China’s central and local governments, as well as state-owned enterprises, are busy preparing for the next five-year planning period, spanning 2026-30.
The top-level 15th five-year plan, due to be published in March 2026, will shape greenhouse gas emissions in China – and globally – for the rest of this decade and beyond.
The targets set under the plan will determine whether China is able to get back on track for its 2030 climate commitments, which were made personally by President Xi Jinping in 2021.
This would require energy sector carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions to fall by 2-6% by 2030, much more than implied by the 2035 target of a 7-10% cut from “peak levels”.
The next five-year plan will set the timing and the level of this emissions peak, as well as whether emissions will be allowed to rebound in the short term.
The plan will also affect the pace of clean-energy growth, which has repeatedly beaten previous targets and has become a key driver of the nation’s economy.
Some 250-350 gigawatts (GW) of new wind and solar would be needed each year to meet China’s 2030 commitments, far above the 200GW being targeted.
Finally, the plans will shape China’s transition away from fossil fuels, with key sectors now openly discussing peak years for coal and oil demand, but with 330GW of new coal capacity in the works and more than 500 new chemical industry projects due in the next five years.
These issues come together in five key questions for climate and energy that Chinese policymakers will need to answer in the final five-year plan documents next year.
Five-year plans and their role in China
1. Will the plan put China back on track for its 2030 Paris pledge?
2. Will the plan upgrade clean-energy targets or pave the way to exceed them?
3. Will the plan set an absolute cap on coal consumption?
4. Will ‘dual control’ of carbon prevent an emission rebound?
5. Will it limit coal-power and chemical-industry growth?
Five-year plans and their role in China
Five-year plans are an essential part of China’s policymaking, guiding decision-making at government bodies, enterprises and banks. The upcoming 15th five-year plan will cover the years 2026-30, set targets for 2030 and use 2025 as its base year.
The top-level five-year plan will be published in March 2026 and is known as the five-year plan on economic and social development. This overarching document will be followed by dozens of sectoral plans, as well as province- and company-level plans.
The sectoral plans are usually published in the second year of the five-year period, meaning they would be expected in 2027.
There will be five-year plans for the energy sector, the electricity sector, for renewable energy, nuclear, coal and many other sub-sectors, as well as plans for major industrial sectors such as steel, construction materials and chemicals.
It is likely that there will also be a plan for carbon emissions or carbon peaking and a five-year plan for the environment.
During the previous five-year period, the plans of provinces and state-owned enterprises for very large-scale solar and wind projects were particularly important, far exceeding the central government’s targets.
The five-year plans create incentives for provincial governments and ministries by setting quantified targets that they are responsible for meeting. These targets influence the performance evaluations of governors, CEOs and party secretaries.
The plans also designate favoured sectors and projects, directing bank lending, easing permitting and providing an implicit government guarantee for the project developers.
Each plan lists numerous things that should be “promoted”, banned or controlled, leaving the precise implementation to different state organs and state-owned enterprises.
Five-year plans can introduce and coordinate national mega-projects, such as the gigantic clean-energy “bases” and associated electricity transmission infrastructure, which were outlined in the previous five-year plan in 2021.
The plans also function as a policy roadmap, assigning the tasks to develop new policies and providing stakeholders with visibility to expected policy developments.
1. Will the plan put China back on track for its 2030 Paris pledge?
Reducing carbon intensity – the energy-sector carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions per unit of GDP – has been the cornerstone of China’s climate commitments since the 2020 target announced at the 2009 Copenhagen climate conference.
Consequently, the last three five-year plans have included a carbon-intensity target. The next 15th one is highly likely to set a carbon-intensity target too, given that this is the centerpiece of China’s 2030 climate targets.
Moreover, it was president Xi himself who pledged in 2021 that China would reduce its carbon intensity to 65% below 2005 levels by 2030. This was later formalised in China’s 2030 “nationally determined contribution” (NDC) under the Paris Agreement.
Xi also pledged that China would gradually reduce coal consumption during the five-year period up to 2030. However, China is significantly off track to these targets.
China’s CO2 emissions grew more quickly in the early 2020s than they had been before the Coronavirus pandemic, as shown in the figure below. This stems from a surge in energy consumption during and after the “zero-Covid” period, together with a rapid expansion of coal-fired power and the fossil-fuel based chemical industry. as shown in the figure below.
As a result, meeting the 2030 intensity target would require a reduction in CO2 emissions from current levels, with the level of the drop depending on the rate of economic growth.
Xi’s personal imprimatur would make missing these 2030 targets awkward for China, particularly given the country’s carefully cultivated reputation for delivery. On the other hand, meeting them would require much stronger action than initially anticipated.
