At COP29 in Baku, Carbon Brief spoke with Prof Wang Can, director of the department of environmental planning and management at Tsinghua University, to discuss its new study on global carbon neutrality progress.
Tsinghua University is located in Beijing and publishes some of the country’s most prominent climate research, which is often used to inform related policymaking.
The study, published by the university’s Institute for Carbon Neutrality and School of Environment, evaluates different countries’ progress on “[climate and carbon] targets, technology, finance and international cooperation”.
It also identifies “implementation gaps between carbon neutrality targets and emission reduction outcomes”.
In this wide-ranging interview, Wang introduces the institute’s findings and identifies key barriers for the world to reach net-zero emissions.
He also shares reflections on the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), China’s upcoming 2035 climate pledge (NDC), its carbon market, “dual control of carbon” policy, the 14th “five-year plan”, carbon “peaking” timeline, electrification, energy storage and hydrogen.
The interview is transcribed in full below, following a summary of key quotes. The transcript has been edited for length and clarity.
- On the need to implement climate pledges: “We follow the idea of looking at actions rather than declarations.”
- On developing countries’ commitment to climate action: “The determination and the sense of urgency from developing countries in dealing with climate change is very strong. [This is] because they are more vulnerable and more affected by climate change, so they are more active.”
- On China’s 2035 climate pledge (NDC): “The main update will be to benchmark our target against the timeline in the [UN] convention, such as extending our goals through to 2035.”
- On global renewable deployment: “[Global renewable energy] has grown very fast, but if we want to implement the 2030 [tripling target for renewable capacity], it must grow faster.”
- On barriers to tripling renewables: “[Renewable energy] could have been deployed faster…but one of the important factors for why it hasn’t is recent trade barriers…[We found that countries] including the US have such policies.”
- On the EU’s CBAM: “We think that the EU’s CBAM is positive for the EU, because it added to its carbon emissions regulations. It is considered to have improved the EU’s domestic policies. However, it is negative for international cooperation, because it is a unilateral policy.”
- On different pathways to net-zero: “[Some] other countries have already decoupled [the growth of emissions and the economy]. After seeing their economic growth does not require an increase in carbon emissions, [they] then announced carbon peak and carbon neutrality [goals]. China has not yet achieved this, so I think this is also a distinguishing feature and it is representative for developing countries.”
- On China’s carbon market: “I think progress in this area will become faster…A total amount [of emissions reduction] has been set first and then the carbon market can help achieve the total amount target at a low cost.”
- On missing China’s 2025 energy intensity goal: “The individual targets, ultimately, serve China’s broader climate action, so we are not obsessed with whether this goal is achieved or not.”
- On China’s emissions peaking early: “I personally would not rule out that there could be a rebound or emissions increase at a certain point, such as 2024 or 2025…Overall, [judging from] recent developments and trends…we are in a stage close to reaching the peak, or similarly a plateau period. I think I agree with this judgment.”
- On China’s electrification: “Electrification is not in a competitive relationship with renewable energy, but a complement – they support each other…In the process of building such a new energy and renewable energy-dominated power system, electrification at the end-use is very helpful.”
- On the need for energy-storage systems: “Energy storage is an indispensable component in the construction of the new energy system, whose main component is renewable energy.”
- On hydrogen: “There are many problems now, such as high costs, difficulty in storing and transporting and, in the long run, these need to be solved. We must work hard to solve them, because without it, the future system and the path for carbon neutrality may fail.”
Carbon Brief: What’s the most important finding of your research?
Wang Can: We tracked the progress [of countries’ carbon neutrality efforts] from the perspective of implementation. We paid more attention to actions and used scientific methods to evaluate them. Carbon goals are set for decades in the future – if we simply look at the goals, it is difficult to evaluate whether our current actions are sufficient, so a scientific and systematic method is needed to evaluate them. We think actions are important, and the method of evaluating action is also important.
CB: Your report found developing countries have a higher “ambition index” while developed countries have a lower ambition index. What does “ambition index” mean here?
WC: When we talk about ambition index or use index to express what I said earlier, we follow the idea of looking at actions rather than declarations. Hence we revise countries’ ambition indexes. For example, a country might advertise that it wants to achieve carbon neutrality as soon as possible, but take the action of setting up various barriers to hinder the flow of technology and hinder global cooperation. [Therefore,] it may be very ambitious in terms of goals, but its actions have negative effects. Our index will take these into account and, after considering these factors, assign a score. As of last year, some developing countries have scored higher, while some developed countries have relatively lower ambition indexes.
CB: So you mean you check goals of countries announced in their NDCs and give positive or negative points for their climate actions, and then calculate a score for their ambition index?
WC: Yes.
CB: Were you surprised by the results?
