The future of fossil fuels – and whether to agree to phase them “down” or “out” – is shaping up to be a key battle at the COP28 climate talks in Dubai.
While some parties and groups would like to see a deal on phasing out all fossil fuels, others only want to restrict “unabated” coal, oil and gas. Some are opposed to both options.
Meanwhile, alternative formulations are emerging, tying renewable expansion to fossil fuel “substitution”, adding additional verbs such as “accelerating”, adverbs such as “rapidly” or adding timescales such as “this decade”.
The fight over using the phrase “unabated” fossil fuels, implicitly accompanied by its opposite – “abated” – raises the question of exactly what these terms mean.
“Unabated” refers to the burning of fossil fuels where resulting carbon dioxide (CO2) or other greenhouse gas emissions are released directly into the atmosphere, adding to global warming.
Conversely, “abated” refers to the burning of coal, oil and gas combined with the capture and permanent storage of some proportion of the resulting greenhouse gases. This proportion is a key detail as there is no agreed definition of what “abated” means.
The ongoing use of fossil fuels with carbon capture and storage (CCS) features in almost all 1.5C pathways, but only to a very limited extent.
Today, CCS barely exists and relying on a major scale-up is considered “risky”. If CCS is limited to plausible levels, then fossil fuel use would have to fall even faster.
While there is disagreement over the difference between “phase down” and “phase out”, the production and use of fossil fuels drops dramatically in all 1.5C pathways.
This Q&A explains the term “unabated fossil fuels”, the science behind fossil-fuel phaseout and the positions of different countries on what should be agreed in relation to fossil fuels at COP28.
The Glasgow climate pact, agreed at the COP26 climate talks in 2021, was the first COP decision to mention any fossil fuel – specifically coal – and this reference was tied to the word “unabated”.
However, this word was not defined and there remains a level of uncertainty around what the associated term “abated” actually means in practice. For example, could a coal-fired power plant capture 10% of the CO2 it produces and still argue its emissions were abated?
Speaking to Carbon Brief, Dr Alaa Al Khourdajie, a research fellow at Imperial College London, says these disagreements highlighted the need to be “transparent and crystal clear about what abated fossil fuels means”. Al Khourdajie says:
“In the absence of such a clear set of criteria, any capture rate – for example, 50-60% – of carbon emissions could be casually considered abated. This cannot be left ambiguous. Looking at the findings of the technical assessment of the first ‘global stocktake’ discussions, the term unabated is used very heavily in the findings.
“But there is a lack of clarity about what counts as unabated and what counts as abated, largely due to the absence of such agreed definitions in the underlying literature at the time of those negotiations.”
The word “unabated” appeared, once again, in the IPCC’s sixth assessment Working Group III report on how to tackle climate change. The report concluded:
“In all scenarios [limiting warming in 2100 to below 1.5C], fossil fuel use is greatly reduced and unabated coal use is completely phased out by 2050.”
(IPCC chair Prof Jim Skea repeated these lines to COP28 delegates, at a 4 December event.)
Moreover, for the first time, the 2022 IPCC report also included a definition of unabated and abated fossil fuels. This definition was added, by Al Khourdajie and other IPCC authors, as a footnote to the summary for policymakers (SPM), after the word “unabated” was added to the summary.
“At the SPM approval session, a group of parties was very insistent on adding the word ‘unabated’ in front of any language on fossil fuels – and that immediately created a need for a definition. A bunch of us [IPCC authors] were concerned to make sure it was defined and so we had to jump in at the last minute to pull something together.”
The IPCC footnote explains that, in order to count as “abated”, at least 90% of fossil-fuel emissions from power plants should be captured and 50-80% of methane from energy supply. It says:
“In this context, ‘unabated fossil fuels’ refers to fossil fuels produced and used without interventions that substantially reduce the amount of GHG emitted throughout the life cycle; for example, capturing 90% or more CO2 from power plants, or 50-80% of fugitive methane emissions from energy supply.”
However, this definition, as drafted, was still somewhat unclear, Bataille tells Carbon Brief. He says the final comma combined with the word “or” implied that this was an alternative to the 90% capture at power plants, whereas the intention had been for both requirements to apply.
In order to clear up this confusion, Al Khourdajie and Bataille published a paper setting out their requirements, in detail, for fossil fuel use to be considered “abated”.
Al Khourdajie tells Carbon Brief:
“We clearly say that the term should be reserved for where the ongoing carbon emissions from using fossil fuels are reduced 90-95% or more; upstream fugitive methane emissions are less than 0.5%, and approaching 0.2%, of equivalent natural gas production; and captured emissions are stored permanently.”
Al Khourdajie notes that the vague definition of “abated” fossil fuel gives a “false, if not dangerous, sense of security” that could lead to inadequate policy measures and investment decisions.
Yet there are some “legitimate uses” of the term, Katrine Petersen, senior policy advisor in thinktank E3G’s fossil fuel transition team, tells Carbon Brief. She says:
“It’s important to note that there are legitimate uses of ‘abatement’ requirements as a route to emissions reductions, too. The use of the term ‘unabated’ in respect to CO2reduction historically stems from how some governments (such as the UK and Canada) used forms of emissions performance standards to rule out the construction of new coal power plants without CCS, and then to require existing coal power plants to either retrofit CCS to reduce emissions, or instead retire, by certain dates – a regulatory approach that, ultimately, led to no new coal plants being built and clear phase-out dates set, given the high costs and difficulty of CCS.
“This has been an effective use of abatement standards by policymakers and regulators to force action from the coal power industry. But it required clear definitions and regulation rather than just vague language.”
She tells Carbon Brief that these risks are particularly acute in the setting of the UN climate talks:
“If the word ‘unabated’ is in the final COP28 text, it will be a distraction from the fossil fuel cuts needed this decade to stay below 1.5C. It muddies the water and could mean parties spend the next five years debating definitions.”
Do fossil fuels have to be phased out to stay below 1.5C?