Recent policy documents and statements, in particular the recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party for the next five-year plan, and the government’s work report for 2025, have put the emphasis on China’s target to peak emissions before 2030 and the new 2035 emission target, which would still allow emissions to increase over the next five-year period. The earlier 2030 commitments risk being buried as inconvenient.
Still, the State Council’s plan for controlling carbon emissions, published in 2024, says that carbon intensity will be a “binding indicator” for the next five-year period, meaning that a target will be included in the top-level plan published in March 2026.
China is only set to achieve a reduction of about 12% in carbon intensity from 2020 to 2025 – a marked slowdown relative to previous periods, as shown in the figure below.
(This is based on reductions reported annually by the National Bureau of Statistics until 2024 and a projected small increase in energy-sector CO2 emissions in 2025. Total CO2 emissions could still fall this year, when the fall in process emissions from cement production is factored in.)
A 12% fall would be far less than the 18% reduction targeted under the 14th five-year plan, as well as falling short of what would be needed to stay on track to the 2030 target.
To make up the shortfall and meet the 2030 intensity target, China would need to set a goal of around 23% in the next five-year plan. As such, this target will be a key test of China’s determination to honour its climate commitments.
A carbon-intensity target of 23% is likely to receive pushback from some policymakers, as it is much higher than achieved in previous periods. No government or thinktank documents have yet been published with estimates of what the 2030 intensity target would need to be.
In practice, meeting the 2030 carbon intensity target would require reducing CO2 emissions by 2-6% in absolute terms from 2025, assuming a GDP growth rate of 4.2-5.0%.
China needs 4.2% GDP growth over the next decade to achieve Xi’s target of doubling the country’s GDP per capita from 2020 to 2035, a key part of his vision of achieving “socialist modernisation” by 2035, with the target for the next five years likely to be set higher.
Recent high-level policy documents have avoided even mentioning the 2030 intensity target. It is omitted in recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party for the next five-year plan, the foundation on which the plan will be formulated.
Instead, the recommendations emphasised “achieving the carbon peak as scheduled” and “promoting the peaking of coal and oil consumption”, which are less demanding.
The environment ministry, in contrast, continues to pledge efforts to meet the carbon intensity target. However, they are not the ones writing the top-level five-year plan.
The failure to meet the 2025 intensity target has been scarcely mentioned in top-level policy discussions. There was no discernible effort to close the gap to the target, even after the midway review of the five-year plan recognised the shortfall.
The State Council published an action plan to get back on track, including a target for reducing carbon intensity in 2024 – albeit one not sufficient to close the shortfall. Yet this plan, in turn, was not followed up with an annual target for 2025.
The government could also devise ways to narrow the gap to the target on paper, through statistical revisions or tweaks to the definition of carbon intensity, as the term has not been defined in China’s NDCs.
Notably, unlike China’s previous NDC, its latest pledge did not include a progress update for carbon intensity. The latest official update sent to the UN only covers the years to 2020.
This leaves some more leeway for revisions, even though China’s domestic “statistical communiques”, published every year, have included official numbers up to 2024.
Coal consumption growth around 2022 was likely over-reported, so statistical revisions could reduce reported emissions and narrow the gap to the target. Including process emissions from cement, which have been falling rapidly in recent years, and changing how emissions from fossil fuels used as raw materials in the chemicals industry are accounted for, so-called non-energy use, which has been growing rapidly, could make the target easier to meet.
2. Will the plan upgrade clean-energy targets or pave the way to exceed them?
The need to accelerate carbon-intensity reductions also has implications for clean-energy targets.
The current goal is for non-fossil fuels to make up 25% of energy supplies in 2030, up from the 21% expected to be reached this year.
This expansion would be sufficient to achieve the reduction in carbon intensity needed in the next five years, but only if energy consumption growth slows down very sharply. Growth would need to slow to around 1% per year, from 4.1% in the past five years 2019-2024 and from 3.7% in the first three quarters of 2025.
The emphasis on manufacturing in the Central Committee’s recommendations for the next five-year plan is hard to reconcile with such a sharp slowdown, even if electrification will help reduce primary energy demand. During the current five-year period, China abolished the system of controlling total energy consumption and energy intensity, removing the incentive for local governments to curtail energy-intensive projects and industries.
Even if the ratio of total energy demand growth to GDP growth returned to pre-Covid levels, implying total energy demand growth of 2.5% per year, then the share of non-fossil energy would need to reach 31% by 2030 to deliver the required reduction in carbon intensity.
