a goal we hope to achieve for net-zero [efforts]. In the process of building such a new energy and renewable energy-dominated power system, electrification at the end-use is very helpful. Why is that? Because electrification at the end-use has implications for energy saving and can also adjust the unstable supply of renewable energy. At the same time, electrification can better absorb some energy storage facilities [integrate energy storage into the energy system] and accelerate energy storage’s technological progress. In addition, electrification reduces dependence on fossil energy. It is not in an “either/or” [zero-sum game] with renewable energy. The more renewable energy develops, the more confident we are that it should be used for end-use consumption.
CB: Can you please explain a bit more? How can electrification ‘absorb energy storage’?
WC: Electrification is the direct consumption of energy at the end-use, such as boilers. So when we talk about electrification, we need to look at what is being electrified. Electrification is [using electric boilers] to replace the use of coal-fired and natural gas-fired boilers for heating in industries, or using electric vehicles (EVs) to replace gasoline cars, or using induction cookers to replace natural gas for cooking. All these directly reduce [the consumption of] fossil energy.
[If] all the traditional fossil energy uses are replaced by electricity, our demand for energy storage will not grow. EVs are applications of lithium batteries being used in the automotive field. Heat pumps and electronic heat pumps for industr[ial production] can also be equipped with energy storage. This opens up a new demand for energy storage at the end-use. Energy storage is an indispensable component in the construction of the new energy system, whose main component is renewable energy. As we mentioned above, energy storage is a link in this system.
CB: Electric heat pumps are generally used in the south while central heating with coal is more common in the north. Are there methods, such as policy support, that can help the north to quickly transfer to heat pumps?
WC: I am not particularly clear about this issue, but I believe that it is centred on technical difficulties. Because the demand for heat in the north is more fundamental and urgent than that in the south. For example, heating under low temperature conditions is a livelihood issue [in the north]. In the south, the demand for heat pumps may be met by low-temperature boilers for production, which can be produced today, tonight, or tomorrow, with certain production flexibility. Therefore, the supply of heat pumps in the south is not so urgent. In the north, [central heating with coal] can be more secure. So there may be different [requirements] in security, technology and applicability of heat pumps. I think it is not just a policy issue, it needs further developments in technology.
CB: What do you think about hydrogen?
WC: I would think that, just like electrification, it may be a very important technical field for the construction of a carbon-neutral technology system in the future. One of the characteristics of renewable energy, once the supply becomes high, is that it is intermittent, so it requires energy storage. Energy storage means that it can store energy when there is no demand, and provide some when supply cannot meet demand. [Hydrogen] is both a better energy storage and a way to develop chemical reserves, because its production method, electrolysis, can use surplus renewable energy. This surplus renewable energy comes from solar and wind energy.
Such an energy storage method is [different from] traditional hydrogen production, where hydrogen is a by-product of the chemical industry or even converted directly from oil and fossil fuels. This is a [current] trend and form of energy conversion, not a form of energy storage. [But] in the carbon-neutral technical system, hydrogen is a form of energy storage.
The core difference is a power system featured with renewable energy, whose marginal cost is very low – almost zero marginal running costs. So after wind and solar are deployed – after the costs of infrastructure and fixed asset investment – the cost for electricity generation via wind and solar is almost zero. The zero marginal running cost can be used for electrolysis. You can understand it as using zero cost for hydrogen production. At that time, the cost of hydrogen will be very low.
CB: But I heard the cost for hydrogen production is quite high currently?
WC: Yes, that’s because enough progress hasn’t been made yet. When we are still using water electrolysis to make hydrogen, the cost of wind and solar power is spread over the electricity used to electrolyse water. It is not using surplus [renewable] electricity for electrolysis, because there is not that much surplus electricity. When the proportion of wind and solar power in our power system reaches a certain level, there will be more surplus electricity. In order to store the surplus electricity, we currently use lithium batteries and other [technologies] to store this electricity, instead of using electrolysis to make hydrogen. So I think hydrogen is a new form of energy storage.
At the same time, hydrogen is also a clean new energy form for end-use. It can replace natural gas and gasoline. After it is converted into ammonia, it can also replace oil used in heavy trucks and even cruise ships. It is a foreseeable clean energy form and an end-use energy. So I think it is very critical. There are many problems now, such as high costs, difficulty in storing and transporting and, in the long run, these need to be solved. We must work hard to solve them, because without it, the future system and the path for carbon neutrality may fail. So it is a key and indispensable technology.