Fossil fuels are the biggest contributors to current global warming, making up the lion’s share of the cumulative historical emissions that have warmed the Earth by more than 1.2C.
Moreover, existing fossil-fuel infrastructure, if used in line with historical averages, would be sufficient to breach the carbon budget for 1.5C, according to the IPCC. It says:
“Projected cumulative future CO2 emissions over the lifetime of existing and currently planned fossil-fuel infrastructure without additional abatement exceed the total cumulative net CO2 emissions in pathways that limit warming to 1.5C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot.”
Furthermore, continuing to build new fossil-fuel infrastructure would “lock-in” further emissions, the IPCC says with high confidence.
Similarly, the IEA has said there is no space for the development of new, unabated coal-fired power stations or “long-lead time” oil and gas developments, if warming is to stay below 1.5C.
These findings are backed by a “large consensus”, across all published studies, that developing new oil and gas reserves is “incompatible” with staying below 1.5C.
At the aggregate level, the IEA’s 1.5C pathway sees dramatic reductions in unabated fossil fuel use, with only a very small role for abated fossil fuels. This is illustrated in the figure below, which shows that unabated fossil fuel use falls 88% by 2050 and abated fossil fuels remain minimal.
Global energy supply from unabated fossil fuels (red) and those where emissions are abated (blue), exajoules (EJ), in the IEA net-zero emissions by 2050 scenario, where warming is limited to 1.5C. Source: IEA. Chart by Carbon Brief.
This is just one pathway to staying below 1.5C. The IPCC looks at a wider range of pathways and confirms that reaching net-zero CO2 emissions to stop global warming would entail “substantial” cuts in fossil fuel use, with only “minimal” unabated use remaining and some CCS. It says:
“Net-zero CO2 energy systems entail: a substantial reduction in overall fossil fuel use, minimal use of unabated fossil fuels, and use of CCS in the remaining fossil fuel system.”
The IPCC looked at a range of different ways to keep warming below 1.5C and used “illustrative mitigation pathways” (IMPs) to show how these approaches are similar – and how they differ.
The second row in the figure below shows four IMPs that limit warming in 2100 to 1.5C, from left to right IMP-Neg, IMP-Ren, IMP-LD and IMP-SP. These refer to pathways relying heavily on negative emissions (IMP-Neg), renewable energy (IMP-Ren), low energy demand (IMP-LD) or “shifting development pathways” (IMP-SP).
Note that only the final three IMPs stay below 1.5C with no- or limited “overshoot”, whereas IMP-Neg sees 1.5C temporarily breached.
Fossil fuel use (red) does not reach zero by 2050 in any of these pathways. As such, it is technically correct to say that fossil fuels can still be used in 2050, in pathways respecting 1.5C.
Nevertheless, as with the IEA’s 1.5C pathway, fossil fuel use overall drops very dramatically in all cases. For COP28, the question is how to describe this dramatic reduction in fossil fuel use, which is clearly needed to stay below 1.5C.
There is disagreement over whether a “phase out” refers to a trajectory that reaches zero or whether it simply refers to a very substantial reduction.
Some prefer the term “phase down” for this reason, whereas others feel this implies a weaker reduction than a “phase out”. In addition, “phase down” could mean only a very small cut.
Furthermore, neither of these phrases cover defined periods of time, unless time bounds such as “this decade” or “well before 2050” are explicitly added.
Regardless of the terminology, the amount of fossil fuels still in the system by 2050 is very small, even when including abated fossil fuels as in the figure below. Furthermore, fossil fuel use reaches zero – or close to zero – in the second half of the century in no- or low-overshoot pathways.
Global energy supply, exajoules (EJ) per year, from fossil fuels (red), nuclear (orange) and renewables (blue), in illustrative pathways set out by the IPCC’s sixth assessment report WG3. Source: IPCC WG3.
Only in the IMP-Neg pathway (leftmost chart in the figure above), where emissions overshoot 1.5C before returning below that level by 2100, is there a larger role for fossil fuels by mid-century.
Here, the ongoing use of fossil fuels is mainly combined with CCS, shown by the grey wedge on the top of the stack in the figure below. (Unabated fossil fuels are shown in dark yellow.)
Notably, in the pathways that stay below 1.5C with no- or minimal overshoot, the use of fossil fuels combined with CCS is almost non-existent. Where CCS is used, it is combined instead with the use of bioenergy (BECCS) or the direct air capture of CO2 from the atmosphere (DACCS).
Global greenhouse gas emissions, billion tonnes of CO2 equivalent (GtCO2e) per year, from unabated fossil fuels (dark yellow), non-CO2 greenhouse gases (dark blue) and industrial processes (light blue), in illustrative pathways set out by the IPCC’s sixth assessment report WG3. Avoided fossil fuel emissions from using CCS are shown in grey, while emissions removals with BECCS, DACCS or afforestation (LUC) are shown in shades of brown. Source: IPCC WG3.
In addition to noting the minimal role of CCS in 1.5C pathways, it is worth adding that, to date, the technology has failed to scale up to significant levels.
According to the IEA, there are now more than 40 commercial capture facilities in operation globally, with a total annual “capture capacity” of more than 45m tonnes of CO2 (MtCO2).
This capacity can be compared with annual global CO2 emissions that are nearly 1,000 times larger, at an estimated 37bn tonnes of CO2 (GtCO2) in 2023. Put another way, CCS facilities currently capture one tenth of one percent of global CO2 emissions.
The IEA says that momentum behind the technology has been growing since the start of 2018, with more than 50 new capture facilities announced since January 2022.
These could be operating by 2030 and capturing around 125MtCO2 per year. However, only around 20 projects under development have taken a final investment decision, the IEA notes.
Even with this growth in momentum, the pipeline of current projects amounts to only around a third of the level needed under the IEA’s 1.5C pathway in 2030.
For this reason – as well as conflicts with other sustainable development priorities – relying on the significant scaling up of CCS technology would be a “risky” way to respect the 1.5C limit.