However, China recently set the target for non-fossil energy in 2035 at just 30%. This risks cementing a level of ambition that is likely too low to enable the 2030 carbon-intensity target to be met, whereas meeting it would require non-fossil energy to reach 30% by 2030.
There is ample scope for China to beat its targets for non-fossil energy.
However, given that the construction of new nuclear and hydropower plants generally takes five years or more in China, only those that are already underway have the chance to be completed by 2030. This leaves wind and solar as the quick-to-deploy power generation options that can deliver more non-fossil energy during this five-year period.
Reaching a much higher share of non-fossil energy in 2030, in turn, would therefore require much faster growth in solar and wind than currently targeted. Both the NDRC power-sector plan for 2025-27 and China’s new NDC aim for the addition of about 200 gigawatts (GW) per year of solar and wind capacity, much lower than the 360GW achieved in 2024.
If China continued to add capacity at similar rates, going beyond the government’s targets and instead installing 250-350GW of new solar and wind in each of the next five years, then this would be sufficient to meet the 2030 intensity target, assuming energy demand rising by 2.5-3.0% per year.
All previous wind and solar targets have been exceeded by a wide margin, as shown in the figure below, so there is a good chance that the current one will be, too.
While the new pricing policy for wind and solar has created a much more uncertain and less supportive policy environment for the development of clean energy, provinces have substantial power to create a more supportive environment.
For example, they can include clean-energy projects and downstream projects using clean electricity and green hydrogen in their five-year plans, as well as developing their local electricity markets in a direction that enables new solar and wind projects.
3. Will the plan set an absolute cap on coal consumption?
In 2020, Xi pledged that China would “gradually reduce coal consumption” during the 2026-30 period. The commitment is somewhat ambiguous.
It could be interpreted as requiring a reduction starting in 2026, or a reduction below 2025 levels by 2030, which in practice would mean coal consumption peaking around the midway point of the five-year period, in other words 2027-28.
In either case, if Xi’s pledge were to be cemented in the 15th five-year plan then it would need to include an absolute reduction in coal consumption during 2026-30. An illustration of what this might look like is shown in the figure below.
However, the commitment to reduce coal consumption was missing from China’s new NDC for 2035 and from the Central Committee’s recommendations for the next five-year plan.
The Central Committee called for “promoting a peak in coal and oil consumption”, which is a looser goal as it could still allow an increase in consumption during the period, if the growth in the first years towards 2030 exceeds the reduction after the peak.
The difference between “peaking” and “reducing” is even larger because China has not defined what “peaking” means, even though peaking carbon emissions is the central goal of China’s climate policy for this decade.
Peaking could be defined as achieving a certain reduction from peak before the deadline, or having policies in place that constrain emissions or coal use. It could be seen as reaching a plateau or as an absolute reduction.
While the commitment to “gradually reduce” coal consumption has seemed to fade from discussion, there have been several publications discussing the peak years for different fossil fuels, which could pave the way for more specific peaking targets.
State news agency Xinhua published an article – only in English – saying that coal consumption would peak around 2027 and oil consumption around 2026, while also mentioning the pledge to reduce coal consumption.
The energy research arm of the National Development and Reform Council had said earlier that coal and oil consumption would peak halfway through the next five-year period, in other words 2027-28, while the China Coal Association advocated a slightly later target of 2028.
Setting a targeted peak year for coal consumption before the half-way point of the five-year period could be a way to implement the coal reduction commitment.
With the fall in oil use in transportation driven by EVs, railways and other low-carbon transportation, oil consumption is expected to peak soon or to have peaked already.
State-owned oil firm CNPC projects that China’s oil consumption will peak in 2025 at 770m tonnes, while Sinopec thinks that continued demand for petrochemical feedstocks will keep oil consumption growing until 2027 and it will then peak at 790-800m tonnes.
4. Will ‘dual control’ of carbon prevent an emission rebound?
With the focus on realising a peak in emissions before 2030, there could be a strong incentive for provincial governments and industries to increase emissions in the early years of the five-year period to lock in a higher level of baseline emissions.
This approach is known as “storming the peak” (碳冲锋) in Chinese and there have been warnings about it ever since Xi announced the current CO2 peaking target in 2020.
Yet, the emphasis on peaking has only increased, with the recent announcement on promoting peaks in coal consumption and oil consumption, as well as the 2035 emission-reduction target being based on “peak levels”.
The policy answer to this is creating a system to control carbon intensity and total CO2 emissions – known as “dual control of carbon” – building on the earlier system for the “dual control of energy” consumption.