WC: I am not surprised, because I have been involved in the negotiation of the [UN] climate convention for more than ten years. From the negotiation process, we can feel that the determination and the sense of urgency from developing countries in dealing with climate change is very strong. [This is] because they are more vulnerable and more affected by climate change, so they are more active. Although developed countries have the ability and technology, and their scientists have more systematic and scientific knowledge in this regard, they are not as persistent as developing countries like China. Once [China] announced [its climate] goal, it systematically and continuously progresses. [Developed countries did not do the same] due to considerations for economy and international trade competition.
CB: The west is particularly interested in China’s 2035 NDC. What new climate goal do you think China would propose or what should be written in the next NDC?
WC: I think the next NDC will still be in line with our “dual carbon” policy [of peaking emissions before 2030 and reaching carbon neutrality before 2060]. The main update will be to benchmark our target against the timeline in the [UN] convention, such as extending our goals through to 2035. We already have a target for what we should achieve by 2030, and [the next NDC instead prompts] a new round of what we should achieve by 2035. Different stages have different tasks, but they both are under the same overall framework. China has already [announced] its “dual carbon’” goals, [set] two time points [of 2030 and 2060], and [established] the “1+N” policy system. I think [the NDC] is nothing more than specifying tasks for from 2030 to 2035 under such a system. This is my personal understanding and expectation.
CB: Your report said that the current speed of renewable energy development globally is insufficient to meet COP28’s tripling target for 2030 and there is a “large gap” in the deployment scale required to meet climate targets. What are the main factors holding back faster growth?
WC: I’m not sure if your question is completely consistent with the point we want to express in the report. My understanding of what we said in the report is that although we have seen rapid development of renewable energy, and it is very optimistic in recent years, there is still a gap compared to the requirements of tripling global renewable power capacity by 2030 and the global net-zero target by 2050.
[Global renewable energy] has grown very fast, but if we want to implement the 2030 [tripping target for renewable capacity], it must grow faster, especially from a global perspective. Now there are a few countries, such as China and Indonesia in south-east Asia, that have deployed [renewable energy] very quickly in the past one or two years, but globally we have not seen the speed we expected. This is what we want to convey at the core, or what we especially want to convey.
The reason behind this is that we believe that [renewable energy] technology has developed to a stage, from our research, that it could have been deployed faster. After it is deployed faster and more widely [in the future], the speed of progress of this technology will accelerate, and it will enter a positive cycle. This could have happened, but one of the important factors for why it hasn’t is recent trade barriers, and the extension of trade barriers from [targeting] originally high-tech and communications products to [also targeting] renewable energy that addresses climate change.
This type of trade barrier is a typical practice, based on traditional and very narrow economic interests. It may have ignored the fact, which actually comes from western international trade theory, that free international trade can promote economic development, technological progress, and thus bring a new round of win-win situation. Short-sighted behavior ignores [this]. In the field of renewable energy, the medium- and long-term economic benefits, as well as a firm commitment to climate change, have both been given up [by western countries]. So this, in our view, is a problem facing the development of renewable energy that needs to be solved.
CB: Can you please give an example of the trade barrier you mentioned?
WC: Increased tariffs, for instance – imposing [high] tariffs on renewable energy equipment imports, and the intentional imposition of such tariffs. This example is what we referenced in our country analysis. [We found that countries] including the US have such policies. Our report set a framework in which we checked whether there are trade barrier policies in place, whether [such policies] are enforced, and then, if they are, we look at whether they targeted green and low-carbon technology that we need for cutting emissions. If so, we then gave different weights and negative scores.
CB: What is the trade barrier or barriers that bring the worst impacts currently?
WC: The import controls on wind and solar, adding tariffs on them, or commerce control lists of this kind.
CB: Mainly in the US?
WC: Mainly in the US.
CB: What do you think about the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM)?
WC: In our evaluation, we think that the EU’s CBAM is positive for the EU, because it added to its carbon emissions regulations. It is considered to have improved the EU’s domestic policies. However, it is negative for international cooperation, because it is a unilateral policy, and its impact may hinder the flow of technology mentioned earlier, the rapid diffusion of technology and the rapid deployment of advanced technology around the world.
Of course, we have to look further and look at it in more detail, because the scope of the industry that CBAM covers will change in the years ahead. At present, from the perspective of international cooperation, its negative weight is not high. From the perspective of execution, although it mainly covers electricity and hydrogen energy [as well as other industries], its scope is not very large at present.
CB: Your report says that there is no “single zero-carbon pathway” that would be universally applicable for all. Instead, it says “differentiated measures are needed for different types of countries”. What’s the best pathway for China to reach carbon neutrality and how does that differ to others?
WC: Yes, what we want to say is that there is no single model that is suitable for all countries to achieve net-zero. Different countries are at different stages of development, their economic structures are different, their resources are different, and even their institutional political structure as well as cultural characteristics are different, so the paths to achieve net-zero will definitely be different. Countries do have differences in policies, [climate] targets, technologies, funds, and international cooperation methods – what we just discussed – [so] we think that different countries should have different models.