(In addition, a new study from the University of Oxford released during COP28, finds that a high-CCS pathway to 1.5C would come with a cumulative $30tn in additional costs by 2050, compared with a low-CCS alternative that relies on faster reductions in fossil fuel use.)
Looking at each of the fossil fuels in turn, in pathways assessed by the IPCC as staying below 1.5C with no- or low-overshoot, there are significant declines in coal use across the board.
In the 1.5C pathway in the middle of the range considered by the IPCC (the median pathway), coal, oil and gas decline by 95%, 60% and 45% by 2050, respectively, compared with 2019 levels.
These median figures hide a wider range for oil and gas. On the other hand, the range gets significantly smaller – and steeper – if pathways are constrained to maximum plausible levels of CCS. In this case, oil and gas see declines of 70% and 84% by 2050, respectively.
Moreover, some countries argue the focus on coal is inequitable, given it tends to be used more heavily in developing countries.
If the pace of coal reductions is eased in these places, then the use of oil and gas – which are more significant in developed countries – would need to fall more steeply.
What has been agreed on fossil fuel reduction so far?
As already noted, COP26 saw the first COP decision that explicitly called out the need to tackle fossil fuels, with agreement on a “phase down of unabated coal”.
The text in the final agreement at COP26 calls upon parties to:
“Accelerate the development, deployment and dissemination of technologies, and the adoption of policies, to transition towards low-emission energy systems, including by rapidly scaling up the deployment of clean power generation and energy efficiency measures, including accelerating efforts towards the phasedown of unabated coal power and phase-out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, while providing targeted support to the poorest and most vulnerable in line with national circumstances and recognizing the need for support towards a just transition.”
This language was hard-won, with earlier text at the summit having called for efforts to “accelerate the phasing out of coal”. This short wording was ultimately tempered with additional language and, in the final moments of the summit, the phrase “phase out” was changed to “phase down”.
At COP27, parties took up the fight over fossil-fuel language once again, with India calling for agreement to phase down all fossil fuels, with a group of 80 countries calling for a phase out.
“Parties asked for it pretty consistently. More and more parties [joined the call] with every consultation. Their ask for all fossil fuels to be included in the text was ignored every time…The presidency chose not to put those phrases into the drafts.”
Despite countries’ efforts, the Egyptian presidency refused to include fossil-fuel language in any of the draft negotiating texts throughout the two-week summit, leaving many parties disappointed.
Instead, the meeting simply restated the language that had been agreed in Glasgow at COP26 – with even this reiteration having been in doubt at times.
The conversation over cutting fossil fuel use has continued throughout 2023.
In April, the G7 group of major economies held its meeting on climate, energy and environment in Sapporo, Japan. It agreed text using slightly stronger language than that of previous COPs.
For example, the group emphasised their commitment to “accelerate the phase-out of unabated fossil fuels so as to achieve net-zero in energy systems by 2050 at the latest”.
The G7 leader’s communiqué reaffirmed a commitment from the previous year’s meeting to achieve a “fully or predominantly decarbonised power sector by 2035”.
This includes taking “concrete and timely steps” towards the goal to “phase-out domestic unabated coal power generation”. It also recognised the need to end the construction of new unabated coal-fired power plants, while working with other nations to support them to do the same.
The G7 agreement added that the member nations ended new direct government support for unabated international thermal coal power generation by the end of 2021, as well as public support for the international unabated fossil fuel energy sector in 2022, except in limited circumstances.
In September, the larger G20 bloc agreed to back global efforts to triple renewable energy capacity by 2030, but failed to find agreed language on fossil fuels.
Following tense negotiations, the group of the world’s largest economies finally secured an agreement at a meeting held in New Delhi, India. The main negotiator Amitabh Kant dubbed the agreement the “most ambitious document on climate action” at a press conference.
Yet the language with regards to fossil fuels remained in line with what was agreed at COP26 in Glasgow and COP27 in Sharm el-Sheikh.
Reiterating the COP wording, the final G20 agreement called for a transition towards low-emission energy systems, including “accelerating efforts towards phasedown of unabated coal power”.
Moreover, neither the G7 nor the G20 included a definition of “unabated” and “abated” fossil fuels.
Finally, in mid-November, the US and China – sometimes referred to as the G2 – released their joint “Sunnylands statement” on climate change, which also backed a tripling of renewable energy, but contained only oblique references to cutting the use of fossil fuels.
Rather than talking of phasing fossil fuels down or out, the English-language version says the two countries will ramp up renewables “so as to…substitut[e]” for fossil fuels. It says they:
“[I]ntend to sufficiently accelerate renewable energy deployment in their respective economies through 2030 from 2020 levels so as to accelerate the substitution for coal, oil and gas generation [in the power sector], and thereby anticipate post-peaking meaningful absolute power sector emissions reduction, in this critical decade of the 2020s.”
The statement also commits the pair to at least five “large-scale” CCS cooperation projects for industry and energy, in each country by 2030.
BBC News quoted Bernice Lee, distinguished fellow at Chatham House, as saying that it had likely “proven to be too difficult to find the form of language that works for both” on fossil fuels.
“Abatement technologies have a role to play in reducing emissions, but that role in the decarbonisation of energy systems is minimal. We cannot use it to green-light fossil fuel expansion.”
It then made a direct call to phase-out fossil fuel production and use within its submission to the global stocktake at the end of October. This submission said:
“Fossil fuels are at the root of this crisis. We must work together to develop a comprehensive global clean energy access approach to accelerate the transition away from fossil fuels.”
With the exception of Colombia, none of the HAC members are fossil-fuel producers of note.
After “fractious” internal negotiations over its position, the EU called for a phase-out of “unabated” fossil fuels – and an energy system “predominantly free of fossil fuels well ahead of 2050”.
Crucially, the bloc’s agreed position also “underlines” limitations on the use of CCS. It says that “emission abatement technologies which do not significantly harm the environment, exist at limited scale and are to be used to reduce emissions mainly from hard to abate sectors”.