The interview was conducted by Wanyuan Song at COP29 in Baku on 16 November 2024.
The post The Carbon Brief interview: Prof Wang Can appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Climate Change
The 2026 budget test: Will Australia break free from fossil fuels?
In 2026, the dangers of fossil fuel dependence have been laid bare like never before. The illegal invasion of Iran has brought pain and destruction to millions across the Middle East and triggered a global energy crisis impacting us all. Communities in the Pacific have been hit especially hard by rising fuel prices, and Australians have seen their cost-of-living woes deepen.
Such moments of crisis and upheaval can lead to positive transformation. But only when leaders act with courage and foresight.
There is no clearer statement of a government’s plans and priorities for the nation than its budget — how it plans to raise money, and what services, communities, and industries it will invest in.
As we count down the days to the 2026-27 Federal Budget, will the Albanese Government deliver a budget for our times? One that starts breaking the shackles of fossil fuels, accelerates the shift to clean energy, protects nature, and sees us work together with other countries towards a safer future for all? Or one that doubles down on coal and gas, locks in more climate chaos, and keeps us beholden to the whims of tyrants and billionaires.
Here’s what we think the moment demands, and what we’ll be looking out for when Treasurer Jim Chalmers steps up to the dispatch box on 12 May.
1. Stop fuelling the fire
2. Make big polluters pay
3. Support everyone to be part of the solution
4. Build the industries of the future
5. Build community resilience
6. Be a better neighbour
7. Protect nature
1. Stop fuelling the fire

In mid-April, Pacific governments and civil society met to redouble their efforts towards a Fossil Fuel Free Pacific. Moving beyond coal, oil and gas is fundamental to limiting warming to 1.5°C — a survival line for vulnerable communities and ecosystems. And as our Head of Pacific, Shiva Gounden, explained, it is “also a path of liberation that frees us from expensive, extractive and polluting fossil fuel imports and uplifts our communities”.
Pacific countries are at the forefront of growing global momentum towards a just transition away from fossil fuels, and it is way past time for Australia to get with the program. It is no longer a question of whether fossil fuel extraction will end, but whether that end will be appropriately managed and see communities supported through the transition, or whether it will be chaotic and disruptive.
So will this budget support the transition away from fossil fuels, or will it continue to prop up coal and gas?
When it comes to sensible moves the government can make right now, one stands out as a genuine low hanging fruit. Mining companies get a full rebate of the excise (or tax) that the rest of us pay on diesel fuel. This lowers their operating costs and acts as a large, ongoing subsidy on fossil fuel production — to the tune of $11 billion a year!
Greenpeace has long called for coal and gas companies to be removed from this outdated scheme, and for the billions in savings to be used to support the clean energy transition and to assist communities with adapting to the impacts of climate change. Will we see the government finally make this long overdue change, or will it once again cave to the fossil fuel lobby?
2. Make big polluters pay

While our communities continue to suffer the escalating costs of climate-fuelled disasters, our Government continues to support a massive expansion of Australia’s export gas industry. Gas is a dangerous fossil fuel, with every tonne of Australian gas adding to the global heating that endangers us all.
Moreover, companies like Santos and Woodside pay very little tax for the privilege of digging up and selling Australians’ natural endowment of fossil gas. Remarkably, the Government currently raises more tax from beer than from the Petroleum Resource Rent Tax (PRRT) — the main tax on gas profits.
Momentum has been building to replace or supplement the PRRT with a 25% tax on gas exports. This could raise up to $17 billion a year — funds that, like savings from removing the diesel tax rebate for coal and gas companies, could be spent on supporting the clean energy transition and assisting communities with adapting to worsening fires, floods, heatwaves and other impacts of climate change.
As politicians arrive in Canberra for budget week, they will be confronted by billboards calling for a fair tax on gas exports. The push now has the support of dozens of organisations and a growing number of politicians. Let’s hope the Treasurer seizes this rare window for reform.
3. Support everyone to be part of the solution
As the price of petrol and diesel rises, electric vehicles (EVs) are helping people cut fuel use and save money. However, while EV sales have jumped since the invasion of Iran sent fuel prices rising, they still only make up a fraction of total new car sales. This budget should help more Australians switch to electric vehicles and, even more importantly, enable more Australians to get around by bike, on foot, and on public transport. This means maintaining the EV discount, investing in public and active transport, and removing tax breaks for fuel-hungry utes and vans.