For China, “dual carbon” is a policy goal with Chinese characteristics. We need to reach carbon peak before 2030 and achieve neutrality before 2060. The carbon peak before 2030 means that we still need time to decouple economic development from carbon emissions. If we don’t reach the peak, it means that we haven’t decoupled these things yet. Economic growth [still leads to] an increase in carbon emissions. Why is that? Because we are still a developing country, and the largest developing country – the developing country with the most industry in the world. Our manufacturing industry is relatively large, our population is large, and we are still in the process of urbanisation and industrialisation. Carbon emissions and economic development have not yet been completely decoupled. Even in such a situation, we have proposed the goal of achieving carbon neutrality, which further reflects our ambition and determination.
[Some] other countries have already decoupled [the growth of emissions and the economy]. After seeing their economic growth does not require an increase in carbon emissions, [they] then announced carbon peak and carbon neutrality [goals]. China has not yet achieved this, so I think this is also a distinguishing feature, and it is representative for developing countries. Many developing countries are similar to us. They have not achieved decoupling, but want to specify response to climate change and achieve the two goals [of carbon peak and neutrality]. To reach net-zero globally by the middle of this century, developing countries introduced some targets and paths.
So what is the path? Achieve neutrality after peaking. First, there is a stage of rapid peaking, and to peak as low as possible. In this stage, technical support, financial support, and even some capacity buildings are needed. For example, China is building a carbon market as a policy tool. Currently it is still in the stage of capacity building – collecting carbon emission data, [improving] professional trading capabilities of the market, and so on. This stage is very important for China. If the foundation is not laid solid at this stage, then after reaching the peak, the stage of carbon reduction and achieving carbon neutrality may take a relatively long time, making it more difficult for us to achieve carbon neutrality.
CB: Speaking of China’s carbon market, in our previous Carbon Brief reports, some analysts said that it is not fully active yet, and that trade may have not achieved its maximum potential. How can we maximise the potential of the carbon market?
WC: I think progress in this area will become faster. Because this year [2024], the State Council issued a work plan for the transition from “dual control of energy” consumption to “dual control of carbon”, and clarified a timetable [for this]. From now to 2030, the main mechanism is controlling carbon intensity [the emissions per unit of GDP], with total control [in tonnes of carbon emissions] as a secondary mechanism. But at the same time, [developing] some total control mechanisms should be explored. After China’s carbon emissions peak in 2030, total control [in tonnes of CO2] will be the main mechanism [of controlling carbon emissions], supplemented by [carbon] intensity control.
As long as there is a total control target, the carbon trading and carbon market system can play a role in lowering emissions. Because a policy tool such as carbon trading essentially aims to achieve a certain set target for total emissions at a low cost. A target for total emissions control only gives an amount [to reach], but whether this target is allocated to emitting entities efficiently or not isn’t something the government has enough information to determine. Through carbon trading and carbon markets, emission reductions can be achieved at the lowest cost. So to answer your question directly, when a total amount [of emissions reduction] has been set first and then the carbon market can help achieve the total amount target at a low cost.
CB: You mentioned the transfer from “dual control of energy” to “dual control of carbon emissions”. There are suggestions that China’s total emission intensity target could be missed because this year’s GDP growth is slower than emissions rates. Do you think this has a big impact?
WC: What impact are you referring to?
CB: The 14th “five-year plan”. The 14th five-year plan has set a total energy intensity reduction goal but it could be missed because economic growth is slower than energy consumption.
WC: The energy intensity goal, yes.
CB: Do you think this will slow down the entire emission reduction process [planned in the 14th “five-year plan”]?
WC: I think this [energy intensity] goal is to serve the broader goal of emissions reduction, so whether it was achievable or not may have been a factor that was considered when the goal was originally set. For example, when the goal was set around 2020, it did not take into account the economic form and technological changes of recent years. In fact, there is another goal corresponding to this goal, which is the total amount of renewable energy [for 1,200GW of wind and solar capacity by 2030]…[which was] achieved very quickly. So we set some goals that are easy to achieve and some goals that may be more difficult to achieve than expected. I think I should go back to my previous point that the individual targets, ultimately, serve China’s broader climate action, so we are not obsessed with whether this goal is achieved or not.
From the perspective of promoting “dual carbon” work in recent years, China has made great progress in the construction of its [climate] policies, reducing the cost of developing renewable energy technologies, and [increasing] the pace of deploying [them]. From the central government to the provincial government and then to the city-level government, there is a top-down push for capacity building and promotion of [the government’s] ecological work around raising public awareness and collecting data, such as the building blocks for baseline data, including exploring the integration of carbon assessments into environmental impact assessments. These are also the views expressed in our report on global progress on carbon neutrality. From this perspective, we think that China’s work over the past three years – since general secretary Xi Jinping announced the “dual-carbon” goals – has been on the right track, helping us achieve carbon peak before 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060.