Furthermore, it adds that “removal technologies [such as BECCS and DACCS] are to contribute to global negative emissions…[and] should not be used to delay climate action in sectors where feasible, effective and cost-efficient mitigation alternatives are available”.
Speaking in July, then-EU climate chief Frans Timmermans listed the phase-out of unabated fossil fuels as a key goal for the bloc, together with tripling renewables rollout by 2030 and doubling the rate of energy efficiency improvements.
Timmermans also highlighted the limitation on CCS, saying:
“It is important to have a precise understanding of the role of ‘abated fossils’ in a net-zero economy. These need to be residual and only in hard-to-abate sectors. And the sector carries the burden of proof in demonstrating this is achievable and proposing credible investment strategies in carbon-abating technologies”.
The stances of other key countries and groups can be seen on Carbon Brief’s Who Wants What grid.
The US is also supporting the phase-out of “unabated” fossil fuels. A statement released by the White House earlier this year argued that the US needs to “accelerate the phase-out of unabated fossil fuels”.
US climate envoy John Kerry backed the use of “abated” fossil fuels, but challenged the oil industry to prove the efficacy of CCS in an interview with the Associated Press earlier this year. He said:
“If you’re able to abate the emissions, capture it. But we don’t have that at-scale yet. And we can’t sit here and just pretend we’re going to automatically have something we don’t have today. Because we might not. It might not work.”
Meanwhile, China’s climate envoy Xie Zhenhua said the phase-out of fossil fuels is “not realistic”, during a speech in Beijing in September.
Going into COP28, sources told Reuters that India would continue to resist those pushing for a deadline on the phasedown of fossil fuels. Instead, it would favour shifting focus to reducing overall carbon emissions through “abatement and mitigation technologies”, the newswire said.
COP28 host nation the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – a major and expanding fossil fuel producer – has shifted its stance on fossil fuels as 2023 has progressed.
In May, a speech given by COP28 president Sultan Al Jaber said: “We must be laser-focused on phasing out fossil fuel emissions, while phasing up viable, affordable zero-carbon alternatives.”
This was widely interpreted as support for CCS and, with its focus on “fossil fuel emissions”, a deflection from phasing out fossil fuels themselves – a sentiment that drew widespread criticism.
Subsequently, Al Jaber started describing the “phasedown” of fossil fuels as “inevitable” and “essential”, following an interview with the Guardian.
A pre-summit note issued by the UAE in October calls for a world “working towards an energy system free of unabated fossil fuels by mid-century, with coal being a priority”.
The early draft texts at COP28 shows countries are considering calling for an “orderly and just” phase out of fossil fuels, but whether “unabated” will be included still remains unclear.
As of 5 December, there are three options officially on the table. These are
“An orderly and just phase out of fossil fuels”;
“Accelerating efforts towards phasing out unabated fossil fuels and to rapidly reducing their use so as to achieve net-zero CO2 in energy systems by or around mid-century”;
The third option would be not to mention a fossil fuel phase out (or down) at all.
For many countries, COP28 will not be seen as a success if it fails to agree to language on phasing out all fossil fuels. Whether this is possible – and whether such language will end up being qualified with “unabated” – or some other form of words – remains to be seen.
Strong definitions of abatement could send an important signal at COP28, says Petersen, but could also have real-world implications in driving emissions reductions.
International definitions of abatement could be translated into regulatory standards at national level, she adds, helping countries to reach Paris-aligned emissions reduction levels.
Al Khourdajie says:
“Both [abated and unabated] are certainly used more prominently in international negotiations than ever before. The hope is for the outcomes of the upcoming COP28 to bring clarity to both terms.”
However, he adds that international negotiations should be discussing deeper decarbonisation in developed countries and efforts to support climate action in developing nations, including financial and technological transfer as well as funds for loss and damage. He adds:
“This is the space that discussions in international negotiations should occupy, rather than nuances around abated and unabated fossil fuels, important as they are.”
Rising temperatures are redistributing the risk of childhood malaria in sub-Saharan Africa, resulting in areas of “new risk” in the east and south of the continent, but also “relief hotspots” in western Africa.
This is according to a new study, published in Nature, which provides the “most comprehensive look to date at the impact of climate change on any infectious disease”.
The research finds that since the year 1900, climate change has resulted in one extra case of malaria for every 1,000 children in sub-Saharan Africa on average.
Over the 21st century, climate change is expected to drive down malaria rates across the continent on average, as temperatures rise above the optimum range for mosquitoes.
However, the authors emphasise that continent-wide averages hide more detailed local trends.
They find that cooler parts of Africa face an increase in malaria risk, as rising temperatures have made the regions more suitable for malaria-carrying mosquitoes, while warmer regions see a suppression in malaria cases.
The lead author tells Carbon Brief that this is the first study to use “attribution” – a field of climate science which uses models to compare conditions in a world with global warming to one without – to assess the impact of climate change on malaria.
The study also reveals that climate change is not the main driver of shifting malaria risk in Africa, with public health measures and government policy making a more significant impact.
The “most important” message from the study, according to another expert, is that to eliminate malaria entirely, “effective surveillance, prevention and treatment remain substantially more influential – and more actionable – than climate change alone”.
Childhood malaria
Malaria kills hundreds of thousands of people every year. The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that 610,000 people died due to the disease in 2024.
The disease is transmitted to humans by bites from mosquitoes infected with the malaria parasite. Malaria spreads most rapidly in warm, wet regions, where the parasite-carrying mosquitoes can live and breed.
However, malaria is preventable. A total of 42 countries – mainly in Europe and the Americas – have eliminated the disease entirely through a combination of measures including insecticide use, draining the swamplands that provide breeding habitats for mosquitoes and improving basic healthcare services .Global mortality from malaria declined by 90% over the 20th century.
Today, the vast majority of malaria cases are recorded in Africa, which was home to 95% of malaria cases and deaths in 2024. Children under the age of five make up three-quarters of all African malaria deaths.