Both the State Council and the Central Committee have set the aim of operationalising the “dual control of carbon” system in the 15th five-year plan period.
However, policy documents speak of building the carbon dual-control system during the five-year period rather than it becoming operational at the start of the period.
For example, an authoritative analysis of the Central Committee’s recommendations by China Daily says that “solid progress” is needed in five areas to actually establish the system, including assessment of carbon targets for local governments as well as carbon management for industries and enterprises.
The government set an annual target for reducing carbon intensity for the first time in 2024, but did not set one for 2025, also signaling that there was no preparedness to begin controlling carbon intensity, let alone total carbon emissions, yet.
If the system is not in place at the start of the five-year period, with firm targets, there could be an opportunity for local governments to push for early increases in emissions – and potentially even an incentive for such emission increases, if they expect strict control later.
Another question is how the “dual” element of controlling both carbon intensity and absolute CO2 emissions is realised. While carbon intensity is meant to be the main focus during the next five years, with the priority shifting to reducing absolute emissions after the peak, having the “dual control” in place requires some kind of absolute cap on CO2 emissions.
The State Council has said that China will begin introducing “absolute emissions caps in some industries for the first time” from 2027 under its national carbon market. It is possible that the control of absolute carbon emissions will only apply to these sectors.
The State Council also said that the market would cover all “major emitting sectors” by 2027, but absolute caps would only apply to sectors where emissions have “stabilised”.
5. Will it limit coal-power and chemical-industry growth?
During the current five-year period, China’s leadership went from pledging to “strictly control” new coal-fired power projects to actively promoting them.
If clean-energy growth continues at the rates achieved in recent years, there will be no more space for coal- and gas-fired power generation to expand, even if new capacity is built. Stable or falling demand for power generation from fossil fuels would mean a sharp decline in the number of hours each plant is able to run, eroding its economic viability.
Showing the scale of the planned expansion, researchers from China Energy Investment Corporation, the second-largest coal-power plant operator in China, project that China’s coal-fired power capacity could expand by 300GW from the end of 2024 to 2030 and then plateau at that level for a decade. The projection relies on continued growth of power generation from coal until 2030 and a very slow decline thereafter.
The completion of the 325GW projects already under construction and permitted at the end of 2024, as well as an additional 42GW permitted in the first three quarters of 2025, could in fact lead to a significantly larger increase, if the retirement of existing capacity remains slow.
In effect, China’s policymakers face a choice between slowing down the clean-energy boom, which has been a major driver of economic growth in recent years, upsetting coal project developers, who expect to operate their coal-fired power plants at a high utilisation, or retiring older coal-power plants en masse.
Their response to these choices may not become clear for some time. The top-level five-year plan that will be published in March 2026 will likely provide general guidelines, but the details of capacity development will be relegated to the sectoral plans for energy.
The other sector where fossil fuel-based capacity is rapidly increasing is the chemical industry, both oil and coal-based. In this sector, capacity growth has led directly to increases in output, making the sector the only major driver of emissions increases after early 2024.
The expansion is bound to continue. There are more than 500 petrochemical projects planned by 2030 in China, of which three quarters are already under construction, according to data provider GlobalData.
As such, the emissions growth in the chemical sector is poised to continue in the next few years, whereas meeting China’s 2030 targets and commitments would require either reining it in and bringing emissions back down before 2030, or achieving emission reductions in other sectors that offset the increases.
The expansion of the coal-to-chemicals industry is largely driven by projects producing gas and liquid fuels from coal, which make up 70% of the capacity under construction and in planning, according to a mapping by Anychem Coalchem.
These projects are a way of reducing reliance on imported oil and gas. In these areas, electrification and clean energy offer another solution that can replace imports.
Conclusions
The five-year plans being prepared now will largely determine the peak year and level of China’s emissions, with a major impact on China’s subsequent emission trajectory and on the global climate effort.
The targets in the plan will also be a key test of the determination of China’s leadership to respect previous commitments, despite setbacks.
The country has cultivated a reputation for reliably implementing its commitments. For example, senior officials have said that China’s policy targets represent a “bottom line”, which the policymakers are “definitely certain” about meeting, while contrasting this with other countries’ loftier approach to target-setting.
Depending on how the key questions outlined in this article are answered in the plans for the next five years, however, there is the possibility of a rebound in emissions.
There are several factors contributing to such a possibility: solar- and wind-power deployment could slow down under the new pricing policy, weak targets and a deluge of new coal- and gas-power capacity coming onto the market.