We are doing solid ground work. It’s not a slogan or “campaign-style” work that could lead to [short-term] reductions that later rebound. If we want to reduce them sustainably, a systematic change in the economy and society is needed. This systematic change must come from the perspectives just mentioned, and we must do some ground work. [The changes brought about by] some work may not be fast in the short term, as [emissions] are still in a climbing stage, and the total amount [of emissions] has not been completely reduced. But this is what we are doing in the short term to prepare for the long term, and the short term is a stage that we can’t avoid.
CB: We previously published an analysis that China may have already achieved carbon peak in 2023, based on data. What do you think about this research finding?
WC: I think predicting a peak is not a scientific approach. So far, I have not seen any indicators or studies that can predict a country has reached a peak. It is something that must be judged by time, and it may take several years [after a peak appears to occur] because emissions may rebound. Of course, there are many factors to consider in analysis and research, such as the growth of the population, the growth of the economy, industrial structure, and energy demand and the energy technology behind it.
There are many indicators that could help us do this analysis. Based on analysis of the existing indicators, I think it is not wrong to [say China has] reached its peak in 2023, and this is definitely credible. But I personally would not rule out that there could be a rebound or emissions increase at a certain point, such as 2024 or 2025. Overall, [judging from] recent developments and trends, including the systematic preparations we have made and the determination of the central government work towards the “dual carbon” goals, we are in a stage close to reaching the peak, or similarly a plateau period. I think I agree with this judgment.
[Carbon Brief analysis published since this interview took place shows that China’s CO2 emissions stopped rising for the last 10 months of 2024, but still grew slightly overall.]
CB: Your previous work has pointed towards the economic benefits of electrification as an approach to cutting emissions. The IEA [International Energy Agency] has also recently highlighted China’s rapid progress on this front. Can you talk about China’s strategy here, the current situation with electrification and what China can do to move forward?
WC: In my articles, electrification is not in a competitive relationship with renewable energy, but a complement – they support each other. Renewable energy replaces fossil energy and builds a new power system – a goal we hope to achieve for net-zero [efforts]. In the process of building such a new energy and renewable energy-dominated power system, electrification at the end-use is very helpful. Why is that? Because electrification at the end-use has implications for energy saving and can also adjust the unstable supply of renewable energy. At the same time, electrification can better absorb some energy storage facilities [integrate energy storage into the energy system] and accelerate energy storage’s technological progress. In addition, electrification reduces dependence on fossil energy. It is not in an “either/or” [zero-sum game] with renewable energy. The more renewable energy develops, the more confident we are that it should be used for end-use consumption.
CB: Can you please explain a bit more? How can electrification ‘absorb energy storage’?
WC: Electrification is the direct consumption of energy at the end-use, such as boilers. So when we talk about electrification, we need to look at what is being electrified. Electrification is [using electric boilers] to replace the use of coal-fired and natural gas-fired boilers for heating in industries, or using electric vehicles (EVs) to replace gasoline cars, or using induction cookers to replace natural gas for cooking. All these directly reduce [the consumption of] fossil energy.
[If] all the traditional fossil energy uses are replaced by electricity, our demand for energy storage will not grow. EVs are applications of lithium batteries being used in the automotive field. Heat pumps and electronic heat pumps for industr[ial production] can also be equipped with energy storage. This opens up a new demand for energy storage at the end-use. Energy storage is an indispensable component in the construction of the new energy system, whose main component is renewable energy. As we mentioned above, energy storage is a link in this system.
CB: Electric heat pumps are generally used in the south while central heating with coal is more common in the north. Are there methods, such as policy support, that can help the north to quickly transfer to heat pumps?
WC: I am not particularly clear about this issue, but I believe that it is centred on technical difficulties. Because the demand for heat in the north is more fundamental and urgent than that in the south. For example, heating under low temperature conditions is a livelihood issue [in the north]. In the south, the demand for heat pumps may be met by low-temperature boilers for production, which can be produced today, tonight, or tomorrow, with certain production flexibility. Therefore, the supply of heat pumps in the south is not so urgent. In the north, [central heating with coal] can be more secure. So there may be different [requirements] in security, technology and applicability of heat pumps. I think it is not just a policy issue, it needs further developments in technology.
CB: What do you think about hydrogen?
WC: I would think that, just like electrification, it may be a very important technical field for the construction of a carbon-neutral technology system in the future. One of the characteristics of renewable energy, once the supply becomes high, is that it is intermittent, so it requires energy storage. Energy storage means that it can store energy when there is no demand, and provide some when supply cannot meet demand. [Hydrogen] is both a better energy storage and a way to develop chemical reserves, because its production method, electrolysis, can use surplus renewable energy. This surplus renewable energy comes from solar and wind energy.
Such an energy storage method is [different from] traditional hydrogen production, where hydrogen is a by-product of the chemical industry or even converted directly from oil and fossil fuels. This is a [current] trend and form of energy conversion, not a form of energy storage. [But] in the carbon-neutral technical system, hydrogen is a form of energy storage.