The malaria-causing parasite can be detected using a blood test. Over the last century, scientists, government officials and healthcare professionals have collected thousands of blood samples from people across sub-Saharan Africa and tested for the presence of the malaria parasite.
In 2017, scientists brought together more than 50,000 samples collected from sub-Saharan Africa over 1900-2016. This data provides a “snapshot” of the amount of malaria in the population in any year in the last century the study explains.
Dr Colin Carlson is an assistant professor of epidemiology at the Yale school of public health and lead author of the study. He tells Carbon Brief that malaria in Africa is “extraordinarily well documented”, as a result of academic interest and colonial rule in the continent.
The size and quality of the malaria dataset are “exceptionally rare”, Carlson says. He explains that the dataset stretches back to before the impacts of human-caused climate change were strongly felt, making it “extraordinarily” valuable for this analysis.
The chart below shows the percentage of children between two and 10 years old who tested positive for the malaria parasite over 1900-2016. Each dot indicates one blood test result and the pink vertical bars indicate periods of “successful malaria prevention intervention”, such as the 1955-69 global malaria eradication programme.
The percentage of children between two to 10 years old who tested positive for the parasite that causes malaria between 1990 and 2016. Source: Carlson et al. (2026)
Attribution
The authors use the blood test survey data to develop a statistical model separating out the climatic, social and economic factors that affect malaria, such as temperature, rainfall, economic development, healthcare and population changes. This allows the authors to isolate the effects of the climate on malaria.
They find that malaria prevalence in children peaks when average monthly temperatures reach 24.9C, dropping off in warmer and cooler climates.
Mosquitoes also need stagnant or slow-moving water in which to lay their eggs. The authors find that periods of drought tend to decrease malaria prevalence one-to-two months later, whereas floods increase prevalence two-to-three months later. However, they conclude that rainfall is “less important than temperature” in predicting malaria rates.
They then combine the statistical models with climate models, to simulate childhood malaria rates in a range of past and future climates.
First, the authors simulate malaria rates in the present day, by running the models using the climate of 2000-14. They then carry out the same analysis, using the climate of a hypothetical world without human-caused climate change.
By comparing the two, the authors were able to attribute the impact of climate change on malaria rates across Africa.
The link between climate change and malaria in Africa is complex and “surprisingly contentious”, according to the authors. For example, they write that “malaria resurgence in the east African highlands became a particular point of contention, with over a dozen studies arguing for or against climate change as a substantial driver”.
It adds:
“Today, malaria experts generally agree that climate change has contributed to elevational shifts in malaria epidemics and the geographical ranges of mosquito vectors. However, the cumulative effect of climate change on the burden of malaria is still an open question.”
Lead author Carlson says this paper is “one of the first impact attributions on infectious disease” and the first attribution study on climate change and malaria. He adds:
“I think it’s the most clarity we’ve had on the malaria question.”
Dr Teresa Yamana, an associate research scientist at Columbia University, who was not involved in the study, praises its “rigorous” methodology. She tells Carbon Brief that the work “demonstrates the potential of climate attribution methods to quantify the impacts of climate change on infectious diseases”.
Warming world
The findings show that “climate change isn’t just making malaria worse or better – it’s moving it, says study author Prof Tamma Carleton, an assistant professor at UC Berkeley:
“Whether a place sees elevated malaria risks or reduced burdens under climate change depends on how hot it is today. We see relief in the hotspots and new risk nearly everywhere else.”
For example, in the Ethiopian highlands, low temperatures – which are unsuitable for mosquitoes to live and breed – have historically limited the spread of malaria. However, the region has seen childhood malaria rates increase by more than eight cases per 1,000 children since the year 1900 as rising temperatures have allowed the insects to expand their habitat.
The authors also found a similar increase in malaria prevalence in cooler southern African countries.
In contrast, global warming is pushing average temperatures above the ideal range for mosquitoes in many hotter parts of Africa, driving down malaria rates. The authors find that in western Africa, climate change has caused a reduction of four malaria cases per 1,000 children per year by 2014, reducing prevalence by 1-2%.
Overall, climate change has resulted in one extra case of malaria for every 1,000 children in sub-Saharan Africa since the year 1900, the study says.
The authors also run their models for three future climate scenarios: low (SSP1-2.6), intermediate (SSP2-4.5) and very-high (SSP5-8.5) emissions pathways. Comparing these to the present-day model results shows how climate change could affect malaria cases over the coming century.
They find that the trends observed so far will largely continue into the future – meaning climate change will lower the prevalence of malaria in warm regions and increase the prevalence in cool regions.
The study concludes that under the intermediate scenario, which is broadly in line with current climate policies, warming will drive down childhood malaria cases by about three cases per 1,000 children in central Africa and 16 cases per 1,000 children in west Africa by the end of the century.
By contrast, cases could increase by around 20% over the same period in regions such as the Rift Valley and coastal southern Africa – a rise of 30 cases per 1,000 children.
The maps below show changes in childhood malaria prevalence due to climate change in today’s climate (left) and the climate of 2096-2100 under the intermediate scenario (right).
Red indicates an increase in malaria prevalence and blue indicates a decrease. Greyer colours indicate greater uncertainty in the model results. White indicates regions where no data was collected.
Carlson tells Carbon Brief that this is “the first study to really confidently answer the highland East Africa debate”.
Eradicating malaria
Healthcare workers, governments and scientists have been working to eliminate malaria for decades.
On average, the authors find that climate change will reduce the prevalence of malaria in sub-Saharan Africa, as temperatures rise above the optimum range for mosquitoes. This effect is more pronounced at higher warming levels.
Under the low emissions scenario, about 1 case per 1,000 children will be averted by the end of the century. Meanwhile under the highest emissions scenario, average prevalence falls by 20 cases per 1,000 children, marking a 9% reduction.
The graph below shows childhood malaria rates over 1990-2024 in the historical climate (blue) and in a world without climate change (grey). These estimates are shown relative to baseline prevalence across 1901-30.