In addition, unfettered expansion of the chemical industry could drive up emissions. And climate targets that limit emissions only after a peak is reached could create an incentive to increase emissions in the short term, unless counteracted by effective policies.
On the other hand, there is also the possibility of the clean-energy boom continuing so that the sector beats the targets it has been set. Policymakers could also prioritise carbon-intensity reductions early in the period to meet China’s 2030 commitments.
Given the major role that clean-energy industries have played in driving China’s economic growth and meeting GDP targets, local governments have a strong incentive to keep the expansion going, even if the central government plans for a slowdown.
During the current five-year period, provinces and state-owned enterprises have been more ambitious than the central government. Provinces can and already have found ways to support clean-energy development beyond central government targets.
Such an outcome would continue a well-established pattern, given all previous wind and solar targets have been exceeded by a wide margin.
The difference now is that a significant exceedance of clean-energy targets would make a much bigger difference, due to the much larger absolute size of the industry.
To date, China’s approach to peaking emissions and pursuing carbon neutrality has focused on expanding the supply and driving down the cost of clean technology, emphasising economic expansion rather than restrictions on fossil-fuel use and emissions, with curbing overcapacity an afterthought.
This suggests that if China’s 2030 targets are to be met, it is more likely to be through the over-delivery of clean energy than as a result of determined regulatory effort.
The post Q&A: Five key climate questions for China’s next ‘five-year plan’ appeared first on Carbon Brief.
Q&A: Five key climate questions for China’s next ‘five-year plan’
Climate Change
Cropped 22 April 2026: Global food ‘catastrophe’ | BECCS emissions | UK solar farm controversy
We handpick and explain the most important stories at the intersection of climate, land, food and nature over the past fortnight.
This is an online version of Carbon Brief’s fortnightly Cropped email newsletter.
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Key developments
Food ‘catastrophe’
FAO WARNING: On Monday, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) warned that a prolonged closure of the strait of Hormuz could lead to a “global food catastrophe”, reported Al Jazeera. With 20-45% of the world’s key agrifood inputs dependent on the sea passage, the outlet explained, poorer countries would be the “most exposed”, with delays in accessing fertilisers “quickly translating into lower output”. A Financial Times essay detailed how the Gulf region has come to “sit at the centre of modern agriculture” over the past two decades”.
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‘PERFECT STORM’: The FAO also warned countries to “not limit shipments” of energy and fertilisers, warning that such restrictions have led to food price spikes in the past, wrote Bloomberg. The UN body asked countries to “closely ponder” biofuel mandates, given the choice between high oil prices and curtailing global food supplies. In a statement, FAO chief economist Dr Maximo Torero warned of a “perfect storm”, if the world is also affected by a strong El Niño.
COUNTRIES RESPOND: Sri Lanka, already “burdened with old fertiliser debts”, has promised to provide fertiliser subsidies to farmers, reported Sri Lanka’s Sunday Times. In India, “fear of a fertiliser shortage is particularly heightened”, wrote Scroll.in. In Australia – where 60% of urea comes from the Persian Gulf – the war could herald a fertiliser “manufacturing comeback”, reported ABC News. Reuters looked at how China is “clamping down on fertiliser exports to protect its domestic market”.
Study: Wood vs gas burning
BASHING BECCS: A new study found that “bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) is unlikely to generate negative emissions within 150 years”. The paper added that BECCS is likely to “produce higher emissions for decades than using natural gas without carbon capture” and to “increase electricity costs by ~3.5-fold”. The Guardian covered the research, stating that its findings “cast doubt” on government plans to offer subsidies for carbon capture attached to wood-burning power, such as the UK’s Drax power station.
INTERPRET WITH CAUTION: Prof Joana Portugal Pereira, an assistant professor at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, told Carbon Brief that the study is “clearly framed and the modelling approach is transparent”. However, she said the results are “very sensitive to the assumptions made” and advised “caution” in drawing conclusions from the analysis. For example, she noted that the study “focuses on BECCS supplied from existing forests”, which is likely to “emphasise higher emissions outcomes”.
MISLEADING HEADLINE: Dr Isabela Butnar, a lecturer in environmental policy at University College London, praised parts of the methodology and agreed that “forest-based BECCS for electricity is a no-go”. However, she argued that the title of the paper – “Decades of increased emissions from forest-fuelled BECCS” – might be “a bit misleading”. The title should specify that the analysis only applies to BECCS for electricity production, she said.
News and views
- TOO HOT TO FARM: A major new joint report by the FAO and the World Meteorological Organization estimated that extreme heat “currently threatens” the livelihoods of more than 1 billion people, with agricultural workers on the “frontlines…absorbing the greatest impacts”. Farmers in much of south Asia, sub-Saharan Africa and central and South America could find it “simply too hot to work” for up to 250 days a year, the report cautioned.