Millions of Australians already enjoy the cost-saving benefits of rooftop solar, batteries, and getting off gas. This budget should enable more households, and in particular those on lower incomes, to access these benefits. This means maintaining the Cheaper Home Batteries Program, and building on the Household Energy Upgrades Fund.
4. Build the industries of the future

If we’re to transition away from fossil fuels, we need to be building the clean industries of the future.
No state is more pivotal to Australia’s energy and industrial transformation than Western Australia. The state has unrivaled potential for renewable energy development and for replacing fossil fuel exports with clean exports like green iron. Such industries offer Western Australia the promise of a vibrant economic future, and for Australia to play an outsized positive role in the world’s efforts to reduce emissions.
However, realising this potential will require focussed support from the Federal Government. Among other measures, Greenpeace has recommended establishing the Australasian Green Iron Corporation as a joint venture between the Australian and Western Australian governments, a key trading partner, a major iron ore miner and steel makers. This would unite these central players around the complex task of building a large-scale green iron industry, and unleash Western Australia’s potential as a green industrial powerhouse.
5. Build community resilience
Believe it or not, our Government continues to spend far more on subsidising fossil fuel production — and on clearing up after climate-fuelled disasters — than it does on helping communities and industries reduce disaster costs through practical, proven methods for building their resilience.
Last year, the Government estimated that the cost of recovery from disasters like the devastating 2022 east coast floods on 2019-20 fires will rise to $13.5 billion. For contrast, the Government’s Disaster Ready Fund – the main national source of funding for disaster resilience – invests just $200 million a year in grants to support disaster preparedness and resilience building. This is despite the Government’s own National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) estimating that for every dollar spent on disaster risk reduction, there is a $9.60 return on investment.
By redirecting funds currently spent on subsidising fossil fuel production, the Government can both stop incentivising climate destruction in the first place, and ensure that Australian communities and industries are better protected from worsening climate extremes.
No communities have more to lose from climate damage, or carry more knowledge of practical solutions, than Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. The budget should include a dedicated First Nations climate adaptation fund, ensuring First Nations communities can develop solutions on their own terms, and access the support they need with adapting to extreme heat, coastal erosion and other escalating challenges.
6. Be a better neighbour
The global response to climate change depends on the adequate flow of support from developed economies like Australia to lower income nations with shifting to clean energy, adapting to the impacts of climate change, and addressing loss and damage.
Such support is vital to building trust and cooperation, reducing global emissions, and supporting regional and global security by enabling countries to transition away from fossil fuels and build greater resilience.
Despite its central leadership role in this year’s global climate negotiations, our Government is yet to announce its contribution to international climate finance for 2025-2030. Greenpeace recommends a commitment of $11 billion for this five year period, which is aligned with the global goal under the Paris Agreement to triple international climate finance from current levels.
This new commitment should include additional funding to address loss and damage from climate change and a substantial contribution to the Pacific Resilience Facility, ensuring support is accessible to countries and communities that need it most. It should also see Australia get firmly behind the vision of a Fossil Fuel Free Pacific.
7. Protect nature

There is no safe planet without protection of the ecosystems and biodiversity that sustain us and regulate our climate.
Last year the Parliament passed important and long overdue reforms to our national environment laws to ensure better protection for our forests and other critical ecosystems. However, the Government will need to provide sufficient funding to ensure the effective implementation of these reforms.
Greenpeace has recommended $500 million over four years to establish the National Environment Agency — the body responsible for enforcing and monitoring the new laws — and a further $50 million to Environment Information Australia for providing critical information and tools.
Further resourcing will also be required to fulfil the crucial goal of fully protecting 30% of Australian land and seas by 2030. This should include $1 billion towards ending deforestation by enabling farmers and loggers to retool away from destructive practices, $2 billion a year for restoring degraded lands, $5 billion for purchasing and creating new protected areas, and $200 million for expanding domestic and international marine protected areas.
Conclusion
This is not the first time that conflict overseas has triggered an energy crisis, or that a budget has been preceded by a summer of extreme weather disasters, highlighting the urgent need to phase out fossil fuels. What’s different in 2026 is the availability of solutions. Renewable energy is now cheaper and more accessible than ever before. Global momentum is firmly behind the transition away from fossil fuels. The Albanese Government, with its overwhelming majority, has the chance to set our nation up for the future, or keep us stranded in the past. Let’s hope it makes some smart choices.
The 2026 budget test: Will Australia break free from fossil fuels?
Climate Change
What fossil fuels really cost us in a world at war
Anne Jellema is Executive Director of 350.org.