After the year 2014, the plot shows projected future changes in malaria prevalence, relative to a 2015-20 baseline, in the low (purple), intermediate (pink) and high (green) scenarios.
Malaria prevalence in the historical climate (blue), historical climate without global warming (grey), low emissions scenario (purple), intermediate emissions scenario (pink) and very-high emissions scenario (green). Source: Carlson et al. (2026)
Carlson emphasises that this does not mean that climate change is “good news” for healthcare in sub-Saharan Africa. He explains that climate change will bring a wide range of negative health impacts that will strain healthcare systems, adding:
“A world that is too hot for malaria is not a good world for the health of children.”
He also notes that climate change is “not the primary driving factor of malaria dynamics”. For example, he notes that malaria prevalence fell over 2000-15, by about 16 percentage points, after the disease was identified as a “critical global target of the Millennium Development Goals”.
This reduction is 200 times greater than the increase seen so far because of climate change, Carlson says. He adds:
“It would not be tremendously hard both to keep malaria out of new places and to eliminate it where it is maybe going to get a little bit of an assist from climate change.”
Woyessa praises the study, telling Carbon Brief that the research could bring about a “paradigm shift” in efforts to eliminate malaria. He argues that the study is a “tool for engaging giant development partners”, adding that “future work will be needed to situate these global trends in local contexts”.
However, she cautions that the findings “should not be interpreted as forecasts of total future malaria burden”, because they only model the impact of climate change on malaria, while excluding “social, demographic and public-health determinants”, such as inequality, migration, conflict and changing access to malaria interventions.
She adds:
“One of the paper’s most important messages is this: effective surveillance, prevention and treatment remain substantially more influential – and more actionable – than climate change alone.”
Carlson, C. et al. (2026) The past and future impact of climate change on childhood malaria in Africa, Nature, doi:10.1038/s41586-026-10840-w
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China has released its “15th five-year plan for the development of renewable energy”, outlining key targets and policies for the sector in 2026-2030.
A key focus of the plan is boosting renewable generation and consumption as a share of China’s overall energy mix.
It calls for continued capacity additions of wind and solar – albeit at lower levels than previous years – as well as hydropower, biomass and other clean-energy sources.
Specifically, China will aim to install 3,500 gigawatts (GW) of renewables capacity by 2030, 2,800GW will be wind and solar.
The country had previously pledged to install 1,200GW of wind and solar by 2030, a goal that China met six years early.
Another major theme is the provision of wind and solar supply that is “dependable” and “grid-friendly”.
Setting a target for “dependable output” from wind and solar could help to entrench their role as a provider of “energy security”, according to analysts.
The government also aims to boost renewables consumption by developing non-power uses of renewable energy, in sectors such as steel and chemicals.
Below, Carbon Brief examines the key targets and policies outlined in the five-year plan and what they mean for China’s energy transition.
Five-year plans are key to China’s political system. An overarching plan, covering all socioeconomic issues of importance to policy leaders, is published at the beginning of each five-year cycle.
The plan for the 15th five-year period (2026-2030) was published in March 2026.
It includes what the government considers to be the most important targets and policy signals for climate and energy. For example, binding targets for carbon intensity, the share of non-fossil energy in total energy consumption and total energy production capacity.
Following this overarching document, five-year plans focused on specific sectors or themes are then published over the course of the five-year plan period.
This year, the government has already published several five-year plans related to energy and climate change. One covers the development of the “new-type” energy sector more broadly. Another wraps climate goals together with other environmental targets under the “Beautiful China” programme.
By contrast, the renewables five-year plan focuses specifically on the development of hydropower, wind, solar, biomass, geothermal and wave energy.
It covers topics including capacity and generation targets, as well as efforts to increase integration and reliability of wind and solar. It also has policies to encourage “non-power use” of renewable energy and ways to strengthen innovation of clean-energy technologies.
What overarching renewables targets are in the plan?
China will aim to install 3,500 gigawatts (GW) of renewables capacity by 2030, according to the five-year plan.
Of this, 2,800GW will be wind and solar – a pledge reiterated from China’s action plan for peaking carbon emissions, which was released earlier this month.
The goal more than doubles a previous 2030 target for wind and solar to reach 1,200GW, which China met six years early.
As of June 2026, the country has installed just under 2,000GW of wind and solar capacity, as well as 454GW of hydropower. Biomass, geothermal and wave energy hold very small shares of the overall energy mix.
As such, China would need to build 160GW of wind and solar each year – and just under 220GW of renewable capacity in total – to meet the targets.
The country installed 277GW of new solar alone in 2024 – and 315GW in 2025.
China’s total installed capacity of renewable energy from 2016-2025, and its target for 2030. Source: National Energy Administration, Carbon Brief.
A key part of meeting the targets will be the development of large-scale clean-energy bases in China’s northern regions. These will generate power to be exported elsewhere via ultra-high voltage lines. The plan also encourages greater “local consumption” and installations of distributed energy (see below).
The plan says that further research will be directed at increasing the renewable share of electricity generated by these large-scale energy bases to 100%.
A recent report by the thinktank Global Energy Monitor (GEM) finds that output from these bases “continues to be paired with coal-fired generation in the name of balancing and system flexibility”. It says that currently, coal generates 42% of the power transmitted to the rest of the country from these bases.
China will also add more hydropower, says the plan, with capacity rising from 448GW in 2025 to 570GW in 2030. Some 160GW of this will be pumped-storage hydropower.
Meanwhile, the plan sets a target for renewable power generation to reach 6,000 terawatt-hours (TWh), 4,000TWh of which would come from wind and solar.
This would be a 50% increase in five years as renewables generated just under 4,000TWh of electricity in 2025, according to the National Energy Administration.
By 2030, the plan says that total consumption of renewable energy will stand at 1.8bn tonnes of coal equivalent (Gtce).