- PALM READING: Demand for palm oil has “surged as the war in Iran drives countries to build up stockpiles” and “boost” biofuel programmes in response to higher crude oil prices, reported Nikkei Asia. While Malaysian and Indonesian palm oil exports have risen to their “highest level in months”, longer-term supply could be “threatened” by rising fertiliser prices and “high temperatures caused by climate change”, added the outlet.
- RED LIST: Emperor penguins and the Antarctic fur seal “have joined the list of wildlife endangered by global warming”, according to the International Union for Conservation of Nature’s (IUCN) Red List, reported the New York Times. Conversely, “iconic” blue-and-yellow macaws have returned to Rio de Janeiro after a 200-year absence, following an ambitious “refaunation” programme, wrote the Guardian.
- CATTLE CLASS: A new Unearthed investigation found that a major US biofuels producer supplied the UK with “sustainable aviation fuel” derived from “beef fat linked to illegal Amazon deforestation”. Darling Ingredients – the producer’s parent company – denied sourcing tallow from slaughterhouses sourcing cattle from illegal farms in the Amazon. It told the outlet it was “in the process” of requiring suppliers to prove their products were “deforestation-free”.
- FUND OPEN: On 10 April, Ecuador issued its “first call” for grants to protect 1.8m hectares of the Ecuadorian Amazon using the $460m Amazon Biocorridor Fund, reported EFE Verde. The trust fund is linked to what is considered the “largest debt-for-land nature swap”, added the outlet. [For more on debt-for-nature swaps, see Carbon Brief’s 2024 explainer.]
- SUPER EL NIÑO: Scientists expect a strong El Niño event to develop by early autumn, driving up global temperatures, according to Carbon Brief’s latest state of the climate update. The analysis said that if a super El Niño develops this year, it is likely that 2027 will top the charts as the hottest year on record. It added that “the latest climate models give a central estimate of 2.2C warming by September – a scenario which would put the world firmly in ‘super’ El Niño territory”.
Spotlight
Oxford solar farm under fire
This week, Carbon Brief unpacks what the UK’s Botley West solar farm development would mean for farmland and biodiversity in the area.
Planning permission for one of Europe’s largest solar farms has been delayed, after the UK government asked for more time to consider the proposal from the developer.
Oxfordshire’s Botley West solar farm has been under consultation since 2022.
If approved, the site – located 80km north-west of London – will deliver 840m watts (MW) to the UK power grid.
However, the development faces vehement opposition – most notably from the Stop Botley West campaign group, which has said the “vast” solar farm will have “unprecedented” visual impact, drive the loss of “arable farmland” and will “disregard Oxford’s green belt”.
Politicians frequently use solar farms to score points with their supporters, with some MPs describing the developments as hazards for rural communities and food supply.
Farmland loss
Most of the land earmarked for the solar farm belongs to the Blenheim estate – a 12,000-acre expanse surrounding the UNESCO world heritage site of Blenheim Palace.
Dr Jonathan Scurlock – the former chief climate adviser at the National Farmers’ Union, which represents farmers in England and Wales – told Carbon Brief that the estate rents out much of its land to tenant farmers. However, he added, it is “not terribly good quality farmland”.
The UK government has a ranking system for agricultural land that is being considered for large-scale development projects, where five indicates “very poor quality” and one indicates “excellent quality”. Developers are generally encouraged to build on lower-quality land, leaving the high-quality land for farming.
According to the Botley West website, 62% of the land surveyed for the proposed solar farm is agricultural grade 3b – defined as “moderate-quality agricultural land”. The remainder is mostly 3a, defined as “good-quality agricultural land”.
Many opponents of Botley West argue that the farm will take away vital farmland. However, Scurlock said:
“Solar is perceived as very challenging to land use and yet the evidence nationally really doesn’t support that…Solar farms do not really represent lots of agricultural land capacity”.
(A 2025 Carbon Brief factcheck found that golf courses currently take up six times as much land in the UK as solar farms.)
The developers plan for the solar panels to remain on-site for about 40 years, after which the fields will be returned to use for agriculture.
Biodiversity gain
The proposed solar farm has also promised to improve local biodiversity.
New development projects in the UK must deliver a “biodiversity net gain” (BNG) under a 2024 regulation.
Developers must arrange for the “biodiversity value” of the land to be assessed, considering factors including the size, quality, location and type of each habitat. They must then ensure that the final project increases this value by at least 10%.