The core difference is a power system featured with renewable energy, whose marginal cost is very low – almost zero marginal running costs. So after wind and solar are deployed – after the costs of infrastructure and fixed asset investment – the cost for electricity generation via wind and solar is almost zero. The zero marginal running cost can be used for electrolysis. You can understand it as using zero cost for hydrogen production. At that time, the cost of hydrogen will be very low.
CB: But I heard the cost for hydrogen production is quite high currently?
WC: Yes, that’s because enough progress hasn’t been made yet. When we are still using water electrolysis to make hydrogen, the cost of wind and solar power is spread over the electricity used to electrolyse water. It is not using surplus [renewable] electricity for electrolysis, because there is not that much surplus electricity. When the proportion of wind and solar power in our power system reaches a certain level, there will be more surplus electricity. In order to store the surplus electricity, we currently use lithium batteries and other [technologies] to store this electricity, instead of using electrolysis to make hydrogen. So I think hydrogen is a new form of energy storage.
At the same time, hydrogen is also a clean new energy form for end-use. It can replace natural gas and gasoline. After it is converted into ammonia, it can also replace oil used in heavy trucks and even cruise ships. It is a foreseeable clean energy form and an end-use energy. So I think it is very critical. There are many problems now, such as high costs, difficulty in storing and transporting and, in the long run, these need to be solved. We must work hard to solve them, because without it, the future system and the path for carbon neutrality may fail. So it is a key and indispensable technology.
The interview was conducted by Wanyuan Song at COP29 in Baku on 16 November 2024.
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After a five-year long legal battle, the Constitutional Court of South Africa has blocked Shell and local partner Impact Africa’s permit to explore for oil and gas off the country’s East Coast, in a landmark victory for local communities and civil society.
“Today’s judgment makes me feel very happy and proud that the ocean is not for profit for mining companies,” said East Coast resident and environmental campaigner Siyabonga Ndovela.
The verdict culminates a years-long process in which non-profits Sustaining the Wild Coast, Natural Justice, Greenpeace Africa, and others took legal action against Shell, Impact Africa and the South African government for failing to consult affected communities – a legal requirement in the country.
The Constitutional Court ruled that Shell and Impact Africa had not complied with resource governance law, had failed to meaningfully conduct public consultation and had failed to consider the impact on climate change, cultural rights, livelihoods and ecological harm.
The ruling references last year’s landmark advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice, which states that countries have a legal duty to prevent and repair damage to the climate system. The South African judges argued climate change “transcends borders” and that states’ obligations “must be understood within the broader framework of international law.”
“This case must also be understood against the backdrop of well-documented struggles by coastal communities to protect their land, marine resources and ways of life in the face of extractive activities that they believe threaten their very existence,” wrote Justice Narandran Kollapen.
The Constitutional Court found that the exploration right had been unlawfully granted by the Department of Mineral and Petroleum Resources.The ruling upholds a 2022 regional court decision against Shell and overturns a 2024 appeal that allowed the company to conduct fresh public consultations under the original exploration right. Today’s decision means the right, initially granted in 2014, must be set aside.
Celebrating the decision, Sherelee Odyar, oil and gas campaigner at Greenpeace Africa, told Climate Home News that the court confirmed “serious failures” in the awarding of exploration rights to Shell and Impact Africa, which “can not simply be corrected later”.
The Wild Coast is a biodiversity hotspot which has been conserved over generations by coastal communities who rely on the ocean and land. “Our land and sea are central to our livelihoods and our way of life. Over generations we have conserved them, and they have conserved us,” reads the founding statement in the case.
A Shell spokesperson said it noted the ruling, responding that “we are committed to responsible offshore exploration, meaningful stakeholder engagement and environmental stewardship.”
The Department of Mineral and Petroleum Resources did not respond to requests for comment at the time of publication.
“Renewed strength” for communities
The ruling adds to a series of legal challenges brought by civil society groups against oil companies and the government as South Africa has expanded oil and gas development since 2014 under Operation Phakisa, a plan aimed at “unlocking the economic potential of the oceans”.
On the West Coast, Walter Steenkamp, Chair of Aukotowa Fisheries Cooperative, which is involved in a separate ongoing legal action against TotalEnergies, said that “today’s court case gave me renewed strength.”
The case could also set a precedent for future oil developments, said Alessandro Mazzi, legal governance researcher at the University of Wageningen. He added that the verdict “sends a strong signal to investors that where projects affect people’s land, livelihoods and environment, meaningful consultation and genuine ecological assessment are an integral part of responsible investment”.
Janet Solomon, coordinator of advocacy group Oceans not Oil, said that the Court’s emphasis on democratic participation, culture, livelihoods and the health of future generations in handing down the verdict signals a shift in jurisprudence on environmental governance, saying that this focus “may prove to be the judgment’s most enduring legacy.”