This would be up from 1.2Gtce in 2025, which represented about one-fifth of China’s total energy consumption of 6.2Gtce that year.
The renewable targets in the plan are lower than those suggested in a recent study by high-profile Chinese scholars.
The study, from the department of energy and power engineering and the Institute of Climate Change and Sustainable Development at Tsinghua University in Beijing, assessed the “likelihood of China attaining its carbon peak” under different pathways.
It found that, in order to meet its climate commitments, China would need to either install more than 4,000GW of “non-fossil energy capacity” before 2030, or to “maintain a total energy consumption” below 6.5Gtce.
The table below outlines some of the key renewables targets for 2030, as specified in the plan.
Key targets for 2030, adapted from 15th five-year plan for renewable energy
Type
2025
2030
Percentage change
Renewable energy use
1.2Gtce
1.8Gtce
53%
Total renewables capacity
2,340GW
3,500GW
50%
Wind and solar capacity
1,840GW
More than 2,800GW
52%
Of which: Solar thermal
1.8GW
15GW
733%
Hydro capacity
450GW
570GW
27%
Of which: Pumped storage hydropower
66GW
160GW
142%
Wave energy
–
0.4GW
–
Renewable generation
4,000TWh
6,000TWh
50%
Of which: Wind and solar
2,300TWh
4,000TWh
74%
Non-electricity use
60Mtce
150Mtce
150%
Renewable hydrogen
0.25Mt
2Mt
700%
Why does the plan focus on ‘firm capacity’ for renewables?
As well as increasing the overall size of China’s renewable power supply, the country must also maintain an “uninterrupted and reliable power supply”, officials from the NDRC and NEA told state news agency Xinhua in coverage of the new plan.
To support this goal, the plan says that the development of renewables will “enter a new stage”. This will mean that “improving quality and serving as a reliable alternative” to fossil fuels will be as important as “expanding scale”.
The plan, therefore, proposes targets for the “firm capacity” from wind and solar (置信出力). This is the amount plants or grids can be relied on to produce during critical supply periods, in conjunction with on-site storage.
The target for wind is a firm capacity of at least 11% of total installed capacity by 2030, while the equivalent goal for solar is 6%.
Wind and solar will also be expected to supply more than 20% of total demand in peak periods during the summer and winter evenings, says the plan. It expects “reliable peak-shaving capacity from renewable sources” to reach more than 300GW.
The new targets are a “positive move”, says Yao Zhe, global policy advisor at Greenpeace East Asia, as it “only applies during peak load and critical supply periods, when coal power is typically used to stabilise the power supply”.
She adds that this could, theoretically, “prevent the construction of new coal-fired power projects that are proposed and approved for the reason of meeting peak demand”.
The new metrics mark a change in focus, says Lyu Wenbin, director general of the Energy Research Institute – a state thinktank under the NDRC – in an “explanatory reading” posted on BJX News. He says it “marks a shift in renewable energy development from the mere pursuit of installed capacity to…also taking into account system support capabilities”.
The plan pledges to “accelerate the construction of grid-friendly wind and solar power stations”. It says this will enhance “reliable peak-load generation” and strengthen renewables’ ability to ensure “safe and stable operation” of the grid.
It says this will particularly be a focus in the energy-hungry east, central and south areas of China.
It sets out a slightly different focus for areas that already have a high share of renewables in their power mix, such as north-west China. Here, the aim will be to develop wind and solar parks that are “capable of providing voltage, frequency and inertia support”.
“This is a real challenge”, says James Norman, research analyst at GEM. He says these challenges are particularly acute in some circumstances:
“[For example], when the share of wind and solar is very high, relatively few synchronous generators (like coal) are online or large volumes of electricity are being transferred through high voltage DC lines.”
The plan mentions many technological solutions to address the problem, he tells Carbon Brief. However, he adds, there are no quantitative details for the issue. For example, he notes there is no target for “how many gigawatts of wind and solar must gain grid-forming capability”. This is in contrast to the goals for overall renewables capacity or generation.
Norman was a co-author on the recent GEM report, which identified further barriers to renewable uptake. It said these include transmission bottlenecks, alongside systemic features such as dispatching and power-contract mechanisms.
As a result, said the report, renewable power – especially solar – is increasingly being “curtailed”, particularly in north-western and northern provinces.
Yao also notes that the plan does not “spell out specific measures to address systemic constraints” around the electricity grid and the role of coal in the power sector.
“I interpret this as evidence that the vested interests are still strong in the policy debate,” she adds.
What does the plan say about ‘distributed’ energy?
Alongside gigawatt-scale clean-energy megabases, China also aims to expand construction of “distributed” energy. This means smaller-scale installations, such as rooftop solar.
More than 300GW of “distributed new energy” is to be added over 2026-30, some 60GW per year.
The plan aims for distributed new energy to be adopted in sectors such as industry, transport, buildings and agriculture.
Applications include the use of distributed solar and wind in industrial parks, coal mines and oilfields, as well as encouraging residents to install solar panels on buildings and developing rural clean-energy grids.
In some regions, distributed solar and wind is “likely to meet a large proportion of local demand”, says Prof Pan Jiahua at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Guangzhou). He tells Carbon Brief that micro- and mini-grids using such resources will be particularly important in central and coastal China.
The 60GW annual target for new distributed energy is not “overly ambitious”, says Isadora Wang, head of China at the thinktank Transition Asia. She tells Carbon Brief that distributed solar additions, alone, exceeded 100GW in both 2024 and 2025.
Cosimo Ries, analyst at the consultancy Trivium China, agrees that the target is reachable. The biggest question mark, he tells Carbon Brief, is whether it will continue to make sense for industry and utilities to build distributed power at the volumes seen during the 14th five-year plan period.
He adds that market conditions for distributed solar have deteriorated sharply over the past two years. He says a range of factors have hit investor confidence:
“[Distributed solar faces] growing exposure to market trading, worsening returns in spot markets, growing risks of curtailment and new policies limiting or forbidding the selling of power back to the grid.”