The war on Iran and Lebanon is a deeply unjust and devastating conflict, killing civilians at home, destroying lives, and at the same time sending shockwaves through the global economy. We, at 350.org, have calculated, drawing on price forecasts from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Goldman Sachs, just how much that volatility is costing us.
Even under the IMF’s baseline scenario – a de facto “best case” scenario with a near-term end to the war and related supply chain disruptions – oil and gas price spikes are projected to cost households and businesses globally more than $600 billion by the end of the year. Under the IMF’s “adverse scenario”, with prolonged conflict and sustained price pressures, we estimate those additional costs could exceed $1 trillion, even after accounting for reduced demand.
Which is why we urgently need a power shift. Governments are under growing pressure to respond to rising fuel and food costs and deepening energy poverty. And it’s becoming clearer to both voters and elected officials that fossil dependence is not only expensive and risky, but unnecessary.
People who can are voting with their wallets: sales of solar panels and electric vehicles are increasing sharply in many countries. But the working people who have nothing to spare, ironically, are the ones stuck with using oil and gas that is either exorbitantly expensive or simply impossible to get.
Drain on households and economies
In India, street food vendors can’t get cooking gas and in the Philippines, fishermen can’t afford to take their boats to sea. A quarter of British people say that rising energy tariffs will leave them completely unable to pay their bills. This is the moment for a global push to bring abundant and affordable clean energy to all.
In April, we released Out of Pocket, our new research report on how fossil fuels are draining households and economies. We were surprised by the scale of what we found. For decades, governments have reassured people that energy price spikes are unfortunate but unavoidable – the result of distant conflicts, market forces or geopolitical shocks beyond anyone’s control. But the numbers tell a different story.
What we are living through today is not an energy crisis. It is a fossil fuel crisis. In just the first 50 days of the Middle East conflict, soaring oil and gas prices have siphoned an estimated $158 billion–$166 billion from households and businesses worldwide. That is money extracted directly from people’s pockets and transferred, almost instantly, into fossil fuel company balance sheets. And this figure only captures the immediate impact of price spikes, not the permanent economic drain of fossil dependence. Fossil fuels don’t just cost us once, they cost us over and over again.
First, through our bills. Every time there is a war, an embargo or a supply disruption, fossil fuel prices surge. For ordinary people, this means higher costs for energy, transport and food. Many Global South countries have little or no fiscal space to buffer the shock; instead, workers and families pay the price.
Second, through our taxes. Governments around the world continue to pour vast sums of public money into fossil fuel subsidies. These are often justified as a way to protect the most vulnerable at the petrol pump or in their homes. But in reality, the benefits are overwhelmingly captured by wealthier households and corporations. The poorest 20% receive just a fraction of this support, while public finances are drained.
Third, through climate impacts. New research across more than 24,000 global locations gives a granular account of the true costs of extreme heat, sea level rise and falling agricultural yields. Using this data to update IMF modelling of the social cost of carbon, we found that fossil fuel impacts on health and livelihoods amount to over $9 trillion a year. This is the biggest subsidy of all, because these massive and mounting costs are not charged to Big Oil – they are paid for by governments and households, with the poorest shouldering the lion’s share.
Massive transfer of wealth to fossil fuel industry
Adding up direct subsidies, tax breaks and the unpaid bill for climate damages, the total transfer of wealth from the public to the fossil fuel industry amounts to $12 trillion even in a “normal” year without a global oil shock. That’s more than 50% higher than the IMF has previously estimated, and equivalent to a staggering $23 million a minute.
The fossil fuel industry has become extraordinarily adept at profiting from instability. When conflict drives up prices, companies do not lose, they gain. In the current crisis, oil producers and commodity traders are on track to secure tens of billions of dollars in additional windfall profits, even as households face rising bills and governments struggle to manage the fallout.
Fossil fuel crisis offers chance to speed up energy transition, ministers say
This growing disconnect is impossible to ignore. Investors are advised to buy into fossil fuel firms precisely because of their ability to generate profits in times of crisis. Meanwhile, ordinary people are told to tighten their belts.
In 2026, unlike during the oil shocks of the 1970s, clean energy is no longer a distant alternative. Now, even more than when gas prices spiked due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, renewables are often the cheapest option available. Solar and wind can be deployed quickly, at scale, and without the volatility that defines fossil fuel markets.