If the Botley West project is approved, the developers will aim for 70% BNG.
Prof Alona Armstrong, an energy researcher from Lancaster University, told Carbon Brief that around two-thirds of solar farms in the UK are built on “ex-arable lands”.
She explained that biodiversity outcomes on solar farms depend on where the farms are located and how they are designed and managed. Much agricultural land is “intensively managed”, with the use of chemicals and farming machinery. In contrast, there is less chemical and machinery use on solar farms, potentially benefiting biodiversity.
Armstrong added that solar farms are often lined with hedges, which are “really good for biodiversity”, acting as refuges for a wide range of plant and animal species.
The latest BNG statement for Botley West filed with the government featured a “habitat and hedgerows creation and enhancement plan”.
The plan included creating 26.5km of new species-rich hedgerow, enhancing 25km of existing hedgerows and developing a range of grassland types within the solar arrays to be managed for conservation.
Watch, read, listen
EARTH ANGELS: From protecting Nigeria’s rare bats to pushing higher climate targets in South Korea, Mongabay profiled the six women who won this year’s Goldman Prize.
CHERRY (BLOSSOM) PICKING: The Guardian reported on the hunt to find a researcher to continue Japan’s 1,200-year record of cherry-blossom blooming dates.
‘SOYA REPUBLICS’: A Phenomenal World essay argued that global grain traders in South America’s soya supply chains “sowed the seeds of anti-democratic politics”.
ZACH IS BACK: Actor-comedian Zach Galifianakis debuted a new Netflix series, called “This is a gardening show”, meant to be an “oddball celebration of the food we eat”.
New science
- Preventing the loss of intact biomes, ecosystems and species is the “most critical strategy” to achieve the “nature positive” future outlined in the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework | Frontiers in Science
- Climate change will lead to “increased pest damage” in North American forests, as “temperature-boosted pest performance” and “climate-induced stress”, such as drought, make trees more susceptible to pests | Nature Ecology and Evolution
- There are 160m “small wetlands” in “non-forested” parts of the world, which together contribute to 24% of total wetland methane emissions | Nature Climate Change
In the diary
- 22-24 April: Eighth meeting of the board for the loss and damage fund | Livingstone, Zambia
- 24 April: Launch of the 2026 global report on food crises | London
- 24-29 April: First conference on transitioning away from fossil fuels | Santa Marta, Colombia
- 5-7 May: Workshop on invasive alien species for Spanish-speaking countries in Latin America and the Caribbean | Panama City
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A recent US court ruling restricting President Trump’s ability to impose sweeping tariffs has improved the chances of an international deal to cut emissions from shipping, observers of UN maritime talks have said.
Government officials meeting at the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in London this week and next are resuming negotiations on a proposed set of measures known as the Net-Zero Framework (NZF), aimed at tackling the sector’s roughly 3% share of global greenhouse gas emissions.
Last October, Trump and his officials threatened any government voting to adopt provisionally agreed green shipping measures, known as the Net-Zero Framework (NZF), with tariffs that would make it harder for their businesses to export to the USA.
The intervention helped derail talks, with governments narrowly voting to postpone for a year the adoption of the NZF.
The framework, provisionally agreed in April 2025 after years of negotiations, would penalise the owners of particularly polluting ships and use the revenues to fund cleaner fuels, support affected workers and help developing countries manage the transition.
The delay plunged the future of the NZF into doubt. Vanuatu’s climate minister said the delay was “unacceptable” given the urgency of tackling climate change. A final decision on the NZF is not expected until November.
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Tariff threat neutered
Since the last round of negotiations, the political landscape has shifted. In February 2026, the US Supreme Court ruled that Trump had no legal authority to impose sweeping tariffs without approval from Congress.
Rockford Weitz, professor of maritime studies at Tufts University, said that his officials would have “a more challenging time” using tariffs as threats at this month’s shipping talks than they did in October.
University College London professor Tristan Smith, a close observer of IMO talks, agreed that the tariff threat is “not quite as potent as it was last year”. He noted that the US also no longer benefits from the element of surprise. In October, Washington began lobbying governments only shortly before the talks, leaving little time for countries supporting the NZF to coordinate a response.
This time, Smith said supporters of the framework – which include most European countries, Pacific Islands and some African and Latin American states – are “working very closely together” to resist the US’s pressure.
He added that the US’s attempt to promote liquefied natural gas (LNG) as a transition shipping fuel, rather than renewable-electricity-based solutions like ammonia or methanol, by weakening the NZF has been undermined by the spike in the cost of gas triggered by the Iran war.