What does the plan say about non-electricity use of renewables?
The plan also sets goals for renewable energy’s role in “non-electricity use”.
This means using renewable energy for purposes other than generating electricity, through converting it to other forms, such as heat or mechanical energy.
The government is aiming for non-power use to nearly triple from 60m tonnes of coal equivalent (Mtce) in 2025 to 150Mtce in 2030.
Ries tells Carbon Brief that he thinks this target is “one of the main highlights” of the plan. However, he notes that limited available data means it is hard to assess the level of its ambition. He adds that, given the relative conservatism of China’s other recent clean-energy targets, this one may also be met relatively easily.
Key applications for non-power use of renewables include “green hydrogen, ammonia and methanol”, says the plan. It also points to using wind and solar for heat, as well as to biomass and geothermal for heating and cooling.
Green hydrogen, ammonia and methanol are the “centrepiece” of the non-power push, according to state-owned newspaper Economic Information Daily.
For hydrogen alone, China plans to scale up renewable hydrogen production to 2m tonnes in 2030, up from 250,000 tonnes in 2025.
Today, non-power use of renewables accounts for only around 1% of China’s total energy consumption, NEA and NDRC officials said in a Q&A. They added that there is “considerable room for growth” in sectors such as industry, transport and buildings.
Potential new applications include the use of wind and solar for heat. This could see the use of centralised wind and solar heating stations in the chemicals, textiles, pharmaceuticals, papermaking and food sectors.
New projects in the steel and cement sectors should use locally-generated wind and solar to power electric-arc furnaces and kilns, adds the plan.
Wang tells Carbon Brief that she believes the naming of individual sectors is a “clear indication” that they will be included in China’s renewable consumption quotas. These already cover aluminium and other heavy industry sectors.
She adds that power and heat demand from the named sectors may help absorb distributed renewable energy. It will also serve as a testing ground for matching demand with supply through increased grid flexibility and power price reforms.
To Ries, the growing focus on non-power use signals that China’s decarbonisation efforts are “now entering deeper waters”. That means regulators are turning from easier-to-abate sectors, such as aluminium, to more challenging industries, such as steel.
The plan could create a “second growth curve” for the new-energy industry, says He Zhao, in a commentary for China Power News Net. He, the vice-president of the China Electric Power Planning and Engineering Institute (EPPEI). says this might begin with non-power use, before shifting to fuel, feedstock and heat substitution.
What does the plan say about China’s cleantech dominance?
The next five years is a prime opportunity for China to “consolidate our leading position across the entire industrial chain” for clean-energy technologies, says the plan.
It adds that the government will “strengthen technological innovation” and accelerate the roll-out of new applications of artificial intelligence in China’s renewable-energy system.
A particular focus for new R&D will be “cutting-edge, original and disruptive technologies”. It also points to technologies that “enhance the reliability of renewable energy” as a substitute for fossil fuels.
The plan names technologies for further development. For wind power, these include “reliable and low-cost” blades, ultra-tall towers and new types of floating platforms. It also mentions the development of “high-altitude wind power”. For solar, it points to the development of perovskite and other “high efficiency” solar cells, as well as space-solar technologies.
The plan also pledges to develop a power market that supports the “full entry” of renewable-energy companies. It underscores that companies should plan for an increasingly market-based and competitive environment.
Meanwhile, the government will also deepen cooperation with other countries on clean energy and “advance” global climate cooperation, it says.
A priority will be “strengthening” international coordination on investment and development in “green energy projects”. Another is “actively promoting the free circulation of China’s high-quality green technologies and products in global markets”.
Chinese exports of clean-energy technologies have been surging, especially since the closure of the strait of Hormuz.
At the same time, Chinese investment in clean-energy projects in Belt and Road Initiative member states totalled $20bn in the first half of 2026. This is also driven by the crisis.
The US, EU and others have launched tariffs and pricing mechanisms to curb imports of Chinese cleantech. This has contributed to pushback from China, against what it and others refer to as “unilateral trade measures”.
China is transitioning from a “major energy nation” (能源大国) to an “energy powerhouse” (能源强国), writes the Energy Research Institute’s Lyu in his explanatory reading. He says this will enable China to increasingly shift to building “systemic” advantages in developing clean-energy technologies.
He continues that, from 2026-2030, China will “move to the very forefront of the global stage” on clean energy, “venturing into uncharted territory”. This will create both “major new challenges and significant opportunities” for the country, he adds.
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SYDNEY/KINGSTON, Wednesday 29 July — The future of deep sea mining will be a focus for world leaders this week as the International Seabed Authority (ISA) Assembly takes place in Kingston, Jamaica.
Country delegates and members from Pacific Civil Society have come together to discuss a deep sea mining code, while the call for a moratorium grows. It follows the ISA’s contentious decision last week to extend The Metals Company subsidiary Nauru Ocean Resources Inc’s (NORI) exploration contract, despite its support for the pursuit of unlawful deep sea mining via US unilateralism.
The Assembly’s agenda was agreed to yesterday, with a science item put forward by Vanuatu to be heard on Thursday local time. Overnight, Mozambique and Mauritius joined the call for a global moratorium.
Rae Bainteiti, Pacific Political Coordinator at Greenpeace Australia Pacific, said from the ISA in Kingston:
“As we move into the General Assembly this week, the fundamental issue remains that there is not enough science to guarantee the safety and protection of the ocean in a world where deep sea mining is allowed. As trustees of the ocean, the common heritage of humankind, our Pacific governments must stand firm against corporate interests that are pushing to move ahead with deep-sea mining outside the ISA framework. If deep sea mining goes ahead, Pacific communities will suffer the economic, cultural and social consequences. We continue to call on all States to support a moratorium as the principled and responsible pathway to protect the ocean.”
Currently, 45 countries, including seven Pacific nations, support a moratorium or precautionary pause on deep sea mining. Last week, Australia’s Labor National Conference committed to supporting a moratorium, but the government has yet to make an official comment.