The post South Africa’s top court blocks Shell’s offshore oil exploration right appeared first on Climate Home News.
South Africa’s top court blocks Shell’s offshore oil exploration right
China has published a new five-year plan for coal, the latest in a slew of important policy documents for the country’s energy transition.
The 15th five-year plan for the development of the coal industry was published by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the National Energy Administration (NEA) on 10 August, covering the period 2026-2030.
This is a key period, covering the years building up to China’s pledge to peak its carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions “before 2030”.
Government-affiliated organisations had previously mooted the possibility of coal consumption peaking before 2027.
However, the new plan does not set a specific, government-endorsed year for peaking coal consumption, instead including a broader goal to peak use of the fuel in this five-year period.
It also discusses the “green and low-carbon transition” of the coal industry, coal-related methane emissions and the “clean and efficient use” of the fuel.
But, in general, the plan emphasises the importance of coal in China’s energy system and focuses on the systems underpinning its production.
Analysts tell Carbon Brief that the plan confirms a “broader trend” – driven by the conflict in the Middle East – in which coal’s role in China as a “cheap and secure” source of energy is reinforced – instead of plotting a phase-down or transition for the industry.
Nevertheless, as the deadline for peaking CO2 emissions looms, the plan does warn the sector of the need to diversify into other industries – including clean energy and chemicals – as coal consumption peaks.
Below, Carbon Brief looks closer at what the plan means for China’s use of coal over the next five years and how it relates to wider climate targets.
What does the plan say about peaking coal?
Five-year plans are a key tool in Chinese governance, used to guide economic and social development across the economy.
The plan for coal is the latest topic-specific document to address climate and energy matters within the 15th five-year plan period of 2026-30. It is subordinate to the overarching 15th five-year plan, which covers China’s broad socio-economic strategy.
Other topic-specific plans for the period cover climate change, developing a “new-type energy system” and renewable energy, among other topics.
The coal plan opens by stating that coal is a “foundational [source of] energy” for China:
“[Coal is] vital to the national economy, people’s livelihoods and national energy security, and plays a crucial role in providing foundational support and systemic regulation within the energy supply system.”
However, the plan also covers the 15th five-year plan period (2026-2030), the final five-year period before China is expected to have peaked its carbon emissions.
The 15th five-year plan period marks a time of “significant transformation” for the coal industry, the plan says.
Policy documents issued in April 2026 called for the “strict control” of fossil fuels and created a framework for local governments to be graded on coal use in their region.
Coal has traditionally been the largest source of energy in China and is responsible for around 80% of its emissions.
But its role is gradually being superseded by non-fossil energy, which accounted for more than half of the country’s power mix in 2025. In the first half of 2026, coal supplied less than 50% of power generation, while its share of total energy consumption fell to 51.4%, as shown below.
The five-year plan for coal signals “continuity” of China’s aim of “safeguarding energy security while advancing the low-carbon transition”, says Kevin Tu, non-resident fellow at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy.
Another key factor behind the plan is concerns from policymakers around energy security, exacerbated by the conflict in the Middle East.
In an article published in early August, the Communist party-affiliated People’s Daily noted the “severe volatility” the war has created in energy markets, adding that “China’s energy system has withstood these shocks”.
It quoted NEA head Wang Hongzhi stating in a press conference that “coal is [China’s] greatest source of confidence in ensuring a stable energy supply”.
The conflict will “reinforce coal’s role in China’s energy system”, both as a source of energy and as a feedstock for commodities, Li Shuo, China climate hub director at the Asia Society Policy Institute, tells Carbon Brief.
The plan outlines a number of aims to be achieved by 2030, starting with a goal to “further strengthen” the coal industry’s “ability to be a ‘bottom-line guarantee’”.
The other targets in the plan, to be achieved by 2030, include:
- Peaking coal consumption;
- “Basically establishing” a modern coal-industrial system;
- Optimising the “layout” of coal production and development;
- Increasing the proportion of “high-quality, advanced” coal-production capacity;
- “Clearly improving” levels of “safe, green development” and “clean, efficient use” of coal;
- Increasing the share of coal produced by “large-scale, modernised coal mines” to 87%;
- Developing a diversified coal-based industrial structure;
- Improving mechanisms to ensure a “dynamic balance” between supply and demand.
The large share of China’s CO2 emissions that come from coal and China’s carbon-peaking and neutrality targets are not the main focus of the five-year plan.
“This is clearly neither a coal phase-out nor phase-down plan,” Tu tells Carbon Brief. He adds that it grants China “considerable flexibility…over the pace of the transition”.
A pledge to peak coal consumption during the five-year plan period is reiterated several times in the document. Notably, the plan says that China will “promote coal consumption successfully reaching a peak”.
This, it says, is “guided” by China’s “dual-carbon” goals for peaking and neutrality, but is also based on the premise of “guaranteeing the secure supply of energy”
However, the plan does not provide a government-endorsed target year for peaking consumption.