How to transition from dirty to clean energy
The solutions are clear. Governments must implement permanent windfall taxes on fossil fuel companies to ensure that extraordinary profits generated during crises are redirected to support households. These revenues can be used to reduce energy bills, invest in public services, and accelerate the rollout of clean energy.
Second, we must shift subsidies away from fossil fuels and towards renewable solutions, particularly those that can be deployed quickly and equitably, such as rooftop and community solar. This is not just about cutting emissions. It is about building a more stable, fair and resilient energy system.
Finally, we need binding plans to phase out fossil fuels altogether, replacing them with homegrown renewable energy that can shield economies from future shocks. Because what the current crisis has made clear is this: as long as we remain dependent on fossil fuels, we remain vulnerable – to conflict, to price volatility and to the escalating impacts of climate change.
The true price of fossil fuels is no longer hidden. It is visible in rising bills, strained public finances and communities pushed to the brink. And it is being paid, every day, by ordinary people around the world.
It’s time for the great power shift.
Full details on the methodology used for this report are available here.
The Great Power Shift is a new campaign by 350.org global campaign to pressure governments to bring down energy bills for good by ending fossil fuel dependence and investing in clean, affordable energy for all


The post What fossil fuels really cost us in a world at war appeared first on Climate Home News.
Climate Change
Traditional models still ‘outperform AI’ for extreme weather forecasts
Computer models that use artificial intelligence (AI) cannot forecast record-breaking weather as well as traditional climate models, according to a new study.
It is well established that AI climate models have surpassed traditional, physics-based climate models for some aspects of weather forecasting.
However, new research published in Science Advances finds that AI models still “underperform” in forecasting record-breaking extreme weather events.
The authors tested how well both AI and traditional weather models could simulate thousands of record-breaking hot, cold and windy events that were recorded in 2018 and 2020.
They find that AI models underestimate both the frequency and intensity of record-breaking events.
A study author tells Carbon Brief that the analysis is a “warning shot” against replacing traditional models with AI models for weather forecasting “too quickly”.
AI weather forecasts
Extreme weather events, such as floods, heatwaves and storms, drive hundreds of billions of dollars in damages every year through the destruction of cropland, impacts on infrastructure and the loss of human life.
Many governments have developed early warning systems to prepare the general public and mobilise disaster response teams for imminent extreme weather events. These systems have been shown to minimise damages and save lives.
For decades, scientists have used numerical weather prediction models to simulate the weather days, or weeks, in advance.
These models rely on a series of complex equations that reproduce processes in the atmosphere and ocean. The equations are rooted in fundamental laws of physics, based on decades of research by climate scientists. As a result, these models are referred to as “physics-based” models.
However, AI-based climate models are gaining popularity as an alternative for weather forecasting.
Instead of using physics, these models use a statistical approach. Scientists present AI models with a large batch of historical weather data, known as training data, which teaches the model to recognise patterns and make predictions.
To produce a new forecast, the AI model draws on this bank of knowledge and follows the patterns that it knows.
There are many advantages to AI weather forecasts. For example, they use less computing power than physics-based models, because they do not have to run thousands of mathematical equations.
Furthermore, many AI models have been found to perform better than traditional physics-based models at weather forecasts.
However, these models also have drawbacks.
Study author Prof Sebastian Engelke, a professor at the research institute for statistics and information science at the University of Geneva, tells Carbon Brief that AI models “depend strongly on the training data” and are “relatively constrained to the range of this dataset”.
In other words, AI models struggle to simulate brand new weather patterns, instead tending forecast events of a similar strength to those seen before. As a result, it is unclear whether AI models can simulate unprecedented, record-breaking extreme events that, by definition, have never been seen before.
Record-breaking extremes
Extreme weather events are becoming more intense and frequent as the climate warms. Record-shattering extremes – those that break existing records by large margins – are also becoming more regular.
For example, during a 2021 heatwave in north-western US and Canada, local temperature records were broken by up to 5C. According to one study, the heatwave would have been “impossible” without human-caused climate change.
The new study explores how accurately AI and physics-based models can forecast such record-breaking extremes.
First, the authors identified every heat, cold and wind event in 2018 and 2020 that broke a record previously set between 1979 and 2017. (They chose these years due to data availability.) The authors use ERA5 reanalysis data to identify these records.
This produced a large sample size of record-breaking events. For the year 2020, the authors identified around 160,000 heat, 33,000 cold and 53,000 wind records, spread across different seasons and world regions.