Attempts to re-negotiate
But divisions remain in the talks scheduled to run until Friday next week. Ahead of this round of negotiations, some governments have proposed re-negotiating the core tenets of the NZF, while others insist it should be adopted in November largely as provisionally agreed in April 2025.
This debate played out last week on a webinar hosted by the African Futures Policies Hub. Liberian diplomat Grace Nuhn said the emissions-reduction requirements included in the NZF are “over-zealous” and “over-ambitious” and do not reflect the limited availability of clean fuels, while penalising “transitional fuels” such as LNG and biofuels.
In a formal submission, Liberia – alongside US ally Argentina and Panama – has proposed weakening emission targets and ditching any funding mechanism for the framework involving “direct revenue collection and disbursement”.
Liberia and Panama host the world’s two biggest ship registries, meaning their governments earn revenue from allowing shipowners from around the world to register vessels in their countries.
The NZF would penalise owners of ships that emit more than certain agreed amounts and use that revenue to clean up the maritime sector, help workers through the green transition and compensate for any negative impacts of the transition on developing economies.
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Japan has also proposed that, in order to reach a compromise with the NZF’s opponents, emissions reduction targets and requirements to pay into the IMO’s Net-Zero Fund are weakened.
Yuki Inoue, a diplomat from Japan’s transport ministry, told the webinar that this would reduce the perception that the NZF is a “carbon tax”. Japan wants to get all governments “back to the discussion table”, he said.
NZF a “fragile compromise”
But Tuvalu’s IMO negotiator Pierre-Jean Bordahandy said that the NZF itself is a “fragile compromise” reached after lengthy discussions and is the “only viable path forward” to meet the sector’s climate targets agreed in 2023.
Tuvalu and six other Pacific nations have vowed to try to make the NZF more ambitious if it is reopened for negotiation. With rising sea levels threatening their survival, “time is not on our side”, Bordahandy told the webinar.
Brazil has also pushed back against attempts to renegotiate. Diplomat Adriana de Medeiros Gabinio warned that it would be unrealistic to expect countries to rewrite a deal in a matter of months after more than two years of negotiations involving over 100 nations culminated in the April 2025 vote in favour of the NZF.
She added that proposed changes to the NZF would not address climate change and food insecurity and “seem aimed at addressing diplomatic pressure imposed by a small group of countries rather than the issue itself”.
Mexico has defended the framework’s funding mechanism. Raul Zepeda Gil, an advisor to the country’s IMO mission, said the net-zero fund is essential to ensure developing countries can access financing for cleaner ships and infrastructure. Without the fund, “then just a few countries will be available to participate in the transition”, he warned
Some countries that previously supported delaying the NZF now appear more aligned with its backers. Kenya was among 16 African nations that voted for postponement last October.
But this month Michael Mbaru, maritime lead for the Kenyan government’s climate envoy office, told journalists that Kenya supports the NZF and hinted that other African and developing countries would follow.
“From the Global South perspective, as you’ve seen from the submissions from Africa, we are moving forward in terms of the framework as is”, he said, adding “we feel like we have compromised enough and we feel like the framework provides the best package.”
“If we are to reopen these discussions, we need to reopen them to strengthen the revenue, not to weaken the revenue”, he said.
Tacit or explicit approval?
Brazil’s Adriana de Medeiros Gabinio warned that even if the NZF is officially adopted in November, its opponents are trying to change the rules by which it comes into force as a “safety net to block” it.
The US and its allies want to shift away from a system of tacit approval where, after the NZF is approved at the IMO talks, its rules are automatically applied unless a certain number of countries object.
They prefer explicit approval instead, meaning it would not come into force unless enough governments – representing a certain percentage of the world’s shipping fleet – actively indicate support for it.
Critics say this change would give a small number of countries with large shipping registries the power to block implementation. Liberia has the world’s biggest shipping registry, which is run by a US-based company, followed by Panama and the Marshall Islands.
The Marshall Islands has long been one of the most vocal supporters of the NZF but, with its officials and its shipping registry income vulnerable to US retaliation, did not sign on to the recent Pacific proposal vowing to strengthen the NZF if it is re-opened.
Commenting on the chances of the NZF being approved, Smith said “there are lots of things which I think generally are much better and stronger than they were last year.”
“I can’t tell you now that that means we’re not going to have a difficult conversation and I can’t put odds on what the outcome is but I think things have improved on the energy transition question,” he said.
The post Prospects for global green shipping deal boosted by US tariff ruling, analysts say appeared first on Climate Home News.
Prospects for global green shipping deal boosted by US tariff ruling, analysts say
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