State-affiliated organisations, such as Xinhua, have suggested that coal consumption is “expected to peak around 2027”. Independent analysis has stated that emissions from coal consumption may have already peaked.
“The absence of a 2027 deadline is significant, but I would be careful not to over-interpret it,” Tu tells Carbon Brief.
While a 2027 peak for coal remains possible, in his view, it is dependent on factors such as “electricity-demand growth, renewable generation, industrial activity, weather conditions and coal demand from the chemical sector”.
Similarly, Li believes that it will be “market and technological progress”, rather than state directives, that determine exactly when coal consumption and emissions will peak.
“Beijing’s regulatory interventions, if any, will be limited to making sure the peaking timelines do not blow past 2030,” he says.
What does the plan say about China’s coal production?
The plan does not set a concrete target for coal production during the five-year plan period. In contrast, total coal production targets for 2015 and 2020 had been set in the 12th and 13th five-year plans.
The plan also reduces a target for “reserve production” capacity, which was first announced in 2024.
The plan reiterates that, by 2030, China should “establish a coal reserve-production capacity of 100m metric tonnes or more per year”. This was first mentioned in the 15th five-year plan for building a “new-type energy system”, published in June.
Despite China’s rapid buildout of renewable energy, reserve coal capacity is necessary, argues state news agency Xinhua. It says that, to balance the variability of renewable energy, coal will shift to “playing a supporting and regulating role to safeguard energy supply”.
Nevertheless, the new reserve goal is lower than the target of 300m tonnes of coal set when China first announced the establishment of the system in 2024.
“Overall, this five-year plan is targeted at the coal industry, not the energy transition”, says Yang Biqing, energy analyst at Ember, although the energy transition and the peaking of coal consumption form the overarching context for the plan.
Provinces in northern China will continue to provide the majority of China’s coal, according to the plan.
It reiterates a pledge from the new-type energy five-year plan that China will continue building “coal-supply security bases” in the provinces of Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi and Xinjiang. It says these bases will supply more than 80% of China’s coal by 2030.
This does not indicate a change in direction, as coal production is already increasingly concentrated in northern China. In 2025, 82% of China’s coal came from these four provinces.
New or expanded coal mines in these provinces – with the exception of southern Xinjiang – must have a minimum annual production capacity of 1.2m tonnes, says the plan.
This is an “important signal”, Tu tells Carbon Brief. He notes that the plans suggest that “China’s coal transition is not simply about reducing the quantity consumed”, but also about creating a “more concentrated, efficient, flexible and resilient” coal system.
The plan also calls for a more centralised approach to managing coal. It states that in 2026-2030, any new production capacity must be “included in the single ledger” – essentially meaning that it must be approved by the central government – before it can be implemented.
Yang tells Carbon Brief that this could indicate that the government is trying to prevent a potential “rush” to get new capacity approved as coal consumption starts to plateau and fall.
What does the plan say about coal’s greenhouse gas emissions?
The plan includes sections on the need to “accelerate” the low-carbon transition of the industry, as well as the “clean and efficient use” of coal.
The former section largely focuses on the production and processing of coal, while the latter addresses emissions associated with its consumption.
Suggested policies include promoting energy efficiency, water conservancy and electrification, coupled with greater use of renewable-energy sources at coal mines.
In addition to promoting a successful peaking of coal consumption, the plan also re-affirms existing policies around promoting energy efficiency and carbon-emission reduction.
It calls for “accelerate energy conservation and consumption reduction in key coal-consuming industries”, largely through methods already established by existing policies.
This includes phasing out inefficient coal-fired equipment, replacing coal-fired equipment with “clean energy” alternatives, reducing use of “dispersed coal” and promoting clean heating sources such as distributed solar heating and waste heat utilisation.
Tom Wang, executive director of People of Asia for Climate Solutions, describes the plan as “more of a coal exploration plan, rather than a coal transition plan”. He tells Carbon Brief that while several policies call for “green” or “smart” development, the plan does not address the greenhouse gas emissions underpinning each step of coal extraction, processing and combustion.
Another major focus is on utilisation of coalbed methane, a significant source of China’s methane emissions.
China will “implement work plans to increase coalbed-methane reserves and production”, the plan says, including a “rapid ramp-up” of production in deep coalbed-methane sites.
Affixed to the main five-year plan is an appendix further detailing plans for coalbed methane.
It notes that utilising coalbed methane has “multiple benefits”, such as improving safety, “increasing the supply of clean energy” and reducing emissions. [Methane is a fossil fuel.]
The government is targeting 26bn cubic metres of coalbed-methane production and 6.5bn cubic metres of mine-gas utilisation by 2030, it says.
At least 18bn cubic metres will be sourced from the Ordos Basin, a region spanning several northern provinces, according to an action plan published by the NEA.
In its coverage of the Ordos action plan, the state-run newspaper China Daily said that developing coalbed methane is a “vital strategic move to optimise [China’s] energy mix and ensure domestic gas supply”.