For their traditional, physics-based model, the authors selected the High RESolution forecast model from the Integrated Forecasting System of the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts. This is “widely considered as the leading physics-based numerical weather prediction model”, according to the paper.
They also selected three “leading” AI weather models – the GraphCast model from Google Deepmind, Pangu-Weather developed by Huawei Cloud and the Fuxi model, developed by a team from Shanghai.
The authors then assessed how accurately each model could forecast the extremes observed in the year 2020.
Dr Zhongwei Zhang is the lead author on the study and a researcher at Karlsruhe Institute of Technology. He tells Carbon Brief that many AI weather forecast models were built for “general weather conditions”, as they use all historical weather data to train the models. Meanwhile, forecasting extremes is considered a “secondary task” by the models.
The authors explored a range of different “lead times” – in other words, how far into the future the model is forecasting. For example, a lead time of two days could mean the model uses the weather conditions at midnight on 1 January to simulate weather conditions at midnight on 3 January.
The plot below shows how accurately the models forecasted all extreme events (left) and heat extremes (right) under different lead times. This is measured using “root mean square error” – a metric of how accurate a model is, where a lower value indicates lower error and higher accuracy.
The chart on the left shows how two of the AI models (blue and green) performed better than the physics-based model (black) when forecasting all weather across the year 2020.
However, the chart on the right illustrates how the physics-based model (black) performed better than all three AI models (blue, red and green) when it came to forecasting heat extremes.

The authors note that the performance gap between AI and physics-based models is widest for lower lead times, indicating that AI models have greater difficulty making predictions in the near future.
They find similar results for cold and wind records.
In addition, the authors find that AI models generally “underpredict” temperature during heat records and “overpredict” during cold records.
The study finds that the larger the margin that the record is broken by, the less well the AI model predicts the intensity of the event.
‘Warning shot’
Study author Prof Erich Fischer is a climate scientist at ETH Zurich and a Carbon Brief contributing editor. He tells Carbon Brief that the result is “not unexpected”.
He adds that the analysis is a “warning shot” against replacing traditional models with AI models for weather forecasting “too quickly”.
The analysis, he continues, is a “warning shot” against replacing traditional models with AI models for weather forecasting “too quickly”.
AI models are likely to continue to improve, but scientists should “not yet” fully replace traditional forecasting models with AI ones, according to Fischer.
He explains that accurate forecasts are “most needed” in the runup to potential record-breaking extremes, because they are the trigger for early warning systems that help minimise damages caused by extreme weather.
Leonardo Olivetti is a PhD student at Uppsala University, who has published work on AI weather forecasting and was not involved in the study.
He tells Carbon Brief that “many other studies” have identified issues with using AI models for “extremes”, but this paper is novel for its specific focus on extremes.
Olivetti notes that AI models are already used alongside physics-based models at “some of the major weather forecasting centres around the world”. However, the study results suggest “caution against relying too heavily on these [AI] models”, he says.
Prof Martin Schultz, a professor in computational earth system science at the University of Cologne who was not involved in the study, tells Carbon Brief that the results of the analysis are “very interesting, but not too surprising”.
He adds that the study “justifies the continued use of classical numerical weather models in operational forecasts, in spite of their tremendous computational costs”.
Advances in forecasting
The field of AI weather forecasting is evolving rapidly.
Olivetti notes that the three AI models tested in the study are an “older generation” of AI models. In the last two years, newer “probabilistic” forecast models have emerged that “claim to better capture extremes”, he explains.
The three AI models used in the analysis are “deterministic”, meaning that they only simulate one possible future outcome.
In contrast, study author Engelke tells Carbon Brief that probabilistic models “create several possible future states of the weather” and are therefore more likely to capture record-breaking extremes.
Engelke says it is “important” to evaluate the newer generation of models for their ability to forecast weather extremes.
He adds that this paper has set out a “protocol” for testing the ability of AI models to predict unprecedented extreme events, which he hopes other researchers will go on to use.
The study says that another “promising direction” for future research is to develop models that combine aspects of traditional, physics-based weather forecasts with AI models.
Engelke says this approach would be “best of both worlds”, as it would combine the ability of physics-based models to simulate record-breaking weather with the computational efficiency of AI models.
Dr Kyle Hilburn, a research scientist at Colorado State University, notes that the study does not address extreme rainfall, which he says “presents challenges for both modelling and observing”. This, he says, is an “important” area for future research.
The post Traditional models still ‘outperform AI’ for extreme weather forecasts appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Traditional models still ‘outperform AI’ for extreme weather forecasts
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