Reporting by Xinhua and economic news outlet Jiemian said that coalbed methane could help China become an “energy powerhouse” and “secure [its] energy self-sufficiency”, respectively.
In addition, the coal industry will “steadily advance methane-emission control” and “actively participate in the reduction of non-carbon dioxide greenhouse gas emissions”, according to the appendix.
However, Sun Xiaopu, senior China counsel at the thinktank Institute For Governance and Sustainable Development, tells Carbon Brief, the plan “does not establish an absolute methane-emissions reduction target”.
She notes that the implications for emissions may only become clear as implementation frameworks for meeting the utilisation targets are released.
How does the plan tell coal companies to evolve?
Despite reaffirming the importance of coal, the plan emphasises that the overall role of the fuel in China will change. It adds that the coal industry must adapt to this changing reality.
As the coal industry “modernises”, coal companies must “strengthen management” of mine closures and exit plans. They must also plan for a “smooth transition” and “prudently handle” workforce relocation, debt resolution and ecological restoration, it says.
Companies should also be supported in expanding into industries such as “power, new energy and chemicals”, according to the plan.
A number of major coal producers, as well as at least one oil giant, have already established wings focused on “new energy”.
But the focus on the use of coal to make chemicals is one of the “most consequential parts of the plan”, says Tu.
China must promote the shift to coal being used “equally” as a fuel and a feedstock, the plan says.
The plan urges policymakers to push through “construction of strategic coal-to-oil and gas bases”
The chemicals sector is China’s fastest source of emissions growth, although it remains well behind power and other industries in terms of total emissions.
Tu notes that the plan calls on the coal-chemicals industry to decarbonise production, such as through low-carbon power, green hydrogen and carbon capture, utilisation and storage.
As such, he says, the policy signal is “not to exit coal chemicals, but to make them more efficient, higher-value and potentially less carbon-intensive”.
Li echoes this, telling Carbon Brief that the sector is “likely to receive a major boost from the conflict in Iran”. He adds:
“We will probably see further capacity expansion in the sector and I doubt environmental arguments will convince Chinese authorities to take a different approach.”
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The post Q&A: What does China’s 15th five-year plan for coal mean for climate action? appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: What does China’s 15th five-year plan for coal mean for climate action?
The world saw the lowest amount of new coal mine capacity brought online for at least 10 years in 2025, according to a new report, as clean energy displaces coal for electricity generation in East Asia.
A report by Global Energy Monitor (GEM) found that new coal mine capacity declined by nearly 40% from 2024, the second consecutive year new mine capacity has hit a decade low. This represents an acceleration of a steady decline that began in 2019.
The slowdown in new coal mine openings was driven by China and Australia, where new additions fell by 44% and 96%, respectively. In China, the report said this was partly due to solar and wind displacing coal for electricity generation – although coal rebounded in the first half of 2026 – and the National Energy Administration implementing new rules to curb new mine openings.
In Australia, a 96% reduction in new coal mine capacity was driven by shrinking demand from the countries that import Australian coal for electricity, like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, the report said.
This trend is likely to continue, according to GEM, as the Australian state of New South Wales recently banned new coal mines on undeveloped greenfield land. South Korea has promised to stop building coal-fired power plants that cannot capture and store the emissions produced. Meanwhile, Japan is pushing for a post-Fukushima nuclear revival to displace coal.
This Australian coal community is co-designing its own green future
Globally, growth in coal demand has slowed over the last few years and the International Energy Agency expects it to plateau through to 2030 because of the growth of renewable energy, nuclear and fossil gas.
Openings down, pipeline up
But while new coal mine openings fell, the amount of global coal mine capacity proposed increased by 11%. This was almost entirely driven by a spate of projects in the eastern Indian states of Jharkhand and Odisha.
“If built,” the GEM report says, “the projects would commit India – a country with no formal coal phaseout timeline – to years of coal expansion and would put a 1.5C-aligned transition away from fossil fuels farther out of reach”.
The Indian government says it needs to increase coal production to meet growing electricity demand from economic growth and from dealing with heatwaves. It plans to open more than 20 new coal mines to meet its coal production targets.
Because of energy security concerns, India is also aiming to produce chemicals with Indian coal rather than imported gas. China is also pursuing this strategy, although the Global Energy Monitor report said that Indian coal’s high ash content means the South Asian nation will find it harder to make chemicals from coal.
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Nations agreed at COP26 five years ago to “phase down” coal power – a commitment that China and India successfully pushed to weaken from “phase out”. At COP28 in 2023, governments agreed to transition away from all fossil fuels in energy systems.
Since then, wealthy nations have partnered with coal-producing countries like South Africa, Vietnam and Indonesia on plans to transition from coal to clean energy. But, after preliminary talks, India and these governments did not agree a JETP.
The post New coal mine openings slow as East Asian demand plateaus appeared first on Climate Home News.
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